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7 
1 Introduction 
 “The U.S. Navy is the world’s most lethal, flexible, and capable maritime force. As they have 
throughout our Nation’s history, every day our Sailors operate forward to provide American 
leaders with timely options to deter aggression, assure allies, and respond to crises with a 
minimal footprint ashore.” 
Admiral Jonathan W. Greenert (Chief of Naval Operations), Navy Program Guide 2013, p. iii 
“America is a maritime nation […].” 
Leon E. Panetta (U.S. Secretary of Defense 2011-2013), Navy Program Guide 2013, p. 9 
 
What exactly constitutes a maritime nation, and why is the United States of America one? 
Why is it that the U.S. Navy is such a self-esteemed maritime force?  
Research into U.S. politics and policies cannot ignore the particular role of America’s sea 
services and the application of sea power to attain defined political and military ends. Sea 
power (two words), the exploitation of the opportunities of the sea, is the foundation for 
American hegemony. The study of the nation, U.S. influence abroad, and the underlying 
world view cannot be conducted without a sound appreciation for the maritime roots and the 
seapower (one word) status of the United States.
1
 But, as Robert Jervis (1995: 44) pointed out, 
“Outsiders find navies especially hard to comprehend and while they are likely to enjoy pho-
togenic rides on ships they rarely know what fleets do under everyday situations, let alone 
how they will operate in a crisis.” The true scope of sea power, therefore, often escapes the 
understanding of the individual. However, there are at least two ways in which salt water im-
pacts human evolution. For one, the sea’s natural character – tides, storms, weather etc. – are 
noteworthy. The other, more lasting influence is the way people have used the oceans. Kears-
ley (1992: xii) noted, “For it is through using the maritime arena as a conduit of power and as 
a generator of that power (exploiting the ocean’s resources) that mankind has affected its own 
history.” He also pointed out that states, as the dominating agents in the global system, were 
the ones to exercise such power. If power is understood as attaining influence over events, 
then all states with access to the sea will have some form of maritime power.
2
 It is important 
to acknowledge that maritime power is a relative, not an absolute concept. In fact, it is up to 
                                                          
1
 This semantic issue will be further developed and explained in this study. This study uses “sea power” to speak 
of the functional use of maritime and naval assets, whereas “seapower” describes the institutional quality. The 
German word for both is Seemacht. Many authors use the terminology indiscriminately.  
2
 Even landlocked countries such as Austria, Switzerland, Luxemburg in Europe and many others have proxy 
maritime interests through military, political, or economic ties to world trade and active foreign-policy engage-
ment in the international system.  
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each state in each given situation to assess the maritime power that is required. Thus, mari-
time power is a constantly moving framework (Kearsley 1992: xii). Even the semantic termi-
nology begs differentiation and description, for it has to be clear what is meant by the various 
words and descriptions. As Geoff Till reminds us,  
“Some of [the words analysts work with] are adjectives without nouns (‘maritime’, 
‘nautical’, ‘marine’), others are nouns without adjectives (‘sea’, ‘seapower’). Some-
times there are nouns that have adjectives (‘ocean/oceanic’, ‘navy/naval’) but they 
tend towards greater specificity. […] The ‘power’ part of the word ‘seapower’ itself 
has generated enormous attention in academic analysis of international politics. What 
does power actually mean? […] Power can be either potential, or consequential – or, 
commonly, both! […] It has to be seen both as an input and an output.” (Till 2009: 20-
21, emphasis in original). 
Seeking an answer to the question what these maritime, or more precisely naval in- and out-
puts are in an American context drives the academic and scientific interest of this dissertation. 
The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, as the three inherently maritime and sea-
going branches of the U.S. armed forces play a significant role in buttressing American for-
eign policy goals. They project and protect American power in some of the remotest regions 
of the globe. Clearly, the study of the employment of naval forces to attain foreign policy 
goals is more than just counting gray warship bows in a given region. Instead, it must focus 
on the overarching concepts of a military service and their particular relationship to the politi-
cal and operational context from which they originate, and to the political goals they are 
meant to serve.
3
 After all, “The influence of the sea, through its ability to bestow and convey 
elements of maritime power, should not be ignored” (Kearsley 1992: 187). In the political 
realm, consequently, such measures are often codified in strategies. The very connection of 
ways, means, and ends is a significant subject area worthwhile of deeper consideration. It is 
especially important if one wishes to arrive at an understanding of the broader utility of naval 
forces for U.S. foreign and security policy. 
Whereas the abstract art of strategy - which “seeks synergy and symmetry of objectives, con-
cepts, and resources to increase the probability of policy success and the favorable conse-
quences that follow from that success” (Yarger 2006: 1) - has been a favorite subject of nu-
merous deliberations, many articles and books (particularly with the trending of the term 
“strategy” in virtually every field of the business and service world), it quickly becomes ap-
parent that there are various degrees of appreciation for the matter. More precisely, there are 
differing understandings of the subject altogether. In essence, strategy can mean all kinds of 
                                                          
3
 The assessment of the relative merit of seapower has drawn intense academic interest. For a quantitative study, 
see Brian Crisher/Mark Souva (2012): Power At Sea: A Naval Power Dataset, 1865-2011. 
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things to all kinds of people. Therefore, regarding the political use and application of strategy, 
one must be clear and concise in defining the term under consideration.  
Unsurprisingly, there is a host of factors that inform, restrain, or otherwise influence security 
policy and corresponding strategy. These are, in no particular order, national interests, institu-
tional checks and balances, military service interests, inter- and inner-service rivalries, grand 
strategic ideas, defense budgets, public opinion, domestic political dynamics and majorities, 
past experiences good and bad, strategic thinking proficiency, international events and the 
context of the world system, military and technological developments, enduring ideas about 
the reasons for going to war and how to prevent it, etc. In addition, these issues often interact 
with each other. 
The study of modern naval strategy in general and U.S. Navy strategy in particular has sur-
prisingly attracted relatively few researchers, given the Navy’s fairly prominent but often 
somewhat underestimated role in U.S. foreign and security policy. Conversely, there have 
been very few attempts to discern and explain naval strategy and the analysis of naval force 
employment in the broader perspective of the strategic studies. Some may hold that the U.S. 
Navy is about operations, not about strategy. This is valid, in that lengthy overseas deploy-
ments were established after World War II as a standard practices. It led the institutional 
knowledge to become almost exclusively operational and experiential. Haynes (2013: 7) and 
Jervis (1995: 44) argue that operations, not strategy or the strategic difference the Navy could 
make, thus became the lens by which the service and its officer corps looked at the world. The 
complex demands of naval operations and advanced ship and sensor technology have histori-
cally left little room in the careers of naval officers to contemplate the Navy’s purpose beyond 
operations and the political ends to which their service (and perhaps their life) is required. 
Conversely, modern contemporary naval strategy has attracted relatively little interest with 
political scientists. There have been few attempts – in particular by outsiders – to discern and 
explain naval strategy and the analysis of naval force employment in the broader perspective 
of strategic studies. In addition, it appears that in government circles and the academy, re-
search and teaching of strategic matters is widely underappreciated and often underfunded.
4
  
There are five broad political developments that warrant a study of U.S. Navy strategy in this 
day and age. First, the current fiscal situation in the United States (brought about by the mas-
sive debt collected over more than a decade of costly foreign interventions, the effects of a 
                                                          
4
 This is certainly the case for Germany. For a discussion on the lackluster state of strategic studies in Germany, 
see Krause (2010). 
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global economic crisis, and the stop-gap spending process dubbed sequestration) demands a 
re-assessment of military and security policy objectives. The concurrent role of the joint 
force
5
 in light of on-going modernization and recapitalization measures in the military must 
also be taken into account.  
Second, the end of the combat operations in (and subsequent withdrawal from) Iraq (2011) 
and Afghanistan (2014), as well as the death of al-Qaida leader Osama bin Laden (2011), 
have appeared to ring in a period of transition regarding the commitment of American land 
forces abroad. Such a move has comprehensive consequences for operational priorities and 
political objectives. This is very likely leading away from land-centric forces engaged in ex-
tended counterinsurgency or state-building missions, perhaps toward a greater emphasis of the 
maritime and naval parts of the joint force (Mazarr et al 2013: 15). 
Given the rising importance of the Pacific and Indian Oceans on the strategic tableau of the 
decision-makers in Washington, D.C. (especially in the White House), the third broad devel-
opment, most prominently displayed by the furiously debated rebalancing of strategic focus, 
resources, and forces to the Asia-Pacific region emerges. Undoubtedly, that area is of a most 
genuine maritime nature where naval forces will play a very important role in the overwhelm-
ing number of possible future contingencies. At the same time, the Indo-Pacific region is a 
strategic crossroad, not least for several littoral states that are increasingly procuring and op-
erating capable naval forces themselves.  
Hence, it appears that more and more U.S. military operations will be fundamentally maritime 
in nature. These joint tasks will need to be supported by solid naval capabilities.
6
 For the U.S. 
and its Navy then, this spells a deeper investment into its own force to retain its dominant 
edge. Seth Cropsey, former Undersecretary of the Navy during the Reagan and Bush admin-
istrations, cautioned (2013: 31) that “If dominant U.S. seapower were to vanish, substantially 
diminish, or find a significant challenge from a competitor that seeks to achieve peer status as 
a naval power, the consequences would be profound and impossible to ignore.”  
                                                          
5
 Coined in light of the Goldwater-Nicols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (which will be 
discussed in more detail in the chapter on the 1980s), this term refers to the efficient and economical inter-
service cooperation between the branches of military in all areas of interest, from research and development to 
operational planning, to the actual use of force. Joint strategy interposed another level between single-service 
and national military strategy.  
6
 Cobble, Gaffney and Gorenburg pointed out that the number of (all) U.S. forces’ response to situations was 
steadily on the rise between 1970 and 2003, especially in overseas operations. Even more importantly, only 6 per 
cent of military operations in that timeframe were actual combat operations, thus pointing towards the utility and 
versatility of the military, and the Navy in particular (Cobble et al. 2005: pp 1-11).  
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Fourth, the nature of sea power and the employment of naval force have always been subject 
to changing political and relatively stable geographic positions. The value of established 19
th
 
and 20
th
 century ‘old-school’ seapower theory constantly needs to be assessed. The im-
portance of decisive battles at sea as the central determinant of victory and defeat, for exam-
ple, has decreased steadily. Instead, more complex and comprehensive uses of naval forces 
can be observed. This complexity mandates, in turn, a coherent strategy if one wishes to use 
naval force successfully because “strategy now refers not only to the direct application of mil-
itary force in wartime but also to the use of all aspects of national power during peacetime to 
deter war and win” (Owens 2007: 112).  
Fifth, an effort is currently underway to revise and update key U.S. strategic documents. A 
successor to the 2007 “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” has yet to pub-
lished (as of July 2014, when this dissertation was formally submitted). The steady stream of 
official strategic documents includes, at the latest, the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review 
(QDR), published in March of this year. To frame and understand these documents from a 
strategic, naval point of view, a study of the very recent history of U.S. naval strategy is im-
perative. How a strategy comes about must also be taken into account.  
This study provides a deeper understanding of the crafting of U.S. Navy strategy since the end 
of the Cold War, its framework setting, and its application. To that end, the work bridges the 
gap between the thinking of American naval officers and planners on the one hand and aca-
demic analyses of Navy strategy on the other hand. It also seeks to provide some outlook on 
what the future may hold by identifying trends in the use of naval force for foreign policy 
objectives and into strategy-making in the American policy context. As such, it spans the re-
cent history of internal U.S. Navy thought and external strategic theory. Perhaps with a grain 
of salt, it must be stated that future developments and the resulting policy demands realistical-
ly remain speculative and often sketchy at best. After all,  
“Strategy is such a plaything of technology and geopolitical shifts that one can never 
say with complete confidence that any particular area will always be of low strategic 
salience. The news headlines of the years since 1945 have been peppered with the 
names of unfamiliar places, about which most people know little, but which were sud-
denly and often tragically thrust into importance.” (Booth 1985: 107) 
However, if one accepts the premise of a decline in land-centric and a rise in maritime- or 
naval-centric issues described above, it follows that these developments occur in an increas-
ingly chaotic world. This is most recently demonstrated by the events unfolding around the 
collapse of the Westphalian, state-centric order in some of the Mediterranean and Black Sea 
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littoral states. The events following from them mandate allied cooperation, political and dip-
lomatic huddling, and perhaps even military power projection. As Ronald O’Rourke noted, 
the U.S. military is structured with such force elements as significant naval forces, long-range 
bombers and airlift that enable it to cross vast expanses of ocean and air space and then or-
chestrate sustained military campaigns upon arrival. The U.S. is the only country in the West-
ern hemisphere willing and able to do just that (O’Rourke 2012). It also follows that the need 
for sound understanding and making of strategy will be in higher demand in the future, both 
in the U.S. and in its allied countries. To frame maritime and naval responses, this analysis 
studies the past three decades and explains how the Navy was tasked to make strategic differ-
ences. The dissertation thus contributes to an understanding of the value of naval forces for 
U.S. foreign and security policy, and points out guiding principles and decisive trends of U.S. 
naval power. 
From a German perspective, the United States remains an indispensable security guarantor 
and shaper of international order, bolstered by a strong military and a global presence. The 
Verteidigungspolitische Richtlinien, the current key German defense policy guideline, states 
that the engagement of the United States of America for the security of Europe, most visibly 
and effectively in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), remains of vital interest to 
Germany and its European allies. Thus follows the task and obligation to preserve the unique 
quality of transatlantic relations, to foster the connections and exchanges and, by way of a 
responsible division of labor, to further develop the partnership with the United States 
(Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2011: 8). This fundamental security relationship is un-
inhibited by the current turmoil in transatlantic relations over intelligence collection and spy-
ing.  
1.1 Outline 
This study uses the concept of seapower as a framework to explain the military and political 
application of sea power and naval force for the United States of America. It will address the 
context in which strategy – and in particular U.S. Navy strategy – evolves. This has econom-
ic, military, constabulary, diplomatic, international and national dimensions. The war-fighting 
application of military might is but one optional employment, after all. Cropsey (2013: 34) 
points out that “Wide-ranging seapower is not so much an instrument of force – although that 
it is – as a condition of stable commerce, effective diplomacy, and regional influence.” Using 
the first iteration of “The Maritime Strategy” in 1982 and the publication of “A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower” in 2007 as cornerstones, this study shows how U.S. Navy 
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strategy was developed and framed in the international, domestic, and inner-service contexts. 
It will explain what drove and constrained U.S. Navy strategy. It will look at selected instanc-
es of where American sea power was directed in support of U.S. defense and security policy 
ends – and whether that could be tied to what a given strategy proposed. It will discuss if doc-
uments had lasting influences in the strategic mindset, the force structure, and other areas of 
American sea power. Problems associated with comparing documents of such significant lev-
els of ambition notwithstanding, the study at hand also assesses the documents’ (relative) suc-
cesses and shortcomings within the context of their time. As previously noted, this disserta-
tion aspires to serve as a contribution to the deeper understanding of how U.S. Navy strategy 
evolved over the course of three decades.  
First, to this end, after a review of existing literature and a description of the puzzle, it will 
discuss the theoretical foundations of seapower. Afterwards, this study embeds naval strategy 
in the setting of general U.S. policy. One cannot understand the role of the Navy in national 
policies without understanding that framework setting. In untangling the complex web of a 
bureaucracy, the study will shed a light on who (and what) makes and influences U.S. Navy 
strategy. This is ultimately desirable because there are still few monographs available which 
discuss the framework of seapower and strategy-making in the American context and which 
take a broader perspective. This study is a step toward narrowing that gap.  
Second, the dissertation will explain the development of U.S. Navy strategy over the course 
of some three decades. In the 1980s, marked by the deepening of Cold War tensions just be-
fore the Warsaw Pact quickly and surprisingly crumbled, containing and deterring the Soviet 
Union was the dominant way of thinking. It led to a global, forward, offensive-minded strate-
gy that confronted the Soviet Union, while the Navy as well as U.S. security policy as a whole 
was engaged in a number of limited wars. In the 1990s, the administrations of George H.W. 
Bush and William J. “Bill” Clinton sought to remake and redefine foreign and security policy 
in the post-Cold War era. This not only sent the U.S. Navy scrambling to re-frame its narra-
tive. An increasingly reluctant U.S. security policy met with the enduring hopes of an en-
largement of the international democratic community. In the 2000s, after the turn-of-the-
century terrorist attacks of 9/11, the United States was faced with a growing number of inter-
national commitments intended to address old and new threats. A globalization of goods and 
services was flanked by a globalization (and renewed immediacy) of threats. The Navy, once 
again, had to position itself accordingly and provide options for U.S. leaders. 
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1.2 Research Design and Puzzle  
A look at history reveals that the 1980s versions of “The Maritime Strategy” were the first 
expressive verbis strategic documents for the employment of naval forces since World War II. 
At the same time, the strategy cannot be seen as isolated from the developments of the 1970s 
which substantially contributed to its making. “The Maritime Strategy”, a document that went 
through a number of versions, thus provides a unique starting point without which the devel-
opment of strategies in the 1990s and 2000s cannot be understood. The objective of this sur-
vey is the study of the strategic development of U.S. Navy strategy, and the broader applica-
tion of sea power for U.S. national security interests, rather than of the development of a sin-
gular strategy, which would require a different methodology altogether. 
This dissertation addresses the following issues as reflected by the U.S. Navy’s declaratory 
capstone strategies. Such is the five-fold research puzzle:  
 How can seapower and sea power be analyzed in the American context?  
 Which factors govern the utility of the Navy for U.S. foreign and security policy as a 
whole?  
 What policies, programs, factors, and actors must be considered for each decade to ar-
rive at a sound and highly diagnostic assessment regarding the evolution of documents 
and strategic concepts? 
 How, where, and why was the U.S. Navy used between 1981 and 2011? Do these na-
val operations reflect well the naval missions which strategic documents prescribed?  
 What recurring themes and lessons can be drawn from three decades of Navy strategy 
making and application of U.S. sea power?  
Numerous dimensions of the subject matter – sea power theory and practice, tactics and oper-
ations, history, defense analysis, makers, and shapers – emerge at a closer look. At the end of 
the day, it is difficult to simply quantify the value of sea power for national security. A coher-
ent, limiting research design is thus imperative in order to stay within the acceptable bounda-
ries of a PhD thesis, while still arriving at a satisfying answer to the overarching research 
questions and a more qualified result.  
First, the timeframe is large enough to allow a coherent analysis and pattern-seeking exercise 
for U.S. seapower and sea power. Second, it is within living memory of current theorists and 
practitioners. Source accessibility is favorable while an academic desideratum is still signifi-
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cant.
7
 Third, research has demonstrated that enduring principles and conditions shape Navy 
strategic thinking and consecutive documents. It is thus prudent to consider a longer period of 
time. Fourth, and perhaps most important, the period contains reinvigorated Navy strategic 
statements in light of geopolitical shifts and changes, all with considerable scope and signifi-
cance.
8
 Accordingly, this study goes beyond the isolated discussion of how the Navy devel-
oped and implemented one certain strategy. Instead, this dissertation takes the concept of 
seapower as a setting, explaining who (and what) makes, shapes, and factors in on American 
sea power and, consequently, on its Navy’s strategy. It will also spend time discerning the 
semantics, discussing the place of strategy in the larger framework of the state, and identify-
ing differences and similarities in selected Navy capstone documents. That approach is em-
bedded in a discussion of naval force theory, naval missions, and the particulars of the mari-
time domain.  
Therefore, it is not a simple discourse analysis. Nor is it a re-telling akin to a popular history 
of how a certain strategy came about. Conscious of the historiographic task of political sci-
ence and strategic studies, it relates pragmatically the Navy’s strategies to its strategic culture 
and to the political, strategic and military context at the time of publication. Spanning three 
decades of U.S. Navy strategy and the employment of naval forces for foreign and security 
policy means, it is also an analysis of the larger sea power theme in U.S. security policy, and 
the utility of naval forces as postulated in strategic documents and as underlined in selected 
operations.  
The selection of the documents was guided by three principles:  
(1) A desire to pick high-level documents (including the signatures of the Chief of Naval Op-
erations and/or the Secretary of the Navy as the highest uniformed/civilian leaders of the ser-
vice) that reflect strategies spanning the decade, respectively;  
(2) Provision of some scope and sense where the Navy is coming from, where it found itself 
at certain times, and a postulation of where it was going;  
                                                          
7
 The starting point in 1981 marks the beginning of the presidency of Ronald Reagan. The endpoint 2011 is se-
lected as to allow an inclusion of the trajectory of the Barack Obama presidency. The analysis can thus touch 
upon U.S. (Navy) strategy on the eve of the U.S.-led (Navy/Marine Corps/Air Force) military operations against 
Libya in the context of the developing “Arab Spring”. 2011, in many respects a pivotal year in international 
relations, also saw the killing of Osama Bin-Laden (in May) a decade after 9/11, the death of North Korean dic-
tator Kim Yong-Il, and the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq (both in December) (Bruns 2012b).  
8
 Early in the selected timeframe, the Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) established the national defense posture that 
is in essence still valid today, thus allowing analytical references to current events. 
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(3) And finally, a workable indication of American sea power, as reflected in strategies and 
selected operations, for the timeframe 1981-2011.   
For this, the dissertation rests on three major pillars. First, it unsurprisingly draws on the rele-
vant literature and the available sources and documents. Second, it employs a number of par-
tially standardized interviews with key senior decision-makers involved in making and exe-
cuting Navy strategy between the 1981 and 2011.
9
 Third, the analysis draws substantially 
from the experiences of the author as the 2010/2011 German Marshall Fund of the United 
States/American Political Science Association Congressional Fellow in Washington, D.C. 
Beyond the usual exposure to the political and politicized environment of the capital, the fel-
lowship allowed for authoritative insights into policy-making on Capitol Hill and the Penta-
gon. Serving Representative Todd Young (a Republican Party member from Indiana), a for-
mer naval officer and a member of the United State House Committee on Armed Services in 
the 112
th
 Congress, the author was privileged to gain substantial experiences and insights into 
the ‘engine room’ of U.S. military and defense policy (and contribute in/participate in policy-
making processes himself).
10
  
Supplemental input for the dissertation is drawn from the extensive familiarization with naval 
forces over the course of many years, specifically with the U.S. Navy, but also with the Ger-
man Navy by providing numerous briefings, publications, and participating in relevant con-
ferences and events.
11
 Aspects pertaining to the subject were presented to a larger public at 
academic conferences.
12
  
1.3 Survey of Relevant Literature and State of Subject Matter Research  
Naval force and sea power have led to a considerable amount of studies and monographs. 
Journal essays, policy papers, conference reports, blog posts, and other publications comple-
ment the roster. However, very few of these take a closer look at the evolution of U.S. Navy 
                                                          
9
 These conversations were conducted in Washington, D.C., Arlington, VA, Norfolk, VA and Mons, Belgium, 
and were graciously supported by grants of the U.S. Department of Defense/Department of the Navy (Washing-
ton, D.C.) and the Michael-Freund-Gesellschaft (Kiel). Moreover, in two cases interviews were also facilitated 
via the online communication software Skype. A comprehensive list of interviewees can be found in the bibliog-
raphy.  
10
 For a review of the fellowship, see Sebastian Bruns (2012a). 
11
 The selection by the German Navy Chief of Staff to participate in a naval exercise for civilians (including 
temporary promotion to O-3 equivalent, or Oberleutnant zur See) in October 2010 served as hands-on exposure 
to the inner workings of a naval force. 
12
 “What the United States and the US Navy learned – or perhaps did not learn – from the Falklands War.” Falk-
lands War 30 Years On Conference, National Museum of the Royal Navy, Portsmouth (UK), 19-20 May 2012; 
“Managing Strategic Change, Embracing a New World Order: U.S. Navy Strategy in the 1990s, with Special 
Consideration of the Atlantic Ocean.” McMullen Naval History Symposium at the United States Naval Acade-
my, Annapolis, MD (USA), 19-20 September 2013.  
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strategy and American sea power over a longer period of time. The correlation of strategy-
making, force employment, ship-building, and the political context seems to escape students 
of U.S. defense policy and followers of the strategic studies discipline. 
In fact, the U.S. Navy as a subject for political science research still enjoys a fairly subordi-
nate place among those that seek to understand and explain the course of American defense 
policy. It is often overshadowed by studies that focus on the presidential or congressional lev-
els of driving the country’s policies. Hundreds of essays and think tank papers constitute a 
canon of often heated debate, but there is a marked lack of monographs and studies written 
about the role of naval power in U.S. policy. This is remarkable given the availability of orig-
inal documents – the U.S. strategies themselves – is broader than one would initially expect.  
However, there is a lack of literature on the relationship among seapower/sea power, strategy, 
and politics. Many of the books that are available are military history works, many of which 
concentrate on selected issues in great detail. While some recount a history of a conflict or an 
individual admiral, others unfold detailed blueprints of weaponry and shipbuilding. Still oth-
ers may offer thoughts and insights into the strategic value of naval force, and the costs and 
benefits that come with it, but remain abstract. Specifically for the U.S. Navy, one of the larg-
est and most capable naval forces worldwide and part of the foreign policy and defense 
toolbox of the world’s preeminent power, this is unsatisfactory.  
It appears that this remarkable research gap has its roots in ‘sea blindness,’ or the inability in 
large parts of a population to appreciate the value and use of naval forces. Consequently, few 
resources are devoted to the research and study of a field that demands a better understanding. 
One need not call upon today’s standard claim that 90% of world trade travels by sea, 80% of 
the world’s population lives at or within a reaching distance to the sea, and 70% of the globe 
is covered with water. It is the influence that navies – especially the U.S. Navy – have at-
tempted to provide to political decision-makers throughout history that warrants a naval fo-
cus.  
‘Sea blindness’ and methodological challenges of analyzing naval force efficiency and effec-
tiveness had discouraging effects on the study of the U.S. Navy.
13
 That is certainly the case 
                                                          
13
 The question of how to best analyze a naval force or, more broadly, sea power, is subject to debate. While 
operational analysis, quantitative and qualitative approaches, systems analysis and historical study all have their 
merits, methods to determine the relative strategic effectiveness of sea power and the successes and shortcom-
ings of navies are hard to come by. As a consequence, much interest has been raised by the metric of counting 
ships and other assets in an effort to bolster an argument with facts. Such qualitative schools of thought can have 
very real political ramifications as they can easily mislead by taking numbers (such as fleet inventory) as the sole 
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for Germany, one of the United States’ most important NATO allies, in the Cold War a coun-
try sorely dependent on safe and reliable sea lines of communication (SLOC) in the event of 
conflict. Nowadays a nation that engages on the Seven Seas and heralds upholding maritime 
security as an important policy goal, the small community of strategists and historians has 
largely navigated around tackling the multifaceted area of the study of naval force in general 
and the U.S. Navy in particular. Therefore, it is disappointing but hardly surprising that, for 
example, Eckardt Opitz’s edition Seestrategische Konzepte vom kaiserlichen 
Weltmachtstreben zu Out-of-Area-Einsätzen der Deutschen Marine (2004) contains six essays 
on naval strategic thinking in selected foreign navies, but a chapter on the U.S. Navy is nota-
bly absent.  
More dramatically, the long-term analysis of U.S. Navy strategy also has not been a favorite 
subject among people in the Anglo-American academy, save for a handful of scholars. The 
reasons for this can only be speculative at best. A degree of ‘sea blindness’ coupled with a 
reluctance of outside researchers to embark upon the somewhat sealed issues of the military 
(and in particular a service that is out at sea and thus often out of sight) certainly cannot be 
ruled out. The complexities of foreign and security policy may also discourage some from 
tackling such a subject. The vast array of institutions involved, policy subjects to consider, 
and defense/military fields to cover render it difficult to keep track of dynamics.  
Given such assumptions, it is hardly surprising that the first structured analysis of U.S. Navy 
strategy development was not developed in the U.S. until recently. Peter Swartz, Center for 
Naval Analyses (CNA), circulated the first iterations of a voluminous slideshow on U.S. Navy 
capstone strategies and concepts from 2005. In preparation for what would become “A Coop-
erative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower”, the Navy tasked the CNA with an overview 
study of heritage capstone documents. There simply had not been a concerted analysis of pre-
vious U.S. Navy strategies over the long haul. The study, to which this author was fortunate to 
provide some minor input, went through several iterations between 2005 and 2011.
14
 The un-
classified brief eventually morphed into a multivolume slideshow backgrounder – still not a 
monograph – that was made available to the public via the CNA’s website. These briefings 
motivated and influenced the dissertation at hand, including framing of its research question 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
determinants of effective sea power. A future collection of the range of methodologies for the particular field of 
measuring navies’ effects, perhaps in form of a handbook, is therefore highly desirable (for sample discussions, 
see Vego 2011, Hooper 2013, and Holmes 2014).  
14
 The author provided comments from a German perspective on earlier iterations of the draft study. His input is 
acknowledged in the final product (Swartz 2011b: 107, slide 213). This dissertation is mentioned as a work-in-
progress on the base of the final CNA product (ibid: 8, slide 16). 
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(although Swartz also is a ‘crown witness’ because of his leading role in the drafting of the 
earlier versions of “The Maritime Strategy” while still on active Navy duty).  
Broadly speaking, there are at least seven categories of relevant academic books and scientific 
articles from the field of social sciences that are relevant to this work.
15
 Although some of 
them predate or go beyond the timeframe of interest, and in some cases, even beyond the par-
ticular concentration on the U.S. Navy itself, they have been of value to familiarize with the 
issues at hand and given some of the enduring trends and certain universal principles of sea 
power/seapower.
 
The selection of works as well as their categorization is obviously subjec-
tive.
16
 The following section would turn into a full-fledged annotated bibliography, if one 
would also include analyses of the overarching national security and defense guiding docu-
ments (insofar as they are unclassified and related to the research interest of this disserta-
tion).
17
 The seemingly endless stream of policy papers, think tank publications, and source 
material from inside and sometimes outside the Beltway
18
 and (since the mid-2000s) authori-
tative military blogs is complemented by the academic journals and magazines from the Unit-
ed States and abroad, which also cover aspects of interest to this dissertation.
19
 Therefore, the 
                                                          
15
 For bibliographies on the broader interplay of politics, defense and strategy in the American context, see, e.g., 
Stephen Chun (2006), Greta Marlatt (2007), and U.S. Army War College Library (ed.) (2007, 2011). 
16
 Due to a “revenge of geography”, as Robert Kaplan would perhaps so gallantly put it, this dissertation princi-
pally rests on English- and German-language sources, both due to the complexity of the subject and for the sim-
ple derivation of the transatlantic area of interest and this author’s background. As such, it is also a “revenge of 
culture” in that there is no use of – potentially available, but impossible to comprehend – i.e. Japanese, Russian 
or Chinese original material.  
17
 Examples include the National Security Strategy of the United States (NSS), the National Military Strategy, 
the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the National Strategy for Maritime Security, and the National Defense 
Strategy. Further intelligence can be gathered from secondary documents and open-source publications such as 
the annual Navy Program Guide, and semi-official statements of purpose such as Congressional testimony, 
speeches, or publications by the independent, but pro-service Navy League of the United States organization. 
18
 The highway which circumcises the capital of the United States has become synonymous with all things polit-
ical in America. Among the most naval-force minded public institutions in the larger Washington, D.C. area are 
the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA), Alexandria, Virginia; the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS), Washington, D.C.; the Atlantic Council of the United States (ACUS), Washington, D.C.; the Brookings 
Institution, Washington, D.C.; the Heritage Foundation, Washington, D.C.; the American Enterprise Institute 
(AEI), Washington, D.C; the Naval History and Heritage Command (NHHC), Washington, D.C. On Capitol 
Hill, the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Congres-
sional Research Service (CRS), as independent research organizations, substantially support many policy deci-
sions by the Congressional committees in charge of naval and maritime affairs. The Council on Foreign Rela-
tions (CFR), New York City, New York, and the U.S. Naval War College (USNWC) in Newport, Rhode Island 
reside outside the Beltway. The online think tank Stratfor can be considered an example of a virtual security and 
military think tank, with a special focus on strategic issues. Beyond the German-American realm, one needs to 
consider the work of the Corbett Centre for Maritime Policy Studies, King's College (London), the International 
Institute for Strategic Studies (London) - most notably for their regular publications on “The Military Balance”, 
and various other think tanks, university research institutes, and public analyses institutions. The list is not ex-
haustive, and it must be cautioned that some of these analyses are ‘politicized’ rather than academically-
motivated. 
19
 Among the most professional naval-force minded military blogs with discussions of U.S. Navy strategy etc. 
are InformationDissemination.com , the U.S. Naval Institute’s blog, Steeljawscribe, and James Holmes’ The 
Naval Diplomat. Among the journals and professional magazines consulted in the course of this study were U.S. 
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following literature review can merely serve as a starting point. The existing literature can be 
grouped into works on naval strategy theory, highly-encyclopedic naval platforms and weap-
ons books, literature on naval strategic culture, areas of operations, naval wars and conflicts, 
biographies of senior leaders, and actual U.S. Navy strategy analysis (of concepts, documents, 
and development).  
Inevitably, the seminal theoretical works by Alfred Thayer Mahan and Julian Corbett must be 
included in any consideration of the subject of Navy and naval strategy.
20
 Naval force strate-
gic theory from the era of the World Wars is useful for context of this work, as is the substan-
tial mid-Cold War literature on the issue.
21
 An indispensable resource on the relationship be-
tween naval forces and foreign policy, even 35 years after publication, remains Ken Booth’s 
Navies and Foreign Policy (1979), in which the author highlights the specific uses of naval 
forces to attain foreign policy ends. Paul Ryan, in First Line of Defense – The U.S. Navy Since 
1945 (1981), provided an important analytical stepping stone for the relationship between the 
state and the sea service from an American perspective. In 1974, Dieter Mahncke and Hans-
Peter Schwarz edited a comprehensive book on Seemacht und Aussenpolitik for the relation-
ship between sea power and foreign policy from a German perspective.
22
 
With the advent of “The Maritime Strategy” and due to a growing concern over the Cold War, 
the 1980s witnessed a more intensive debate over the role of naval forces and their applica-
tion. For example, Colin Gray submitted his analysis in Maritime Strategy, Geopolitics, and 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Naval Institute Proceedings (US), Naval War College Review (US), Seapower Magazine (US), Marineforum 
(GER), Leinen Los! (GER), Warship –International Fleet Review (UK), and Jane’s (UK/US) publications. 
20
 The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (1890/1892) – the German translation of which, Der Einfluß der 
Seemacht auf die Geschichte 1660-1812 (1967), edited by Gustav-Adolf Wolter, was used primarily in prepara-
tion for this dissertation – and Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (1911) are the starting point for anyone who 
aspires to understand the relevant theoretical roles, missions and functions of naval forces in a political and stra-
tegic context. However, as has been remarked, “If theory won battles, theory would be a state secret” (Hughes 
2000: 244). 
21
 See Bernard Brodie (1941, 1943), L.W. Martin (1967), and Liddell Hart (1967). More contemporary, Sergej 
Gorshkov’s The Sea Power of the State (1976) was a much-read book in which the Admiral of the Fleet of the 
Soviet Union and Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy detailed Moscow’s strategic understanding and aspi-
rations of using the sea for military purpose. For an exemplary Western view of the Soviet Navy, one and a half 
decades on, see Geoffrey Till/Bryan Ranft (1989). 
22
 The contributions sketch the significance of naval forces in the strategic thinking after World War II and the 
Cold War roles and missions, and the elements of sea power and maritime force. Other essays discuss legal prob-
lems and economic expenditures as well as rising technological trends. The nexus of naval forces and air forces 
is also under review. A third section of the book deals with selected fleets and relevant operating areas, while the 
final chapter looks at sea power as a foreign policy tool. Naturally, at the time of publication, the strategic setting 
decisively influenced the approach that this book took. It is NATO-centric and thus also covers some aspects of 
the U.S. Navy, especially regarding the conflict with the Soviet Union. What makes it noteworthy are the theo-
retical discussion of the role of naval forces for foreign policy objectives – and the fact that it would remain the 
only German-language book of its scope for more than three decades. 
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the Defense of the West (1986).
23
 Eric Grove’s The Future of Sea Power (1990) was the first 
sea power book to be published after the fall of the Berlin Wall and amidst the thawing super-
power conflict. The British naval historian eloquently weaved considerations of sea power in 
the modern world with thoughts on maritime strategy, the use of the sea as an economic and 
military medium, and the evolving technological, political, and legal environments to enter-
tain a good, forward-looking sea power concept. Its complementary piece, Colin Gray’s The 
Navy in the Post-Cold War World: The Uses and Value of Strategic Sea Power (1994), was 
the first to present a comprehensive post-Cold War strategic usage of sea power and naval 
forces in book form.
24
 His deliberations on the utility of maritime power not versus land (and 
air) power, but complementary to it, remain very convincing.
25
  
A superb resource continues to be Globalization and Maritime Power (2002a), edited by Sam 
Tangredi. The essays contained within touch on a vast number of subjects of the 21
st
 century 
with maritime dimensions such as the emerging security environment (Thachuk/Tangredi 
2002, Bowdish 2002), the nexus of economic issues and maritime strategy (Looney 2002, 
Coulter 2002), legal problems (Moran 2002, Kugler 2002), naval operations (Holland 2002, 
Friedman/O’Brasky/Tangredi 2002, Mattonen 2002), and force structure (Binnendijk/Stewart 
2002, Gaffney 2002). This survey of politics, economics, strategy and naval operations in an 
age of globalization has lost little of its instructiveness even if the economic and political in-
tegration of the globe has accelerated dramatically. A good theoretical discussion of strategy 
in the present-day context can be found in Strategy in the Contemporary World (4
th
 edition, 
2013), edited by John Baylis, James Wirtz, and Colin Gray (this study largely draws on the 3
rd
 
edition, which was published in 2010). John Mearsheimer’s concept of offshore balancing, as 
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 An illustrative example from the German perspective for the time is Der Einsatz von Seestreitkräften im 
Dienst der Auswärtigen Politik (1983). It contains the presentations from the venerable Historisch-Taktische 
Tagung der Flotte 1981, and is useful for two chapters on the interdependency of naval forces and foreign policy, 
by Lennart Souchon and Wilfried Hofmann, respectively. One of the last enduring works on naval strategy in 
German is from 1999, namely the collection of essays entitled Seemacht und Seestrategie im 19. und 20. 
Jahrhundert (edited by Jörg Duppler and the Military History Research Institute). For this study, Duppler’s own 
contribution Seemacht, Seestrategie, Seeherrschaft on the theory of seapower and maritime might, and Geoffrey 
Till’s Die Ursprünge des maritimen Verhaltens der Großmächte: Die Zeit des Kalten Kriegs und die Jahre 
danach on the interplay of naval forces and their operational and political environment in light of short-term and 
long-term factors governing naval strategy decision-making and force employment were instructive.  
24
 Two years prior to that, Gray published The Leverage of Sea Power: The Strategic Advantage of Navies in 
War (1992), a much more historically minted overview of the use of naval forces in armed conflicts, from the 
age of galley warfare to the nuclear age. 
25
 Very helpful contemporary handbooks on the practical application of strategic theory are John Collins’ highly 
recommendable books Military Geography for Professionals and the Public (1998) and Military Strategy. Prin-
ciples, Practices, and Historical Perspectives (2002). Whereas the former one discusses geographic features of 
the global terrain and sheds some light on the political and military ramifications – certainly important in the 
formulation process and subsequent application of strategy – the latter gives a very good overview of the frame-
work of military strategy in a state and the relevant fundamentals.  
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outlined in his 2001 book The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (along with the essays by 
Samuel Huntington [1954] and Barry Posen [2003])
26
 constitute the basis of contemporary 
maritime theory (Scholik 2013: 142). To date, the indispensable resource on seapower is 
Geoffrey Till’s remarkable Seapower – A Guide for the 21st Century (now in its 3rd edition, 
2013). Till’s extremely captivating and insightful book, developed from previous works of a 
similar thrust, is the standard work on the application of sea power in the course of modern 
history and contemporary maritime strategy. Very recent additions to the literature include 
Christian Le Miére’s Maritime Diplomacy in the 21st Century; Twenty-First Century 
Seapower. Cooperation and Conflict at Sea, edited by Peter Dutton, Robert Ross, and Øystein 
Tunsjø; and Ian Speller’s Understanding Naval Warfare (all 2014). In 2015, a handbook of 
naval strategy and security for the 21
st
 century will be published by Joachim Krause and the 
author of this study.  
Nevertheless, it appears that the technological scope of naval platforms and weaponry has 
fascinated far more authors. For a very substantial discussion of modern warships, their tasks 
and technological developments in platforms, weaponry, propulsion, sensors and tactics, and 
survivability, as of the early 1980s, Norman Friedman’s Warships remains one of the better 
sources.
27
 It is quite striking that one of the most detailed and comprehensive reviews of 
American warships and systems comes from the late German U.S. Navy specialist Stefan 
Terzibaschitsch.
28
 A more contemporary and up-to-date version is Paul Silverstone’s The Na-
vy of the Nuclear Age 1947-2007 (2009). As opposed to many of his counterparts, Silverstone 
does not attempt to keep the ship register up to minute detail. That is often an effort quickly 
doomed to fail given the rapid changes in the inventory of the U.S. Navy. Procurement and 
decommissioning of individual units and whole classes render such a ship-counting exercise 
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 Barry Posen’s Article Command of the Commons is a groundbreaking analysis (2003) on the military founda-
tions of U.S. hegemony. Samuel Huntington’s 1954 landmark article National Policy and the Trans-Oceanic 
Navy, published in the U.S. Naval Institute’s Proceedings. Huntington, who would much later coin the idea of a 
“clash of civilizations”, described the key elements defining an armed branch of the military. According to Hun-
tington, “a military service may be viewed as consisting of [1] a strategic concept which defines the role of the 
service in national policy, [2] public support which furnishes it with the resources to perform this role, and [3] 
organizational structure which groups the resources so as to implement most effectively the strategic concept” 
(Huntington 1954; emphasis added). These three aspects ring true until today and also inform the approach that 
this dissertation is taking. 
27
 The German translation, Seerüstung heute. Entwurf und Konzeption moderner Kriegsschiffe published in 1981 
was used for the purpose of this dissertation. 
28
 With their impressive attention to detail, his works, although outdated by now, are a valuable starting point for 
anyone wishing to involve themselves in the matters of the U.S. Navy. His books Seemacht USA. Rüstung, Or-
ganisation, Dislozierung, Entwicklung (2 volumes, 1981/1997), Kampfsysteme der U.S. Navy. Waffen und Elekt-
ronik auf amerikanischen Kriegsschiffen (2001) and Die Schiffe der U.S. Navy (2002) provide unique coverage 
of U.S. Navy platforms, systems and organizational structures. Regrettably, they shy away from any discussions 
of the strategic or larger political dimension of the Navy’s role for the United States. 
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out-of-date within a couple of years. Silverstone therefore takes five decades as a whole when 
providing his comprehensive data on warship life cycles.
29
 Seapower by John Gresham and 
Ian Westwell (2008) is another richly-illustrated reference book that weds details on platforms 
with high-resolution photographs. For naval weapons systems, see Norman Friedman’s The 
Naval Institute Guide to World Naval Weapon Systems (5
th
 ed., 2006). The one-stop resource 
for data on all of the inventory of the U.S. Navy remain the voluminous The Naval Institute 
Guide to the Ships and Aircraft of the U.S. Fleet by Norman Polmar, now in its 19
th
 edition 
(2013), and Eric Wertheim’s The Naval Institute Guide to Combat Ships of the World, 16th 
edition (2013).
30
  
Although only of peripheral concern to this dissertation, tactical and operational issues de-
serve mentioning because they are instrumental for an understanding of the relationship be-
tween the different levels of warfare at sea; the symbiotic association with the constraints and 
opportunities of policy; and, the latter’s implications for naval strategy and operations.31 An 
instructive book on the particulars of the strategic culture of a Navy and the ramifications for 
thinking about the employment and strategic role of a naval force is Roger Barnett’s Navy 
                                                          
29
 The indispensable source for the current state of naval forces is Jane’s Fighting Ships. It analyses current 
trends and developments in the international navies, and review fleet strengths and technological innovation. The 
IISS Military Balance, drawing from comprehensive sources, outlines snap-shots of the numerical strengths of 
the U.S. Navy and practically all other naval forces worldwide. The website of the U.S. Navy is a secondary 
source, along with the listings of the Navy History and Historical Command. 
30
 A separate sub-category within this field contains works on specific platforms, most prominently the aircraft 
carrier, of which the U.S. Navy operates the most units worldwide. It appears that the focus on the aircraft carrier 
in many publications reflects the rise of this type of warship to be the largest and most visible combatant plat-
form, relieving the battleship and its associated representation in the academic literature. Examples of these less 
academically inspired, but often very insightful works include Stefan Terzibaschitsch’s comprehensive 
Flugzeugträger der U.S. Navy/Flottenflugzeugträger und Geleitflugzeugträger (1999), famed novelist Tom 
Clancy’s descriptive work Carrier: A Guided Tour of An Aircraft Carrier (1999), David Jordan’s 
Flugzeugträger. Von den Anfängen bis heute (2002), and Björn Trotzki’s Carrier Power (2013). The aircraft 
carrier has certainly also been subject to more detailed academic studies which also make note of the political 
value of such a platform; examples include Jacquelyn Davis’ Aircraft Carriers and the Role of Naval Power in 
the Twenty-First Century (1993) and, as a recent example from the University of Kiel, Tore Wethling’s Die 
Transformation der Rolle von Flugzeugträgern in der U.S. Navy (2012). Often, the detailed discussion of the 
aircraft of the U.S. Navy inventory has also been subject of these works. It should be noted that other platforms 
of the U.S. Navy – such as cruisers or submarines – have led to books on these kinds of warships as well. Exam-
ples include Submarines of the US Navy (1991), Die letzten Giganten der Meere. Die Schlachtschiffe der IOWA-
Klasse (1996), Zerstörer der U.S. Navy. Von der Farragut- bis zur Forrest Sherman-Klasse (1998b) and Kreuzer 
der U.S. Navy. Von der OMAHA-Klasse bis zur LONG BEACH (1998a) by Stefan Terzibaschitsch, and William 
Donko’s book on the nuclear-powered cruisers, Die Atomkreuzer der U.S. Navy (2002). A more contemporary 
example, is a forthcoming Naval War College book on the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS). 
31
 Representative works include Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat (2
nd
 edition, 2000) by Waynes Hughes and 
Command At Sea (5
th
 edition, 1998) by William Mack and James Stavridis. The former sheds some light on the 
relationship of tactics and missions to strategy: after all, tactics are what young sailors are taught (Hughes 2000: 
xvii), and in contrast to dramatic changes in policy and strategy, tactics did not change as much over history 
(Hughes 2000: 3). Milan Vego sought to further the understanding of the fundamentals of naval warfare in his 
2009 book Operational Warfare at Sea: Theory and Practice. For a general introduction on characteristics and 
types of naval operations, decision making and planning as well as operational design, ideas and their subsequent 
execution, see Milan Vego’s Major Naval Operations (2008). 
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Strategic Culture. Why the Navy thinks differently (2009).
32
 For helpful views from the 
ground see Robert Kaplan’s books Imperial Grunts: On the Ground with the American Mili-
tary, from Mongolia to the Philippines to Iraq and Beyond (2006) and Hog Pilots, Blue Water 
Grunts: The American Military in the Air, at Sea, and on the Ground (2008), some chapters 
of which follow U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps operations.  
An attempt to discern the strategic relevance of naval forces in a particular region would high-
light the need to look at certain areas of operations, conflicts and wars,
33
 or perhaps opera-
tional or political challenge,
34
 the use of a certain task group/force (or any larger accumulation 
of warships), or even down to an individual ship or unit. Unfortunately, many of these lack a 
broader discussion connecting American strategic interests and U.S. Navy strategy in a given 
theater of operations. One book that focuses the perspective on the implications of naval strat-
egy on operations in shallow or confined seas is Milan Vego’s Naval Strategy and Operations 
in Narrow Seas, currently in its 2
nd
 edition (2003). Naturally, the concurrent areas of interest 
for the U.S. Navy – the Pacific, the Persian Gulf – draw a significant amount of academic 
attention.
35
 In the fall of 2014, a forthcoming book by Heinz Dieter Jopp on Maritime 
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 The otherwise instructive book, which also details the Maritime Strategy of 1986, unfortunately closes on a 
reactionary note when the author denies the integration of women and homosexuals in the Navy, partially on 
biological grounds. Therefore, Barnett’s article sans that twist, Strategic Culture and Its Relationship to Naval 
Strategy, published in the Naval War College Review in 2007, is also to be recommended.  
33
 For the German perspective, Wolfram Höpker surveyed the South Atlantic as an area of operations in light of 
U.S. interests and the aftermath of the Falklands War 1982, in Südatlantik. Machtvakuum der Weltpolitik (1983). 
Soon thereafter, for the German market, this was complemented by a collection of essays on another area of 
naval operations: Nordeuropa. Ausfalltor der Sowjetunion zu den Weltmeeren (1985), and the proceedings of a 
conference on Seemacht Sowjetunion (1986), the major antagonist of the U.S. Navy and its allies at the time. 
These works would remain to be the among the last German-language books on contemporary naval operations 
for quite some time, perhaps until Nikolaus Scholik’s 2011 doctoral thesis on the geostrategic and geopolitical 
relevance of maritime choke points, Zur geopolitisch-geostrategischen Bedeutung von Seewegen: Die Strassen 
von Hormuz, Malakka und die Nordwestpassage. A broader cultural and historical look at the Indian Ocean as an 
area of interest for the United States is Robert Kaplan’s Monsoon. The Indian Ocean and the Future of American 
Power (2010) 
34
 The widely-perceived rise of the asymmetric threats in recent years – piracy, maritime terrorism, etc. – has led 
to some publications on these subjects (examples include Martin Murphy’s instrumental book on maritime 
threats, Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World [2008] or 
Daniel Sekulich’s more popular Terror of the Seas. True Tales of Modern Day Pirates [2009]. Stefan Eklof’s 
Pirates in Paradise: A Modern History of Southeast Asia's Maritime Marauders is a good introduction to mari-
time organized crime from the 1970s to the 1990s). Unfortunately, they also lack any discussion on how these 
phenomena are related to U.S. Navy strategy, and what naval forces specifically can do to counter such threats.  
35
 Recent examples from the period of interest of this dissertation include, for the Pacific, Red Star over the Pa-
cific – China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (2010) by Toshi Yoshihara and James Holmes, 
The Great Wall at Sea – China’s Navy in the 21st Century (2nd ed., 2012) by Bernard Cole, and Naval Moderni-
zation in South East Asia – Nature, Causes, and Consequences (2013) edited by Geoff Till and Jane Chan. For a 
German perspective on the China Navy, see Seidler (2013). For the Persian Gulf/Central Asia, see for instance 
Lee Atarain’s Tanker War – America’s First Conflict with Iran, 1987-1988 (2008), Shield and Sword – The 
United States Navy and the Persian Gulf War (2012) by Edward Marolda and Robert Schneller, and Nathan 
Lowry’s From the Sea – U.S. Marines in Afghanistan 2001-2002, U.S. Marines in the Global War on Terrorism 
(2011).  
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Sicherheit im 21. Jahrhundert (another much-desired addition to the German-language litera-
ture on strategic maritime studies) will shed some light on worldwide case studies again.
36
  
Perhaps the best starting point for a comprehensive overview of the use of naval forces (U.S. 
Navy and U.S. Marine Corps) in the realm of crisis response in the Cold War era is Adam 
Siegel’s 1991 study on the subject, The Use of Naval Forces in the Post-War Era. U.S. Navy 
and U.S. Marine Corps Crisis Response Activity, 1946-1990. Particular to our timeframe of 
interest, and more relevant, is Eugene Cobble’s, Hank Gaffney’s and Dimitri Gorenburg’s 
For the Records: All U.S. Forces Responses to Situations, 1970-2000 (with additions cover-
ing 2000-2003), a study from the year 2005.
37
 The particulars of an expeditionary-minded 
military that includes forward-stationed warships have, to date, warranted two official histo-
ries on the 5
th
 Fleet (Robert Schneller’s Anchor of Resolve. A History of U.S. Naval Force 
Central Command/Fifth Fleet, 2007) and 7
th
 Fleet (Ed Marolda’s Ready Seapower. A History 
of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, 2012). A third volume on the 6
th
 Fleet – also by Bob Schneller – is a 
work in progress and is slated to be published soon.  
The highest decision-making level of government is a traditional focus area of analysis for 
many policy researchers. Consequently, biographies, autobiographies and other studies about 
American presidents and their tenures abound. These can be helpful to support the argument 
that Navy strategy does not happen in a vacuum. Instead, it is shaped and often fundamentally 
driven by a president’s explicit and implicit policies.38 Additionally, many other leaders have 
published memoirs, which, as all such recollections, should be taken with professional dis-
tance by the analyst.
39
 Many historians’ reservations towards writing comprehensive recent 
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 This author’s contribution Der Atlantik: Vom strategischen Schachbrett des Kalten Krieges zur Prototyp-
Region für postmoderne maritime Sicherheit will be found within.  
37
 For a German perspective on the state and strategy of the U.S. Navy, see Bruns (2013a).  
38
 The presidents Ronald Reagan, George Bush Sr., Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama have been 
subject to numerous biographies. They have also written down their own experiences, published their papers, or 
provided other memoirs after they left office. It was especially the presidency that, in the post-Cold War world, 
has attracted through literary interest. Many autobiographies are self-serving and omit details while over-stating 
others. This is not to say that biographies by third persons would not sometimes suffer from similar biases, alt-
hough they provide valuable insight into processes. Note the interviews-based works of Bob Woodward on the 
decision-making processes of the George W. Bush administration regarding the use of force in Afghanistan and 
Iraq: Bush at War (2002), Plan of Attack (2004), and The War Within (2008). Woodward, a prolific author, has 
also written on the Obama administration in Obama’s Wars (2010).  
39
 Admiral Elmo Zumwalt’s On Watch (1976) was the last memoir a Chief of Naval Operations penned to date (a 
more recent biography is Larry Berman ([2012]), Zumwalt: The Life and Times of Admiral Elmo Russell “Bud” 
Zumwalt, Jr.). James Holloway’s Aircraft Carriers at War (2007) contains some autobiographical aspects on his 
time as CNO. Hyman G. Rickover, one of the most opalescent admirals of the Navy, was subject to at least one 
full-length biography by Norman Polmar and Thomas B. Allen, Rickover. Controversy and Genius (1981). The 
only recent Secretary of the Navy to write a memoir is John Lehman (2001). Secretaries of Defense to reflect on 
their tenures (from the time of interest to this study) with full autobiographies/memoirs include Casper Wein-
berger, Fighting for Peace, Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (1990), Dick Cheney, In My Time (2011), Don-
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histories stem from the lack of accessible and diverse sources. Understandably so, because 
much of the material that they are interested might still be held in a classified status and/or the 
individuals involved are still in around. That has not discouraged some authors from compil-
ing histories that touch on contemporary issues, e.g. the voluminous Seemacht edited by Ad-
miral (ret.) Chester Nimitz and E.B. Potter (1982), first published as Sea Power in 1960 (alt-
hough it arguably is a comprehensive history of sea power and naturally covers contemporary 
issues towards the end), and the more recent encyclopedic volume Weltgeschichte der 
Seefahrt - Seeherrschaft III, Seekriege und Seepolitik von 1914 bis 2006 by Helmut Pemsel, 
an Austrian author (2006). Instrumental U.S. Navy histories for this dissertation were Robert 
Love’s two-volume of History of the U.S. Navy (1992), covering 1942 through 1991, respec-
tively, George Baer’s indispensable One Hundred Years of Seapower. The U.S. Navy 1890-
1990 (1996), and the more encyclopedic U.S. Navy. A Complete History by M. Hill 
Goodspeed (2003). On the particulars of the 1980s, see Frederic Hartmann’s Naval Renais-
sance. The U.S. Navy in the 1980’s (1990). On the history of the U.S. Navy in a theatre over a 
longer period of time within the larger political confrontation – namely against Iran – see Da-
vid Crist’s critically acclaimed The Twilight War. The Secret History of America’s Thirty-
Year Conflict with Iran (2012).
40
  
The one-stop resource for the relevant documents on U.S. Navy strategy and further findings 
are the indispensable editions of the Naval War College. The Evolution of the U.S. Navy’s 
Maritime Strategy, 1977-1986 (2004), U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1990s. Selected Documents 
(2006), U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1970s. Selected Documents (2007), all edited by John 
Hattendorf, and U.S. Naval Strategy in the 1980s. Selected Documents (2008),
41
 co-edited by 
Hattendorf and Peter Swartz, provide the foundation of material for this dissertation.
42
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown (2011), and Robert Gates, Duty (2013). An auxiliary and insightful type of 
source is the oral history which is built around structured, extensive career interviews.  
40
 For a review, see Karim Sadjadpour, Three Decades of Mistakes and Mistrust, The New York Times, 30 July 
2012. 
41
 In marked difference to some of the subsequent U.S. Navy capstone documents, the publication of “The Mari-
time Strategy” generated an intense public and private debate in the military and the academia as well as in the 
general media. One of the better works from that period of time on the subject at hand is Colin Gray’s Maritime 
Strategy, Geopolitics, and the Defense of the West (1986). For a bibliography on maritime strategic thinking and 
writing in the 1980s, centered on the publication of the 1986 operational document, see Peter Swartz’ The Mari-
time Strategy Debates. A Guide to the Renaissance of U.S. Naval Strategic Thinking in the 1980s (1988), 
amended and reprinted in Hattendorf , J. (ed.) (2004), pp. 185-277. See also Swartz 2011h: 44-48. 
42
 Other volumes of the Newport Papers dedicated to U.S. Navy Strategy in general include Gary Anderson’s 
Towards a Pax Universalis. A Historical Critique of the National Military Strategy for the 1990s (1992) and 
Beyond Mahan. A Proposal for a U.S. Naval Strategy in the Twenty-First Century (1993), Peter Dombrowski’s 
2005 edition Naval Power in the Twenty-First Century, and Paul Taylor’s edition Perspectives on Maritime 
Strategy. Essays from the Americas (2008).  
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Hattendorf’s 2004 book also contains a very insightful discussion of the text-book processes 
of Navy strategy-making.  
Until now, only a handful of books have been written on the strategic development of U.S. 
naval power application. Remarkably, two of these works were written by German scholars. 
On is Wilfried Stallmann’s doctoral dissertation Die maritime Strategie der USA nach 1945: 
Entwicklung, Einflußgrößen und Auswirkungen auf das atlantische Bündnis (2000).
43
 Another 
study on U.S. seapower and naval arms control is Amerikanische Seemachtpolitik und mariti-
me Rüstungskontrolle unter Carter und Reagan (1990) by Peter Rudolf.
44
 This dissertation is 
the third study on U.S. Navy strategy by a German scholar.  
Finally, at the heart of the resource canon for this study is not a book, but rather a comprehen-
sive output by the think tank Center for Naval Analyses (CNA). The works of Peter Swartz on 
U.S. Navy capstone documents and strategies emitted from an internal U.S. Navy strategy 
workshop in 2005. The original request to analyze three strategies (“The Maritime Strategy”, 
“… From the Sea”, and “Forward… From the Sea”) soon morphed into a multi-volume 
slideshow, “the lingua franca of the practicing US Navy strategy and policy community, and 
those who support & comment on US Navy policy & strategy” (Swartz 2011b: 12, slide 23). 
The compilation pointed out that much work would have to be done around this framework to 
strengthen the understanding of the development of U.S. Navy strategy and to provide aca-
demic and scientific analyses for the broader strategic studies and political science communi-
ties. Aside from influencing the genesis of this dissertation and informing its contents, the 
Swartz Reports have thus far spawned three other PhD dissertations:
45
 
 Larissa Forster from Switzerland published her empirical thesis on Seaborne Crisis 
Response in 2013;
46
 
 Peter Haynes’ dissertation American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era: The 
U.S. Navy and the Emergence of a Maritime Strategy, 1989-2007 was also published 
                                                          
43Stallmann’s study, which partially overlaps with the timeframe of this dissertation but otherwise focuses 
strongly on the NATO context, was never published as a book. It thus provides an instructive example of “sea 
blindness” in Germany. The author of this study wishes to acknowledge the support that Dr. Stallmann provided 
in obtaining a digital copy of the manuscript.  
44
 The author looks at the Presidential administrations of Jimmy Carter and Ronald Reagan, and their arms-
control efforts. In order to arrive at an understanding “The Maritime Strategy”, Rudolf uses a comprehensive 
model similar to this study, although his professional background is more in the peace and conflict studies sub-
section of Political Science. Just as his book was published, the Cold War was ending, with the U.S. Navy com-
ing out of the superpower confrontation. Its timely focus and its methodological approach make the study very 
worthwhile.  
45
 It should be noted that, to the knowledge of this author, these four remain the only contemporary academic 
books at post-graduate level on the subject of contemporary U.S. Navy strategy.  
46
 See also Forster’s article Trust Cannot Be Surged. Challenges to Naval Forward Presence (2011).  
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in 2013, but focuses strongly on intellectual processes and the development of ideas 
inside the service (as an active Captain of the U.S. Navy, Hanyes is a crown witness to 
these processes);
47
 
 Amund Lundesgaard from Norway will submit his thesis on U.S. Navy strategy in 
2015 (with a focus on the force structure of the service), tentatively.
48
  
This goes to show that the emerging research on the subject matter at hand complements each 
other and the complexity of the subject offers complimentary perspectives and methodologi-
cal approaches. 
1.4 Limits and Constraints of this Study 
This dissertation, as previously noted, is submitted in the field of political science. More pre-
cisely, it is a contribution to the sub-discipline of strategic studies. Strategic studies are less 
concerned with fundamental research but rather focus on trends and developments in a policy-
prescriptive, hands-on, and operational manner. Thus, the study also includes aspects of 
neighboring disciplines such as military history, geography, and cultural studies. In using 
some methods from those fields, it employs an interdisciplinary approach designed to allow 
more than a strictly theoretical debate that is so often an end in itself in the social sciences. 
While such a marching direction does in part reflect the author’s academic background, this 
dissertation should not be confused with an original study in military history. 
First, with the understanding of being a ground-breaking work, this study must show the 
broad scope and application of sea power in a U.S. context in order to underline the role of the 
Navy in U.S. foreign and security policy. This is the desirable original contribution to the stra-
tegic studies. 
Second, returning to the problem of semantics discussed earlier, the study must define care-
fully what is actually meant by the term (Navy/naval/maritime) strategy. Even cursory re-
search shows that the “U.S. Navy [is] never rigorous in its approach to poli-
cy/strategy/concepts terminology. Definitions [are] considered dull, unimportant [and] indi-
vidual idiosyncratic approached abound (and change over time)” (Swartz 2011b: 23, slide 45). 
The Navy has referred to its capstone documents – and in fact labeled them as – white papers, 
doctrines, concepts, strategic concepts, concepts of naval operations (CONOPS), principles, 
missions, strategic plans, and simply strategies. Some were capitalized, others not. Some 
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 The study was distributed widely via e-mail. This author holds a copy.  
48
 See also Lundesgaard’s essay US Navy strategy and force structure after the Cold War (2011). 
  
29 
played with ellipses, others were bureaucratic acronym behemoths. Clearly, there is more in 
strategy than a simple branding suggests.  
Third, there must be an appreciation as part of this study as to what the original sources can 
supply in meaningfulness, and where they perhaps fall short in the overall assessment of sea 
power application and Navy success. Determining such – relative – value of one U.S. Navy 
document over another can be undertaken, for instance, through the prism of their alignment 
with national policies and Navy strategic culture, sustained convincing of politicial appropria-
tors, and persuasiveness of friends, allies, and potential adversaries. Such comparisons come 
at a high price because a strict comparison will hardly yield more resilient results. Quantify-
ing capstone documents, at the end of the day, remains speculative at best. Ultimately, only 
qualified general statements of a document’s prevailing impact can be derived in order to de-
scribe emerging patterns. Therefore, the study aims at identifying recurring themes and pro-
cesses in U.S. Navy strategy and strategic sea power application rather than comparing indi-
vidual capstone documents with each other.  
Last but not least: As an analysis of a subject with expansive U.S. national security ramifica-
tions, this study can only draw upon such material that was unclassified and openly accessible 
at the time of writing. Accordingly, findings and policy recommendations of this study need 
to be seen in light of those constraints. 
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2 Political and Military Power by Sea 
2.1 The Sea 
The sea is a central determinant in human development. For one, it is an indispensable source 
of food and nutrition. Seafood and desalinated water can provide against malnutrition, hunger, 
and thirst. More importantly, the sea serves as a trade route for businesses and the fostering of 
relationships with other peoples. It is an area for the exploitation of resources, a site for recre-
ation and tourism, a medium of political dominion, and an area for the exchange of infor-
mation. It is also a formidable element and a potentially life-threatening force of nature that 
man has attempted to conquer and command for larger political and economic rationales.  
Seafaring and the capability of using the sea for political purposes have influenced world his-
tory decisively. Examples for these civilizing developments can be found in the days of the 
Roman Empire and Athens, in Mediterranean Venice, or the Hanseatic League in northern 
Europe. The Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and certainly Great Britain are more contemporary 
examples that global political aspirations – or Weltpolitik – and the quest for power status go 
hand in hand with oceanic command and the control of the seas. In any larger regional, and 
certainly any global struggle for power, command of the seas played a vital role (Wegener 
1974: 37).  
If it holds true that “seapower is the product of an amalgam of interconnected constituents 
that are difficult to tease apart” and “these constituents are attributes of countries that make it 
easier or harder for them to be strong at sea” (Till 2009: 83), then it behooves to also look at 
these components and the actual use and usage of the sea for political purposes. The sea as a 
domain of defense and security is of substantial strategic importance, when one or more par-
ties to a conflict rely on the uninhibited use of the sea lanes for transportation, provision of 
troops and equipment, or desire maritime resources. Command and control of the maritime 
arena are also of significance to deter land powers. The appreciation for one’s own depend-
ence on the uninhibited use of the sea must never be lost (McDonald 1984: 62). According to 
Eric Grove, one can distinguish a military, a diplomatic, and a constabulary role for the use of 
the maritime domain.
49
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 Grove’s assessment builds on the analysis by Ken Booth on the role of naval forces in foreign policy, where 
the latter designed a similar, albeit less ambitious triangle (Booth 1979: 16).  
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Illustration 1: The 'use of the sea' triangle (Grove 1990: 234). 
There are three principal security-political uses of the sea. The military use includes the pro-
jection of power ashore, sea control, and sea denial. The diplomatic use includes showing of 
the flag and various forms of gunboat diplomacy. The constabulary use includes maintenance 
of sovereignty and good order, safeguarding of national resources, and peacekeeping. Navies 
principally have the largest role in all of these, although coast guards, state-owned civilian-
crewed vessels, harbor police units, and other institutions can use the sea (in particular in a 
diplomatic or constabulary role) as well.
50
 How does the United States, as an heir to the sea 
powers of the past (Nimitz 1982: xiii), thus stand in this line, using the sea for the roles out-
lined here?  
2.2 Seapower & Sea Power 
For reasons of their physical topography and political geography, most states in most eras of 
their history have either displayed a clearly continental or decisively maritime imprint of their 
strategic posture and culture (Gray 1992: 2). In all major conflicts and wars that were not ex-
clusively fought by land powers, sea power played a role in various stages, albeit to differing 
degrees (Scholik 2011: 91).  
                                                          
50
 Even non-state navies such as the Sea Tigers (the naval wing of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Ealam during 
the Sri Lankan civil war), Greenpeace, and the Sea Shepherd Conservation Society (a militant marine conserva-
tion organization) can use the sea utilize the roles of the sea within their means.  
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For a state, the utilization of the sea for political purposes is an incentive for seeking prosperi-
ty and the preservation of the integrity of the sovereign (this can certainly stem from a signifi-
cant dilemma such as the dependence on functioning maritime trade in the face of a lack of 
indigenous resources). In other words, a government can purposely execute maritime might to 
consolidate power and seek to embellish it on a grander scale. It must be made clear that as a 
concept, it is something that particular countries have. Therefore, sea power (two words) is to 
be understood as a functional application of power at, from, above, or across the sea. A 
seapower (one word) is a maritime-minded institution (a nation-state) with a given number of 
prerequisites to exercise sea power successfully toward larger objectives: “’Seapower’ […] is 
something that particular countries, or sea powers, have” (Till 2009: 21). The U.S. is arguably 
a seapower in the systemic and institutional understanding of the term (as will be further dis-
cussed in chapter 7), and it certainly fields sea power. The classic application of sea power is 
a military one (Wegener 1974: 25). The use of military might is usually for one, or a combi-
nation, of three political ends: deterrence, coercion, and defense. If military power is em-
ployed against a state or a non-state actor, a state does so because it seeks to prevent that ad-
versary from doing something (deter it), to force that adversary to change its behavior (coerce 
or compel it), or to protect itself against some harmful action that the adversary threatens or 
has taken (defend itself) (Art 2003: 4-5). 
2.3 Theories on Sea Power  
To the Greek philosopher Thucydides (c. 460-c. 395 BC), whose writings on the Peloponne-
sian War addressed guarding maritime trade to foster security and prosperity, sea power pro-
vided an indispensable guarantee for the achievements of political objectives in war (Duppler 
1999: 14-15). This held true as long as certain geographic criteria were given or could be 
turned to one’s favor using available means. Thucydides meritoriously also underscored that 
neither sea power nor seapower could not be improvised, but had to be masterfully crafted 
and continuously developed in order to serve the varying needs of a state in the different stag-
es of peace, crisis, and war (ibid.: 15). In other words, a seapower is not a disembodied con-
centration of armed vessels, intelligence, communication, or related competencies to launch 
and sustain great fleets. In fact, it resembles a living and breathing organism empowered by 
commerce, animated by a substantial merchant fleet, in possession of bases, and fortified by 
naval power (Cropsey 2013: 168-169). 
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A crucial differentiation of such ideas on the level of the state did not occur until the theoreti-
cal reflections of Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914) at the end of the 19
th
 century.
51
 Mahan, a 
Navy captain at the time who later rose to Rear Admiral, provided a vindication of the utility 
of sea power for future grand strategic applications of such might (Scholik 2011: 91-92). Ma-
han, according to one of his biographers not a military strategist or navalist in any sense of the 
word, but rather a world politics analyst and historically-minded strategy theorist (Schössler 
2009: 495), laid the foundation for naval force application in the machine age.
52
 At that time, 
the United States was largely inward-looking and concerned with reconstruction and recon-
cilement after the devastating bloodshed of the Civil War (1861-1865). Mahan looked out-
ward. He concerned himself with a theory that remains one of the central starting points for 
maritime military and strategic thinking, not least because it occurred at a time when political 
science emerged as a separate academic discipline.
53
 All aspects of the causal chain from Ma-
han to the theories of geopolitics and the various schools of realism have incorporated mari-
time perspectives in their considerations and theories (Scholik 2011: 92). 
According to Mahan, the United States, in essence, was to command the seas and guard its 
maritime trade using armed and armored ships. Sea power from its inception was a truly mili-
tary term. A close reading of Mahan will reveal that in his view there was a functional mean-
ing of the term sea power that describes the capacity to exert power in support of national 
interest at/across the sea as well as an institutional sense of seapower.
54
 The latter described a 
form of government, whose overarching interests are geared toward the oceans and seas as an 
area of exerting economic and political influence (Duppler 1999: 15).  
Mahan developed principal conditions that govern the institutional seapower of nations: geo-
graphic position, natural resources and climate, extent of state territory, population, and the 
character of the people and government (Tangredi 2002b: 119). When these terms were prin-
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 Even though Mahan was hardly the first even in the American context, but perhaps the most vocal and simply 
the right voice at the right time. As Cropsey (2013: 62) points out, an intellectual such as John Adams, 2
nd
 Presi-
dent of the United States (1797-1801) “laid down four of the most fundamental ideas: (a) the importance of ge-
ography to seapower; (b) the inflexible requirement of defending seapower trade [...]; (c) the strategic imperative 
of being able to transport troops and military equipment by sea; and (d) the pivotal role of ports or, more broadly 
understood, bases, in maintaining seapower”, thus preceding Mahan. 
52
 Examples for technological-military innovation include the development of the steam engine, the propeller, 
the armament of warships, and the first attempts of subsurface - or submarine – warfare, some of which already 
had to prove their worth in various armed conflicts and wars of the 1800s.  
53
 Prior to that, sea power application and seapower study was largely “Realpolitik over theory” and there was no 
academically useful political science disciplinary foundation (Scholik 2011: 90) 
54
 Both would be translated into German as Seemacht, rendering a semantic distinction obsolete. In this disserta-
tion, it is attempted to make a conscious differentiation between the two, focusing on American sea power as 
wielded by America, the seapower. In practical usage however, both variants exist, often without any deliberate 
distinction. Once again, semantic rigorousness should not constrain the intellectual debate.  
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cipally maritime the likelihood for a state to claim seapower status and display a willingness 
to defend such aspirations rose significantly. However compelling these terms are, they can 
only partially be supported with empirical data. It may be relatively easy to assess geographic 
position and conditions, and the extent of territory, on the basis of geographic (and geospatial) 
data. For questions of character, especially in a population, this is much more difficult. 
Seapower, according to Mahan, was thus not something that could be calculated easily using 
mathematical formulas.  
In its functional variant, sea power means the control and influence of international trade, war 
at sea, and the use of naval forces as instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and political inter-
action in the absence of major war (ibid: 114). According to Mahan, functional sea power 
required maritime thinking, a capable and efficient industry including shipyards, docks, quali-
fied personnel, and a favorable geographic position. Elements of sea power are the naval forc-
es, bases, and a potent fishery and trade (or, in the broader sense, maritime as opposed to just 
naval) fleet. The latter underscores the nexus of maritime might, state prosperity, and social 
welfare (Duppler 1999: 15). Only if the elements of sea power are sensibly orchestrated and 
integrated, can security and well-being be guaranteed. Safeguarding of maritime trade and 
oversea resources, according to Mahan, in principle required a capable fleet and bases (at the 
time principally coaling stations at home and around the world) that could secure that trade, 
sustain the force and, if necessary, engage competitors out to disturb that flow of goods.  
Sea power as a means of exercising power, at least for a territorially constituted state, can be 
expressed in a formula according to the late Edward Wegener (1904-1981), in his last rank 
Konteradmiral (RADM) of the German Bundesmarine. According to Wegener (1974: 29, 
1982: 1085-1086), seapower can be expressed by the following formula:  
Seapower = Fleet * Bases * Maritime Thinking 
However, this equation, as Wegener and likeminded fellows readily admit, is only a finding 
of relative value. While fleet size and number of bases can be counted, maritime thinking is 
hardly quantifiable. Moreover, sea power as a whole is dependent on a state’s political objec-
tives, i.e., what it intends to use its seapower for, as well as its geographic position. The prod-
uct is therefore not to be taken as a mathematical value. Seapower is not the sum, but rather 
the product of the formula shown above. If one factor goes towards zero, the product is also 
zero (Duppler 1999: 19). This approach to assessing seapower quickly strikes boundaries, 
especially in the more contemporary consideration of the constituents. At the same time, Ma-
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han’s institutional framework for seapower has been the point of departure for many studies. 
Naval historian Eric Grove, for example noted conditions when a state would be likely to at-
tain seapower status. According to Grove, economic strength, technological prowess, socio-
political culture (factors of the first order), geographical position, sea dependence in terms of 
seaborne trade, merchant marine, shipbuilding, fish catch, offshore zone, and government 
policy and perception (factors of the second order) would principally affect the sea power of 
nations (Grove 1990: 221-232). Thus, Mahan’s theory was not radically abolished, but rather 
developed to reflect the post-1945 realities. The conceptual return to Mahan’s thinking shows 
some of the enduring constants of determining sea power. Along with geography, such lasting 
concepts provide intellectual underpinning for the military and geo-economic understandings 
of seapower and sea power (Tangredi 2002: 114). Whereas the application of strategic princi-
ples to any given situation might be complex, the basics of strategy are relatively constant – a 
downright “Clausewitzian observation” (Boorman 2009: 92).55 
Sea power is to guarantee command of the seas, which is the comprehensive control of rele-
vant maritime areas (seas, oceans, lines of communication) for policy objectives (Wegener 
1974: 36). With a proactive, offensive approach, states that seek to challenge the indivisible 
control of the sea shall be forced into decisive battle at sea in the sense of concentration of 
forces (Crowl 1986: 456), a concept based on the Swiss strategic thinker Antoine-Henri 
Jomini (1779-1869) (Stahel 2013: 40-44). From this, Mahan made an argumentative case in 
point for powerful high seas forces tasked with safeguarding maritime trade and ready to fight 
a battle against similar forces should the need arise (a so-called blue-water navy).
56
 The idea 
that a superior naval battle force conducting offensive operations at sea was at the core of 
maritime strategy gained lasting popularity (Till 2009: 54). 
Given the fact that complete command of the sea is impossible due to the physical conditions 
of the oceans and frankly unnecessary given the vast expanse of the globe, a group of French 
naval officers (Jeune École) developed a strategic theory that challenged Mahan’s preconcep-
tions. They developed the more defensive concept called sea denial, or the partial disturbance 
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 Carl von Clausewitz (1780-1831), Prussian general and military theorist, most renowned for his groundbreak-
ing work “On War”. For an introduction to his work, see Paret (1986). For a short essay on the conceptual rela-
tionship between the works of Clausewitz and Mahan, see Preuschoft (1998).  
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 Analogous to the color of the water, the very broad distinctions between high seas naval forces (blue-water 
navy), coastal navies (green-water navy) and simple coastal and riverine forces (brown-water navy) has become 
popular. Blue and green have, in a U.S. military context, also the connotation of Navy (blue) and Marine Corps 
(green) for the color of their service dress. There is an academic desiderate to return to the subject of ranking 
navies in a separate chapter; for an instructive classification of navies by their capabilities, see Grove 1990: 236-
241. 
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of aspirations to command the seas. They advocated the use of torpedoes, mines, submarines, 
blockades, and targeted attacks on trading routes. Sea denial disrupted and restricted com-
mand of the seas. In marginal seas and other geographically defined areas it could even make 
it impossible for the numerically larger and more capable navy to exercise command of the 
sea altogether. This approach rested on the technological innovations of the 19
th
 and early 20
th
 
century and signaled the evolution of classic sea power concepts. In addition, the Jeune École 
proposed raiding an opponent’s commercial fleet to drain his supply and resources. Reflecting 
this emerging shift in thinking, command of the sea appeared to be widely anachronistic. By 
the 1970s it had been substituted by the more appropriate term ‘sea control.’ The change in 
terminology may appear to be minor but it is a deliberate attempt to acknowledge the limita-
tions of ocean control in an age of multi-dimensional warfare at sea. As opposed to ‘command 
of the sea,’ which insinuated total control of the seas for one’s own purpose or total denial to 
an enemy, the new term ‘sea control’ pointed out the more realistically achievable control in 
limited areas and for limited periods of time (Till 2009: 145-152).  
The value of military means should be measured in terms of their contribution to a state’s 
grand strategy. Mahan’s work lacks the firm embedding of sea power in the larger political 
context (Stallmann 2000: 3). Naval forces serving as an instrument for the policy of a state 
must consequently be geared toward achieving political objectives, not striving for absolute 
dominion of the seas as an end itself. The major foreign policy effect of sea power that rests 
on the ability to control (rather than command) seas in times of peace is its potential applica-
tion in times of war (Wegener 1974: 25). It has been noted that sea power is dependent on 
time, geography, and the political-military objective in question, policy, politics between the 
states concerned, and the international constellation in general (Mahncke 1974: 18). In sum, 
sea control can be understood as the control of maritime lines of communication by naval 
force means with the goal of keeping them open for one’s own military and economic uses, 
while denying such to the enemy. It is not an absolute, but rather a relative variable in power 
politics. The sea, as opposed to territory ashore, cannot be conquered, occupied or controlled 
in any such fashion. Whereas armies are designed and trained to control territory, navies are 
tasked with securing access to territory, international maritime routes, and trade (Tangredi 
2002b: 130).  
The development of nuclear weapons since the 1940s dramatically changed the world of na-
val warfare and sea power as Mahan and his contemporaries knew it. A vastly expanded com-
plexity of warfare at and from the sea forced the re-assessment of sea power in the face of the 
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possibility of a devastating nuclear war. World War II had, in the meantime, demonstrated the 
trend toward increasingly more joint (different branches of the military integrating) and com-
bined (different countries’ militaries increasingly working together) operations. The war also 
highlighted the utility of new platforms and tactics in novel naval missions, for example anti-
submarine warfare (ASW). It provided the impetus for the aircraft carrier and naval aviation 
to replace the battleship as the capital unit of the fleets. Against this background, the gradual 
supersession of Mahan’s central argument of decisive battle at sea by other strategic functions 
below the threshold of general war became increasingly plausible and popular.  
The multidimensionality of the operating space (surface, subsurface, air, and more recently 
the electromagnetic spectrum, space and cyber), the absence of defined geographic borders 
and fronts, the sheer size of the playing field (about three quarters of our globe are covered 
with navigable water), the indispensability of a functioning logistics tail, and the challenge of 
obtaining a correct operational situational picture are some further aspects that should be in-
cluded in a more contemporary approach to sea power (Allen 1996).
57
  
Mahan’s assumptions on the functional use of naval force by way of decisive battle have been 
developed further in the course of the 20
th
 century toward a broader, more comprehensive 
understanding of the value and use of sea power. In the age of the Cold War, which under-
lined the utility of naval forces on the spectrum of conflict below general (nuclear) war, it was 
apparent that the understanding and exercise of that sea power had to be reconsidered 
(Hattendorf 2004: 5). The following illustration shows the contemporary spectrum-of-conflict 
model that was developed in conjunction with “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s. It dis-
plays the three generic phases of international engagement (peacetime presence, crisis re-
sponse, and war) and shows the correlation between the probability of occurrence and the 
level of violence involve. It also marks a number of political-military operations. Sea power, 
the reasoning went, can be utilized on the whole spectrum und thus offer unparalleled utility 
to policy-makers.  
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 See also Testimony of Admiral Thomas Hayward before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, 25 Febru-
ary 1982. 
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Illustration 2: Spectrum-of-Conflict Model (Tangredi 2002c: 10; source: The Maritime Strategy, U.S. Naval 
Institute Proceedings, January 1986 supplement, p.8). 
At the same time, the fundamentals of naval force application have remained constant, thus 
informing the making of strategy on how to apply sea power. Strategy can be understood as 
the attempt to systemize planning and conduct of wars by providing a coordination of the ob-
jective, the means, and the ends (Wagener 2010: 4). Frank Uhlig has pointed out that despite 
the variety of conflicts that navies were engaged in during the past two centuries and the vast 
changes in their instruments, there is a remarkable constancy in how they go about their busi-
ness. In the overwhelming cases, navies have been employed for  
“(1) The strategic movement of troops (and now, of armies and air forces alike); (2) 
The acquisition of advanced bases as close as possible to the scene of the action, by ei-
ther military force or civil means; (3) the landing of armies on a hostile shore and their 
support then and thereafter by means of fire and logistics; (4) the blockade, and (5) the 
struggle for master of the local sea.” (Uhlig 1997: 96) 
 
The persistence of naval utility is thus decidedly noteworthy. Its independence from most 
changes in political dynamics makes it an interesting tool for statecraft. As H.P. Willmot 
pointed out, “Sea power is a rational instrument of state power and […] a long-term phenom-
enon […]” (cited in Gray 1994: 86). This comes at a certain price, though. Pointing toward 
the need for a grand design and thus a distinguished strategic approach, Colin Gray (1994: 86) 
notes that, “Ships, design teams, industries, and, above all, experience cannot be improvised.” 
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This is the basis for the need for strategy, which in the political and military realm is usually 
understood as the declaratory path of how to connect ways, means, and ends with (naval) 
power. Such strategies must contribute to the overall goals of a state. They must inform deci-
sion-makers, preferably while offering a long-term perspective, in the political, military, and 
industry spheres. Preferably, they also inform the public because the tax-payer is ultimately 
the financier of such strategies and the underlying materiel.  
Strategy is the conditio sine qua non without which a seapower could not exercise its sea 
power effectively. A targeted application of power under the conditions of insecurity and giv-
en finite resources can therefore only be made through a coherent, reliable, but still flexible 
strategy, which is understood here as the art of directing maritime capabilities to attain politi-
cal ends (Grove 1990: 11). It is imperative to understand strategy as an interdisciplinary ap-
proach. One must include political, economic, geographic, technological, and perhaps even a 
sociological and psychological perspectives. Military force structure, operations, and tactics 
are of note as well (Baylis/Wirtz 2010: 5) if one attempts to dissolve the ritualized character 
of blunt force in conflicts and replace it with a higher degree of rationality (Wagener 2010: 4). 
While the desire for strategy is apparent, it is often nonetheless the level of the military con-
struct that in the eyes of many decision-makers warrants the least attention.  
Illustration 3, printed in a 2005 study about the challenges of fighting a global insurgency, 
points to the setting of strategy in the U.S. military construct. It criticizes that the focus of the 
military’s financial, intellectual, and human resources is often rather at the bottom of the pyr-
amid, namely at the tactical level and, to a lesser degree, at the operational level.  
  
40 
 
Illustration 3: The U.S. Military Construct for the Levels of War (Barno 2005: 17). 
According to the author, the modern U.S. military is characterized by an overwhelming focus 
on doctrine, organization, training, leadership, materiel, personnel, and facilities weighted 
heavily toward the tactical level (the large base of the triangle) with proportionally less in-
vestment in the operational and strategic levels. Accordingly, defense spending – both, pro-
curement and future research and development – heavily centers on tactical-level require-
ments. Tanks, helicopters, fighter planes, individual body armor, assault amphibians, cruise 
missiles, munitions of all sorts, unmanned aerial vehicles, and littoral combat ships all provide 
the combat power to fight and win battles at the tactical level. These are immediate demands 
often justified by wartime needs, but they are hardly rationalized by tying them to strategy 
(Barno 2005: 17-18).  
In terms of how to grasp the tactical level through doctrine, the military services (a function 
of their strategic culture) fundamentally part ways. For the Navy, doctrine is essentially an 
unwritten set of convictions, principles, and understandings that was acquired experientially 
and passed down more or less orally. All of these aspects were thoroughly understood by oth-
er (Navy) practitioners. To the Army and the Marine Corps, however, written doctrine is fun-
damental because it fuses their operational planning, organizational structure, training, tactics, 
and resource decisions. It coordinates artillery, infantry, armor, and air units, creating the real-
ity of ‘combined arms’ (Haynes 2013: 152-153). 
The model, representing a common view of modern warfare and a visual reflection of the in-
stitutionalized paradigm, is notable for its addition of the political level. It underlines that a 
  
41 
distinct political level is often omitted from the pyramid, although it would belong to the apex 
of the figure as the grand-strategic driver. Therefore, any study of war must go beyond the 
purely military character of war and at the war’s intended results, which are in all cases politi-
cal in nature. Overlooking such relationships by students of war, policy-makers, and military 
professionals alike yields unsatisfying results at best and at worst (for a policy-prescriptive 
approach) can have severe consequences.  
How one arrives at teasing apart the different levels and the concurrent objectives for political 
planning is the subject of the next chapter. This is important in order to underline the merits of 
strategy and underscore how reckless an unbalanced focus can be. Strategy is not politically 
expedient, as Liotta and Lloyd (2005: 121) cautioned. Rather, it is a long-term instrument that 
supports shaping the future environment. In the absence of strategy, there is not a reliable di-
rection for policy and planning. There may be several routes to the goal but enduring crises 
and changes along the way will be painful teachers. 
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3 From Grand to Military to Maritime and Naval Strategy 
“’Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?’ 
‘That depends a good deal on where you want to get to,’ said the Cat. 
‘I don’t much care where—‘ said Alice. 
‘Then it doesn’t matter which way you go,’ said the Cat. 
‘--so long as I get SOMEWHERE,’ Alice added as an explanation. 
‘Oh, you’re sure to do that,’ said the Cat, ‘if you only walk long enough.’” 
(Lewis Carrol – Alice’s Adventures in Wonderland, 1865; emphasis in original) 
 
3.1 American Grand Strategy 
At best, strategy is only an approximate exercise. It will get the strategist somewhere near 
where he or she intends to go. Strategy grants a systematic approach to dealing with change, 
with both what should and should not stay the same. Strategy, in short, is the application of 
existing means to secure desired ends (Liotta/Lloyd 2005: 122).  
The indispensable point of departure for an endeavor as opaque and challenging as formulat-
ing strategy is the overarching national interest. Those pluralistic interests form the abstract, 
amalgamated bases of the foreign-policy decision-making processes. They are an ex-post cat-
egory, stemming from history and national imagination, and are chaperoned by the elected 
government of the sovereign (when the responsibility to defend the national interests is vested 
in elected officials, it constitutes a primary reasoning and motivation for political action). It 
follows that the definition of national interests is the prerogative of the executive branch, but 
is subject to the ‘checks and balances’ of a political system of shared power (Maull 2006: 64-
65). For the United States, therefore, the following overarching maxims of foreign policy can 
be derived:  
 First, the need to prevent an attack on the American homeland is the indispensable ob-
jective for national survival;  
 Second, the prevention of great-power war in Eurasia and the underlying security 
competition that makes these outbreaks of destabilizing violence more likely;  
 Third, preservation of acceptably-priced and secure oil supply;  
 Fourth, fostering of a friendly, competitive international economic order; 
 Fifth, the advancement of democracy and human rights abroad in an attempt to pre-
vent civil wars, genocide, and mass atrocities; and, 
 Sixth, the protection of the environment from the adverse effects of global warming 
and climate change (Art 2003: 7).  
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It must be noted that there is an inherent struggle to prioritize and categorize these overarch-
ing interests against each other, and dispatch finite resources to attain these ends (ibid: 45-47). 
This process shapes how the United States makes strategy under the condition that they are, in 
fact, planning for uncertainty. They influence what role America seeks to play in shaping the 
global environment and the course of history. According to Theodore Lowi et al. (2010: 697-
698), there have been four principle roles that the United States has played in international 
relations in the past. These are, in no particular order:  
 a Napoleonic strategy in which a powerful nation seeks to prevent aggressive actions 
against it by improving the internal state of affairs of a particular country even if that 
implies encouragement of a revolution in that country;  
 a Holy Alliance strategy in which a strategy of a super-power to prevent any change in 
the existing distribution of power among states is pursued, even if it means interven-
tion into another country’s internal affairs;  
 a balance-of-power strategy, in which a concert of powers is carefully balanced in alli-
ances with one or more states in order to counterbalance the behavior of other, usually 
more powerful nation-states; and,  
 the economic expansionist role which is a grand strategy pursued by capitalist coun-
tries to adopt foreign policies that will maximize the success of domestic corporations 
in their dealings with other countries. 
3.2 Security and Military Strategies  
When one connects these idealist roles with selected national interests in the security realm, it 
is possible to identify at least eight distinct strategies with strong military strategic implica-
tions. These are 
 dominion to rule the world;  
 global collective security, to keep the peace everywhere;  
 regional collective security, to keep the peace at some places;  
 cooperative security, to reduce the occurrence of war by limiting the offensive military 
capabilities of states; 
 containment, to hold the line against a specific aggressor state;  
 isolationism, to stay out of most wars and to keep a free hand for the United States; 
 offshore balancing, to do that and, in addition, to cut down any emerging Eurasian 
hegemon; and, 
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 selective engagement, to do a selected number of tasks deemed critical (Art 2003: 82). 
Domestic, foreign policy, economic, psychological and military aspects must be considered in 
strategy-making as well (Ruge 1960: 424-425). However, states as a general rule do not have 
a single strategy, but rather a topical, measured system of synchronized strategies which relate 
to and act upon one another. In accordance with the level of decision-making, contents, and 
scope, these sub-strategies will have different military, diplomatic, or economic objectives 
(Wagener 2010: 6). The corresponding institutional terms, conditions, and resources must be 
made available. At the same time, democracies often have a difficult time thinking strategical-
ly, for the decision-making timeframe is severely constrained by the time between regularly-
held elections rendering decade-long outlooks improbable for the policy-maker who has to 
deal with much more immediate issues.  
Democracies tend to be uneasy in the use of military force for political ends in the first place 
(Gray 1994: 61), but a strategy without some sort of enforcement tools amounts to wishful 
thinking at best and hara-kiri at worst. Finally, democracies by virtue of their nature, are more 
consensual and compromise-oriented; a factor which often limits the velocity of decision-
making. Strategy is the attempt to frame and control these processes (Boorman 2009: 93), and 
to hold those individuals or institutions who are engaged in them accountable. Through the 
orchestrated use of power, a country attempts to control situations or areas using military 
force to achieve larger ends. Control is a highly volatile construct – “What is there to control? 
How? To what end? How long? To what degree? etc.” (ibid: 103) – but it is the raison d’être 
of strategy. A strategic concept, therefore, is “a verbal statement of (a) What to control, (b) 
For what purpose, (c) To what degree, (d) When to initiate control, (e) How long to control, 
and (f) in general, how to control in order to achieve the strategic objective” (Hattendorf 
2004: 5). As such, strategy must deliver on a comprehensive motif, a topic, and a fitting polit-
ical approach. There may be global, regional, or functional strategies (Kugler 2006: 66-69). 
The ideal synthesis of these sub-strategies is a product that is very near to grand strategy.
58
 
Security strategy is an integral part of grand strategy. It contains both a military and a diplo-
matic strategy (recalling two of the three uses of the sea), which in turn are influenced by ge-
ography and geostrategic considerations of a state. Security strategy serves the continuous 
security of a state’s well-being, its territorial integrity and sovereignty, the functioning of its 
political system, and the safety and security of its people and goods. The goal of a security 
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ington, D.C.’s Army-Navy Club on 4 August 2011, “Grand Strategy is not always great strategy.”  
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strategy is the applicability of military and diplomatic power in peace, crisis, and war 
(Wagener 2010: 6). Military strategy, then, is derived from this canon. The Oxford Essential 
Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 274) defines it as “the art and science of employing the 
armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, 
or the threat of force.” For the United States this commonly includes missile defense, expedi-
tionary forces and stability operations, countering weapons of mass destruction, countering 
trans-national threats, facilitating information operations, and environment shaping operations 
(McGuinn et. al. 2002: 66). It also includes a focus on persistent military modernization and 
innovation to retain a leading edge.  
Thus, military strategy is a sub-category of security strategy, in which the various branches of 
a military have a shared responsibility (Wagener 2010: 6). In conjunction with diplomatic and 
geostrategic measures, military strategy can contribute to keeping an enemy at bay and more-
over help attain the political objectives of armed conflict (Kugler 2006: 102). Liddel Hart 
(1967: 322) reminds us that “Whereas strategy is only concerned with the problem of winning 
military victory, grand strategy must take the longer view – for its problem is winning the 
peace.” As a subset of security strategy, military strategy has an important role to play in 
peacetime. Its function is to prevent belligerent conflicts in the first place, and if it does come 
to a military conflict, it seeks to reduce damage to a minimum (Stallmann 2000: 1-2). Military 
strategy informs force posture, deployments, and tactical actions, all for a larger political ob-
jective.  
At the same time, force posture decisions, deployments, and the tactical use of force can have 
strategic implications as well (Art 2003: 5). Deterrence, coercion, and defense have political-
military ramifications that transcend the tactical use of force. They are intended to change the 
political behavior of the state or non-state actor who is subject to the force. Military power 
can also be used to reassure allies or coerce antagonists by dispatching troops near their terri-
tory (peacetime presence). It can be committed to punish those who commit aggression 
through systems of collective security and defense. It can serve as the tool for forceful inter-
ventions to prevent mass atrocities, ethnic conflicts, and genocide (humanitarian interven-
tions). It can also interposition itself between warring parties to keep an agreed-upon peace 
between them (peacekeeping). Intervention in civil conflicts to impose peace (peacemak-
ing/peace enforcement) or the occupation of a territory to provide stability in rebuilding the 
political structure and seed good governance practice (nation-building) are further options. 
Targeted limited use of military force can include quick and decisive intrusion to rescue for-
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eign nationals (rescue operations), to exact revenge for harm done (punitive operations), and 
highly directed use of force to prevent supplies and war materiel from reaching a given desti-
nation (interdiction).  
Naval forces seem particularly useful to serve such objectives and the underlying political 
goals of applying military force. They are inherently more flexible and mobile than land or air 
forces, given the political and legal context of the sea as an operating space. Their presence, 
and the threat of the kinetic force that they could potentially leverage, can be a central contri-
bution to achieving these ends. Other branches of the military do not offer such a comparable 
luxury (Tangredi 2002b: 133). It follows from the relatively slow speed of deploying naval 
forces – a very mobile Army unit can deploy within days (depending on readiness and dis-
tance to theatre), whereas an Air Force unit can often deploy within hours – that a degree of 
forward presence is imperative for sustained global engagement (Fischbock 1982: 2). Histori-
cally, the U.S. Navy has been forward-operating and forward-deployed from its inception.
59
 
Sea power can only bring to bear its inherent mobility, versatility, agility, and deterrent value 
when it is forward-deployed or present instead of lingering in home port. Thus, presence be-
comes a value of its own right. This holds true militarily (casualties strongly depend on the 
degree of readiness, force disposition, and deployment), as well as politically in the spirit of 
the overarching goals. It is instructive to once again look at the setting of strategy and its rela-
tionship to the other two commonly used intellectual concepts: operations and tactics. Illustra-
tion 4 shows that all three levels are intimately connected and responsibilities are designated. 
There is a logical chain that connects the large, overarching strategies and policy directives to 
the smallest tactical military engagement. To make sense of that connection is a supreme duty 
of the political leadership. They must offer a compelling explanation. At the same time, mili-
tary services must provide doctrine and an upward narrative that displays to political leaders 
how their tactical and operational actions have desirable strategic consequences.
60
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Illustration 4: Hierarchy of Guidance and Implementing Operations (Globalsecurity.org/U.S. Army Field Manual 
100-7). CINC = Commander in Chief, appointed highest-ranking soldier/sailor/airman in a given theater of oper-
ations.  
Although engagements and battles occur on the tactical level, they are intimately related to the 
operational plans of major operations, campaigns, and wars. In turn, these arrangements are 
part of larger theater campaign plans which feed into and from the overarching strategy. The 
chain goes up to the national security strategies and policy directives. In theory, a coherent 
picture emerges where every single engagement and battle is an expression of national securi-
ty and military strategy. This holds true for land warfare and naval warfare, although for the 
latter there are some qualifications.  
3.3 Maritime and Naval Strategies  
It must be cautioned that putting Navy strategy (or naval) on par with maritime strategy is 
misleading. The history of this semantic disarray is a long one, particularly since naval force 
strategists have sometimes opted to call their strategies maritime, naval, Navy – or something 
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else altogether.
61
 Maritime power is a broader term, usually not confined to a navy and naval 
infantry, but often includes Coast Guards, merchant marine, and the corresponding industrial 
base. It holds true that,  
“[…] the understanding of the naval aspects of an overall maritime strategy and of the 
creation and wide employment of naval forces is vitally important. Maritime power is 
but one of the elements of overall national power and of national strategy. ‘Maritime 
power is indispensable to the attainment and employment of purposeful great power,’ 
[Henry] Eccles wrote. ‘Seapower cannot be understood save as a component of mari-
time power, and thus, naval strategy cannot stand alone.’” (Hattendorf 2004: 6) 
 
The “Maritime Strategy” (capital ‘M’) of the 1980s is a case in point for the potential for se-
mantic confusion. It was a capstone document driven by the Navy and the Marine Corps and 
could easily be perceived as a simple Navy/Marine Corps plan to contribute to Allied victory 
in Europe should war with the Soviet Union occur.
62
 Naval strategy therefore is understood as 
that part of the American military strategy, which principally draws on the contributions of 
the U.S. Navy to national defense and security. Naval insinuates involvement of the U.S. Ma-
rine Corps. It is also part of the broader maritime (lower-case ‘m’) strategy (i.e., Coast Guard, 
seaborne trade, maritime ecology, etc.) of the nation.  
With the U.S. Marine Corps’ unique position in the American context (integrated with, but 
strategically-minded separate from the Navy), there is another complicating factor at hand for 
the analyst concerned with teasing apart semantics. At times in the past, the USMC was part 
of a Navy/naval/maritime strategic document (i.e. the Commandant of the Marine Corps 
[CMC], its highest-ranking uniformed soldier, would co-sponsor and co-sign a strategy). 
Sometimes, the Marine Corps would not partake in strategies and on occasion even issued its 
own capstone documents. The use of the terms “maritime” and “naval” in the context of this 
dissertation must therefore transcend too rigorous semantics. In this context the use of the 
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 Similar confusion plagues the recent German contributions to the subject. Lacking a linguistic distinction 
between the terms safety and security (both translate into German as Sicherheit), “Maritime Sicherheit” has 
become a catch-all term to encompass all sorts of naval activity, not just maritime security operations. This often 
blurs the arguments of naval officers, politicians, and the academia alike (see Bueger 2013). 
62
 From the perspective of this dissertation (preempting the analysis of the respective documents in chapter 8 of 
this study), “The Maritime Strategy” was a deliberate wording to offer an complementary alternative to the con-
tinental school of thought that had dominated security affairs in the West at the time (it did not claim to be the 
sole strategy, just the maritime component of overall U.S. strategy). It was also a global approach and hence 
necessarily maritime in nature from a U.S. point of view. It offered the other services an extended hand so they 
could link in (it listed a number of roles, missions, and task for the Air Force and the Army; to what degree they 
accepted that is another question). In addition, the wording tracked better with senior decision-makers (if the 
documents had been called “The Naval Strategy”, it probably would have required more explanation). In short, 
“The Maritime Strategy” was a maritime strategy – with heavy naval ownership. 
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either term signals U.S. Navy ownership in a certain capstone document, and/or the use of the 
Navy alone or in conjunction with sister services and allies to U.S. policy ends.
63
  
As discussed previously, sea power and seapower as concepts encompass many more premis-
es and characteristics than simply the number of warships, men, or materiel. If one were to 
understand maritime strategy exclusively as a component of military strategy or even as an 
end in itself, an important, even decisive factor for measurement would be omitted. After all, 
a Navy’s strategy and success are determined not only by tactical capabilities or operational 
tasks, but by the political context in which strategic planning and execution occur (Grove 
1990: 159). If anything, defense needs can only be established sensibly when measured 
against the threat, deciding on an acceptable level of risk, conceiving a strategy that addresses 
both risk and threat, and then building the forces that the strategy requires. Thus, naval strate-
gy succeeds when the Navy complements and makes possible the execution of a coherent, 
overarching national security strategy (Cropsey 2013: 16).  
The simple application of sea power, whether predominantly militarily, diplomatically, or in 
any other form, will likely not be felt on land if it is not aligned to the larger context. In other 
words (Hart 1967: 353), “grand strategy should control [military] strategy.” That makes the 
strong case for a sound configuration of grand strategy so that subordinate civil and military 
organizations can provide their upwards and downwards mobile documents of strategic intent.  
Grand strategies have four distinct functions. They guide the allocation of scarce resources, 
help complex organizations coordinate their activities, communicate interests to others (po-
tential adversaries, allies, and friends), and permit criticism, correction, organized public dis-
course as well as an opportunity for policy evaluation (Posen/Ross 1996). Grand strategy also 
has an auxiliary function for a nation going to war. In this view, grand strategy should both 
calculate and develop the economic resources and man-power of nations in order to sustain 
their fighting services and further social prosperity (Hart 1967: 322, Wagener 2010: 5).  
Julian Corbett (1854-1922), the noted British naval historian and strategist, warned of analyti-
cal self-restraint in the attempt to understand the role and place of strategy. In his book Some 
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 The same holds true for the definition of strategy. Analyzing strategies simply by looking at how they adhere 
to a given central definition is a shortsighted, methodologically challenging, and ultimately fruitless exercise. For 
example, if one was to take the joint U.S. military definition of strategy as a framework of reference, it would 
quickly show that even that agreed, official definition changed over time, reflecting bureaucratic compromises 
and changing dynamics within the system. If one was to strictly adhere to a dictionary’s definition, such a selec-
tion would be arbitrary at best, hardly satisfying the desideration of the Political Science/Military History disci-
plines.  
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Principles on Maritime Strategy, published in 1911, “the best theorist of his time” (McDou-
gall 2011: 32) noted,  
“Naval Strategy is not a thing by itself, […] its problems can seldom or never be 
solved on naval considerations alone, […] it is only a part of maritime strategy […] 
[by which we mean] the principles which govern a war in which the sea is a substan-
tial factor. Naval strategy is but that part of it which determines the movements of the 
fleet when maritime strategy has determined what part the fleet must play in relation to 
the action of the land forces” (Corbett 1911: 9-11). 
 
The point of the relationship of sea power on the one hand and land power on the other hand 
is worth exploring. The finding that man lives on land and not at sea appears to be trivial. 
Considerably less trivial is the insight that the strategic impact of naval forces must be felt on 
land (Gray 1994: 3). The value of sea power and a naval strategy that buttresses it must there-
fore be measured against what is on land. In this regard, Corbett underlined that strategy must 
be closely aligned with foreign policy in order to make a difference. Corbett’s further merit 
lies in breaking up Mahan’s fleet-on-fleet action focus (Till 2009: 57). Instead, Corbett em-
phasized the broad spectrum of naval operations and application of force in lieu of decisive 
battle at sea (McDougall 2011: 32). Using mobility, relatively unimpeded access, operational 
reach, and flexibility (all of which are aspects inherent in principal navies), sea power, as part 
of a country’s military and security strategy can be of compelling value in conflicts. It can 
also serve as a major deterrent and a significant contribution to limited wars. Moreover, mari-
time nations that bring sea power to bear can better scale their participation in conflicts and 
wars to a degree that continental states cannot (Till 2009: 60).
64
 
It is important to emphasize once more that sea power must, as a principle, serve a political 
end, and should be fully integrated into the grand strategy of a state. As Mahnken (2010: 69) 
notes, “Strategy is about making war useable for political purposes. […] It is the essential link 
between political objectives and military force, between ends and means.” A strategy seeks to 
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 The argument between continental and maritime strategists has a rich history and repeatedly stirred controver-
sies in academia. If one follows the deliberations of early 20
th
 century geopolitical thinkers such as Harold Mac-
kinder or Karl Haushofer, world politics is first and foremost the struggle for continental domination over the 
Eurasian heartland (the ‘world island’ in Mackinder’s words). Hegemonic policies across the sea, they asserted, 
was doomed to fail from the beginning (McDougall 2011: 31). However, a look into history will qualify that 
argument. The courses of World War I and II were decisively changed after the United States was drawn into the 
conflict (1917, 1941). Massive economic and materiel support for allies, successful battles at sea (e.g., Midway 
1942), colossal amphibious landings (e.g., Normandy 1944), and the prevalence of commercial shipping in the 
Battle of the Atlantic (1941-1943) are visible reminders of what sea power can accomplish. This goes to show 
that decisions in epochal military struggles could be forced from the sea by seapowers (Duppler 1999: 13-14). 
The final decision, obviously, occurred on land because continental powers either collapsed due to internal 
struggles or because a massive use of force was directed against the land-wards center of gravity by the antago-
nists (Gray 1994: 8). For more on the seapower/maritime vs. landpower/continental argument, see Sheehan 
(2010: 52-54).  
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limit trade-offs in the face of finite resources, evade incompatibilities, and hedge against 
negative consequences (Kugler 2006: 62). In this sense, it reflects central themes of Carl von 
Clausewitz in that war is the continuation of politics by other means; that acts of violence in 
war serve a larger purpose that would be unattainable otherwise; in that a military victory may 
be regarded as useless if it does not serve the acquirement of a political objective (Sheehan 
2010: 49). Jörg Duppler suggested that strategy be understood as having both an institutional 
and a functional dimension in peace and war. Likewise, naval strategy is the operative art of 
orchestrating naval warfare in support of the overall effort (Duppler 1999: 16; corresponding-
ly Wegener 1974: 28). More trenchantly, navy (or naval) strategy is the science of using the 
Navy in peace, crisis, and war. In the framework of the overall grand and security strategy, it 
serves the implementation of a nation’s maritime interests. Naval strategy is therefore unique-
ly positioned between the political and the operational level (Duppler 1999: 17). 
That limits the documents under consideration to those official, declaratory “Washington-
level” pieces that feature involvement of the highest representatives of civilian and military 
actors, usually the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) and/or the Secretary of the Navy 
(SECNAV), thus making is a U.S. Navy strategy. 
 “What is a “Navy strategy”? – The US Navy’s theory about how its forces contribute 
to US national security (= a set of concepts & arguments). It should coherently enu-
merate, think through, lay out, and ideally prioritize: maritime components of threats 
to the nation, strategies those threats are likely to employ, reasons why these threats & 
strategies are salient, optimal potential Navy operations to counter those threats & 
strategies, reasons how & why these operations will work.” (Swartz 2011b: 27, slide 
53) 
 
It is instructive to remember that, besides declaratory Navy strategies – or “what it says to 
itself and the world about what it should do and does, and where it is heading” (Swartz 2009b: 
3) – deployments, operations, force structure, personnel, and training also need strategic ap-
proach that, ideally, are coordinated with the declaratory documents (ibid). This list is hardly 
exhaustive and furthermore could include infrastructure, warfare areas, cyber security, re-
cruitment, and other subsets.  
3.4 Naval Missions and their Implications on Strategy and Fleet Design  
Historically speaking, states in general have developed six distinct ways to employ naval 
forces. As offensive variants, fleet-on-fleet action (or battle at sea), blockade of the enemy, 
and power projection/expeditionary operations can be noted. Commerce raiding (attack on 
commercial trade), coastal defense, and the fleet-in-being concept fall into the defensive cate-
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gory.
65
 In order to frame the role U.S. naval forces could fulfill, it is instructive to take a look 
at the characterization of the function of modern navies. It was first laid out by Admiral 
Stansfield Turner in 1974 as “Missions of the U.S. Navy” (Turner 1974, reprinted in 
Hattendorf 2004: 31-52) and soon adopted by many analysts as the most useful military ana-
lytical framework for naval force missions of modern navies. The ‘classic 4’ missions were 
sea control, projection of power ashore, naval presence, and strategic deterrence. These mis-
sions, in turn, serve larger naval roles and policy objectives.
66
 Sea control and power projec-
tion have been described briefly above; naval presence is understood as the geographically 
forward deployment of naval forces so that they could be on station to attend to events ashore 
and provide decision-makers the range of options on the spectrum of conflict. Strategic deter-
rence is understood the use of sea power assets to keep an adversary from following a certain 
course of action. It follows that there is an intimate relationship between the level of coercion 
and the level of power projection activity at and from the sea (Kearsley 1992: 102).  
The following illustration uses a slightly different metric in assigning deterrent and combative 
functions to sea control and power projection. It then derives specific naval function. Presence 
is taken as a prerequisite for these missions, although the term does not appear.  
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 According to the Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 145), a fleet-in-being is “a fleet that 
avoids decisive action, but, because of its strength and location, causes opposing forces to locate nearby, and so 
reduce the number of opposing units available for operations elsewhere.” A fleet-in-being strategy was employed 
by the German High Sea’s Fleet during World War I.  
66
 Secondary naval missions such as naval diplomacy or humanitarian assistance/disaster relief were, at the time, 
not part of the general consensus of naval missions. Samuel Huntington had cautioned against using Navy assets 
for missions they were not designed, built and equipped for in the first place. To him, the ships were not built 
and the men not trained for that kind of detours. 
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Illustration 5: Functions of modern-day navies (Alford 1980: 66, reprinted in Till 1987: 53; see also Kearsley 
1992: 9) 
Methods of sea control, as Turner outlined, can include sortie control (a contemporary syno-
nym for blockade), chokepoint control, open ocean operations, and local engagement through 
the exercise of sea control (Till 1987: 59-61). This canon was amended by a fifth option, for-
ward operations as a way of keeping and exploiting initiative (ibid. 63). Naval missions there-
fore serve as a suitable tool to grasp the intended strategic effects of naval forces as articulat-
ed by document drafters. It follows that specific instruments (i.e., naval platforms and weap-
ons systems) must be developed, procured, and fielded for such missions. The instruments (or 
weapon systems) for such endeavors are summed up in the following diagram.  
  
Naval missions 
Sea control 
Deterrent 
Function 
Threat of denial 
of use of the 
seas 
Combative 
Function 
Assert 
Control/Deny 
Control 
Projection of Power Ashore 
Deterrent 
Function 
Strategic 
Deterrence/Threat 
of conventional 
attack 
Combative 
Function 
Amphibious assualt/naval 
bombardement/tactical 
air/nuclear missile strikes 
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Weapons systems Tactics: Sortie  
Control 
Chokepoint 
control 
Open area 
operations 
Local 
defense 
Forward 
Operations
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Submarines  X X X X X 
ASW aircraft   X X X X 
Fighter aircraft   X  X X 
Surveillance systems  X X X X X 
Attack aircraft  X X   X 
Mines  X X   X 
Escort ships   X X X X X 
Illustration 6: Weapons Systems Appropriate for Sea Control (USNI 1975: 9, cited in Till 1987: 65) 
Image 6 illustrates the advantages of a balanced fleet, a term favored by many naval strate-
gists. The wider the variety of weapon systems available, the wider the range of operational 
possibilities; a properly balanced composition of weapon systems, in principle, increases na-
val flexibility and the capacity to respond to changing or unexpected circumstances (Till 
1987: 65). A reliance on one platform may inhibit flexibility, restrict the numbers of options 
for the national command authority, and unbalance the fleet to become a niche force.  
Sea control capabilities are at the heart of the naval mission set. For power projection ashore, 
naval presence, and strategic deterrence (the other three of Turner’s ‘classic 4’), a navy can 
utilize their sea control assets although it will be better served to field flexible warships de-
signed for that specific purpose which retain the capability to do other missions as well. It 
needs to be noted that role of navies in strategic deterrence, as mentioned in illustration 5, 
must be divided into general, conventional deterrence – “potential adversaries are deterred, or 
not deterred, by demonstrations of a navy’s evident ability to perform conventional maritime 
‘war-fighting’ tasks efficiently” (Till 1987: 92) – and nuclear (strategic) deterrence.68 Finally, 
the combative function of navies, the last column in illustration 5, also deserves detailing. 
One of the still most lasting instances of the range of power projection ashore can be derived 
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 “Forward operations” was not included in the original table, but has been added here based on Till’s assess-
ment that “they [too] would require the full set of weapons systems” (Till 1987: 65).  
68
 Strategic deterrence by U.S. Navy submarines armed with nuclear-tipped missiles as the naval leg of the U.S. 
nuclear triad exploits the maritime domain and fields advanced technology. For the purpose of this dissertation, 
the strategic nuclear deterrence use of the sea is outside of the core interest of the study. The SSBN’s special role 
in the naval strategic context is symbolized best by the fact that the U.S. nuclear weapons are subject to the ju-
risdiction of a specialized functional military command, the U.S. Strategic Command.  
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from the British experience in the Falklands War 1982, where – perhaps with the notable ex-
ception of nuclear missile strikes – the broad spectrum of modern sea power tools was dis-
played.
69
 
All of these missions describe the political function short of general war. This provides deci-
sion-makers with a scalable instrument in their toolbox. Although naval missions have cer-
tainly evolved over time, Turner’s ‘classic 4’ remain the leverage for any serious discussion 
about the utilities of navies. For naval planners and document drafters, these missions often 
provided a starting point for their conceptual ideas and writings.
70
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 Even more than 30 years after it was fought, the Falklands War still warrants deeper study in the context of 
naval warfare and strategy. It was a conflict of many “firsts” (first modern A2/AD war, first use of anti-ship 
missiles, first successful attack of a nuclear hunter/killer submarine against a major enemy surface combatant, 
operational debut of the V/STOL Harrier aircraft, an illustration of the Royal Navy’s new Invincible-class air-
craft carrier in combat action, etc.) and a major expeditionary joint operation. Although the conflict dynamics 
must be understood by its historical background, the lessons of the war hold continuous relevance. For an essay 
on lessons for the U.S. Navy, see Bruns (forthcoming), part of a volume. The official Navy report (DON 1983) is 
also worthwhile, and the best lessons-learned study remains Cordesman/Wagner (1991: 238-401). Two books 
instrumental to the course of the conflict are the memoirs of the British South Atlantic naval task force com-
mander (Woodward/Robinson 2012) and the authoritative military history account (Middlebrook 2001).  
70
 For a concise overview of these naval missions with a focus on the evolution in light of 21
st
 century security 
challenges, see Forster (2013: 25-49).  
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4 The Nexus of Strategy, Planning, and Force Structure 
There is an indivisible connection among the ways, the means, and the ends in policy. These 
quintessential components of strategy govern planning, for a given strategic document would 
be of little or no use if it were not speaking to how to achieve a proclaimed goal. Force plan-
ning (the art of structuring, budgeting, maintaining, and periodically reviving the force), thus, 
is indispensable in any strategic deliberation. There is a correlation among six key variables 
regarding force planning. These are:  
 national interests and objectives; 
 the derived security strategy; 
 the means and instruments in use; 
 the risk of failure; 
 the security environment; and, 
 the available resources (Bartlett/Holman/Somes 1995: 114-126).  
A change in one of these parameters would require the modification of the other key indica-
tors. Depending on which variable is being changed, the balance of the whole effort requires 
adjustments in the goals, the means, a reassessment of the risk of failure, or a revision of the 
strategy altogether (Fitschen 2007: 19-20). Bartlett, Holman, and Somes as well as Fitschen 
have subsequently identified eight, partially complementary approaches, which underline 
planning strengths and weaknesses. All of these methods are driven by unique factors, result-
ing in certain strengths and distinct collective weaknesses.  
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Planning Drivers Planning Strengths Planning Weaknesses 
Top-Down  Interests 
 Goals 
 Strategies 
 Concentration on 
objective 
 Macro perspective 
 Different instruments 
of power 
 Resource constraints 
are usually ignored 
Bottom-Up  Existing level of 
military capabilities 
 Emphasis on the 
present security and 
policy conditions 
 Neglect of the future 
 Micro perspective 
Scenario  Situation and context  Specific focus 
 Setting of priorities 
 Dynamic, flexible 
approach 
 Unpredictability of 
events 
 Self-dynamic 
approach 
 Trends towards 
retrospective  
Threat  Enemy  Focus on future 
threats and enemies 
 Combined macro and 
micro approaches 
 Emphasis on military 
capabilities 
 Simplistic model 
 Inflexible/static 
approach 
 Inherently retrospec-
tive 
Mission  Functional approach  Realistic assessment 
of capabilities 
 Priority-setting 
 Trend toward sub-
optimization  
 Ignorance of strate-
gic objectives 
Hedging  Risk minimization  Approach faces 
insecurities 
 Balanced and 
flexible planning 
 Threat of overstating 
enemy capabilities 
 Categorization in 
“worst case” scenari-
os 
Capabilities/ 
Technology 
 Superior technologi-
cal systems 
 Emphasis on 
knowledge and crea-
tivity 
 Risk and loss 
reduction 
 Force multiplier 
 Cost-intensity 
 Higher risk 
 Imbalanced force 
structure 
Fiscal  Budget  Reflection of 
domestic poli-
cies/politics 
 Necessary setting of 
priorities 
 No illustration of 
security and defense 
policy environment  
 Defense spending on 
basis of well-being of 
the economy 
Illustration 7: Strategic Planning Ways, Drivers, Strengths, and Weaknesses (Fitschen 2007: 21). 
The table illustrates the various approaches to make and similarly to analyse strategy. It is 
striking that only the top-down approach features the primacy of politics (a precondition in 
democratic states), whereas the other variations potentially run the risk of allowing the in-
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struments of politics a higher priority than the overarching goals. A top-down strategy at the 
same time can be problematic because it may run diametrically opposed to a military service’s 
culture and outlook.  
The top-down approach is closely aligned with a logical strategy and force planning model. It 
follows a logical path that runs from the determination of national interests to the formulation 
of a national strategy and a military strategy, including components for different branches of 
the military. In reality, however, this approach is in fact heavily influenced by currently shift-
ing political and economic framework conditions, finite resources, new and old threats, and 
technological advancements (Lloyd 1997: 3, Stallmann 2000: 8, George/Bennet 2005: 276). It 
is thus seldom, if ever, linearly accountable.  
Strategy remains a loop series of questions that need to be answered. First, which policy ob-
jectives are to be achieved (‘What do we want to do?’). Second, how can the strategic execu-
tion go about (‘How do we plan to do it?’). Third, an indispensable assessment of threats, 
vulnerabilities, opportunities, and challenges (‘What are we up against?’). Fourth, unilateral 
or multilateral choices, alliance or coalitions or alignments, international institutions, defense 
forces, and other economic, political, diplomatic, and informational instruments must be 
weighed (‘What is available to do it?’). Fifth, risks, deficiencies, unforeseen outcomes, and 
other cultural blinders must be considered (‘What are the mismatches?’). The sixth question 
loops back to the first step in that it ponders strategic goals and desired or demanded endstates 
(‘Why do we want to do this?’) (Liotta/Lloyd 2005: 122).  
Any sound analysis of strategic and force planning processes must take into account both 
long-term factors as well as more short- and medium-term issues such as technological revo-
lutions, reactions to a changing strategic environment, and maritime capabilities of an oppo-
nent (Till 1999: 242).  
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5 Methodology for Analysis 
Based on what has been established in the previous chapters, seapower has a horizontal di-
mension (following Mahan’s (et al.) requirements of a seapower) as well as a vertical dimen-
sion (following Lloyd/Liotta’s notion that it must be embedded into the security and defense 
policy context of a nation). For the U.S., that means considering the joint, interagency, and 
international policies, processes, activities, and operations, and “it would be difficult if not 
downright impossible to discuss the Navy in complete isolation from its sister services, joint 
command and planning systems, and allied and friendly navies” (Swartz 2009b: 7).  
A solid sea power analysis of the reciprocal connection among maritime strategy, naval strat-
egy, and U.S. security and defense policy – especially across the broad spectrum of three dec-
ades – consequently can only be made on the basis of a reliable methodology. Richard Kugler 
(2006: 42-47) lists 25 possible subject areas as to how strategic analysis could be undertaken. 
The list includes the comparison of policy visions, values, or ambitions; a discussion of main 
actions, instruments, and other characteristics; theories of actions and consequences; an as-
sessment of expected effectiveness, benefits, and losses; a discussion of the level of effort, 
resource requirements, and costs; a cost-effectiveness analysis; a look at implementation 
strategies; time horizons; identification of constraints, difficulties, and roadblocks; a confi-
dence-motivated study on the U.S. ability to make policy succeed; a check on consistence 
with other policies; an assessment of unipolarity and multipolarity; a discussion of feasibility 
and prerequisites for success; checking for encouraging signs and warning signals; a discus-
sion of robustness and flexibility; vulnerabilities to opposition; externalities, wider conse-
quences, and implications; persuasion and public support; assumption, uncertainties, and bi-
ases; sensitivities and risks; contentious issues and key judgments; ‘gold badges’ and ‘red 
flags’ (features that make a particular strategy and strategic option particularly attractive, nec-
essary, or unavoidable – or the opposite, respectively); an analysis of trade-offs; the adaptabil-
ity to other ideas; and bottom-line appraisals. Each would be a methodological warranted per-
spective, although only a combination of these could yield the best analytical results. These 
partially influenced the framing of this study, but they required a workable overarching con-
ceptual tool to make an analysis spanning three decades of U.S. Navy strategic capstone doc-
uments possible. In that spirit, this study uses an analytical pattern in that it concentrates on: 
 (1) macro-level grand strategic developments; 
 (2) domestic factors and events; 
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 (3) development of U.S. Navy strategies (taking into account technological develop-
ments); 
 (4) the particular sea strategic concept behind such capstone documents;  
 (5) force planning (including budgeting);  
 (6) planned vs. actual implementation (strategically and operationally); and 
 (7) assessment of selected strategies regarding their legacy and enduring naval power 
principles.
71
  
 
This conceptual approach encompasses the overarching aims as well the subordinate policies. 
The interaction of politics, grand strategy, maritime strategy, and naval operations (Gray 
1994: 33) must always be taken into account.
72
 The dynamic relationship between strategic 
and operational guidelines intimately connects to the tides and currents of political changes 
and upheavals which have characterized the period from the 1980s onward. Major threats and 
challengers came and went as presidential administrations sought to craft policies according 
to their agendas, the pressures of domestic developments, and in response to (or in anticipa-
tion of) international crises. All the while, technological advances increasingly shaped the use 
of military force. Major modifiers on strategy-making (such as particular individuals or rising 
and falling budgets) came and went. At the same time, there are some identifiable constants in 
developing, maintaining, and exercising sea power. In fact, that framework of naval missions 
has remained relatively constant over the decades just as constant evolution in war-fighting, 
operational, tactical, technological, political, and strategic decision-making occurred.  
 
Using this methodology, this study takes U.S. Navy capstone documents into consideration to 
produce a strategic analysis. Only overarching, “Washington-level” documents with signifi-
cant involvement of top-level officials that transport fundamental assertions about the use of 
American sea power (more precisely: naval power), communicate aspiration to shape the 
course of events, and inform the Navy, the other sea services, politics, and the larger public, 
will be considered.
73
 Given their reciprocal relationship with U.S. Navy strategy, global and 
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 This approach is inspired by Geoff Till’s discussion of the setting of sea power and seapower (2009: 21).  
72
 Questions of naval tactics will be outside of the realm of this discussion – despite the established bon-mot that 
tactical actions may have strategic consequences. The levels of war – strategy, operations, tactics – are obviously 
closely interrelated, as strategy requires tactics, and tactics can enabled strategy (Swartz 2011b: 14, slide 28). 
The political and strategic levels are more fruitful for the objective of this study. Naval tactics on the other hand 
remain relatively constant despite the influences of technology (Hughes 2000: 3).  
73
 Similar approach to Swartz (2011b: 16, slide 32): He cautions that CNO (Chief of Naval Operations, the U.S. 
Navy’s highest-ranking officer) involvement and visibility should also be taken into account when choosing the 
capstone documents to look at. Self-descriptions, on the other hand, are often of little help, for documents of the 
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regional (geo-) political situations, national security strategies and events, and technological 
innovations need to further inform the frame of reference.  
 
Such a contextualizing approach serves as the pattern that allows tracking U.S. Navy strategy 
development since the end of the Cold War and comprehending it as a product of the strategic 
science and art of strategy.
74
 There is neither a formal nor a mathematical proof that one strat-
egy is better than another (Kugler 2006: 86). Successful strategy – the adjective remains prob-
lematic – thus must be measured against achieving a clearly articulated objective, the empha-
sis of relative superiority versus an antagonist, a faithful cost-revenue calculation, and a check 
of advantages and disadvantages of alternative strategies (Mahnken 2010: 69). An analysis of 
the reaction of an antagonist/competitor in the international arena contributes to whether a 
strategy was successful or not. Checks and balances of domestic politics must also be taken 
into account for foreign policy objectives, and – quite important – that the quality of a given 
strategy is dependent on the intellectual capacities of a political leadership (Wagener 2010: 
10-11).
75
 If strategy-making is a demanding, targeted task requiring conceptual, analytical, 
and evaluative talent as well as the ability to handle empirical data and numbers (all at the 
same time), the same holds true for strategic analysis as well. Therefore, aspects of change 
and continuity in capstone documents must also be taken into account (Kugler 2006: 113). In 
sum, the methodological challenges of strategic analysis, especially regarding the U.S. Navy, 
are manifold:  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
same league have been labeled as “strategies”, “concepts”, “visions”, “strategic plans”, etc. In the face of few 
formal definitions on the term (some of which may even change over time, too), Swartz rightfully underscores 
the need for this working interpretation. It should also be noted at this time that this dissertation does not attempt 
to analyze unsigned and aborted draft efforts of capstone documents in-depth (for a list of examples, see Swartz 
2011b: 17, slide 34).  
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 Thomas Mahnken (2010: 70) stated that, in the face of numerous strategic choices which are influenced both 
by people and by political realities, “[Strategy] is more an art than a science. […] [But that] does not mean that it 
cannot be studies systematically. Rather, the theory of strategy consists of concepts and considerations instead of 
fixed laws.”  
75
 It should be noted that this is a difficult, if not impossible feat to measure. For illustration: just because a polit-
ical or military leader in Washington, D.C. does not have a Navy background, he or she will not automatically 
disfavor the Navy for a lack of intellectual embrace of all things maritime. The same holds true for the other way 
around: A Navy background does not automatically warrant a comprehensive proposition of the sea-going ser-
vices. As an instructive example, consider the presidency of James E. “Jimmy” Carter (1977-1981), a graduate 
of the U.S. Naval Academy (Class of 1947). As will be emphasized in the central chapters of this study, his pres-
idency was one that is largely viewed as detrimental to the Navy. Ronald Reagan’s two terms (1981-1989), on 
the other hand, were a period of “naval renaissance.” Reagan was a U.S. Army Captain during World War II, 
serving on the U.S. East and West Coasts, but not overseas. His background was in the acting and advocacy 
business before he became a politician in the 1950s. This goes to show that personal backgrounds of stakehold-
ers are hardly an analytical category to reckon with. Personalities and strategy-making, as much as everything 
else, is about context, and political and personal interplay.  
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“Proof of a document’s ‘success’ is impossible; too many interacting military, politi-
cal, bureaucratic, economic & human factors to track; impossibility of untangling all 
relationships; difficulty in finding data (very sparse and unbalanced literature; difficul-
ty in finding accurate data (memories can be thin reeds); precise parallels between 
past & present & future are speculative.” (Swartz 2011b: 12, slide 24; emphasis in 
original) 
 
In turn, this makes the methodology of identifying and analyzing a pattern all the more cen-
tral. It should be helpful to visualize, again, what the context of the subject area of interest is 
and how it can be framed methodologically.  
 
 
Illustration 8: The Setting of the U.S. Navy Strategy 
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6 The Particulars of Naval Strategic Culture and How They Inform 
Strategy and Force Employment 
After the terms and conditions of sea power have now been established, the genesis of grand, 
military, and naval strategy has been touched upon, and typical models of rational force plan-
ning and strategic deliberation processes have been outlined, it must be noted that there is a 
particular strategic culture that governs how one thinks about the sea as an operating space for 
military force. After all, the key contribution of the U.S. Navy to U.S. national security is the 
conduct of operations at and from the sea with the central theme of expeditionary warfare 
(Barnett 2009: 6-7). There are certain constraints, but also a number of opportunities associat-
ed with war at and war from the sea. “Naval warfare,” as Bernard Brodie (cited in Barnett 
2009: 44) remarked, “differs from land warfare in the objectives aimed at, the implements 
used, and the characteristics of the domain on which it wages”. These boundaries influence 
the applicability of naval power at all times. Senior civilian decision-makers must expect ex-
pertise from their subordinates and from military leaders due consideration of these factors. 
These individuals also have an obligation of counseling objectively and true to facts. It fol-
lows that advisors and decision-makers can formulate a wise strategy only in acquaintance 
with the specific opportunities (and potential shortcomings) of naval forces, thus minimizing 
the risk of catastrophic failure.
76
  
6.1 Multidimensionality of the Operating Space 
The space that is analytically relevant for sea power has dramatically increased in complexity 
in the course of just over a century. Well into the 1800s, it was one-dimensional, essentially 
encompassing surface warfare using rowing boats, then sail ships, and finally steam-powered 
vessels. Thanks to massive technological innovation since the early 20
th
 century, the space 
became three-dimensional owing to the advent of submarines and aviation. Later that century, 
exploration of the earth’s atmosphere and space added a fourth dimension. The fifth dimen-
sion, electronic warfare (EW), has complicated the analysis.
77
 With regard to the 21
st
 century, 
cyberspace became the sixth dimension of naval warfare. Jointness and combined operational 
dynamics add additional layers. In short, these developments have vastly complicated orches-
trating financial, personnel, technological, and intellectual resources. It follows for decision-
makers that naval power must be wielded in a sound and coherent fashion in order to make a 
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 (Strategic) Failure also has effects on learning. Armies and navies hardly ever learn from success (Gray 1994: 
23), and may thus fall victim to planning for the last, rather than the next conflict. As a matter of fact, Gray noted 
that “painful experience provides excellent education” (ibid: 43).  
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 Gray described the five dimensions of naval warfare as surface, sub-surface, aviation, EW, and nuclear weap-
ons (1994: 132-133).  
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strategic difference. Success in any one dimension is usually not very likely to be decisive 
enough in winning a war as a whole – save perhaps for the employment of the “wild card” 
nuclear weapons (Gray 1994: 135). This is a consideration that relates to the distinct subcul-
tures that can be observed in the U.S. Navy (as much as in any other modern naval force). 
These subcultures, or unions, are usually the surface warfare, submarine warfare, and naval 
aviation careers that those who wear a naval uniform must specialize in early in their profes-
sional education.
78
 Such specialization usually occurs according to talent, military aspirations, 
socialization, and a host of other factors. Therefore, at times it is perhaps misleading to speak 
of the Navy as a whole. The “unions” are in a constant competition with each other regarding 
budgetary allocations, promotion of flag officers to the top of functional/regional commands, 
or staff positions in the White House, Pentagon, or elsewhere. Yet, their common denomina-
tor is a naval strategic culture that influences how the members think about, and consequently 
appraise, their operating spaces. This culture is an amalgam of shared beliefs, values, and 
training regarding the use of military force to achieve political ends (Barnett 2009: 9). It feeds 
from immediate common experiences as well as from a larger, overarching institutional expe-
rience. Naval history – the academic study of war at sea, and how and why naval forces oper-
ated – becomes an important tool in conveying such experience to the officer corps, politi-
cians, and the broader public. In other words (Grove 1992: 189), “naval history is far too im-
portant for naval practitioners of any generation to ignore.”79 
6.2 Naval Forces and Their Oceanic Environment 
The maritime domain differs from conditions on land in a number of ways. The physical 
complexity of the operating space and the forces of nature are worth noting. Wind, waves, 
precipitation, ice, clouds, fog, currents, temperature, or obstacles such as reefs, sandbanks, 
shallow waters, and confined waterways mandate a heavy dependence of naval forces on 
technology. Mastering the art of navigation is a central life insurance policy against the brute 
forces of nature. The world’s physical and legal organization influences significantly what 
navies offer to do – and how they do it.  
6.2.1 Technology  
The dependence on technology for survival at sea, coupled with the capabilities of the indi-
vidual to master such technologies, can be described illustratively (in stark contrast to the way 
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 It should be noted that the U.S. Marine Corps is part of the surface and aviation communities, owning to its 
unique position within the Department of the Navy. Its roles in modern combat and war-fighting (infantry, coun-
terinsurgency, et al) furthermore shape the self-image of the USMC. Interestingly, a subculture for EW, cyber-
space, or nuclear weapons has not (yet) taken shape.  
79
 For further discussion of the subject, see Jervis (1995).  
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of doing business in armed forces on land) as, “The Navy mans the equipment while the Ar-
my equips the man” (Barnett 2009: 17).80 Successful sea power rests principally on fielding 
and mastering sound technology in overcoming the hardships and hazards associated with the 
sea. For a warship, that means staying afloat, going places, and returning home as deemed 
necessary, in order to defend itself, serve larger policy (even strategic) objectives, provide 
operating and rest space for its crew, and to be interoperable with other branches of the mili-
tary or international partners in joint and combined operations. A reliable industrial base that 
can provide for such an advanced system of systems is imperative if one wants to sustain 
forces and morale.
81
  
6.2.2 Points of intersection 
Given the sheer distance and multidimensionality of the domain, focal points on the high seas 
are the own and opposite coastlines and numerous choke points, straits, harbors, approaches, 
channels, canals, and bights. Whether natural (e.g., the Strait of Hormuz that connects the 
Persian Gulf with the Arabian Sea or the Strait of Gibraltar that links the Atlantic Ocean with 
the Mediterranean Sea) or man-made (such as the Suez Canal which allows transit from the 
Mediterranean to the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden or the Panama Canal which links the At-
lantic with the Pacific Ocean), these hubs and bottlenecks are a prime starting point for trying 
to obtain influence through force. Collins (1998: 57) points out that control of key straits and 
other natural or manmade narrows has been a basic military objective since naval warfare 
came into vogue, because adversary armed forces on one or both sides of any naval choke 
point may try to deny free passage to opponents. The history of the 20
th
 century is littered 
with events where such bottlenecks made bold headlines. The Panama and Suez Canals, Gi-
braltar, the Dardanelles, the Red Sea’s southern gate at Bab-el-Mandeb, the strait that sepa-
rates Taiwan from mainland China, and the Strait of Hormuz astride sea lines of communica-
tion (SLOCs) that have been (or still are) bones of contention. The control of sea lines of 
communications and choke points enables reinforcements of forces and their logistical sup-
port, whereas the control of geographic areas at sea enables the projection of power from the 
sea on land. Countries can be coerced or economically throttled by way of a blockade, and 
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 It follows that for many naval officers and enlisted personnel develop an almost intimate familiarity with the 
units that they work with and serve on. This symbiotic relationship is most visibly displayed by the fact that 
members of the naval service usually live and work on their respective (sea-going) units (with some notable and 
obvious exceptions such as command billet holders, ashore staff, naval aviators, and most submariners who 
usually get to spend their time off a vessel while it is in port). 
81
 For an illustrative discussion on the importance of industry for war, see for example Heinz Schulte (2012), Die 
Industrie und der Krieg.  
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one’s own maritime traffic and coast can be guarded against interference (Fischbock 1982: 
1).
82
 Choke points and sea-lines can become a scare strategic commodity (Nincic 2002).  
6.2.3 Legal context  
The economic importance of the seas goes hand in hand with an almost absolute absence of 
political control and jurisdiction, at least in comparison to the contexts ashore. International 
rules and regulations such as the Convention on International Regulations for Preventing Col-
lisions at Sea (1972), the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS) 
(1982), or the International Ships and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code) (2004) cannot 
overcome the realization that international waters, the High Seas beyond the territorial waters 
(12 nautical miles) are largely ungoverned spaces. 
The following illustration shows the legal boundaries of the oceans and its neighboring air-
space. The prescription stems from the UNCLOS. The territorial sea (measured 12 nautical 
miles from the so-called baseline, the low-water mark) is sovereign territory of the given 
state. Legally, rights and obligations similar to land and airspace apply. The adjacent exclu-
sive economic zone (EEZ) is the sea zone in which a state has special rights over the explora-
tion of marine resources. It stretches 200 nautical miles from the coast. The surface waters are 
international waters. In other words, a third state can use the seas – in accordance with 
UNCLOS – up until the 12-nm-territorial water mark. This has significant political ramifica-
tions. The absence of clear boundaries at sea (and the need to rely on GPS technology or visu-
al marks like buoys) and unclear intentions can inhibit otherwise legal and rational encoun-
ters.
83
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 Maritime trade and seaborne commerce increasingly dominate prosperity and global economic development, 
and are consequently a good worth safeguarding in times of peace, conflict, and war. Often, these sea lines are 
compared to land-based routes. In contrast to highways or railway lines, however, fixed and clearly marked 
routes are unusual at sea – safe for harbors, choke points, approaches, and roadsteads.  
83
 For comprehensive overviews, see Andree Kirchner (2012) and Tim René Salomon (2013).  
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Illustration 9: Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace (USNWC 2011: 19) 
With the increasing use of the sea for commercial and political means, there appears to be a 
larger need for international law to regulate the jurisdiction of the domain. At the same time, 
the world’s oceans remain in ownership of the world’s population (commons), in essence an 
area that does not belong to a single state, but offers global access (Posen 2003). Posen em-
phasizes that command of the commons (the seas, air space above 15,000 feet, space, and 
cyberspace) is the indispensable foundation of American hegemony. It follows that states that 
bring to bear corresponding means can use the sea as a genuinely unique area for deployment, 
positioning, and (military) operations (Feldt 2003: 25). 
However, rules of engagement for the use of military force at sea have also gained importance 
in what can be understood as the famous ‘Prisoner’s Dilemma at sea’. Jervis (1995: 43) 
speculates that 
 “Some technologies and tactics generate incentives to strike first. In such a situation 
fighting may occur even though neither side wants it: each knows that despite a mutual 
interest in staying at peace, attacking is much better than receiving the first blow. Be-
cause ships are small in number and relatively vulnerable, […] navies are more prone 
to destabilizing dynamics of this kind than are armies. While there are cases of isolat-
ed inadvertent exchanges between land units, these rarely spread very far. But ships 
not only carry more national prestige, they operate in fleets and the potential for unde-
sired escalation is very great.” 
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Therefore, there is a direct thread that runs from strategic objectives to tactical and operational 
procedures, where tactical actions in turn can have strategic consequences. Navy commanders 
must be aware of such problems and follow rules and regulations closely.
84
 These issues not-
withstanding, the legal context translates into the ‘freedom of the seas’, which is of overarch-
ing strategic use for a global power projecting nation such as the United States. Using the 
freedom of the seas, the U.S. (and for that matter any other state so wishing) can routinely 
deploy its forces across the globe to loiter at the territorial seas of a friend or competitor, sur-
vey international naval exercises, collect data and intelligence, transit straits and canals, etc. 
The sea thus offers unique opportunities for a preventively-tailored security and a defense 
policy built around crisis management and conflict prevention (Feldt 2003: 25). The control 
of the seas is, as previously noted, a very important power factor.
85
 Despite the fact that the 
United States is not a signatory to UNCLOS to date, the Convention has entered into custom-
ary law and its effects are of central strategic and political importance to the U.S.  
6.3 Mobility, Flexibility, and Scalability of Naval Forces 
Long transits into a given theater of military operations can be a logistical nightmare for an 
island nation such as the United States. This problem is overcome by relying on permanent 
forward bases, host-nation support, or port rights in allied countries. In peacetime, crisis, and 
war, replenishment-at-sea (RAS) maneuvers complement extended periods on station for Na-
vy warships; floating warehouses supply warships with fuel, ammunition, stores, mail, and 
numerous other services while at sea. This allows operations in a given area for weeks (as 
opposed to days), with the notable exemption of nuclear-powered vessels, which are limited 
only by the physical and psychological endurance of the crew.  
The scalability of force packages from single units to large fleets and the flexibility of naval 
platforms to serve in a variety of missions vastly broaden policy options. From maritime in-
terdiction operations to sanctions/no-fly zone enforcement, noncombatant evacuation opera-
tions, and preemptive strikes on the lower end of the spectrum to amphibious raids/assaults 
and full-scale strike warfare to defeat an enemy on the higher-intensity end of combat opera-
tions, naval forces can – in principle – offer a broad and politically rationalized palette of op-
portunities to decision-makers (USNWC 2011: 39). Others options include contributions to 
global or regional balance of forces, surveillance and shadowing (intelligence gathering), 
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 For instructive samples, see DON/OPNAV/HQ USMC/DHS/USCG (2007) and Judge Advocate General’s 
Legal Center & School (2012).  
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 For a critical assessment regarding the potential military use of the seas for armament, warfare, testing, and 
military-political political objectives, see Gröh (1988: 21-53). 
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demonstration of political will and technological innovation, sea denial (rejection of access to 
a certain area at sea), blockade and quarantine, “showing the flag”, port visits, contributions to 
alliance coherence, maritime security and safeguarding from piracy and maritime terrorism, 
and denial of a shadow jurisdiction of the high seas (Hofmann 1983: 137-139). Cost-intensive 
naval units, often delivered in only the smallest of quantities (a marked difference to the quan-
titatively expansive armament of armies and even air forces), must therefore be flexible 
enough to attend many, if not all, of these tasks successively and complementary. A ship that 
serves only a single task is hardly useful (with the exception of the strategic deterrence sub-
marines). During operations in task forces (with task groups and task units as subordinate cat-
egories), such a modular concept can be brought to full effect. Admiral William Halsey, Jr. 
(1882-1959) compared it with a card game, stating,  
“A fleet is like a hand of cards at poker or bridge. You don’t see it as aces and kings 
and deuces. You see it as a hand, a unit. You see a fleet as a unit, not carriers, battle-
ships and destroyers. You don’t play the individual card, you play the hand” (cited in 
Barnett 2009: 79).
86
  
 
In the U.S. Navy, the operational procedures in times of peace only marginally differ from 
operations in conflict and war, save perhaps for the use of weapons, the accompanying risk, 
and the mounting tension and fear (Barnett 2009: 41). The Navy, unlike the Army or the Air 
Force, is not a garrisoned force. Its training at sea but in view of the own or foreign coastline 
(or carefully transmitted through media outlets) can be a more direct and visible contribution 
to U.S. national security needs than the work-up of a Army brigade at a military training facil-
ity in Louisiana or an Air Force dry bombing-run of a warplane at a proving ground in Indi-
ana. U.S. naval forces are designed to be inherently deployable and, whether in times of peace 
or crisis, they need to keep up a high operations tempo to overcome the inherent operational 
stress of being at sea. 
At the same time, as outlined above, operational flexibility and maneuverability offer unique 
opportunities for the use of naval forces. Operations in conflict and war can include naval gun 
fire support of operations ashore, covert introduction of special operations forces, air opera-
tions using helicopters and airplanes, air defense against ballistic and cruise missiles, and am-
phibious warfare (vertical insertion via helicopter, horizontal insertion via amphibious 
transport). Moreover, anti-surface warfare (ASuW), anti-submarine warfare (ASW), anti-air 
warfare (AAW), and mine-countermeasures (MCM) warfare constitute key applications of 
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 For a sample composition of U.S. Navy task forces and task groups, see annex to this dissertation. 
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naval force. The portfolio is further complemented by options such as non-combatant evacua-
tion missions, humanitarian assistance, sanctions enforcement, and maritime security, alt-
hough some may hold that these missions are not what navies should primarily be maintained 
for, and which can only be side projects for the core tasks.  
Naval forces are a scalable and subtly tuned part of the military and policy toolbox of a state. 
Unlike armies and air forces, forward presence can be applied outside of territorial waters, 
and can be withdrawn with relatively little loss of face (Hoffmann 1983: 144). Overflight or 
stationing rights in foreign countries (with their possible political ramifications, both interna-
tionally and at home) do not play a larger role.
87
 In contrast to garrisoned, stationary forces, 
which may have to conquer, clear, hold, control and defend physical territory, the advantage 
of naval forces is their inherent dynamic posture. At the same time, war at and from the sea 
must deal with the absence of geographic front lines, a vastly more complicated reconnais-
sance and surveillance of territory at sea, and nearly constant maneuverability of naval force. 
A ship outside of a port, whether it is friend or foe, is hardly ever in a stationary position. It 
follows that their relative mobility, flexibility, and adaptability represent a “way of life” (Bar-
nett 2009: 64-66). This knowledge underlines, in turn, that in order to make a strategic differ-
ence sea power must be tightly moored to political goals and strategic objectives (Gray 1994: 
11). Otherwise, navies risk their strategic irrelevance.  
The essence of the post-World War II U.S. Navy is globally forward operations in peacetime, 
crises, and war. This significantly influences the way naval officers think about the contribu-
tions their service can provide. Because of their operations-heavy experience, they often over-
look the strategic effects navies (and the U.S. Navy) can have. They can fail to acknowledge 
the geostrategic effects navies have when these officers are physically tasked to write strate-
gy. As Haynes (2013: 9) points out, such emphasis on operational experience, tactical skills, 
technological knowledge, and resource management was reasonable during the demands of 
the Cold War. But it came at the expense of a greater understanding of the Navy’s strategic 
effects and the underlying strategic theoretical foundations of sea power. Someone who by 
virtue of their professional upbringing is schooled at keeping the largest degree of versatility 
may be skeptical if not outright disdainful of written strategic concepts, or elaborated cap-
stone documents crafted at a Pentagon or White House desk. Even codified, written doctrine 
is often skeptically received; after all, the U.S. Navy (in marked difference with other U.S. 
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 Colin Gray suggested abstaining from understanding land power, air power and sea power as a zero-sum 
game. Rather, one has to consider the relative strategic applicability of sea power (Gray 1994: 10; emphasis by 
the author) over other forms of military interventionism. This dissertation follows that counsel.  
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services or institutions and some foreign navies) prides itself on its “can-do” attitude, its ad 
hoc operational and flexible mentality (Swartz 2009b: 14). Naval doctrine functions more like 
the British constitution, passed from generation to generation of naval officers. Attempts to 
codify doctrine in naval warfare publications were often all but ignored. As a result, the Navy 
never developed a formal corpus of doctrine capstone documents like the U.S. Army, Marine 
Corps, or the joint forces did (and do).  
All of this – lack of political controls, unburdened oceanic environment, a certain degree of 
independence from daily logistical support, extended sustainability, multi-mission capability 
– fosters a highly imaginative and innovative mindset in the minds of Navy operators (Barnett 
2009: 69). Strategy development in a democracy is a multi-level, dynamic, but very seldom 
bureaucratically traceable, and ultimately nonlinear process. It must also be noted that there 
are obviously also disadvantages to naval forces which can translate into political disad-
vantages. These include misinterpretation of signals, limitations of endurance, vulnerabilities, 
and indecisive outcomes (Forster 2013: 15-17).  
6.4 The Elements of a Strategic Concept 
The problem of formulating strategy, much less sound strategy, stems from a dilemma. On the 
one hand, strategy must serve as guiding principles for decision-makers. It has to be clear and 
concise. On the other hand, it appears illogical and outright impossible to expect from a strat-
egy a prompt, adequate reply to any and all current and potentially emerging policy challeng-
es. Therefore, strategy must be flexible enough to provide guidance beyond the day. The val-
ue of a written strategy thus can be constrained (Wagener 2010: 2). If the development of 
strategy often is a permanent process of questioning, application, and evaluation (Hattendorf 
2004: 2) – a perpetual “reality check” – the question is why does a military service, a Navy in 
general, and the U.S. Navy in particular need a strategy?  
As a young political scientist in 1954, Samuel Huntington wrote in his ground-breaking arti-
cle ‘National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy’ that three key elements would define an 
armed branch of the military. According to Huntington, 
“a military service may be viewed as consisting of [1] a strategic concept which defines 
the role of the service in national policy, [2] public support which furnishes it with the re-
sources to perform this role, and [3] organizational structure which groups the resources 
so as to implement most effectively the strategic concept” (Huntington 1954; emphasis by 
the author).  
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Calling for a unifying purpose that shapes and directs a military service’s activities, the stra-
tegic concept should describe how, when, and where a military would appear to protect na-
tional security. Without such a fundamental description of how to implement national policy, 
a military service would remain merely the sum of its parts, its people, its platforms, its tradi-
tions, and its bases. Moreover, a strategic concept needed to provide impetus for budgetary 
allocation by the government and recruit personnel, without which a military branch cannot 
be sustained. The resources allocated to a service, Huntington noted, are a function of the 
public support that the institution enjoys. The service has a responsibility to harness such sup-
port and foster an organizational culture that supports such endeavors. 
 “It can only do this if it possesses a strategic concept which clearly formulates its rela-
tionship to national security. […] If a service does not posses[s] a well defined strategic 
concept, the public and the political leaders will be confused as to the role of the service, 
uncertain as to the necessity of its existence and apathetic or hostile to the claims made by 
the service upon the resources of society.” (Huntington 1954) 
Whereas these roles can be analyzed individually, one should not understand these dynamics 
solely as linear processes. Strategic planning resembles a parallel process, not a sequential 
one. Strategic planning (declaratory, procurement, manning, etc.) and execution run on paral-
lel tracks, often with very limited feedback and interaction between one another. It follows 
that by focusing on strategy as a sole determinant of naval power, the analysis must fall short. 
Rather, the strategy, policy, concepts and doctrines are a determinant of national naval power, 
not the exclusive determinant (Swartz 2011b: 46, slides 91-92).
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This dissertation proposes to explain the constituents of U.S. seapower by dividing them into 
a horizontal (functional) and a vertical (institutional) axis. 
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 CAPT (USN) John Byron, in a 1987 USNI Proceedings article, noted four determinants, namely strategy, 
resource input, force structure, and technology. Each drives and is driven by the other three (Swartz 2011b: 46).  
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In other words, American seapower (a functional and a horizontal dimension) and the sea 
power it wields is a complex and comprehensive amalgam of rational and institutional mak-
ers, shapers, and factors – as part of an “outward-looking foreign policy […] rooted in geog-
raphy, political constitution, and national character” (Cropsey 2013: 85). After discussion the 
institutional and functional American seapower (one word) in chapter 7, the dissertation will 
then analyze American sea power (two words) in chapters 8, 9, and 10. 
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7 Makers, Shapers, Factors: Genesis of American Seapower  
7.1 Horizontal Dimension: Functional Constituents of the U.S. as a Seapower  
There are central factors that influence seapower in the sense of area analysis and formulation 
of applicability of a given naval strategy. A firm knowledge and a sound understanding of the 
functional dimensions of seapower can sustain successful strategic application. If one is un-
clear and ineffective about seapower (one word) components, sea power (two words) cannot 
unfold to the degree desired. A comprehensive discussion of all characteristics of American 
seapower, not unlike the one that Mahan, Booth, and Grove have carved out, would certainly 
warrant its own independent, geospatial study. It is useful to briefly look at the factors, keep-
ing in mind the global applicability that governs such an understanding of seapower, but it is 
ultimately fruitless to simply measure U.S. landmass, economic output, or other contributors 
and then proclaim the absolute quality of American seapower. Geo-economic issues mean 
little without the context of grand strategy.  
According to Ken Booth (1979: 173), the central determinants of functional seapower – and 
these can obviously be applied to the U.S. as well as any other state – are:  
 physical separation of a state’s fleets and units (U.S. reserve fleets on the East and 
West Coast plus the forward-deployed assets); 
 the quality and quantity of its harbors (a number of large naval bases on either coast, 
several of that largest commercial ports worldwide on the Atlantic, the Gulf of Mexi-
co, and the Pacific);  
 a state’s location relative to important choke points and potential allies/enemies (as an 
island nation with strong normative and historical ties to Eurasia);  
 the distance from the country’s own maritime obligations (global); and, 
 the type of land/water that separates a state and its maritime responsibilities (the High 
Seas).
89
  
A detailed analysis of the application of military seapower would also have to include cultural 
geography, that is: population patterns, ethnicities and races, religious groups, population ge-
ography (cities, towns, military bases, military installations, fortifications), and infrastructure 
in the littoral and coastal regions (ports, approaches, offshore installations, navigational haz-
ards, channels, canals, locks, docks, shipyards, roadsteads, railroads, airports, pipelines, 
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 For a brief overview, see entry on the United States of America, in: The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
World Fact Book, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/us.html.  
  
75 
bridges). Such an area analysis has significant military implications that cannot be totally left 
out of consideration by military planners.
90
 Very broadly speaking, there are two pillars to 
functional seapower, a geographic and an economic one.  
Regarding physical geography, factors such as position, size, texture of the landmass, offshore 
islands, shape of territory, drained areas along the coast, geology, condition of the soil and 
vegetation principally constitute seapower, one’s own or anyone else’s. These considerations 
have very real naval implications for shipbuilding and training. It holds true that, “Currents, 
tides, waves, swell, and sea ice are manifestations of intense interest to military mariners and 
civilian policy-makers who plan, prepare for, conduct, or depend upon naval considerations” 
(Collins 1998: 49). Additionally, tactical awareness is a major enabler of sea power. The 
complexion of the sea water, surf, the littoral zone,
91
 light data, meteorological circumstances, 
and climate conditions also govern effective application of naval force (ibid: 340). A nation 
that understands itself as a seapower needs to factor in these considerations. Aspects pertain-
ing to oceanography (the oceans, their contents, subsea topography, shorelines, etc.) have an 
influence on the use of sea power, too. The operating conditions and mastering the challenges 
they provide shape naval plans, programs, and operations on, above, and below the surface 
along the littoral as well as on the high seas. They influence ship designs, amphibious land-
ings, and submarine and antisubmarine warfare (ibid: 59). The constant and complex threat of 
natural disaster such as floods, storms, and earthquakes also needs to be taken into account. A 
seapower can hedge against such disasters by developing contingency plans and provide de-
ployable military and civil-diplomatic power to dispatch rapidly to a crisis area. For that, it 
needs to maintain a capable industrial and intellectual base of private and federal institutions 
employing oceanographers, meteorologists, and other (maritime) researchers. Many declarato-
ry strategies, especially those on military force, cannot include all of these issues. However, 
such high-level documents need to at least implicitly convey that the planning rests on a 
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 On the level of tactics, a comprehensive picture is indispensable for the military leaders, and military geogra-
phy (approaches, chokepoints, cover) needs to be taken in account. It also informs military logistics, replenish-
ment, maintenance, engineering, and transport of materiel and casualties. This points to the intimate relation of 
the different level of wars again, for a seemingly peripheral issue such as casualties can be charged with strategic 
importance.  
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 “The littoral zone is the part of the ocean closest to the shore. The littoral zone is from the shoreline to 600 feet 
(183 meters) out into the water and is divided into three zones: the supralittoral zone, the intertidal zone, and the 
sublittoral zone. The supralittoral, or spray, zone is only underwater during unusually high tides or during 
storms. It starts at the high-tide line and goes toward dry land. The intertidal zone is between the high-tide and 
low-tide lines. The sublittoral zone extends from the low-tide line out to 200 meters. The littoral zone is a tricky 
area for predicting water conditions because so many factors affect it. Coast currents, onshore and offshore 
winds, reef, bays, and the shape of the shoreline are some of the things sailors have to deal with in this zone.” 
(Office of Naval Research, Science & Technology Focus. Ocean Regions: Littoral Zone – Characteristics; 
http://www.onr.navy.mil/focus/ocean/regions/littoralzone1.htm [22 March 2013]) 
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sound understanding and knowledge of functional seapower components. A declaratory strat-
egy need not factor in the remote possibility of coastal devastation by a major accident or a 
natural disaster, but it must convey to its audience that such an event would not render the 
strategy completely useless. In addition, an overarching strategy has to – at least implicitly – 
consider geopolitics, centers of gravity, strategic mobility of one’s own and the opponent’s 
forces, alliances, and critical infrastructure. Naval doctrine can be helpful to that end, but 
overarching documents have to be flexible and comprehensive enough (sometimes perhaps 
deliberately vague) to have their desired impact. A declaratory strategy that does not take into 
account these important constraints is doomed to significantly limit its own effectiveness. 
A second pillar of functional seapower is the economic domain. It goes without saying that a 
potent industrial base, sustained investments in state-of-the-art research, design and technolo-
gy, and access to (and profit from) the liberal international market enable sustaining capable 
naval forces. In fact, the protection of ocean trade, which would be rooted in and considerably 
further a country’s industrial base and economic well-being, rests at the very heart of Mahan’s 
naval strategy ideas. To arrive at a more contemporary assessment of economic inputs into 
and net value from seapower, analyses of the percentage of GDP (directly or indirectly invest-
ed in the maritime domain and maritime business, or in relation to other branches), the mer-
chant fleet size, the seaport usage, and the population size have to be considered (Kearsley 
1992: 139-152). Once again, such a discussion would warrant its own deepened study.
92
 It 
must be reiterated that these aspects, even down to the operational and tactical level, can have 
strategic significance (as they are a carefully placed piece of the puzzle that makes an aligned 
successful strategy). Ultimately, this study is much more interested in the institutional, or ver-
tical, determination of American seapower and the setting of U.S. Navy strategy in it.  
7.2 Vertical Dimension: Institutional Constituents of the U.S. as a Seapower  
As famous American baseball player Yogi Berra once remarked (quoted in Yarger 2006: 31), 
“In theory, there is no difference between theory and practice. In practice, there is.” An analy-
sis of domestic conditions for the institutional mooring of sea power which rests solely on 
theoretical models will therefore likely remain limited in practice-oriented analysis. Too inter-
twined and ultimately impossible to tease apart are the various responsibilities, institutional 
and personal interests, leadership and subordinate personalities, institutions, systemic dynam-
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 For an enlightening discussion about the crucial relationship between naval force and the U.S. seapower status, 
see Mackenzie Eaglen/Bryan McGrath (2011). There, the authors explore how the maritime power that is the 
United States requires sustained financial and intellectual investments into naval force for one cannot function 
without the other.  
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ics, and the interplay of politics, policy, and polity. History also plays a significant role. As 
Kearsley (1992: 157) remarked, “In relation to maritime power, there is also value in looking 
at the population’s links with its past, so as to better understand its current attitude and future 
direction.” A people with a maritime history and a maritime component of its political culture 
can go a long way in establishing institutional seapower. 
7.2.1 Hierarchic Organizations and their Planning and Learning Processes 
Collins’ attempt to display the strategic, operational, and tactical responsibilities (or “Who 
does what?”) serves as an illustration of a hierarchical model that allocates responsibilities for 
the different levels of military strategy.  
 Primary 
Focus 
Primary 
Participants 
Primary 
Policies 
Primary 
Input 
Primary 
Output 
National 
Strategies 
National Objec-
tives 
Chief of State; 
Governmental 
Advisers 
National Poli-
cies 
National Power National Plans 
National 
Security 
Strategies 
National Securi-
ty Objectives 
Chief of State; 
Security Advis-
ers 
National Securi-
ty Policies 
Suitable Na-
tional Power 
National Securi-
ty Plans 
National 
Military 
Strategies 
National Mili-
tary Objectives 
Chief of State; 
Military Advis-
ers 
National Mili-
tary Policies 
Military Power National Mili-
tary Plans 
Regional 
Strategies 
Regional Objec-
tives 
Foreign Minis-
ters; Ambassa-
dors 
Foreign Policies Diplomacy; 
Economic Lev-
ers 
International 
Accords 
Theater Mil-
itary Strate-
gies
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Regional Mili-
tary Missions 
Defense Minis-
ters; CINCs 
Unilateral or 
Coalition Poli-
cies 
Unilateral or 
Coalition Forc-
es 
Unilateral or 
Coalition Plans 
and Ops 
Operational 
Art and 
Tactics 
Subordinate 
Military Mis-
sions 
Subordinate 
Military Com-
manders 
Joint or Single 
Service Policies 
Joint or Single 
Service Forces 
Joint or Single 
Service Plans 
and Operations 
Illustration 10: Joint and Tactical Hierarchy (Collins 2002: 4). 
This template can be applied to the American context. There is a logical causal connection 
between the operational art and tactics and the national strategies (see also illustration 4). The 
division of labor and responsibility ensures a shared effort to attain the larger strategic ends. It 
also helps to hold politicians, appointees, and military commanders accountable for their ac-
tions and plans. The national military, regional, and theater military strategies are designed by 
designated civilian and military individuals.  
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 The Oxford Essential Dictionary of the U.S. Military (2002: 441) defines a theater (of operations) as “a large 
geographical area designated for the conduct of military operations and for the administration of such opera-
tions.” 
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Similar to the standardized models of strategic planning, a formalized textbook process of 
institutional learning seldom confirms to practice. Historically, with regards to navies, there 
have been two kinds of revolutionary changes that shaped how these military services think 
about their function. Either, technological innovation prompts a “bottom-up” reaction or shifts 
in the international security environment provoke a “top-down” response. The former is more 
common than the latter (Breemer 1994: 40).The figure below, taken from John Nagl’s land-
mark study on counterinsurgency, serves as an illustration. Although it deals explicitly with 
doctrine, strategic learning – arguably even more complex and fragile than doctrine – works 
under similar dynamics.
94
  
 
Illustration 11: The Institutional Learning Cycle - The Process of Doctrinal Change (Nagl 2005: 8). 
The nature of this study and the practical impetus of the dissertation with its analytical ap-
proach and the inclusion of many different sources highlight the limits of an overly standard-
ized approach, although an analysis of U.S. Navy strategy from an agency perspective re-
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 The differences in the level of ambition between doctrine and strategy have been established. It is also of note 
that the particulars of a military service – especially those being at sea – are often limiting the opportunity and 
indeed the ability to think and act according to the doctrine, and even more so to strategy. In other words: Doc-
trinal learning has the most chances of being successfully moving forward with people (or institutions) who can 
commit sufficient time and resources to the art of learning; on the other hand, many institutions and certainly a 
lot of military officers on active duty seldom find themselves able to consider the larger questions at hand. This 
is certainly even more true for the even abstracter art of strategy (beyond, perhaps, what has been taught in the 
course of education), and significantly being reduced the farther down the chain of command one goes. The 
implementation of best practices may be the best thing participants can hope for. In other words: the navy sailor 
at sea is focused on doing his or her job, and that is a full-time employment. Doctrine may be an issue for offic-
ers; strategy is hardly an issue on the minds of anyone below the level of admiralty, or in the civilian world be-
low agency leadership (Haynes 2013: 7). Exceptions only prove the rule.  
Individual 
Action/Attention to 
Events 
Organisational 
Performance Gap 
Identified 
Search for 
Alternative 
Organizational 
Actions 
Sustained Consensus: 
Accept/Reject Appropriate 
Alternative/Solution as 
Doctrine 
Transmit 
Interpretation: 
Publish Doctrine 
Change in 
Organizational 
Behavior 
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mains highly desirable.
95
 In lieu of an agency framework, a closer look at strategic processes 
is necessary. This comes at the significant cost of adding further complication to the analysis.  
Process is the key to understanding and explaining naval strategy. It does not suffice to identi-
fy and analyze ideas and concepts. In order to elucidate the history of naval strategy, one must 
move behind the ideas to consider where they came from, and how they were translated from 
theory into practice (Rosenberg 1993: 145). It follows that standardized models for the evolu-
tion of strategy have rather limited value, especially in the face of competing interests and 
research methodologies that historians and political scientists bring to bear. More than a doz-
en aspects could be accounted for in a comprehensive analysis of naval strategy and the his-
torical context in which the capstone documents emerge.  
 The nature of naval training and education, officer career patterns, professional spe-
cialization of the officer corps;   
 The career patterns and operational, technical, and staff background of individual na-
val officers in significant national or fleet positions of leadership; 
 The procurement expenses, capabilities, operating patterns, and sustainment require-
ments of modern naval weapons systems; 
 Changes in tactical doctrine and naval operational art; 
 The administrative structure, operational doctrine, strategic plans, and command and 
control organization of tactical units beyond individual warships; 
 The sources of intelligence information, including their nature, their quality, and their 
frequency, and the methods of intelligence production, analysis, and dissemination; 
 The structure, organization, and procedures of naval service’s strategic planning; 
 The structure, organization, and procedures of naval service-wide sys-
tems/sensors/weapons program and procurement planning; 
 The status of research and development progress of a nation’s naval warfare technolo-
gy and the situation of the national scientific and industrial infrastructure for research, 
development, and production of naval warfare technology; 
 The character and personalities of national naval service leadership; 
 The structure, organization, and procedures of national strategic military planning; 
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 As of 2014, an agency-focus analysis of naval strategy-making in the United States remains a sought-after 
academic desideratum. As a theoretical discourse, or focusing on the details of one particular Navy strategy, such 
a study in the context of evaluating and measuring the strategic utility of naval forces would be most desirable as 
a methodological handout and a conceptual instruction. Hattendorf (2004) has some points regarding the formal 
processes. Insightful, but limited to PowerPoint slide format, is Swartz’ study on lessons learned (2009b).  
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 The structure, organizations, and procedures of national program and procurement 
planning;  
 The character and personalities of national defense leadership; 
 The character and structure of the national political system as it relates to defense is-
sues; and, 
 The character, structure, and status of national financial and economic systems as they 
relate to national defense (ibid: 150-152).  
However, a ready template or methodology has thus far not emerged. Analysts have repeated-
ly attempted to grasp these complex processes and to understand and explain the determinants 
of naval strategy making (Grove 1990). The quintuplicate of “machines, men, manufacturing, 
management and money” (Sumida/Rosenberg 1995) sums up the governing factors of the 
quintessential forces at play. Wilfried Stallmann (2000: 259) added a sixth factor: mentality. 
Once again, these organizational features of the Navy strategy process are difficult to weigh in 
their relative importance, and ultimately impossible to tease apart.  
Although some of these factors may be secondary in nature, their correlative value – first their 
influence on a work-in-progress Navy strategy; second their reflection in tabled drafts of such 
documents; third their accurate success/failure as part of a published strategy; fourth their 
persistence (i.e., operational reflection, and continuity in following strategies) – must be con-
sidered in the overall picture. They are not necessarily sequential in what is called the Plan-
ning, Programming, Budgeting, and Execution (PPBE) processes in the U.S. Department of 
Defense bureaucracy, but often parallel, converging, competing, and ultimately impossible to 
discern academically. It follows that the process of naval strategy-making is not a mechanistic 
dynamic, but an organic one. It cannot be captured easily in flow charts. In fact, it rests more 
on operational experience or programmatic realities (often classified, obscure, complex and 
poorly articulated) than on readily definable theory. This makes the process hard to track and 
even harder to describe (Rosenberg 1993: 174). In other words, Navy strategy is an organic, 
intricate, non-linear, and inherently dynamic system that is methodologically challenging to 
analyze. This leads the researcher to return to the larger context, such as grand strategy, 
framework conditions, and the trade winds of political processes. If one wishes to understand 
why and how the Navy formulated its capstone documents the way it did, one needs to com-
prehend the broader grand strategy (and strategic) choices. These, in turn, were influenced by 
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world events, domestic interests, technology, naval force employment options, and intellectu-
al influences stemming from the idealistic strategic culture of the United States.
96
  
Collins provided a useful illustration of the six-step planning process, fully aware that this 
would constitute a simplification of the dynamics at play (illustration 12). Beginning with the 
national interests, threats to those fundamental aspects of national benefit and well-being are 
identified. To counter such pressures, political and military objectives are derived to guard 
these national interests. It follows that the military leadership, complying with providing op-
tions to the civilian commander-in-chief, devises a preferable military strategy. That, in turn, 
is influenced by domestic and foreign policies (and, one might add, politics as well). A coher-
ent strategy identifies the resources it requires, which are inevitably finite and thus must be 
checked against those resources available. It follows that ends and means are ultimately mis-
matched. Consequently, trade-offs and acceptable risk must be considered. Once those risks 
have been identified, the strategy, the resources, or both are subject to revision. Such changes 
can occur frequently if and when political-military priorities, threats, and policies transform. 
In general, the frequent and chaotic interplay and correlation between those logical steps is 
seldom discernible.  
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 This segment’s deduction was developed for, and is to a significant degree based on the paper “Managing 
Strategic Change, Embracing a New World Order. U.S. Navy Strategy in the 1990s, with Special Consideration 
of the Atlantic Ocean”, given by the author on the occasion of the McMullen Naval History Symposium, Sep-
tember 20, 2013, at the United States Naval Academy (USNA) in Annapolis, MD. The author holds a copy.  
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Illustration 12: Six-Step Strategic Planning Process (Collins 2002: 6) 
In order to comprehend continued high levels of spending on defense and the concurrent ef-
forts at doctrinal and strategic adjustment as well as institutional redesign, one must also look 
at the role of ideas – and fundamentally, to what end a military is used – as well as domestic 
and bureaucratic (i.e. inter-service, inter-administration, inter-governmental) politics (Gold-
man/Arquilla 1999: 11). These logical chains are often broken and obstructed.  
For context, it is useful to briefly explain the functions and roles of those domestic makers 
and shapers of institutionalized American seapower. This aims to present the reader with a 
sense of context for American seapower and strategy-making responsibilities (these include 
statements or actions that effect strategy, naval operations, policies, etc.). It also provides in-
sight into some standardized and non-standardized processes as well as universal responsibili-
ties in decision-making and action regarding U.S. Navy strategy. Given the inherent dynamics 
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of complex bureaucracies, personal interplay, and related framework conditions, the follow-
ing descriptions are only of a general nature. However, one needs to take into account the 
structure in order to arrive at a sound understanding of the shapes that U.S. Navy strategy, and 
the relevant developments associated therewith, can take. National security, after all, is ulti-
mately a domestic public good.  
Against the background of representative and applicable democratic parameters (e.g., consti-
tutional and legal provisions, general elections every four year, Congressional elections every 
two years, primacy of politics, relevant jurisdictions, standardized bureaucratic processes, and 
professional career patterns), three generic but at best vaguely definable groups of institution-
al makers and shapers of U.S. Navy strategy can be defined: Makers, shapers, and factors of 
seapower and strategy.  
 Makers are all those who are constitutionally obliged to “make” U.S. Navy strategy 
and the larger national strategy into which it links, or those who directly inform or 
shape such processes. The most prominent makers belong to the executive and legisla-
tive branches of government, the civilian and military bureaucracy (in particular the 
Department of Defense), and obviously to the Navy itself.  
 Shapers are understood as those people or institutions that, bounded by constitutional 
obligations or driven by commercial and political interest, indirectly influence the 
making and execution of U.S. Navy strategy. They do not have a formal role in the 
making or execution of Navy strategy. Shapers can also be generic influences on Navy 
strategy that inform, propel, or in some cases even constrain how the Navy goes about 
its business.  
 Finally, the international context and the enduring importance of ideas are valid fac-
tors to be considered.  
The analytical differentiations between these groups can be murky, and the criminological 
tracing of “Who did what when to which effect?” is difficult, if not impossible to exercise 
given the scope of this study. Much rests on a combination of influences, not least the asser-
tiveness of the characters (indeed, personalities) involved. Domestic politics, political net-
works and interconnectedness, membership/association with a political party, or simply ac-
cess to decision-making and exercise of power play a significant role in the process. An indi-
vidual strategic mindset is hard to measure, but corresponding education – e.g., PhDs in inter-
national relations or strategic studies – can serve as valuable indicators.  
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Given the frequently lamented problems of strategy and strategic analyses outlined earlier – 
or in other words, theory vs. practice – the following pages supply modest general-purpose 
statements regarding the qualitative organizational framework of U.S. security policy. These 
different makers and shapers are typically under the influence of the ‘checks and balances’ 
concept. That particular notion describes the often institutionalized inability of one branch (or, 
in some cases, a fraction of a branch) of government, one institution, or one person (or a 
group thereof) to attain wide-ranging power over the strategic direction of policy and, implic-
itly, maritime and naval strategy. America, the seapower, is an amalgam of influences from 
governmental institutions, ideas, a variety of interests groups, the news media, and political 
movements, all of which shape the foreign policy realm (Lowi et al 2010: 680) and transcend 
simplistic geo-economic determinants. The following makers and shapers vertically constitute 
institutional American seapower. These are the people and institutions responsible for the 
genesis of U.S. seapower and by extension Navy strategy. The following discussion does not 
include the specific offices and institutions within the Navy Department itself which are 
tasked with strategic planning; they will be acknowledged when the actual naval strategic 
capstone documents are analyzed (chapter 8, 9, and 10).  
7.2.2 Makers 
The first principal starting point to lay out what “makes” American seapower is a discussion 
of U.S. national interests, reflecting Collins’ six-step planning process diagram. These nation-
al interests – derived from a nation’s inherent values and proclaimed rationale – have been 
discussed previously in chapter 3.1, but it is worthwhile to briefly review them here. National 
interests can reach from the realist point of view on one end of the spectrum to the idealist or 
even utopian point of view on the other end. The former considers national interest insepara-
ble from national power; the latter identifies national interests as a universal aspiration for 
mankind (Bindra 2005: 4-5). The weighing of these views naturally differs and emphasis of-
ten shifts with presidential policies. Still, for the U.S. a general canon of basic and indivisible 
national interests can be identified. These are defense interests, economic interests, world or-
der interests, and ideological interests (ibid: 7). It must be noted that all four groups of nation-
al interests are to be subdivided into more comprehensible policy objectives. Defense inter-
ests, for instance, include the national survival of the United States, including deterrence and 
prevention of an attack using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons of mass destruction. 
Economic interests incorporate the viability and stability of the global economic system, in-
cluding trade, energy supply, and financial markets. World order interests have as a feature 
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the maintenance of cordial relations among states and their citizens as well as the provision of 
relative peace and stability. Ideological interests include the promotion of human rights, de-
mocracy, justice, and good governance abroad.  
A tripartite report from July 2000 issued jointly by the Belfer Center for Science and Interna-
tional Affairs at Harvard University’s John F. Kennedy School of Government, the Nixon 
Center, and the Rand Corporation suggested – yet unobstructed by the terrorist attacks of 
2001 and their aftermath – a different categorization. This academic view should not be con-
fused with an official statement, but according to the report, national interests for the U.S. can 
be subdivided into vital, extremely important, important, and secondary interests. 
Vital interests are the prevention, deterrence, and reduction of WMD attacks on the U.S. or its 
military forces abroad, assuring allies’ survival and cooperation in the international system, 
prevention of hostile powers or failing states on U.S. borders, ensuring the viability and sta-
bility of the major global systems, and the establishment of productive relations with strategic 
competitors such as China or Russia. To the commission, extremely important U.S. national 
interests include the prevention of WMD weapons and its proliferation, the promotion of in-
ternational mechanisms and the rule of law for conflict prevention and solution; the preven-
tion of regional hegemony in areas of interest such as the Persian Gulf, a general promotion of 
the well-being of America, its allies, and friends; the promotion of democracy, prosperity, and 
stability in the Western hemisphere, the prevention, management, reasonable termination of 
major conflicts in important regions, the maintenance of a key edge in military and infor-
mation systems technology, the prevention of uncontrolled massive immigration across U.S. 
borders; the suppression of organized transnational crime, drug trafficking, and (state-
sponsored) terrorism; and, the prevention of genocide.  
Important national interests include discouragement of human rights violations in foreign 
countries, promotion of pluralism, freedom, and democracy in regions of strategic interest, 
prevention and ending of conflicts in less significant regions of strategic interest, protection of 
American citizens from terrorist organizations, reduction of the economic inequality between 
richer and poorer nations; prevention of nationalization of U.S.-owned assets abroad, boosting 
of domestic output of key strategic industries and sectors, information superiority on the dis-
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tribution of U.S. values, promotion of international environmental policies, and a maximiza-
tion of U.S. gross national product from international trade and investment.
97
  
Finally, a groups of secondary or, in the words of the report, “less important” national inter-
ests contains the following objectives: balance of bilateral trade deficits; enlargement of a 
democratic community of states; preservation of territorial integrity or the particular political 
constitution of other states everywhere, and export enhancement of specific sectors of the 
economy (Commission on America’s National Interests 2000: 5-8). In contrast, Yarger and 
Barber (1997) proposed a much more cautious formulation of national interests in that they 
warned against using a verb or an action modifier.
98
 Such semantic concerns aside, in reality 
national interests are seldom mutually exclusive, although national survival and well-being 
are a precondition for many other objectives. Policy-makers must accept certain trade-offs. It 
can be safely assumed that these national interests condition decision-makers’ actions. Their 
enduring influence stems from national political culture, U.S. history, and the strategic, na-
tional DNA. Changes to the layout or priority of these goals are usually measured in decades, 
not years or months (Bindra 2005: 8).  
The second principal starting point for this tour d’horizon is the U.S. Constitution. As illustra-
tion 13 summarizes, a crafted division of labor and responsibilities exists between the legisla-
tive and the executive branch. In the realm of foreign policy (and implicitly decision-making 
that affects strategic planning accordingly), both branches of the government have certain 
rights and obligations, which individuals can use to various effects (the third constitutional 
branch, the Supreme Court, seldom interferes in these power brokerages). 
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 For introductions on regions of U.S. strategic interest from a German perspective, see Richter (2012), Heiduk 
(2012), Kaim (2012), Nolte (2012), and Leininger (2012).  
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 Yarger and Barber also proposed the grouping of national interests along four characteristics: Defense of the 
homeland, economic prosperity, promotion of values, favorable world order. In a second step, the intensity of 
interests would be determined into vital, important, and peripheral. It follows that on this basis that challenges 
(that is to say threats as well as opportunities) can be identified, checked against the national strategic policy, and 
according policy-recommendation can be facilitated.  
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 Power granted to 
President Congress 
War power Commander in chief of 
armed forces
99
 
Provide for the common de-
fense; declare war 
Treaties Negotiate treaties  Consent to treaties, by two-
thirds majority (Senate) 
Appointments Nominate high-level gov-
ernment officials 
Confirm president’s ap-
pointments (Senate) 
Foreign commerce  No explicit powers, but trea-
ty negotiation and appoint-
ment powers pertain 
Explicit power “to regulate 
foreign commerce” 
General powers Executive power; veto Legislative power; power of 
the purse; oversight and in-
vestigation  
Illustration 13: Principal Foreign-policy Provisions of the U.S. Constitution (based on Lowi et al. 2010: 684) 
Ultimately, the American system of strategic planning is a pluralistic one. According to 
Hattendorf (2004: 1), four discernible levels are at work. First, high policy is established at 
the level of the President and modified and supported by Congress. This includes the general 
direction for the country, and how decision-makers attempts to spend finite resources on de-
fined objectives. Second, the general conceptual planning for war is the responsibility of the 
Joint Chiefs of Staff. This group provides the military context to those high-policy ends that 
are seen to need a forceful backing. Third, the services program the force through a system of 
coordinated procurement of equipment often accompanied by statements of strategy that de-
fine the rationale for the weapons or platforms involved. It is coordinated by the Secretary of 
Defense (SECDEF). The Secretary is providing the rationale in the division of the budget 
(and labor) among the branches of the military. Fourth, the preparation of operational plans 
for operations is the responsibility of the various unified and specified commanders in chief. 
The U.S. is the only country that has divided the world into geographic areas of responsibility 
complemented by functional military commands.  
These four actors in strategic planning, in other words the makers of strategy, need to be re-
viewed briefly for the purpose of this study.  
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 Constitutionally, this is a congressional power (Article II, Section 2 of the Constitution, the “Commander-in-
Chief clause”). The question of whether and to what extent the president has the authority to use the military 
absent a declaration of war by Congress is a long-standing sources of conflict and debate in political and legal 
circles. 
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The President and his senior staff are the principal architects of U.S. foreign policy (Lowi et 
al 2010: 680-681, Sirakov 2012). U.S. foreign policy is very strongly identified with the Pres-
ident.
100
 As commander-in-chief, he is the head of state, head of government, and the highest-
ranking commander of the U.S. military in peacetime, crisis, and war. It follows that there is a 
unique responsibility regarding the ability to put people in uniform into harm’s way. Presi-
dents have the power to set their own foreign policy agendas (with very real ramifications for 
the use of military and naval force toward selected ends). They are also under almost constant 
pressure to respond to international crises, factor in global developments, or assess domestic 
events such as election campaigns, poll numbers, or economic conditions. Within the admin-
istration there may be rifts over competing policy solutions and resources, with the President 
often directly or by implication involved in the management of the staff battles occurring at 
subordinate levels. A President’s performance over the course of his term(s) is often subject 
to wave-like changes, and phases of strong, powerful decision-making can alternate with pur-
suing unrealistic policies in transition periods (Hastedt 2012: 156). Prime examples are presi-
dential transitions. Incoming administration can have sweeping policy ambitions. Outgoing 
administrations can suffer from the ‘lame duck’ phenomenon (an outgoing president is unable 
or unwilling to be reelected but a successor is not yet inaugurated). This usually serves to im-
pede presidential assertiveness.  
The President very much relies on the National Security Council (NSC), established by the 
National Security Act of 1947, and the National Security Advisor. The wording speaks of 
national security rather than foreign policy, which shows the council’s limited strategic aspi-
ration in contrast to long-term policy crafting (Hacke 2005: 32).
101
 That does not mean that 
the NSC could not, and would not, engage in micromanaging the Pentagon or other military 
issues.
102
 Presidents have made use of the council and its staff to varying degrees over time, 
and consequently on occasion National Security Advisors have risen to the highest influences 
on a President’s mind and action – with Henry Kissinger, advisor to President Richard Nixon 
1969-1974, perhaps as the most illustrative case in point.  
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 The actual power of the presidency as a person or as an institution is among the favorite subjects of research-
ers who focus on the political system of the United States. For an overview of the debate and literature on the 
subject, see Hastedt (2012: 151-152). One of the key standard discussions of Presidential powers is Neustadt 
(1991).  
101
 On the role and history of the National Security Council, see Rothkopf (2005), Auger (2012), and Horlohe 
(2012).  
102
 For a very recent example of a Secretary venting about these incursions into Pentagon responsibilities, see 
Gates (2014: 352, 452, 553, 586-588).  
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General national security decisions can involve a perceived current threat to the territorial 
security of the U.S., its current allies, major clients, or proxy states, and a perceived danger to 
U.S. government, military, or diplomatic personnel, to significant numbers of U.S. citizens, or 
to U.S. assets. In addition, events related to ideologically committed opponents of the U.S. 
(states, regimes, or regime contenders), events that likely to lead to loss of U.S. influence in 
regions perceived as within the U.S. sphere of influence, events which involve inter-state 
military conflict of potential consequence in human and strategic terms, or events that, be-
cause of civil disorder, threatened destruction of a substantial number of persons, also trigger 
national security decisions (Meernik 1994: 123). 
U.S. military involvement in world affairs is typically larger when the region or the area of 
interest features an established U.S. military presence (most likely an existing base), involves 
the transfer of military aid to a state or organization, and if there was a prior use of force (ibid: 
127). However, sea power is absent from this land-forces focused view.
 103
 
It is crucial that such policy demands will need a toolbox that is able to fulfill a president’s 
needs. In other words, a coherent strategy of a military service that hedges against a broad 
range of uncertainties and provides options to a president is in the highest demand. However, 
it also runs the risk of being vague and indiscriminate. Once again, sea power with its inherent 
flexibility can be a preferable tool. This is not to say that sea power is the solution to every-
thing. In fact, presidents may be tempted to over-use naval forces and thus drive a more esca-
latory policy. For an assessment of the relevance of sea power to a president, the intangible 
personality and character of a leader – his family roots, social and political upbringing, his 
pre-politics career, his relationship to the sea in the broadest sense – may also factor in. At the 
same time, an intimate understanding of the Navy or even active duty can be a formative 
component of national seapower and presidential sea power policies, although the influence 
should not be overestimated.
104
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 On the use of the military with special consideration of naval forces in the post-World War II world, see 
Siegel (1991) and Cobble/Gaffney/Gorenburg (2005). 
104
 Of the post-World War II presidents, the following served in the U.S. Navy (notably, Dwight D. Eisenhower, 
the 34
th
 President, was a Five-Star Army General in World War II): John F. Kennedy, the 35
th
 President, served 
with distinction on torpedo boats PT-109 and PT-59 in the South Pacific in World War II. Lyndon B. Johnson, 
the 36
th
 President, served in the Pacific theater – while a sitting Congressman. He retired as a Lieutenant Com-
mander. Richard Nixon, the 37
th
 President, retired as a Lieutenant Commander after an administrative career that 
took him to the Southwest Pacific in World War II. Gerald Ford, 38
th
 President, saw wartime service on the air-
craft carrier Monterey (CVL 26). He transitioned out of the Navy as a Lieutenant Commander. James Earl “Jim-
my” Carter graduated from the U.S. Naval Academy in 1947, serving as a nuclear submarine officer until his 
naval career cut short in 1953 when he resigned his commission due to family circumstances. George H.W. 
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According to Hastedt (2012: 158-161), past Presidents have tended to execute their office 
either in a rhetorical, unilateral, constitutional, or partisan style – all with very comprehensive 
implications for their way of composing and bringing across their foreign policy and accord-
ing strategy. Most visible examples include policy statements named after presidents, such as 
the Bush (after George W. Bush) or the Monroe (after James Monroe) doctrine. All the while, 
the extent of presidential powers is constantly evolving, which is inherent in the interplay of 
‘checks and balances’, but has also generated warnings of imperial notion or institutional 
blockades. Presidential planning statements on strategy, drawn up by national security staff 
(most notably the National Security Council and the wide-spread U.S. intelligence communi-
ty)
105
 include high-level documents such as National Security Strategies. Subordinate sea-
focused strategic statements include the (first) National Strategy for Maritime Security 
(2005). More comprehensive presidential initiatives since the turn of the century were the 
Container Security Initiative (CSI)
106
 and the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI).
107
  
Seemingly lesser documents can also have substantial strategic leverage. The label ‘strategy’ 
need not necessarily be applied to such documents. In fact, omitting the term altogether can 
serve policy objectives. But high-level statements of this sort can have very real consequences 
for strategic planning and execution, with wide-ranging implications for the military and the 
Navy to follow. A striking recent document is the Defense Strategic Guidance, which intro-
duced the notion of a rebalanced strategic focus of U.S. foreign and security policy on Asia 
and the West Pacific into the discourse (The White House 2012).
108
 With the immediate pow-
er that a president has through speeches or policy directives, carefully crafted and vetted in-
teragency documents can on occasion simply be eclipsed by events. This holds especially true 
in a city like Washington, D.C., where new strategies can have a short half life if a domestic 
news story or some international event appears more important.  
The Congress consists of a lower and an upper chamber, the United States House of Repre-
sentatives and the United States Senate, respectively. While there is usually little in the way 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Bush, the 41
st
 President, served as a naval aviator aboard the aircraft carrier San Jacinto (CVL 30) in World War 
II and left the service with the rank of Lieutenant (junior grade).  
105
 On the role of national security intelligence, see Johnson (2012) and Wala (2012).  
106
 CSI = Container Security Initiative. U.S.-sponsored program launched in 2002 under the auspices of the De-
partment of Homeland Security, aimed at securing containers shipped to the United States. By virtue of global 
trade, the vast number of cargo is transported in these TEU, or 20-foot-equivalent, steel boxes. Intermodal trans-
fer allows transportation by ship, truck, and railroad, offering cheaper transport – but also a potential inroad for 
criminal or terrorist activities.  
107
 PSI = Proliferation Security Initiative. U.S.-sponsored program launched in 2003, to stop trafficking of weap-
ons of mass destruction (WMD). As of 2013, the program has been endorsed by 102 states worldwide.  
108
 This anticipated or actual rebalancing to Asia was very much driven by the White House, but it discomforted 
allies and stirred up China.  
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of disagreement over U.S. grand strategy (and, frankly, little influence on it), both legislative 
bodies have unique functions and rules pertaining to strategic planning outlined in Article I, 
Section 8, of the U.S. Constitution. The Constitution mandates that Congress shall have pow-
er to “provide and maintain a Navy”, while it only allows the legislature to “raise and support 
Armies” (Art I, Sec. 8, emphasis added). In other words, while the fathers of the Constitution 
had a notable aversion against standing armies, they saw the need for a standing Navy and 
were ready to give Congress far-reaching powers to sustain a naval force. The two principal 
congressional tools that heavily influence strategic decision-making (with implicit repercus-
sions for the U.S. Navy) are the provision of a funds to budget current ongoing and possible 
future (Fiscal Year) operations of the military, and oversight and investigation (Lammert 
2012).
109
 
Congressional hearings and testimony serve an important purpose. They usually consist of an 
oral and a written component. These events are designed to inform and influence members of 
Congress, their staff, and anyone from the public, press, or other interest groups who attends 
(that group is obviously considerably smaller in classified hearings). The written testimonials 
are usually disseminated to larger audiences in print or electronic form, thus providing a pow-
erful leverage for policy steering. This is particularly crucial for the Planning Programming 
and Budgeting System (PPBS) cycle. The PPBS links operational requirements with financial 
requirements and points out where funds need to be steered. This cycle consists of a two-year 
budget plan that is brought before Congress. It rests on the so-called Future Years Defense 
Plan (FYDP), a six-year overview drawn from even more outward-looking documents of stra-
tegic intent.  
As Lowi et al. (2010: 684) have remarked, “Congress’s ‘power of the purse’ is its ultimate 
weapon.” Via assessing the reasons for spending a large amount of money on certain military 
hardware, by way of hearings in the Armed Services Committees and subcommittees, and 
allocating funds to one project or another, Congress can have a strong influence on military 
spending (Stallmann 2000: 10). By supporting, modifying, or blockading presidential policy, 
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 The Senate also confirms presidential nominees. Although often consequential (the Senate has to approve a 
large number of presidential government appointees each year), that power can be used to slow down the ongo-
ing course of procedure. On occasion, such provisions are used as a bargaining chip in order to extract conces-
sions from the president or from fellow Senate colleagues. At the same time, promoting proven strategic thinkers 
or experienced policy-crafters into executive positions in the political, bureaucratic, or military realm potentially 
can have wide-reaching implications. For example, promoting someone with a visible track record in strategic 
thinking to a higher office can serve higher political purposes. A very recent example is the nomination of Rob-
ert “Bob” Work, former Undersecretary of the Navy (2009-2013) and a retired Colonel, United States Marine 
Corps, to Undersecretary of Defense.  
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and a wide range of other direct and indirect influences on foreign policy, Congress can exert 
considerable leverage on strategic decision-making. This is something usually not well-
reflected in political science analysis, and particularly in strategic studies pertaining to the 
U.S. Navy. Congress hardly plays a role in those analyses. Less visibility versus the high-
profile personality of the President, however, does not mean less importance in the policy-
making process.
110
 There are a number of direct and indirect legislative and nonlegislative 
congressional avenues to shape foreign policy, as the following illustration shows.  
 Direct Indirect 
Legislative Legislation Appropriations 
Treaties (Senate)  
Nonbinding Legislation 
Procedural Legislation 
Appointments (Senate) 
Nonlegislative Letters/Phone Calls 
Consultations/Advising 
Hearings  
Oversight Activities 
Litigation 
Agenda Setting 
Framing Debate 
Foreign Contacts 
Illustration 14: Avenues of Congressional Foreign Policy Influence (adapted from Carter/Scott 2012: 233) 
Congressional action is to a very large degree impacted by  
 The constituency (the desire to be reelected, to obtain campaign funding, and a sense 
of representation of the home state/district) and relevant interests groups (with often 
narrow agendas); 
 Partisanship, driven by alignment with the party leadership;  
 The President, his policies, and party identifications;  
 The news media;  
 Staff, or the professionalism and topical expertise of aides to a representative/senator;  
 Chamber membership;  
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 The crucial role of Congress as a whole and particular individual members of parliament is especially high-
lighted in times of deep-rooted partisanship and ‘divided government’ (when the Republican Party and the Dem-
ocrat Party both control a parliamentary chamber, or hold the White House), where decision-making processes 
pertaining to larger strategic ends is severely hampered by the inability (or unwillingness) to compromise. 
Whereas Congress as a collective body may fail, it is instructive to give significantly more attention to the role of 
the relevant committees, and the Representatives and Senators who sit on these working groups. A study on 
Congressional role in American seapower and strategy would be highly desirable.  
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 Relevant committee membership as a source of policy expertise and the location for 
procedural access points from which to influence policy;  
 Party status (the majority/minority role that governs each chamber’s full plenum and 
committee leadership);  
 Party leadership position (the power and visibility a Congressman or woman has in-
side a party structure); and, 
 Seniority, or the accumulated (assumed) expertise (and, in many cases, ‘expert-ness’) 
of a politician (Carter/Scott 2012: 236-239).  
The Navy, much like other military services, maintains a congressional liaison office for both 
chambers of Congress. Thus, it seeks to inform and influence legislative action, update staff, 
and explain to elected officials the status of current and future Navy business. While Congress 
does not issue formal strategies (let alone Navy, naval, or maritime strategies), it can request 
statements of various lengths and substance from the executive branch. Used as one basis for 
further planning, these documents – among the most relevant to this study are the Department 
of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the Navy’s 30-Year-Shipbuilding Plan 
– often serve as a basis for allocation of funds, and thus a budgetary shaping of future strate-
gy.   
Having briefly described the constitutional obligations of the Presidency and Congress in the 
articulation of strategy (which influences Navy strategy to a degree), one can now turn to the 
U.S. military establishment (Rid 2012). These are the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of 
Defense and the Office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and the Regional/Functional Com-
batant Commanders.  
The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) is the panel of senior military leaders, appointed by the Presi-
dent and confirmed by the Senate, who advise the Commander in Chief and subordinate bod-
ies and institutions on military matters.
111
 The second hat they wear is as advisor to the (civil-
ian) secretary of their respective service, i.e. the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) to the Sec-
retary of the Navy.
112
 The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs (CJCS) is a member of the National 
                                                          
111
 The council currently (July 2014) consists of the Chairman (currently General Martin Dempsey, USA), the 
Vice Chairman (currently Admiral Sandy Winnefeld), the Chief of Staff of the Army (currently General Ray-
mond Odierno, USA), the Commandant of the Marine Corps (currently General James F. Amos, USMC), the 
Chief of Naval Operations (currently Admiral Jonathan Greenert), the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (currently 
General Mark Welsh, USAF), and the Chief of the National Guard Bureau (currently General Frank Grass, 
USA).  
112
 With more responsibility for the operational and strategic levels of war transferred to joint organizations, the 
military services – as institutions – have become more tactical in their focus. They are increasingly reduced to 
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Security Council. Although the service chiefs represent the highest-ranking flag officers of 
their services, since the adoption of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in 1986 the chain of command 
goes from the President to the Secretary of Defense to the Regional/Functional Combatant 
Commanders and essentially bypasses the JCS.
113
 As such, the Joint Chiefs do not have direct 
authority to craft strategy. However, by virtue of its political role and its obligation to provide 
for general conceptual plans for war (Hattendorf 2004: 1), the panel can still substantially 
influence the decision-making processes.  
Military-strategic responsibility increasingly rests with the Department of Defense (DOD), 
the military bureaucracy, and the unified combatant commanders. Therefore, one needs to 
turn to the Pentagon itself, and more precisely to the Department of the Navy (DON), which is 
the governmental organizational structure for the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and in 
wartime the U.S. Coast Guard. As §5061, Title 10 of the U.S. Code further states, the DON is 
composed of (1) the Office of the Secretary of the Navy, (2) the Office of the Chief of Naval 
Operations, (3) the Headquarters, Marine Corps (Commandant of the Marine Corps), (4) the 
entire operating forces, including naval aviation of the Navy and of the Marine Corps, and the 
reserve components of those operating forces, and (5) all field activities, headquarters, forces, 
bases, installations, activities, and functions under the control or supervision of the Secretary 
of the Navy.
114
 The CMC and the CNO are the principal senior advisors to SECNAV and 
serve as members of the JCS. These individuals can push or decelerate service strategies. 
Again, a general statement is difficult to come by and the analysis that follows in chapters 9-
11 will discuss the varying degrees of such senior leaders on particular strategic documents.  
OPNAV has two roles. It provides naval advice to the higher echelons and it crafts service 
budgets and programs. Internally, these responsibilities include the linking and coherence of 
parallel initiatives, the alignment of force structures, the building and maintenance of a ser-
vice consensus, cohesion and esprit, the integration of warfare unions, and the focus on exer-
cises, war games, and experimental, educational and training efforts. Externally, OPNAV has 
to demonstrate that Navy leadership is thoughtful and consistent with national and joint poli-
cies, in step with or even ahead of the times, highly trustworthy for the purpose of national 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
force providers charged to organize, train, and equip rather than to draw up the larger designs to fight and win 
wars (Barno 2005: 18-19). 
113
 For a history of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, see Rearden (2013).  
114
 It also includes the U.S. Coast Guard if it operates under the command and jurisdiction of DOD/DON by 
Presidential or Congressional direction in times of national emergency. The last such occasion was World War 
II. In peacetime, the Coast Guard’s governmental structure was the Department of Transportation (DOT) and is 
since 2003 the newly-formed Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
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policies, displaying a compelling rationale for its desired new procurements, and appearing 
unified. Further goals included giving sister and allied services a sense of how to best partner 
with the Navy, to contribute to deterrence and perception management of potential foes, and 
finally shaping and leveraging overarching (military/security/grand) strategic capstone docu-
ments (Swartz 2011b: 85, slides 169-170). Historically, various OPNAV offices and branches 
have been engaged in formulating capstone documents and naval strategy. Support for think-
ing about, and more importantly writing, capstone documents is often solicited through out-
side contractors.
115
  
The Unified Combatant Commanders: The commanders of the regional or functional com-
mands are an integral part of the chain of command coming from the President and going to 
the Secretary of Defense. The Goldwater-Nichols Act reorganized and codified the role of 
these theater or specialized commands, essentially establishing the command structure that is 
still in place today (although some changes have occurred, a list is reprinted here along with a 
graph detailing the current areas of responsibility which can be found in the annex).  
Name Acronym Established HQ Scope 
African Com-
mand 
USAFRICOM 1 October 2007 Stuttgart (Ger-
many) 
Geographic 
Central Com-
mand 
USCENTCOM 1 January 1983 Tampa, Florida 
(USA) 
Geographic 
European Com-
mand 
USEUCOM 15 March 1947 Stuttgart (Ger-
many) 
Geographic 
Northern Com-
mand 
USNORTHCOM 1 October 2002 Petterson AFB, 
Colorado (USA) 
Geographic 
Pacific Com-
mand 
USPACOM 1 January 1947 Oahu, Hawaii 
(USA) 
Geographic 
Southern Com-
mand 
USSOUTHCOM 6 June 1963 Miami, Florida 
(USA) 
Geographic 
Special Forces 
Command 
USSOCOM 16 April 1987 McDill AFB, 
Florida (USA) 
Functional 
Strategic Com-
mand  
USSTRATCOM 1 June 1992 Offutt AFB, 
Nebraska (USA) 
Functional 
Transportation 
Command 
USTRANSCOM 1 July 1987 Scott AFB, Illi-
nois (USA) 
Functional 
Illustration 15: Unified and Specialized Commands (as of July 2014).  
The geographic commands have a naval component in their organization (e.g., U.S. Naval 
Forces Europe) and draw up the requirements for fulfilling the missions assigned to them by 
the political and military leadership. Such requirements, in turn, inform the public debate and 
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 The 1992 strategy “…From the Sea” was developed under considerable input from outside contractors Nor-
man Polmar and Scott Truver to turn it from an internal Navy paper to a document that could track with Con-
gress and the public (Truver interview 2012, 00:38:00 – 00:41:15). 
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shape the strategic and operational pressure in Washington, D.C. For example, the demand to 
have a larger carrier presence in the Persian Gulf can go a long way to inform the political 
debate about the current and future carrier force. The functional commands also have naval 
components in their organizations and make similar requests to their superiors as well as re-
flect overarching guidance (such requirements often represent an ideal demand hardly execut-
able in the face of finite overall resources).  
It follows that the President, Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Department of De-
fense/OPNAV, and the Regional/Functional Commanders influence (with varying resources, 
diverging levels of ambition, and disparate outcomes) the process of strategy formulation and 
its implementation. They also provide a constant stream of authoritative and even semi-
authoritative directions to the military as a whole and the U.S. Navy in particular. Measures to 
shape and postulate strategy (even if the term ‘strategy’ is carefully omitted) include presiden-
tial directives as well as National Security Strategies, various kinds of military reviews, Na-
tional Military Strategies, Nuclear Posture Reviews, National Defense Strategies, Quadrennial 
Defense Reviews, DOD, joint, and doctrinal publications, various testimonies and directives, 
modifications of U.S. public law, and international treaties (Swartz 2011b: 93, slide 185). 
Congressional records on authorizations and appropriations language, statements of congres-
sional intent and committee reports, Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS) documents, and 
CJCS papers add to the convolute.
116
  
 On balance, all of these makers: 
 Are instrumental to the intellectual deliberation of seapower;  
 Oversee (and occasionally hinder/halt) the rise of a capstone document through the 
echelons;  
 With the assistance of their staff and independent government entities assess its policy 
repercussions, ideally both inside and outside of the United States Navy and the gov-
ernment; and, 
 Attempt to align the processes as well as the products with overarching policy guid-
ance and multi-faceted developments (such as technological breakthroughs, major in-
ternational conflicts, manpower issues, etc.) that inform sea power practice.  
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 A look at the wealth of documents stemming from evolving national policies and strategies over the period 
under consideration for this study reveals that reciprocal causality is a difficult thing to assess. In other words, it 
is ultimately futile to discern when the Navy utilized language handed down from its political and civilian lead-
ership, and when it was able to shape the discourse itself. The fact is that there is a dynamic relationship between 
the various levels which leads to strategic progress.  
  
97 
They literally ‘make’ and drive strategy, not least because of their designated role in the U.S. 
political bureaucratic system. Besides these true makers of foreign policy, there are additional 
influences which shape the institutional dimension of U.S. seapower, and by implication parts 
of its derived Navy strategy. The ‘foreign-policy establishment’ is a much larger arena, in-
cluding what can properly be called the shapers of foreign policy. These are a host of unoffi-
cial, informal players, and individuals who possess varying degrees of influence depending on 
their prestige, their reputation and socioeconomic standing, and (most important) the party 
and ideology that are dominant at a given moment (Lowi et al. 2010: 685). Some of these can 
very broadly be put into different groups which inform American seapower posture. They will 
briefly be discussed in the following section.  
7.2.3 Selected Shapers  
The shapers and factors have limited (to none) codified authority in the actual making of the 
U.S. Navy’s strategy, due to the absence of U.S. constitutional guidance, and/or their position 
and standing in an administration. Unsurprisingly, even the outright lack of direct influence 
on actual decision-making procedures does not prevent attempts to indirectly influence deci-
sions regarding the implicit making of strategy. These actions can at least shape strategic ac-
tions and decisions. Thus, these shapers are a necessary consideration in the analysis of Amer-
ican seapower. The shapers discussed here are other departments of the U.S. government, 
other branches of the U.S. military, interest groups, the news media, and laws and courts. Of-
ten, these shapers will seek to join hands and find avenues to leverage even more influence. 
For example, industry representatives will work through their respective Congressman in 
Washington. Successful lobbying for one type of warship over another can impinge on the 
force structure for years and even decades to come. Media and professional lobbyists can 
drive a certain agenda, be it friendly toward the Navy or not. These shapers deserve some 
discussion (although it is a bird’s-eye perspective) in order to provide a broader understanding 
of the complexities under which seapower genesis occurs. Fundamentally, they make up the 
conditions under which the Navy operates strategically on the “home front”. The institutions 
portrayed do not make strategy, but they may often attempt (and at times successfully) shape 
public and professional opinions about how it should or should not be used. Consequently, 
their view is often less systemic, i.e. less (grand) strategic, but rather interest-group oriented 
and often deliberately narrow. The larger outside debate about grand strategy is usually con-
fined to academic circles instead.  
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Within the executive branch, there is also competition between various agencies and depart-
ments, be it for resources or access to higher levels. Policies of agents outside of the national 
security and foreign policy establishment, i.e., other Departments, can have indirect ramifica-
tions for the military, and by extension eventually the Navy (Arnautovic 2012). A visible ex-
ample is the handling of diplomatic relations by the Department of State, although that partic-
ular department’s role in national security matters has been somewhat declining for decades 
(Rosati/DeWitt 2012: 179-182).
117
 The shared responsibilities between the Department of 
State and the Department of Defense in foreign affairs are a recurring source for potential 
conflict and contention (recalling the diplomatic use of the sea in the ‘use of the sea’ triangle 
previously discussed), although there are instances where both departments successfully co-
operated (for a recent example, see Gates 2013: 98-99, 283, 482). In a more abstract regard, 
non-partisan government agencies can also have substantial influence. The Congressional 
Research Service (CRS), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) all provide a never-ending stream of analyses which in them-
selves can decisively inform policy and eventually influence strategy.
118
 
With finite resources, the Other Branches of the Military are natural competitors for a share of 
attention and, more importantly, the budget allocation that the Navy receives. Despite the var-
ious reforms in the national security and military establishment, it is particularly the U.S. Ar-
my and the U.S. Air Force that can infringe on the Navy’s turf when it comes to the division 
of labor, visibility in the public’s eye (i.e., through the appointment of high-ranking members 
of a specific service to another public position), and most importantly the division of the 
budget shares.
119
 Although for long periods of time the division of the budget remained 
roughly at 1/3 for each major military branch, there is a constant battle by the services to be 
an administration’s favorite poster child and make its case for investments into hardware or 
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 Other departments with limited international roles are the Department of Finance and the Department of 
Homeland Security. 
118
 For example, all three institutions have recently provided a continuous stream of analyses on the subject of 
the Littoral Combat Ship (LCS) and the problems associated with the program. These papers inform the staffers 
at various agencies and institutions. In principle, these organizations are non-partisan and neutral.  
119
 For a review of U.S. Navy/U.S. Army relations, see Swartz’s briefing slides for the 1980s (2011h: 86-90, 
slides 171-180), 1990s (2012b: 110-115, slides 220-229), and 2000s (2011j: 167-180, slides 334-360). For a 
review of U.S. Navy/U.S. Air Force relations 1970-2010, see Swartz’s stand-alone briefing slides (2011m) as 
well as his sections for the 1980s (2011h: 73-85, slides 145-170), 1990s (2012b: 93-110, slides 186-219), and 
2000s (2011j: 147-167, slides 294-333). 
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manpower. Additionally, in the past there has been some notable naval infightings between 
the Navy and the Marine Corps, which also inhibited coherent strategy-making.
120
  
Also of some notable importance are the various Interest Groups. The literature usually 
broadly divides these shapers into three categories. Economic, ethnic, or human rights (Lowi 
et al. 2010: 685-686; Haney 2012: 294-297) interest groups can serve as intermediate agenda-
setters and more or less sensibly shape policies toward a certain country, region, or issue.
121
 
These interest groups display many varying degrees of organizational coherence and profes-
sionalism (some enlist lobbyists to further their cause), as well as a wide range of motifs. For 
example, industry lobbyists from a defense manufacturer may want to raise support for a new 
weapon or warship. Other interest groups may want to draw attention to a much larger agenda 
such as constitutional concerns over military spending, human rights infringements abroad, or 
even more principal issues. In combining grass-roots activism with high-visibility statements 
or events, some of these interest groups can have substantial impact on policy-making.
122
 
Within the U.S. political culture, frequent interchanges between the government sector and 
the private sector occur. The most visible issue is the use of contractors (often retired military) 
in areas of strategic planning and thinking. The cross-fertilization between think tanks, lobby-
ing firms, and the executive and legislative branch is remarkable. In fact, members of the vast 
presidential government often find new jobs working for such a private institution while 
members of the permanent government stay put. Think tanks and academic institutions may 
hope to use that person’s contacts and tide him or her over until the next potential change in 
government occurs. Consequently, these people come up with new ideas and concepts, hoping 
to foster a pool of talent for the next election and return to government positions after the next 
cycle. Against this background, the output of the energetic think tank community in Washing-
ton, D.C., and beyond must be understood a potential factor of medium-term agenda-setting 
(Braml 2012).  
                                                          
120
 The Marine Corps is under the jurisdiction of the Department of the Navy, but has its own ethos and standing 
– while it relies on the funds for its platforms and weapons to come from the overall DON budget. Lately, the 
USMC has been increasingly used in the expeditionary campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, provoking a scoffing 
characterization as a second land army. Since 2001, it has been increasingly co-elevated in standing.  
121
 Additionally, those associations that support a certain professional cause merit attention. Illustrative examples 
in the realm of the Navy should include such interest groups as the Navy League of the United States, the Naval 
Order of the United States, the Surface Warfare Association, and various veterans’ associations.  
122
 For instance, the annual AIPAC (American-Israeli Political Action Committee) conference has become a key 
event on the schedules of many decision-makers. Likewise, industry trade shows such as the annual Sea Air 
Space Exposition are often utilized for programmatic speeches by SECNAV, SECDEF, USN flag officers, and 
other principal makers of U.S. Navy strategy. As other shapers, the influence on the course of events is difficult 
to discern – but noteworthy nonetheless.  
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The influence of national Media on policy decisions (and, eventually, strategy-making) needs 
to be taken into account as well (Kleinsteuber/Kutz 2012). For the news media, this was de-
scribed as a “CNN effect” in 1993 by veteran diplomat George F. Kennan (1993: A14).123 
Although the term was coined using the relatively new cable news network and figured prom-
inently in the context of U.S. experience intervening in the Somali civil war 1992-1994, it is 
in fact far from being a modern phenomenon.
124
 For the U.S., media reports often decisively 
triggered or subsequently shaped military interventionism in such instances as the Spanish-
American War 1898, the Vietnam War (1964-1973), and the Teheran Hostage Crisis of 
1979/80 (van Belle 2012: 277-278). The revolutionary potential harnessed from the introduc-
tion of social media since the early 2000s, social media websites such as Twitter, Facebook, 
Flickr, and Youtube, and the wide advent of the internet have dramatically increased the 
speed and potential impact of news media reporting on policy-makers, but also offer a number 
of new opportunities to engage to public.
125
 
Finally, one must also mention the Laws and Courts as secondary framers of the shape and 
form of American seapower. The premier direction to the seapower makers, and by implica-
tion for U.S. Navy Strategy, obviously stems from the U.S. Constitution. Title 10 of U.S. 
Code (as amended) is the key legal text that governs how American seapower is constitut-
ed.
126
 The judicial branch it is deeply interlinked with the executive and legislative branches 
through the checks-and-balances system, but rarely mingles with grand and military, let alone 
naval, strategic issues. Exceptions to the rule are the potentially wide-ranging decisions of 
federal courts on the ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ policies regarding military service of gays and 
lesbians (1994, repealed in 2011) or the Defense of Marriage Act (1996, ruled unconstitution-
                                                          
123
 CNN = Cable News Network, usually referred by its acronym. The Atlanta, Georgia-based, 24-hour cable 
news channel was founded in 1980. 
124
 The U.S. decision to intervene in Somalia was partially motivated by the images of the humanitarian crisis in 
the failing country. Consequently, when U.S. Marines of the United Task Force (UNITAF) conducted an (unop-
posed) amphibious assault and landed at the beach and the airport at Mogadishu on 9 December 1992, they were 
greeted by a trove of reporters and TV cameras eager to transport images of the U.S.-led intervention into the 
living-room of the world. By the same token, the decision to leave the country is also attributed to the grave 
images that were broadcast worldwide after American helicopters were shot down over Somalia’s capital on 3 
and 4 October 1993. Five U.S. Special Forces soldiers were killed in action and a couple of the bodies were 
mutilated and dragged through the streets of Mogadishu.  
125
 One can also consider the use of popular culture (music, television, computer games, and movies) by the 
Navy and its friendly-minded supporters to raise public awareness of the service. For a discussion of the rela-
tionship between the Navy and Hollywood, see Suid (1996). For a short article on the relationship between the 
Navy and popular culture, including “The Simpsons” TV series, the “Top Gun” movie (1986), and the music 
video “If I Could Turn Back Time” by the artist Cher, see Bruns (2010a).  
126
 Other acts with wide-reaching decision-making and -planning implications are the aforementioned National 
Security Act (1947), which established a centralized bureaucratic and military command structure, and the 
Goldwater-Nichols Act (1986) which brought the concept of jointness into being.  
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al in 2013), and rulings on authorization on the use of military force. They can inhibit or pro-
pel military effectiveness, especially in times of crisis.
127
  
7.2.4 American Seapower and Alliance Considerations  
Finally, the debate of potent shapers of U.S. Navy strategy must include the important inter-
national context, in particular normative roots and political and military alliances 
(Varwick/Hecht 2012). After all, this context is a principal determinant of U.S. sea power. 
Geography and alliances indicate where, when, and how U.S.-led sea power can be directed. 
The actual process of aligning ways, means, and ends regarding the use of military (naval) 
force obviously is confined to the American context (grand, military, and naval/maritime 
strategies are usually a sovereign function after all), but alliance and international organiza-
tional constraints must be considered. The U.S. is obviously bound by international law and 
subscribes to established norms and forums. It is a member of various international organiza-
tions and alliances, and a signatory or implicit supporter to numerous multilateral agreements 
with a security and/or maritime dimension.  
The United States is bound in one military alliance in particular: NATO.
128
 The alliance, a 
political and military pact formed in 1949 against the increasingly assertive Soviet Union and 
its satellite regimes, is a system of collective defense (Kaplan 1999). Article 5 of the treaty 
states that after appropriate review and decision-making, an attack on one member state shall 
be considered an attack on all member states. This unique function, designed for the Cold 
War, was not invoked until after the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 (Hallams 2010). 
Today, NATO, as a fundamentally trans-oceanic alliance, operates four standing naval task 
groups.
129
 NATO naval forces were involved in embargo and strike operations in the Balkan 
Wars during the 1990s and operations against Libya (2011). To date, there is a NATO anti-
piracy operation at the Horn of Africa (“Operation Ocean Shield”) and since 2001 naval forc-
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 For a very recent example, see Gates (2014: 332-333). The Secretary of Defense and the service chiefs were 
very concerned that a quick repeal of the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell” policy, e.g., if the policy was declared uncon-
stitutional by the Supreme Court, would have detrimental effects for unit cohesion and fighting morale on the 
front lines in Iraq and Afghanistan.  
128
 On European influence on U.S. foreign policy, see Risse-Kappen (1995). 
129
 Standing NATO Maritime Groups 1 and 2 (which evolved from standing NATO naval forces in the Atlantic, 
activated in 1968, and the Mediterranean, activated in 1992) and Standing NATO Mine Countermeasure Groups 
1 and 2 (activated under different names in 1973 and 1999, respectively) train and operate together. U.S. Navy 
units are participating regularly in these exercises, providing a visible commitment to the alliance. 
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es have been engaged in “Operation Active Endeavour” in the Mediterranean to enhance mar-
itime security and provide for maritime domain awareness.
130
  
The U.S. Navy also conducts or participates in a host of multinational maneuvers and exercis-
es designed to improve interoperability and to convey political ends. While these exercises do 
not hold automated defense obligations for Washington, they are an expression of politico-
military objectives and signal intent to partners and adversaries. Forward-based or forward-
deployed naval forces provide the necessary options to commanders, which once again under-
lines the versatile nature of naval assets. The annual US-led exercise in the Baltic Sea pro-
vides an illustrative example. Baltops was first conducted in 1971 under direction and com-
mand of a U.S. Navy admiral. Recently, the exercise even featured the participation of former 
Warsaw Pact forces, and even the Russian Navy as recently as in 2013.
131
 This is a marked 
difference from earlier such tactical operational maneuvers of Cold War days. During Baltops 
1985, when five U.S. Navy warships practiced in conjunction with NATO navies, the reac-
tivated battleship Iowa (BB 60) demonstratively fired a full broadside (in an cordoned-off 
area) east of the Danish island of Bornholm. That action certainly echoed with Soviet leader-
ship at the time. In both eras, the conduct of Baltops served immediate as well as larger 
American interests. Naval forces’ inherent flexibility and the particulars of the sea as an oper-
ating space allow a fine-tuned commitment to underscore political objectives.
132
 Growing 
Russian assertiveness against its European neighbors in 2014 has rekindled a debate in the 
U.S. over which treaty obligations justify going to war.
133
  
A similar military bond albeit without the same trigger as the NATO treaty exists for various 
other U.S. defense relations, such as in Pacific where allies like Japan and South Korea are 
currently concerned over an increasingly assertive and militarized Chinese foreign policy. 
Beijing’s policy raises concerns in Tokyo and Seoul as well as in other capitals in the Asia-
Pacific region. Japan and South Korea have a substantial U.S. military presence in their coun-
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 A study on the relationship between NATO and the U.S. Navy would be desirable. The same holds true for 
finding out if, when, and how multilateral vs. unilateral considerations have influenced the thinking of U.S. Na-
vy strategists.  
131
 In 2014, Russia did not participate in the Baltops exercise.  
132
 For U.S. Navy relations with foreign navies during the timeframe of interest for this study, see Swartz’ brief-
ing slides for the 1980s (2011h: 91-96, slides 181-191), 1990s (2012b: 115-122, slides 230-243), and 2000s 
(2011j: 181-194, slides 361-387). Also see Weir/Doyle (2013).  
133
 For an exemplary exchange of views on this contentious debate, see a debate at The National Interest in April 
2014. Justin Logan, director of foreign policy at the Cato Institute (Washington, D.C.), questioned the worth of 
going to war over a country such as Estonia on the grounds of a treaty (“Is Estonia Worth a War?”, 10 April). 
For a strong rebuttal, see David Santoro, Senior Fellow at CSIS (Washington, D.C.), who for the East European 
case argues that failure to uphold codified alliance defense commitments would undermine U.S. and NATO 
credibility, and by extension that of the entire U.S. alliance system (“America’s Treaty Allies: Worth Going to 
War Over?”, 28 April).  
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tries, and Japan hosts the U.S. Navy’s only forward-homeported nuclear aircraft carrier, cur-
rently the George Washington (CVN 73).
134
 
In the Middle East, specifically with regard to the U.S. commitment to Israeli defense and 
security, American assurance is also under closer scrutiny. These examples are designed to 
underscore that diplomatic and military treaty requirements at least implicitly influence 
American seapower posture and operational priorities. If defense obligations were invoked, 
they would have clear implications for U.S. defense policy. In fact, with forward-deployed 
U.S. sea power and the surge capabilities discussed, naval forces are particularly prone to be 
first-responders. Concurrently, U.S. military strategy – and by implication Navy strategy – 
has to take such scenarios into account. Accordingly, these dynamics need to be factored into 
strategic planning.  
7.2.5 The Enduring Persuasiveness of Ideas and Ideals 
How the United States seeks to shape global order, and to what ends it employs its military (in 
particular the Navy) to attain these goals, is a determining factor of America’s seapower pos-
ture. Obviously, such considerations are deeply linked to national interest and the political 
culture. A contemporary model proposes the theory of liberalism as a point of departure. Such 
a school of thought presumes that the traditional, neorealist balance-of-power politics fall 
short of providing sustained peace and security. The underpinning of U.S. policy in the pur-
suit of political goals (where applicable) are supported by military means (imperial liberalism) 
and/or the construction of hegemonic structures (hegemonic liberalism) (Krause 2009b: 91). 
The U.S. has an opportunity – some would perhaps even suggest an obligation – to responsi-
bly shape the world order. The promulgation of advancing democracy, human rights, and 
principles of a liberal economic order often drives U.S. foreign policy (although rhetoric and 
actual policy are often divergent: the latter is necessarily more pragmatic). This should not 
obstruct the notion that U.S. policies are first and foremost self-serving American interests, 
not global common political denominators. The nation’s tools of influence are manifold, and 
the presence of military power such as forward-stationed or -deployable naval force can be a 
central one.  
The visualization of national security can be traced to overarching, sometimes competing 
world order ideas. The analytical division into a realist-internationalist, a liberal-
internationalist, a realist-isolationist, and a liberal-isolationist vision is the most compelling 
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 George Washington will be relieved by Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) when the former will undergo a planned 
complex, multi-year overhaul. 
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(Rhodes 1999: 18). The realist-internationalist school of thought proposes a large capable 
military that enables the U.S. to single-handedly contain, deter, and defeat an adversary pow-
er. It was a favorable model for the Cold War years. By comparison, a liberal-internationalist 
model requires smaller forces whose main target is to assure allies and contain smaller re-
gional rogue states.  
Where in the realist-internationalist view military forces can be tailored for fighting war, pos-
sibly even for fighting the general war that represents the ultimate danger, in the liberal-
internationalist understanding military forces are required to be capable of a wider variety of 
activities. They need to be able to act in concert with allies or within a coalition framework, 
even when such cooperation is not military necessary (ibid: 19). 
A realist-isolationist worldview would instead lobby for a fortress America that is shielded 
from the perils of the world, but which punishes aggressors. A liberal-isolationist view, final-
ly, would dismiss the military as a tool to improve international order altogether. Such com-
peting visions are especially compelling after fundamental changes in the international envi-
ronment, where the nation ponders its future and the Navy (much like the rest of the military) 
has to justify its existence and relevance. The end of World War II offered much of the same 
knee-jerk as did the end of the Cold War and the post-9/11 years. In all instances, the Navy 
had to justify its place in the political establishment and anticipate what framework the presi-
dential administration would prefer to visualize American national security.  
Such competing theories are principal methods of attempting to explain U.S. foreign and se-
curity policy. If, when, and where sea power is fielded often rests on these paradigms offered 
by idealist, liberal, or realist convictions, world order visions, and geopolitical considerations. 
More fundamentally, the link among national grand strategy, national interests, and naval 
force is one worthwhile exploring. In other words, the question begs an answer as to when, 
why, and how America goes to war by sea. Here, the role of naval force in peacetime also 
factors in, for it has ramifications for naval presence, deployment patterns, and procurement. 
If a naval service cannot make its case along the lines of national imagination or the visions of 
its political leadership, it risks looking unimaginative and self-centered. To make a strategic 
difference, naval strategy needs to be finely attuned to such demands.  
There are two other sets of competing visions, more specifically about the nature of war 
America conducts and the role of naval power in such conflicts. These visions are principally 
either countersocietal or countermilitary (Rhodes 1999: 21-25). Whereas the former, rooted in 
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American colonial experience, sees war as a conflict that pits one national society against an-
other, the latter stems from the European state tradition and interprets war as a clash between 
rival nation-states and their professional military establishments. Consequently, with regard to 
the specific use of war and the targets against which armed force is directed, rivaling patterns 
emerge. Rhodes points out that a countersocietal way of war ultimately seeks to impose forci-
ble change on an adversary society. It accepts the use of military force to obtain political con-
cessions. In the countermilitary view, competition is framed as a struggle between armed pro-
fessional militaries instead and societal casualties are to be avoided at high costs: “In one, the 
deliberate reduction of the Soviet Union to radioactive rubble is acceptable; in the other, the 
accidental death of a few hundred civilians in a Bagdad shelter is unacceptable” (ibid: 21).  
Historically, American political culture has shifted between oceanic and cis- or transoceanic 
visions. Whereas the former assumes that control (indeed, command) of the international 
commons attains political objectives, the latter assumes that war requires the destruction or 
occupation of the adversary’s territory to achieve that purpose; the cisoceanic version puts a 
premium on protection of the homeland, which at least in theory assures a political stalemate. 
The following illustration shows the more practical ramifications of naval forces in the U.S. 
mindset. This paradigm has shaped U.S. naval thinking especially in times of strategic reori-
entation. 
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 Countersocietal Countermilitary 
Oceanic Vision  Main target is enemy 
commerce, not its mili-
tary forces 
 Imposing of unacceptable 
stalemate on an imperial 
aggressor  
 Force demands: im-
proved intelligence and 
reconnaissance, space-
based systems (cyber), 
long-range aviation, mis-
siles, choke point control, 
offensive mining, for-
ward submarine patrols, 
convoy escorts to defend 
own seaborne trade 
 Examples: Jeune École, 
German U-Boat fleet in 
World War I, II 
 Sea denial, destruction of 
enemy fleet 
 Navy need not be rou-
tinely forward-deployed 
 Force demands: Fleet to 
go deep into harm’s way; 
SSN (anti-ship/anti-
submarine missiles), car-
rier battle groups with 
capable air- and missile-
defense escorts  
 Examples: Mahan 
(1890s), post-Vietnam 
period 
Cis-/Transoceanic Vision  Strategic bombing 
 Navy support role (Ma-
rine Corps, Army, Air 
Force bring war to ene-
my) 
 Enemy navy needs to be 
neutralized if it attempts 
forward operations 
 SLOC control 
 Force demands: SSBN, 
CVNs, amphibious lift, 
ASW, superior surface 
fleet to deter enemy (bal-
anced fleet) 
 Example: early Cold War 
(1949-1968) 
 Strategic bombing less 
important 
 Force and power projec-
tion into the littoral (car-
rier air strikes, amphibi-
ous landings) 
 Protection of allies, swift 
and decisive force, SLOC 
control, precision strikes 
 Navy designed and rou-
tinely dispatched forward 
 Force demands: carriers, 
cruise missiles, 
AAW/BMD, mobile Ma-
rine units 
Illustration 16: Competing visions of war and their naval-strategic implications (Rhodes 1999: 23-25). 
There are two settings of sea power; this study uses the image of two dimensions of seapower. 
One is of a more functional (or horizontal) kind. It can best be described with basic geograph-
ic, geopolitical, and geophysical terms. Unsurprisingly, the United States displays seapower 
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features under that template. Such conditions can also be applied to allies and antagonists, 
foreign shores so to speak, for they constitute major operating areas for the U.S. Navy.  
The second dimension of seapower is an institutional (or vertical) one with much higher inter-
est to the strategic studies. With regard to the United States, it involves such complex deliber-
ations as organizational planning and learning, a definition and derivation of national inter-
ests, major makers and shapers of institutional seapower, and understanding the role of alli-
ances and ideas. Functional and institutional seapower form the context in which sea power is 
exercised. Accordingly, the context also significantly influences strategy-making.  
In theory strategy-making should directly and discernibly complement high policy in the es-
tablishment of goals and objectives for programming and war-planning. In practice, each level 
of strategy-making has its own demand and supply relationship, a function of the nature of the 
system (Hattendorf 2004: 1-2). This is a recipe for contradiction and disjunction. A strictly 
rational calculation of strategy is eclipsed by the practical necessity for simplification. Bu-
reaucratic interests and a high degree of uncertainty contribute to the confusion and render 
logical models limited in use. Any rational calculus is forever changing against the backdrop 
of political events and technological developments, which alter the situation at home and on 
the global stage. The development of strategy and the posture of American seapower and its 
application of sea power is a perpetual process of questioning, application, reexamination, 
constant adjustment, and reevaluation.  
This study will now turn to how these processes played out between 1981-1989, 1989-2001, 
and 2001-2011. 
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8 A “Naval Renaissance”135 through “The Maritime Strategy” (1981-
1989) 
Describing the 1980s as a gleaming ‘naval re-birth’ implies that there must have been a great 
deal of agony and sluggishness prior, in French parlor, a ‘naval baisse.’ It is instructive to 
look at the development of the U.S. Navy prior to the 1980s, in particular in the Cold War and 
the 1970s.
136
 Similar to changing currents and tides or the ‘bull and bear’ phases of the stock 
markets, strategic culture and strategic implementation also undergo periodic ups and down 
which in turn decisively affects the role of sea power, the genesis of capstone documents, and 
their respective political and military implementation.  
8.1 Prelude: 1945-1980, a “naval baisse?” 
The U.S. Navy came out of World War II as a large force resting on battleships and aircraft 
carriers. It was proud of its wartime contribution in defeating the Axis powers by large-scale 
transoceanic campaigns in the Atlantic and Pacific, in Europe, North Africa, and Asia. In con-
junction with allies, the U.S. Navy had developed and brought to bear a variety of sea power 
measures. These ranged from sea control, efficient ASW and ASuW, large-scale amphibious 
landings, carrier aviation, to naval gun-fire support, and others. A massive military and com-
mercial ship-building program sustained the allied efforts and provided the embattled allied 
war economies. Allied forces were supplied with men and materiel courtesy of U.S. maritime 
power. The war began on a shock on the morning of 7 December 1941 with the Japanese at-
tack on the U.S. naval base in Pearl Harbor (Hawaii) and ended for U.S. sea power on a high 
note with the Japanese capitulation on the deck of the battleship Missouri (BB 63) in Tokyo 
harbor on 2 September 1945. However, the Navy soon found itself in stormy political weath-
er. In September 1945, a month after the detonation of two nuclear bombs over Hiroshima 
and Nagasaki forced Japan to surrender (at the moment of the Navy’s apotheosis), Navy Sec-
retary James Forrestal appeared before the House Committee on Naval Affairs and asked, 
‘Why should we maintain any Navy after this war?’ Absent a maritime enemy, and with air-
atomic warfare the apparent mode of the future, the Navy did not have a mission (Baer 1994: 
275). 
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 Hartmann 1990; see also Rudolf (1990: 241-362) for a similar characterization.  
136
 For an overview of the U.S. Navy history and its capabilities from the founding to the early Cold War, see for 
example Love (1992a), Rose (2006a/b), and Symonds (2006). It is important to note that the history of capstone 
documents as a broad category can be traced back to roots of the U.S. Navy. The Navy always had some form of 
capstone document, of varying proficiency and quality, since its inception in 1775 (see Swartz 2011b: 47-58, 
slides 94-115 for a list), but none of the quantity and quality that emerged with “The Maritime Strategy” and the 
follow-on capstone documents.  
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The Soviet Union, the principal foreseeable antagonist, was a continental land power almost 
straight from a textbook, and did not possess an offensive naval fleet.
137
 The advent of nuclear 
weapons – the Soviet Union’s first testing of a weapon in 1949 ended the U.S. monopoly on 
the atomic bomb – in its cynical Dr. Strangeloveian sense lured many strategists to assume 
that nuclear delivery platforms and a small conventional standing army, not a globally-
engaged military controlling the seas, were the wave of the future. The next war, in all likeli-
hood, was bound to be quick, escalatory, nuclear, and ultimately devastating. In other words, 
strategic thinking was nuclear thinking (Schmidt-Skipiol 1992:4). That in turn either limited 
the Navy’s purpose to little more than transport of reinforcements. The prospect of all-out 
nuclear war degraded sea power. The anticipated World War III battlefields in Central Europe 
did not have much in common with the Navy’s Pacific campaigns at all. Organizationally, 
strategically, perhaps even intellectually, the Navy was ill-prepared for the post-war strategic 
landscape. Instead, it found itself fighting bureaucratic domestic wars. The reorganization of 
the national security apparatus through the creation of the Department of Defense (through 
the National Security Act of 1947, as later amended)
138
 robbed the Navy of considerable bu-
reaucratic clout and established the U.S. Air Force as a serious competitor for resources, polit-
ical influence, and a major role in the coming war.
139
 The Navy, as all services, was also sub-
ject to extensive demobilization from its wartime posture. This was significantly in the inter-
est of Congress, which proclaimed that, as Baer (1994: 278) pointed out, “the United States 
had command of the sea and was in no danger of losing it.” In an era of nuclear warfare, other 
uses of a Navy in limited warfare and power projection – two classic sea power measures, 
after all – were in little demand. However, the conditions under which defense policy operat-
ed soon changed. In April 1950, a joint group from the Department of State and the Depart-
ment of Defense issued a directive that changed the U.S. outlook on the world. National Secu-
rity Council memo # 68 (NSC-68)
140
 called for an assertive, staunch anti-Soviet policy 
worldwide, coupled with substantial investments in defense. Although the message did not 
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 See George Kennan alias X (1947). The famed essay “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” established the basis 
for the American policy of containing the Soviet Union using sea control as the glue that tied the United States to 
its European and Far East allies.  
138
 For the National Security Act (1947), as amended through Public Law 110–53(August 3, 2007), see Library 
of Congress (2007). 
139
 The argument between the Navy and the Air Force came to a heat in the controversy over resource allocation 
towards a new supercarrier, the planned United States (CVA 58). Only three days after the keel of the massive 
new warship was laid, construction was abandoned on the grounds that the money would be better invested in 
long-range B-36 bombers. This preservation of carrier aviation became known as ‘Revolt of the Admirals’, “and 
in these terms, the National Security Act of 1947 was a Navy victory. It denied the Air Force the control of naval 
aviation. The Navy could keep direct control of its carrier-based and land-based aircraft […].” (Baer 1994: 291) 
For an account, see Barlow (1994).  
140
 The original report was made available by the Truman Library: National Security Council (1950).  
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put the Navy in a significantly more favorable position, it implied a larger utility of American 
sea power in the emerging postwar order and a strategy of containment of Soviet Russia.  
Five World War II and post-war developments helped buttress the U.S. grand strategy of con-
tainment in the maritime realm, which later became known as combat-credible forward pres-
ence. First, the wartime creation and use of fast carrier task forces to attack and destroy criti-
cal targets ashore and at sea; second, the wartime creation and use of Navy-Marine Corps 
amphibious task forces to assault defended forward beaches; third, the late-war creation and 
use of mobile afloat logistic support forces to refuel and replenish forward warships far for-
ward, while underway, even in combat; fourth, the development of air-delivered nuclear 
bombs as the most lethal and important weapons in the American arsenal; and fifth, the 1949 
U.S. Navy decision to develop the attack submarine as a principal forward ASW weapon sys-
tem (Swartz 2014: 2-3).  
The decision to send the Missouri (BB 63) to Turkey in 1946 signaled early American com-
mitment to the volatile states in the East Mediterranean littorals in the face of Communist 
inroads. The U.S.-led United Nations force to intervene in the Korean War between 1950 and 
1953 relied substantially on naval assets such as battleships, carriers, and amphibious assaults. 
The Navy sought to bring to bear the advantages inherent to its force: mobility, readiness, 
flexibility, and power-projection ashore. Its instruments were more discriminating than what 
the Air Force and the supporters of nuclear war proposed. Other limited conflicts of the time 
seemed to vindicate that position and underscore the Navy’s role and the view the service 
held of itself. The Suez Crisis in 1956 underlined the troublesome constellation in the Middle 
East as a hot proxy conflict between East and West, and it gave a role to sea power. An Israeli 
drive toward the Suez Canal was backed by substantial British and French naval forces cen-
tered on battleships and carrier aviation. The Soviet Union was drawn into the conflict on the 
side of Arab nationalists; nuclear escalation was not ruled out by Soviet leader Nikita Khrush-
chev. The intervention of U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower halted the escalatory path and 
eventually defused a crisis that severely curtailed British and French power and prestige.
141
 
Two years after Suez, the U.S. intervention in Lebanon in 1958 rested on the capabilities of 
the recently-established, forward-based U.S. Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean Sea. The Suez 
crisis and the U.S. intervention in the Levant also turned out to be a significant motivation for 
the Soviet Union to acquire more offensive sea power capabilities under the leadership of 
Admiral Sergey Gorshkov.  
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The Cuban Missile Crisis in October 1962, which put Soviet missiles on the U.S. doorstep, 
was eventually defused by the installation of a naval quarantine (a type of naval blockade) 
around the Communist-ruled Caribbean island, which drove home the value of measured po-
litical and military responses, particular by American sea power.
142
 Consequently, the doc-
trine of massive retaliation (a general nuclear war strategy devised in the mid-1950s) was su-
perseded by a doctrine of flexible response by the late 1960s. U.S.-led sea control supported 
the containment of the Soviet Union by surrounding it with forward-based forces and cover-
ing the seas in between (Baer 1994: 335). Whereas the grand and military strategies against 
the Soviet Union were codified, the U.S. Navy failed to publish its thinking in written, public-
ly concise, and declaratory fashion. That left the position of the Navy dependent on that the 
global political fever chart, domestic political opinion, and the general budget share that the 
service could obtain. The Navy’s narrative atrophied because it was not explained what exact 
strategic importance the Navy had in the overall design of U.S. foreign and security policy 
(Schmidt-Skipiol 1992: 5).  
Meanwhile, new platforms such as the Forrestal-class aircraft carrier, the development of sea-
launched missiles capable of carrying nuclear warheads, and the feasibility of nuclear propul-
sion for surface warships and submarines gave the Navy longer, state-of-the art legs. This 
shaped the Navy’s raison d’être but came at further cost to its strategic mindset and its mili-
tary-intellectual capabilities. The promises of technology eclipsed the need to think about the 
political ends of naval warfare. Admiral Hyman G. Rickover, the father of the nuclear navy, 
established a power base outside of service control. Until his forced retirement, Rickover 
went on a comprehensive campaign to establish and maintain a nuclear Navy. Although each 
warfare community (surface, subsurface, aviation) wrestled for support and influence, win-
ning support for nuclear-powered ships significantly drove the Navy’s narrative.  
In the next major crisis, the Vietnam War (1964-1973), U.S. sea control remained largely un-
contested, and consequently the Navy very much focused on strike warfare against shore tar-
gets. Sustained carrier strike warfare, naval gunfire support, coastal and riverine operations, 
counterinsurgency, and late in the war the mining of North Vietnamese ports drove USN in-
volvement in Vietnam. This came at the expense of Navy sea control capabilities (Nich-
ols/Tillman 1987, Sherwood 2004, Marolda et al. 2013). Meanwhile, in Washington, the De-
fense Reorganization Act of 1958 had given increasing operational and force-structure plan-
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ning oversight to the Secretary of Defense at the expense of the CNO. Secretary of Defense 
Robert McNamara’s style of management frustrated many who saw a Navy’s value in more 
than just riverine and coastal small-boat operations, carrier air strikes against an elusive ene-
my, and junior partnership to the other branches of the U.S. military, but they lacked argu-
ments against seeming compelling numbers and statistics that came from the Pentagon leader-
ship. It did not help that President Lyndon B. Johnson micro-managed a significant number of 
U.S. military issues in Vietnam, and that the Army and Air Force had shouldered considera-
bly more costs and losses in South East Asia. The Navy found itself between a rock and a 
hard place. The war in Vietnam threw the Navy off balance. It was the limited war the Navy 
had talked about when it rationalized its force-structure and training to contrast with the popu-
lar nuclear-war scenarios. Against a coastal country, major tactical firepower could be 
brought to bear, and the use of attack aircraft carriers and bombers for shore bombing vindi-
cated the force structure. Ultimately, the Navy was much less prepared for other dimensions 
of limited war, such as small-unit actions to attain coastal control, riverine patrols, and coun-
terinsurgency. The emphasis of carrier air strikes also came at the expense of understanding 
and practicing the value of sea control in the age of the flexible military response strategy 
(Baer 1994: 392-393).  
In July 1969, President Richard Nixon, in an address on the Pacific island of Guam sought a 
way out of the unwinnable war in Southeast Asia. In what became known as the Nixon Doc-
trine,
143
 the President went on record underlining that the U.S. would keep its treaty and alli-
ance commitments. It would also continue to provide nuclear deterrence for its allies, but un-
like before, the U.S. would stay out of what it saw as regional Asian wars. To support the 
Nixon doctrine, an ocean strategy based on a deterrent force of missile submarines and a gen-
eral-purpose fleet was formulated. The latter presumably permitted the Navy to control select-
ed sea areas, project power abroad, and maintain a naval presence where desirable, albeit with 
a much smaller force (Ryan 1981: 66). 
In other words, the Navy faced three major challenges. It tilted internally toward some mis-
sions at the expense of others and at the cost of intellectual verve of broad, comprehensive 
understanding and application of sea power; it was disadvantageous in the budgetary competi-
tion with the other services which bore the brunt of Vietnam; and in the face of financial aus-
terity under Nixon, it had to rely on and utilize an increasingly aging and shrinking fleet still 
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featuring a large number of different ship and aircraft types. Dramatic social and demographic 
dynamics in desegregating the Navy and transitioning to an all-volunteer force (reflecting 
developments in U.S. society accordingly) put an additional burden on the service.
144
 The 
Navy’s public image was further rocked by such catastrophes as the deadly blaze aboard the 
aircraft carrier Forrestal (CV 59).
145
 To add insult to injury, just as the United States wan-
dered deeper and deeper into the Vietnamese quagmire and the Navy faced its internal prob-
lems, the Soviet Navy aspired to emerge as a formidable naval challenger on the high seas. 
Moscow sought to augment its coastal defense forces (which relied on diesel submarines and 
light surface units) with more capable ships, thus reflecting broader geopolitical claims and 
significant strategic ambitions for a blue-water navy.
146
  
At the time of withdrawal from Vietnam, the U.S. Navy had maneuvered itself into a corner 
and was not able to stand up to a sea-control challenger. As an institution, the Navy had ad-
hered to power-projection and reliance on attrition air strikes from the sea against a foreign 
shore. This came at the cost of neglecting the sea control mission. Concurrently, the discourse 
concentrated on naval platforms, not the missions. The introduction of nuclear-powered bal-
listic submarines (SSBN) had freed the aircraft carriers from their nuclear role and provided 
an impetus for revitalized thinking what could be achieved with these (and other) ships in the 
first place.  
At the same time, a reemergence of conventional war concepts provided a new thrust for Na-
vy thinking and planning. The Sino-Soviet political split signaled the potential for inner-
Communist bloc rifts and provided leverage for U.S. strategy. The defense drawdown by the 
United Kingdom (including the Royal Navy) from east of Suez pointed to an increasingly 
important transfer of presence requirements to the U.S. and its Navy.
147
 Decolonization after 
World War II had multiplied the number of states, some of which were often drawn into vio-
lent civil wars and then became sites for proxy superpower conflict. In parallel, world mari-
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time trade experienced a growth, despite the first in a row of oil price shocks, as still more and 
more first-world countries emerged as economic powers since 1945.
148
  
This is not to say that the nuclear, bipolar world ceded dominating world affairs; in fact, just 
as the superpowers negotiated the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), other countries (India, 
South Africa, and Pakistan) aspired to join the exclusive nuclear club. Wars continued to oc-
cur frequently, and these crises would be more complex than ever. Such thinking emphasized 
conventional force, even in the age of nuclear warfare, as the weapon of choice. Ironically, 
opposing (and roughly equal) nuclear forces diminished in their political value, while conven-
tional balances became more important in their relation to nuclear equilibrium, deterrence, 
and incremental escalation. The Cold War and the vast conceptual and ideological differences 
between the East and the West had settled in the minds (and purses) of decision-makers. Dé-
tente, the easing of the Cold War begun under Richard Nixon and continued under his succes-
sor Gerald Ford, for the time being replaced the containment approach toward the Soviet Un-
ion. However, direct Soviet-American conflict was always a possibility, as the naval confron-
tation during the Yom Kippur War (1973) readily demonstrated.
149
 
The Navy needed to reinvigorate its offensive strategic thinking rather than simply support 
defensive considerations. To that end, five major efforts to codify Navy thinking emerged 
during the 1970s: These were “Project SIXTY” (1970), “Missions of the U.S. Navy” (1974), 
“Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy” (1975-1978), “Sea Plan 2000” (1978), and “The Future 
of U.S. Sea Power” (1979). The selection of the commander of the U.S. brown-water naval 
forces in Vietnam, Admiral Elmo “Bud” Zumwalt, as Chief of Naval Operations is therefore 
not without a timely sense of irony. A hands-on personality, Zumwalt was “determined to 
right the balance and give the Navy a full-service doctrine and a full-service force” (Baer 
1994: 393). That included the designation of the Strategic Concepts Branch (OP-603) and the 
CNO Executive Panel (OP-00K), specific offices within OPNAV to foster and institutionalize 
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strategic planning. “Project SIXTY”150 (a planning memorandum, Zumwalt’s favorite vehicle 
to distribute his views in the navy) was signed by Zumwalt in 1970. It was a self-described 
assessment and sought to give the Navy a direction. Strategic deterrence, sea control, power 
projection, and maritime presence were articulated as the principle ordered tasks of the U.S. 
Navy for American national security.
151
 The memorandum proposed to shape the future fleet 
along the lines of a “hi-low mix” of expensive capital ships for power projection (specifically 
new carriers and some submarines) and more affordable, smaller, low-value sea control com-
batants.
152
  
“Missions of the U.S. Navy,” drafted and signed by Vice Admiral Stansfield Turner (then 
President of the Naval War College), was published four years later (Turner 1974). It elabo-
rated on the preceding document and outlined four distinct naval missions: power projection, 
sea control, naval presence, and strategic deterrence. Those were the ‘classic 4’ that funda-
mentally focused the Navy’s roles in U.S. foreign and security policy.153 Turner’s paper illus-
trated the relationship of missions and tactics, created new vocabulary, and underlined the 
focus on the Soviet Union, thus providing lasting intellectual legacy for the Navy officer 
corps in the decades to come. The advent of new platforms and technologies and the introduc-
tion of the Harpoon-type anti-ship missile in the 1970s provided a further influx of capabili-
ties to support a broader mission- and mind-set.
154
 However, the national leadership in the 
early and mid-1970s was not very receptive to include power projection or sea control. Con-
sequently, the services did not even need to consider their role in the next war and the politi-
cal ends of their contributions to national defense. The Navy (much like the Marine Corps, the 
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Army, and the Air Force) continued to think about itself in isolation and focused on how to 
fight, not why.  
For the Navy, one of the more palpable side effects of détentist, retrenched high-level policy 
decisions after the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal was a drop in force levels. Old 
ships were retired en block and scrapped without suitable replacements. Congressional auster-
ity, a senior political leadership that invested in other things than the Navy, and the high infla-
tion rate which drove up unit cost further limited ship-procurement. Consequently, the Navy 
battle force consistently stayed behind the force level goals articulated by its leaders. Fleet 
size dropped from 769 in 1970 to just 512 in 1975. It reached a contemporary all-time low of 
464 in 1977 (Hattendorf 2004: xiv-xv). This quantitative attrition of American sea power was 
met with intellectual erosion of sound naval strategic thinking; Admiral Rickover’s nuclear 
ideology went so deeply into the service’s educational and operational structure that it left 
little room for thought exercises (and writings) on more traditional naval missions and how 
these in turn should shape strategy.  
In the face of a worn-out and ever-shrinking fleet, Admiral James L. Holloway (CNO 1974-
1978) provided a new focus on long-range planning, including calling for prospective ship 
levels from 500 to 800 warships (Hattendorf 2004: 7-8). To Holloway, sea control and power 
projection were not to be ranked or prioritized. Instead, they necessitated each other (Schmidt-
Skipiol 1992: 6). A qualitatively and quantitatively robust and more capable naval force 
would be needed – not least because the momentous Red Fleet exercises Okean-70 (1970) and 
Okean-75 (1975) drove home to many the extent of Soviet naval armament and their adoption 
of a global offensive maritime strategy.
155
 The emergence of a Soviet blue-water navy 
sparked increasing attention for Soviet naval doctrine, strategy, and operations. That analysis 
surprisingly indicated that the Soviet Union assigned a much higher priority to defending the 
Soviet homeland and its strategic SSBN reserve. A Battle-of-the-Atlantic-style campaign 
against allied sea lines of communication, which had loomed large in Western strategic 
minds, was comparably less important (Center for Naval Analyses 1992: 48). This insight 
yielded one of the central tenets of “The Maritime Strategy” a decade later, namely configur-
ing its forces and thrust to engage the SSBN, not to guard Atlantic SLOCs.  
For the time being, senior leaders in Washington were consumed by domestic post-Watergate 
and post-Vietnam agendas, which added to overall strategic uncertainty. Successive admin-
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istrations under Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter reduced the Navy’s role in 
national war plans, with the notable exception of the nuclear ballistic missile submarines now 
used for strategic deterrence. Presidents followed a policy that hoped to drive strategic deci-
sions through a combination of cost-control measures, diplomacy with the Soviet Union, a 
hope for arms-control agreements, and a rejection of limited armed conflicts like Vietnam 
(Baer 1994: 411). 
Very prominently, the concept of swinging the U.S. Navy from the Pacific to the European 
theater in times of crisis and war gained some notoriety. The Navy operated under what was 
known as the 1.5-war assumption, or providing enough forces to respond to one contingency 
in Europe and have the on-station Pacific forces ‘swing’ to the European theatre if deemed 
necessary (or the other way around). Few Navy leaders doubted the potentially devastating 
consequences of this plan. The underlying assumption implied the desertion of U.S. interests 
in the Pacific. From the Aleutians to Japan, the Pacific would be left essentially unprotected. 
The Indian Ocean would also be affected. In times of conflict and crises, this could have dis-
astrous consequences, both militarily and politically.   
The Navy instead wanted to give intellectual support to the concept of keeping a two-ocean 
force ready and available should superpower war (contrary to the conviction of the senior 
leadership) not be confined to the Central European front. In practice, however, the ‘swing 
strategy’ remained official doctrine, however fraught with geostrategic challenges and consid-
erable intellectual shortsightedness it was. National strategy had largely dismissed the Pacific, 
and consequently the Navy did not receive sufficient guidance for that theater. The reasoning 
went ‘Why have a two-ocean navy at all, when the national strategy does not favor an offen-
sive, global seapower role in general war with the Soviet Union in the first place?’.  Contrary 
to the assumptions in Washington, to the Navy the war in the Pacific would have been by all 
predictions not a half-war, but rather part of a two-ocean war with the Soviet Union, one for 
which the Navy was ill-prepared. Toward the end of the 1970s, the gap between internal Navy 
thinking and the naval part of the national defense policy as outlined in the Carter administra-
tion’s Presidential Review Memorandum-10 (PRM-10) widened (The White House 1977). 
Critics such as the political scientist and military strategist Edward Luttwak blasted the ad-
ministration and the Navy publicly for failing to come up with a coherent and consistent mari-
time strategy (Hattendorf 2004: 13). 
Secretary of the Navy Graham Claytor and Undersecretary of the Navy James Woolsey took 
it upon them to produce “Sea Plan 2000”, a study was done with the consent of – and direc-
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tion of – the Secretary of Defense.156 A working group’s effort from the Secretariat of the 
Navy, the document underlined how naval forces could be decisive in crises and war with the 
Soviet Union by maintaining stability through forward deployments and the perception of 
naval power; by containing crises through their inherent capability to affect outcomes ashore 
and lasting superiority at sea versus the Red Fleet; and by deterring global war through the 
protection of sea lines of communication, reinforcement of allies, holding pressure against the 
Soviet Union, and hedging against further possible contingencies (Hattendorf 2004: 15, 
Swartz 2011a: 6, slides 11-12). It also suggested three different force level options aimed at 
maintaining “a balanced fleet as national insurance” (Ryan 1981: 130). This served to turn 
around force level declines and to reflect that despite the U.S. industrial base’ capabilities, 
warships could not be churned out from the shipyards overnight. At the same time, “Project 
Sea Strike”, a complimentary effort aimed at taking on the Soviet military at sea, originated 
with Admiral Thomas Hayward during his time as Commander, U.S. Seventh Fleet 
(Hattendorf 2004: 17-20). Hayward wanted to place the Pacific Fleet within a global naval 
strategy to be used in the event of war with the Soviet Union. In his mind, the Pacific Fleet 
needed to develop an offensive plan, if only for political flexibility, not just keep the defen-
sive one that it already had. Ultimately, such offensive-minded ideas would serve to hedge 
against the impractical reflex to swing forces from the Pacific to another theater. Hattendorf 
(2004: 18-19) pointed out that “[…] By using Sea Strike as a threat to the Soviet Union, Pa-
cific Fleet planners argued that U.S. naval forces in the Pacific could make a strategic differ-
ence by preventing the move of Soviet forces to Europe.” Together with re-discovering its 
naval mission roots, the Navy now proposed thinking about the larger political context and 
began to emancipate itself from the burdens of the past. Those in Washington, however, were 
not quite ready to support this.  
Hayward soon succeeded Holloway as CNO, serving from 1978 to 1982. In congressional 
hearings on Capitol Hill, Hayward criticized the civilian planning in the Department of De-
fense and how it stood diametrically opposed to naval planning. To Congress, the administra-
tion, and the public, he sought to explain the need for an offensive Navy with a global aspira-
tion. Hayward suggested a naval force that relied on technological superiority and carrier avi-
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ation that offensively addressed Soviet claims to power. If possible, the Soviet Navy should 
not have the luxury of maintaining sanctuaries for its conventional and nuclear maritime as-
sets. At the same time, Hayward reminded his audiences of the principle of calculated risk. A 
coherent and sensible force structure was as imperative as the integration of allies into it, 
Hayward noted. In his view, sea power was also critically important for the post-conflict envi-
ronment. In theory, this offered a compelling narrative for a large, strong, and global Navy.
157
 
However, Hayward soon learned that convincing political leaders is often more of a marathon 
than a 100-yard dash. A global maritime thinking did not fare well with President Carter and 
his Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown. The administration continued to direct resources 
toward meeting the Red Army on the ground in Europe, not at sea. A maritime strategy was 
superseded by continental commitment and the focused shifted away from the Pacific (as the 
Navy underlined) to Central Europe (where the Army and the Air Force succeeded). The two-
ocean Navy concept was not maintained further. By all indications, the Navy was closer to 
being reduced to a one-ocean force than growing into a two-ocean navy.  
For the time being, the colliding ideas in Washington over the role and direction of the U.S. 
Navy could not be resolved, although Carter (a U.S. Naval Academy graduate, after all) did 
not fully dismiss a Navy’s role. To him, the main task remained sea control and Third World 
contingencies. The President engaged actively in debates about the future U.S. Navy. Carter, 
e.g., supported a smaller, conventionally-powered carrier earmarked for peacetime presence 
missions (dubbed the CVV) during 1978/1979. He encountered the fierce opposition of those 
who lobbied for further nuclear-powered Nimitz-class large aircraft carriers. These platforms 
were the most capable aircraft carriers in the world. They were designed for global operations 
and general war against the Soviet Union, and its supporters insisted that power projection 
and sea control for the Navy were mutually accommodating and indivisible.
158
 A distant 
blockade of the Soviet Union was floated as an alternative by the supporters of the Carter pol-
icies, but that amounted to a move that never gained much traction (Rudolf 1990: 161). Even-
tually, the Navy was able to lobby Congress successfully for the inclusion of CVN 71 (the 
future Theodore Roosevelt) into the budget for fiscal year 1980. The point was made that 
without a sufficient number of CVNs, the Navy feared that it would be reduced to convoy 
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escorts and ASW (Love 1992b: 674). As such, “Sea Strike” and “Sea Plan 2000” were the 
Navy’s codified attempts to push back the defense policy of the Carter administration (and 
scuttle the CVV in the process). The main point of the Navy’s argument was that the Central 
Front could not be seen isolated from the European flanks such as the Mediterranean and the 
Norwegian Sea. What was more, an emphasis on a NATO-Warsaw Pact war in Germany with 
a severely constrained role for naval forces, in the minds of Navy advocates, risked national 
survival.  
Linking policy objectives to war-fighting capabilities again became the essence of strategic 
thinking and a competitive narrative. Admiral Hayward quite masterfully nourished this re-
naissance within the Navy in the face of a militarily hesitant, human-rights-policies-heavy 
Carter administration that clearly preferred continental over maritime thinking.
159
 In the 
minds of Navy leaders, the Navy needed to offer a compelling idea that overcame the estab-
lished strategy which on a battle between ground forces and supporting air forces in Germany 
(which, to most Navy people, was not even strategy, but rather a logistics exercise and a ques-
tion of ‘Who could get there first?’). As Rear Admiral (ret.) James Stark recounts (interview 
2012, 00:00:45-00:01:30), “There was no deception, there was no political dimension to it; 
the Navy wanted to put more of that in [the debate].”  
These developments occurred against the background of geopolitical events that seemed to 
give the Soviet Union and its allies a leg up in the bipolar world conflict.
160
 In the Indian 
Ocean region and the Middle East, U.S. foreign policy was fundamentally challenged by the 
Soviet invasion in Afghanistan in December 1979, which (aside from being a demonstration 
of conventional military power) promised Moscow potential access to warm-water ports in 
Pakistan. A little further to the West, the fall of the U.S.-supported Shah in Iran to the Mullah 
regime in January 1979 replaced one authoritarian regime with another, albeit this one 
staunchly anti-American. Admiral (ret.) “Ace” Lyons asserted that, “The Carter administra-
tion never really understood that the Shah and his military was the underpinning for our [the 
U.S., S.B.] military strategy in the Persian Gulf.” (Lyons interview 2012: 00:32:50 – 
00:33:10) The kidnapping of U.S. embassy personnel on 4 November 1979 yielded the Tehe-
ran hostage crisis. It lasted a full 444 days, and a U.S. military operation to free the captives 
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slides (2011f). 
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(“Operation Eagle Claw”) resulted in catastrophic failure (Crist 2013: 31-32).161 In a sweep-
ing recognition of the strategic interests of the United States in the Persian Gulf region, Jim-
my Carter proclaimed a new policy during his State of the Union address in January 1980.
162
 
The president announced the prospective use of force if the vital U.S. Indian Ocean/Persian 
Gulf interests were impaired by a Soviet takeover. The presence of two carrier strike groups 
during the course of the crisis signaled the merits of a continuous, combat-credible forward 
naval presence in the region that went beyond the island of Diego Garcia (recently leased 
from the British). However, there were simply no assets available for a three-ocean Navy that 
was needed to convincingly buttress the Carter Doctrine. In other words, and certainly not 
limited to the Indian Ocean, Carter essentially began naval armament without wanting to pay 
for it (Love 1992b: 700).
163
  
After one term, Carter was voted out of office in the November 1980 general election. The 
Navy had learned the hard way that “as any other agent of government, [it] is the instrument 
of national policy, its junior partner in every regard, and to disassociate itself from the broad 
national position is to disassociate itself from the source of its purpose and its strength” (Baer 
1994: 415). Yet, the Navy’s rearguard battles set the stage for a reinvigoration of strategic 
naval thinking that formed the roots of “The Maritime Strategy”. Both as a process and a cap-
stone document (or, more fittingly, a series of documents), “The Maritime Strategy” is a 
product of its 1970s context.  
8.2 U.S. Navy Strategy 1981-1989: The macro-level  
8.2.1 Global trends & Challengers to U.S. Security 
The Soviet Union appeared to come out of the 1970s on a high note, having acquired visible 
influence and access worldwide. The build-up of its blue-water navy and its challenge to the 
United States were symbolically illustrated best by the Soviet’s utilization of the former U.S. 
naval bases in Cam Ranh and Da Nang (Vietnam). The Soviet Union’s naval build-up result-
ed in a quantitative, but not necessarily qualitative dynamic upper hand at sea versus the Unit-
ed States early in the decade. The Red Fleet’s global aspirations were visibly underlined by 
the large Okean-80 naval exercise (1980). The introduction of new warships such as the 
Akula-class attack submarines first commissioned in 1984 – which could not be detected reli-
ably by the U.S.-maintained SOSUS system – drove home the point of global Soviet blue-
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 For an on-scene account of the operation by one of the commanders, see Kyle (1990).  
162
 For an analysis of this new grand strategic component, see Crist (2013: 33-48). For the text of the speech, see 
Carter (1980).  
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 On the U.S. Navy’s shift to the Indian Ocean, see Ryan (1981: 153-166). 
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water intentions.
164
 The impression of a stable, powerful, even prosperous Soviet Union 
would turn around within just a few years. Moscow witnessed a stunning stagnation and a 
rapid succession of leaders. Leonid Brezhnev, in office since 1964, died in 1982. He was suc-
ceeded by the ailing Juri Andropov, who passed away in 1984. Then, Konstantin Chernenko 
governed little over a year before dying in 1985. His successor, in turn, was the young and 
assertive Michael Gorbachev. Under his reign, the tight grip of the Soviet Union on its War-
saw Pact alliance loosened imperceptibly.
165
 The continuous unraveling of Communist lead-
ership led to the end to the Cold War in 1989. But for the early and mid-1980s, nuclear-
underwritten bipolarity seemed destined to stay. The bipolar world order – not to be confused 
with the medical condition, but perhaps often with similar symptoms – was a hallmark of su-
perpower relations. While the Cold War deepened at the beginning of the 1980s, major arms 
limitations inroads contained and then reduced the number of nuclear weapons in the second 
half of the decade.
166
  
On balance, the constellation of parallel Cold War and lower-level inter- and intrastate com-
petition continued to dominate international affairs. The 1980s marked a continued rise in the 
number and lethality of terrorism incidents, and the number of reported natural disasters was 
on the rise as well (Swartz 2011h: 4-5, slides 7-9). There was also a visible upswing in the 
number of multilateral forums and international codification. Examples include the G-7 meet-
ing of the world’s seven largest economies as a key political steering and coordination forum. 
Significant in the maritime domain, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS) was codified (The United Nations 1982).
167
 In the United Nations, the United 
States continued to exercise its rights and obligations as a permanent member on the U.N. 
Security Council which it held since 1945.
168
 In Europe, the process of political integration 
continued to deepen. The European Community (EC), created in 1957 and more of an eco-
nomic integration tool than a military partner for the United States (that role would rest prin-
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 On the rise of the Soviet Union as a major naval power, see e.g. Ryan (1981: 135-152), Potter/Nimitz (1982: 
1016-1043). On the state of Soviet naval strategy and programs through the 1990s as of late 1982 from the U.S. 
intelligence community, see the unclassified, insightful national intelligence estimate (NIE 11-15-82/D), reprint-
ed in Hattendorf (2004: 101-182). 
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 Poland for instance was the first country under Moscow’s umbrella to allow labor unions. A few years earlier 
in 1981, the same country had installed martial rule to fend off domestic turmoil in hope of preventing a Soviet 
intervention on the template of the Red Army’s incursion into Czechoslovakia in 1968. 
166
 Peter Rudolf noted that Ronald Reagan put an end to talks about conventional arms limitations at sea, some-
thing which the Carter administration had carefully started; instead, Reagan focused exclusively on nuclear arms 
control efforts (1990: 241). The Navy did not seem particularly invested in arms control at all.  
167
 The United States is not a signatory to date but subscribes to some significant aspects of the treaty as custom-
ary law. 
168
 For the relations of the United Nations and the United States, see Ostrower (1998) and (particularly during the 
Cold War in the security policy realm) Bruns (2008: 24-36).  
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cipally with the Western European Union), expanded by the inclusion of Greece in 1981, and 
Portugal and Spain in 1986.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), founded in 1949 as Europe’s insurance pol-
icy against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact, remained in place. In response to the intro-
duction of SS-20 nuclear-tipped missiles in Eastern Europe, a double-track decision was 
agreed upon. Moscow’s failure to withdraw its SS-20 missiles from the Central front resulted 
in a coordinated NATO decision to upgrade and expand its own arsenal of theater (as opposed 
to intercontinental) nuclear weaponry, consisting of Pershing II and ground-launched cruise 
missiles. In Europe, this could only be marshaled against substantial domestic protest, espe-
cially in West Germany. In 1983, movies like “The Day After” (about the world after a nucle-
ar war) and “War Games” (about the threat of nuclear escalation between the United States 
and the Soviet Union), as well as German singer Nena’s hit record “99 Luftballons” (or “99 
Red Balloons” in its English variant, about a mass release of balloons that triggers inadvertent 
nuclear war) had considerable impact on, and were a deep-felt expression of, public opinion 
in opposition to NATO’s double track decision.  
In the ongoing context of the Cold War, the Soviet Union remained the central challenger to 
American security. In response, the U.S. fielded a more assertive foreign policy, a stronger 
commitment to national defense, more confrontational rhetoric, and offensive security strate-
gies (Keller 2008b: 105-131). Both superpowers’ nuclear and conventional arsenal retained 
substantial potential.  
By extension, some states like Libya continued to challenge regional (rather than grand stra-
tegic) U.S. security interests. In the 1980s, the United States sought to hedge against being 
drawn too openly into proxy wars (like Angola or Nicaragua). It only engaged militarily with 
substantial ground troops if it was assured of a clear mission success (e.g., in Grenada 1983 
and Panama 1989). This underlined the value of sea power as a foreign policy tool. In princi-
ple, sea power provided more nuanced but open options in peacetime, crisis, and war when 
ground forces were not available or other means appeared to be too risky.  
8.2.2 Conflicts, Crisis, and Wars  
By virtue of Cold War rationale, the armed conflicts of the 1980s influenced American think-
ing and strategic posture as they were all seen in that context; by virtue of bureaucracy ration-
ales, it is impossible to discern which events influenced which change in “The Maritime 
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Strategy” (if any). To give the reader an idea of the violent 1980s, selected wars and conflicts 
with U.S. participation shall be discussed briefly.  
Soviet offensive military, diplomatic, and economic outreach had tied together separate loca-
tions of strategic American interest, namely the Middle East (with close ally Israel and access 
to natural resources) and the West Pacific (a forward U.S. naval hub). Those who had turned 
away from the costs and responsibilities of armed interventions in the years after the conclu-
sion of the Vietnam War were shocked by a series of American humiliations by antagonist 
powers. The embassy seizure in Teheran in November 1979, the introduction of Soviet naval 
ships to recently forsaken Vietnamese bases (providing reach into a critical maritime arena), 
and the invasion of Afghanistan which threatened a Soviet reach to the Indian Ocean region 
(including access to its maritime and energy supply lines) contributed to conveying that 
American power and influence was waning (Baer 1994: 426-427). 
Consequently, the public perception of the military’s readiness and its capabilities suffered a 
blow. Since the conclusion of the Vietnam War, there had been a marked skepticism and 
sometimes even outright unwillingness to engage militarily. The impression that even limited 
commando operations by Special Forces could not be marshaled successful added to Ameri-
ca’s crisis of self-confidence.169 The Middle East at the time continued to be in grave turmoil. 
Iran and Iraq went to war against each other between 1980 and 1988. This included the use of 
weapons of mass destruction (C-weapons). Israel’s air force raided Iraq’s nuclear plant at 
Osirak in June 1981. In the meantime, Egypt consolidated a new leadership under Hosni Mu-
barak after his predecessor Anwar El Sadat, an advocate of reconciliation with Israel, was 
assassinated on 6 October 1981.  
In the South Atlantic, the Falklands War from April to June 1982 occupied the minds of poli-
ticians and militaries in the West and the East alike.
170
 Although the United States was not a 
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 To maritime strategists such as retired Vice Admiral Lyons, “[John] Lehman’s favorite fleet admiral” (Swartz 
1996: 94), Islamic Anti-American fundamentalism has its roots in the U.S. inability and unwillingness to act 
swiftly and decisively in the face of aggression in Teheran. The American withdrawal from Lebanon after the 
Marine Corps Barracks bombing in 1983 and the attack on the U.S. embassy in 1984, in his view, encouraged 
the notion that once U.S. casualties had to be taken into consideration, the political power base for American 
interventions would crumble and U.S. forces would withdraw, a key idea that al-Qaida built its own strategy on. 
Lyons lobbied unsuccessfully to retaliate against Iran in 1979/1980 and against Hezbollah in Lebanon in 
1983/1984 (Lyons interview 2012: 00:35:00 – 00:46:20) 
170
 To British naval historian Eric Grove, the war was the “most notable naval event of the decade and the most 
significant traditional, fleet vs. fleet battle in the post-war era.” (Grove 1990: 159) It is important to note that this 
war was an inner-system and not a U.S.-Soviet proxy conflict.  
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warring party in this conflict, it quickly sided with the U.K.
171
 The war between Great Britain 
and Argentina over the South Atlantic islands was an instrumental example of modern war-
fare at and more so from the sea. Its lessons included the roles and values of smaller and larg-
er warships, aircraft performance, anti-ship missile use, submarine operations, ship survivabil-
ity, logistics, and more. Consequently, the Department of the Navy commissioned a report 
that was submitted in 1983, outlining the lessons the United States could draw from that 
South Atlantic war.
172
 In the context of the Cold War, and thus perhaps most importantly to 
the U.S., “the effect of the Falklands War was far greater than simply the retaking of the is-
lands. It greatly improved the credibility of NATO’s deterrence in demonstrating the willing-
ness of a Western democracy to fight for principle, and its skill in doing so” (Lehman 2001: 
283).173 
1983 was a very tense year in the U.S.-Soviet conflict, prompting superpower tensions to the 
brink of serious and direct war. On 25 October, U.S. Marine Corps and Army forces invaded 
the Caribbean island of Grenada. Operation Urgent Fury was designed to oust the Socialist 
government on the island.
174
 U.S. forces involvement in the Lebanese Civil War also escalat-
ed that year: two suicide attacks on the American embassy and the Marine Corps barracks in 
Beirut with a large number of casualties prompted U.S. withdrawal a few months later 
(Hammel 2005: 285-420). During the transitions at the top leadership position of the USSR, 
the Reagan administration continued its strictly anti-communist rhetoric. In parallel, arrange-
ments were made for the deployment of new MX intercontinental ballistic missiles, and a 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) was proclaimed. Amid renewed tensions, a South Korean 
type-747 jumbo jet was shot down on 1 September over the Sakhalin Peninsula.
175
 Three 
weeks later, on 26 September, a Soviet early-warning installation erroneously detected a U.S. 
nuclear missile launch. The Russian officer of the guard decided to override his orders, based 
on his knowledge of previous false alarms – thus sparing the world a consequential retaliatory 
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 In a presentation at the “Falklands War – 30 Years On” conference in Portsmouth (UK) on 19 May 2012 and 
in subsequent statements, Lehman revealed that the United States made preparations to deploy the U.S. Navy’s 
helicopter carrier Iwo Jima (LPH 2) should one of the Royal Navy’s aircraft carriers be lost (see also Lehman 
2012b).  
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 For the report, see DON/OPA (1983). 
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175
 KAL flight 007 bound for Seoul had digressed from its designated route due to a navigational error. In conse-
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Soviet nuclear strike at the U.S. heartland and prospective global nuclear war (Hoffmann 
1999: A19). 
During the first half of November, NATO conducted its “Able Archer” military staff exercise. 
The Soviet Union, by all accounts, considered this exercise as a thinly disguised veil for an 
imminent decapitating nuclear first-strike of the alliance against the Warsaw Pact and in-
creased the readiness of its forces. In the fall of 1983, the world was closer to nuclear war 
than at any other time of the Cold War (Schild 2013: 190), perhaps with the exception of the 
Cuban Missile Crisis of 1962. Fortunately, tensions leveled and then decreased after 1983. 
In the middle of managing the superpower confrontation, Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi 
continued to be a secondary, but very persistent nuisance in international affairs. Sponsorships 
of international terrorism prompted the United States to retaliate repeatedly (Lehman 2001: 
350-360). And in 1989, Central America once again became the site of a U.S. military inter-
vention, this time in Panama. Throughout the decade in the Caribbean region, a “War on 
Drugs” also consumed many intergovernmental resources. The U.S. Navy began to be tasked 
with a supporting role in the attempt to curtail drug shipments from South America to the 
markets in the United States (and practice its low-intensity conflict-resolution skills in coun-
ter-narcotics operations in the process) (Thompson 1999: 1-28).  
8.3 Personalities, Domestic Conditions, and National Security Strategies 
8.3.1 Presidents, Secretaries, and Policy/Strategy Leaders176 
Ronald Reagan succeeded Jimmy Carter in the White House in 1981. As running mate, the 
former governor of California selected his inner-party rival, George H.W. Bush from Tex-
as.
177
 Reagan had already campaigned for the Republican Party ticket four years earlier, only 
to lose the presidential primaries to then-incumbent Gerald Ford. In 1976, a controversial 
CBO study about the role of the Navy and future battle-force levels had diverted considerable 
public attention to the question of military force levels (Love 1992b: 678-688).
178
 The Repub-
lican Party platform had taken this discussion into the primaries that year. Reagan therefore 
was no stranger to the concept of a large Navy. In 1980, with foreign policy issues high on the 
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 In line with Hattendorf (2004:1), with the addition of Congress to the discussion (see also introduction to this 
study). 
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 After eight years as Vice President, Bush successfully ran for President in the general election of 1988. His 
tenure will be analyzed in more detail in the chapter on the 1990s.  
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 That paper analyzed three force levels: 600 ships assembled mainly around 14 aircraft carriers groups, 500 
ships grouped around 12 carriers, and 400 vessels clustered around 10 carriers. The study was criticized for 
weighing sea control tasks versus power projection against the Soviet Union, rather than having the Navy do 
both (see also Rudolf 1990: 113-114). 
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election agenda and President Carter attacked as weak on American leadership, the focus in 
the primaries and the general election in 1980 again turned to the future size of the military. 
The 600-ship Navy theme tracked strongly with audiences during the campaign (Lehman 
2001: 100-101).  
The new president sought a tougher stance against the Soviet Union, as amplified by his sup-
port for the controversial Strategic Defense Initiative and a more aggressive rhetoric.
179
 He 
reversed his course notably toward the end of his first term and took a significantly less con-
frontational public stance going into 1984 and his re-election campaign. This became known 
as the “Reagan reversal” (Schild 2013: 191-202). As his Secretary of Defense, Reagan chose 
Casper “Cap” Weinberger (in office from 1981 to 1987). Weinberger, a staunch supporter of 
the defense build-up in the 1980s, postulated what became known as the Weinberger Doc-
trine. In a speech at the National Press Club in Washington, D.C., on 28 November 1984, the 
Secretary of Defense stated six conditions under which U.S. military forces would be commit-
ted to a conflict. This doctrine was informed by the post-Vietnam War reluctance to commit 
military power in entangling limited wars, and influenced by reflecting on the U.S. interven-
tions in Grenada and Lebanon in the year before. In the future, the U.S. should only assign 
military forces when its vital interests or those of its allies were at stake. If combat forces 
were deployed, they should be sized accordingly and committed to defined political and mili-
tary objectives. The relationship between objectives and the forces committed should be con-
tinually reassessed and adjusted if necessary, beginning with the exploration of whether a 
conflict was in the American national interest at all. Consistent support of the American peo-
ple and its elected leaders in the legislative and executive branches was also a prerequisite. In 
any case, the Secretary proclaimed, the commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be a last 
resort (Weinberger 1984).
180
 
As Secretary of State, Reagan picked Alexander Haig, a retired four-star Army general, grad-
uate of the Naval and the Army War Colleges, and former SACEUR (1974-1979). After a 
tumultuous eighteen months in office (which included international foreign policy crises in 
the Falklands and in Lebanon), Haig – who frequently clashed with Secretary of Defense 
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 In an address on 8 March 1983, the President called the Soviet Union an “evil empire” (Reagan 1983). In a 
much-less confrontational 12 June 1987 speech in front of the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin, with reference to the 
iconic nature of the speech’s site he appealed to Soviet General-Secretary Gorbachev to “open this gate, tear 
down this wall” (Reagan 1987).  
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 Weinberger’s successor was Frank Carlucci, who had served the Reagan administration in various positions 
and oversaw the last two years of the Reagan administration (1987-1989). His impact on foreign policy was 
limited compared to Weinberger. When George Bush Sr. became President of the United States in 1989, Richard 
“Dick” Cheney was nominated as Secretary of dDfense (1989-1993).  
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Weinberger – resigned over disagreements with administration policies.181 His successor was 
George P. Shultz, who remained in office until 1989 (the longest-serving Secretary of State 
since Kennedy/Johnson appointee Dean Rusk). Shultz efficiently managed the foreign policy 
challenges of the time and he was among the first to advocate a more cordial approach to the 
Soviet Union from March 1985.  
Over at the Pentagon, John Lehman was sworn into office as Secretary of the Navy in 1981. 
Lehman quickly ascended as the face and public voice of “The Maritime Strategy”.182 He con-
fidently remarked (2001: 105) the he saw himself as the Navy’s CEO:  
“The best CNOs have provided real leadership and good professional advice to the 
president, but never have they operated as chief executive officers. When the Secretary 
of the Navy does not run the Navy, the Navy simply is not run.”  
Lehman’s get-go attitude and media-savvy personality made him a star in Washington. He 
provided the necessary top cover and climate where the idea of an offensive, forward Navy 
that provided the Commander in Chief with multiple opportunities on the spectrum for peace-
time engagement, crisis, and war could blossom. As “The Maritime Strategy” was dissemi-
nated, Lehman had to increasingly cede control of the process to OP-603 and the Navy who 
fleshed out the details of the idea.
183
  
Admiral Thomas Hayward, CNO from 1978 to 1982, oversaw the transition from Carter to 
Reagan. Hayward created the Strategic Studies Group (SSG) at the Naval War College, the 
work of which became one of the key influences on “The Maritime Strategy”. Traditionally, 
the Navy’s service chiefs are usually appointed for a single term of four years (with the nota-
ble exception of Admiral Arleigh Burke, CNO 1955-1961) and so it would be up to the in-
coming admiral to utilize the changing circumstances and steer the Navy forward. As an ad-
ministrative rather than an operational leader, Navy strategy and strategic documents are 
among the prime activities for CNOs. In 1982, Admiral James Watkins, Hayward’s deputy, 
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 His relatively short time in office, his military career, and his policy management isolated him from any seri-
ous influence on “The Maritime Strategy”. For an account of his one and a half years in office in his own words, 
see Haig (1984). 
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 Swartz (1996: 118) recalls that “Lehman repeated the same themes over and over again in his speeches, rather 
than jumping from topic to topic. He made himself, the U.S. Navy, and the Maritime Strategy synonymous in the 
public, Capitol Hill, and much of the Pentagon mind.”  
183
 Thanks to his energetic way of handling his exceptionally long tenure as Secretary of the Navy, Lehman 
quickly eclipsed the legacies of his Carter-era bureaucrat predecessors Graham Claytor (1977-1979) and Edward 
Hidalgo (1979-1981). Lehman successors also stood in his shadow, and Jim Webb (1987-1988), William Ball 
(1988-1989), and Lawrence Garrett, III. (1990-1992) consequently only had short terms with little lasting influ-
ence. It should be cautioned that there were (and probably are still today) as many fans of Lehman (“The right 
man at the right time” [Rudolf 1990: 244]) as there are cautious critics (“There was more to the Maritime Strate-
gy than John Lehman” [Swartz 1996: 95]). Lehman was a key figure in “The Maritime Strategy”, but by far not 
the only driver.  
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became CNO. He was the first member of the submariner’s union to rise to that position since 
Admiral Chester Nimitz (CNO from 1945-1947). He provided essential continuity from the 
Hayward era. “The Maritime Strategy” was then developed by Watkins’ flag officers and 
their staff between 1982 and 1984. Watkins was succeeded in 1986 as CNO by Admiral Car-
lisle Trost, another submariner who embraced “The Maritime Strategy” (Trost participated in 
the development of “The Maritime Strategy” in some of his previous posts and roles). Trost’s 
term was characterized by the rapidly changing nature of global political conditions and a 
significant number of transitions in the Reagan administration. Trost in turn was succeeded by 
Admiral Frank Kelso (1990-1994), the third consecutive submariner to be appointed to the top 
of Navy leadership. In Admiral William Crowe Jr., the Navy also provided the Chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff from 1985 to 1990.
184
 The influence of the military in the executive 
branch rose during the Reagan administration, with a rising budgetary tide lifting all services’ 
boats. The Navy, both uniformed and civilian leadership, sought to capitalize on this, looking 
to push back the civilian and scientific control of military (and by implication naval/maritime) 
strategy through systems analysis tools that dated back to the tenure of Secretary McNama-
ra.
185
  
In Congress, the Republicans held a majority of Senate seats during Reagan’s first term, but 
lost it to the Democrats in the 1984 election. The House of Representatives was under Demo-
cratic control over the course of the whole decade. Although working with a divided govern-
ment, Reagan policies during his first term fared reasonably well on the Hill, which can be 
attributed to the persuasive and aggressive lobbying of Lehman and powerful allies in the 
committee chair seats. Even without these force multipliers, Congress was generally sympa-
thetic toward the Navy,
186
 because the discussion shifted from certain budget items like ex-
pensive aircraft carriers or nuclear submarines to the overall rationale of the Navy in U.S. 
national security. Additionally, the increase in defense money was to the benefit of many 
states and districts with defense-related industry or military bases. In fact, Lehman’s strategic 
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 His predecessor was General John Vessey Jr., USA (1982-1985); his successor was General Colin Powell, 
USA (1989-1993). Powell later served as Secretary of State in the first administration of George W. Bush (2001-
2005). 
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 Rudolf (1990: 243) suggests that the leadership of the Pentagon was brought off-balance by the Navy’s and 
Navy Department’s assertiveness in the 1980s. In the view of that author, Secretary of Defense Weinberger was 
in a particular unfortunate position. Rudolf attests a lack of security-policy expertise and describes him much 
less versed than his predecessor Harold Brown.  
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 According to Swartz (1996: 36), an exception from the rule was Senator Sam Nunn. The Democrat from 
Georgia challenged Lehman at various hearings on Navy budget and strategic decisions. Other, somewhat influ-
ential counter-Navy voices on the Hill included Senator Ted Kennedy, the venerable Massachusetts Democrat 
who attacked the Navy on arms control issues later in the decade, and Representative Les Aspin, the Wisconsin 
Democrat who would be appointed Secretary of Defense in the Bill Clinton administration. 
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home-porting initiative, underwritten as a force dispersal action to hedge against a massed 
Soviet attack, multiplied the number of naval stations throughout the country, thus potentially 
providing thousands of jobs and revenue dollars to more states and municipalities.  
8.3.2 Domestic conditions  
The Reagan administration steadily increased its defense budget. A persistent national securi-
ty consensus and a more assertive foreign policy buttressed that policy. 
 
Illustration 17: U.S. Defense Budget FY 1981-1990, in FY 12 billion US-$; GDP share in % (Swartz 2011c: 10, 
slide 20 and 15, slide 29). 
This soaring government spending is significant because the U.S. economy experienced a 
period of turbulence in the 1980s. Military investments were an example of deficit spending, 
an economic strategy where government spending is higher than revenue in hopes of rekin-
dling an ailing economy through federal intervention. Due to a recession in the early 1980s, 
the nationwide unemployment rate climbed to more than 10% in 1982. Industries such as the 
automobile and steel manufacturers experienced substantial downturns. Inflation was on the 
rise, and oil prices had peaked in 1980. Through a combination of measures that soon became 
known as Reaganomics, the U.S. government sought to alleviate domestic pressure. On Mon-
day, 19 October 1987, the “Black Monday” stock market crash sent further shock waves 
through the economies of the U.S. and the world (Carlson 2006: 3-11). 
8.3.3 Selected U.S. National Security Policies, Doctrines, and Capstone Documents 
By 1980, détente between the superpowers had definitely ended. The U.S. continued its over-
arching grand strategic path of attempting to contain the sprawl of Soviet influence world-
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wide. But the emotional trauma of the Vietnam War loomed large in the American psyche, 
and world events suggested a downturn in U.S. power that even the Carter Doctrine could not 
decelerate significantly. The Reagan administration, in turn, was vocal against the Soviet Un-
ion, buttressing its rhetoric with potent and controversial policies.  
The first major national capstone document, National Security Decision Directive (NSDD) 
32, appeared on 20 May 1982. It stated the overarching security policy goals of the United 
States as:  
 Deterring military attack by the USSR and its allies against the U.S. and its allies; 
 Strengthening of U.S. influence globally through existing alliances and coalitions; 
 Containment and reversal of Soviet military presence and control throughout the 
world; 
 Neutralization of non-military efforts by the Soviet Union;  
 Actively seeking long-term liberalization and nationalist tendencies within the USSR 
and its allies;  
 Strengthening the U.S. military;  
 Assurance of U.S. access to foreign markets and resources;  
 Access to oceans and space;187 
 Nonproliferation of nuclear weapons; 
 Encouragement and support of development aid by the U.S. and its allies in the Third 
World; and, 
 Promotion of a well-functioning international economic system (The White House 
1982: 1-2).  
Reagan’s address to the nation on 28 March 1983 was another milestone in publically laying 
out his administration’s national security policies. The address laid out the rationale for the 
Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI). Despite its tremendous costs and doubtful viability, 
Reagan supported this ground- and space-based system designed to destroy incoming ICBMs. 
To his critics, the high-tech “Star Wars” program signaled a grave waste of resources; to some 
in the Soviet Union and even in Europe, SDI signaled that the U.S. was beginning to plan a 
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 Space gained increasing prominence in the military and political spheres in the 1980s. It served both as an 
operating space for satellites and weaponry, as SDI promised, and as a frontier for American destiny as the 
Space Shuttle program readily demonstrated (damped only by the explosion of the Challenger shuttle on 28 
January 1986).  
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limited, first-strike nuclear war by evading mutual assured destruction (Schild 2013: 155-
161).  
On the lower end of the conflict spectrum, U.S. support of anti-communist governments and 
insurgencies increased. The Reagan Doctrine attempted to destabilize Soviet proxies through 
material aid and training for insurgents and rebels in countries like El Salvador, Nicaragua, 
Angola, Cambodia, and Mozambique. In Afghanistan, the U.S. supported the Mujahidin in 
their war against the Soviet invaders. Whereas most of these programs were shrouded in se-
crecy, one revelation made headline news and sent the Reagan administration into its most 
serious domestic crisis. In the Iran-Contra affair, it was revealed that Contra rebels in Nicara-
gua were supported with revenues of weapon sales to Iran. These in turn were designated to 
free American hostages from the hands of Shiite militias in Lebanon. Iran, which demanded 
more weapons, humiliated the Reagan administration as much as it had previously humiliated 
the Carter government (Hacke 2005: 373). The Iran-Contra conspiracy came to a head in July 
1987, when National Security Council staffer Colonel Oliver North, USMC, was summoned 
to testify before Congress on the scandal. North was indicted in 1988 (and Reagan barely 
avoided an impeachment). By then, an exodus of seasoned hardliner national security deci-
sion-makers already had begun. CIA director William Casey passed away, and National Secu-
rity Advisor John Poindexter, presidential speechwriter Pat Buchanan, and Secretary of De-
fense Weinberger left the administration in the course of 1987 (Bierling 2003: 183). National 
Security Advisor Frank Carlucci became Secretary of Defense and General Colin Powell fol-
lowed in Carlucci’s position.  
On the bureaucratic side, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of October 1986 was the most important 
congressional intervention in DOD bureaucracy since the creation of the Department in 1947. 
The Act mandated increasing focus and emphasis on joint strategy, planning, and operations 
in the military realm. It broadened the operational command roles of the CINCs as well the 
advisory powers of the CJCS, both at the expense of service chiefs such as the CNO. More so, 
it mandated annual presidential reports on national security strategy, and it triggered a flood 
of new publications on ‘jointness’. The Navy was skeptical towards the move for such deep 
integration, which was perceived as irreversible. Henceforth, the nation’s naval forces would 
be far more tightly integrated into joint concepts and operations, in spite of the unique nature 
of the maritime environment and of warfare at and from the sea (Swartz 2014: 18).  
The Reagan administration rushed out its first National Security Strategy (NSS) in January 
1987, soon after the Goldwater-Nichols Act was signed into law. This first official NSS was 
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thus “prepared in a very limited period of time and reflected the intent to document only cur-
rent strategic thinking. […] Taken as a whole, of course the document portrayed a compre-
hensive strategic approach toward the Soviet Union” (Snider 1995: 7), but it did not integrate 
strategy across regions of U.S. strategic interest. Its January 1988 follow-up document came 
at a time of increasing deficits. It attempted to formulate a comprehensive and integrated na-
tional security strategy, e.g., elevating economic elements of national power into the calcula-
tion.  
Reagan’s successor George H.W. Bush submitted his first NSS in March 1990. The rapidly 
changing geopolitical landscape in Eastern Europe greatly complicated the facilitation of a 
visionary administration statement of ways-means-ends causality on time. The original Gold-
water-Nichols legislation had implicitly assumed a fairly stable state in the international envi-
ronment, with the yearly report articulating incremental changes to both perceptions of and 
responses to that environment (Snider 1995: 8). In an increasingly uncertain environment, the 
NSS therefore appeared over one year later than planned. The central formal document by 
which the President and the Secretary of Defense were advised on military matters was the 
National Military Strategy, compiled by the CJCS. In its classified 1989 version submitted by 
Admiral Crowe, it included chapters on national military objectives and national military 
strategy and an appraisal of U.S. defense policy and intelligence. It looked at fiscal constraints 
on force levels, and evaluated risks to U.S. national interests. The capstone document still 
focused on the Cold War and the Soviet Union. It emphasized the military value of alliances 
such as NATO while emphasizing forward-deployed forces (Meinhart 2012: 84). Such was 
the lay of the land in the 1980s when the Navy sought to use the momentum provided by the 
incoming Reagan administration and its policies to present its case vocally for a coherent 
strategy. 
8.4 Developing and Promulgating USN Strategy 1981-1989 
a) Evolution 
When Reagan was sworn in as President in January 1981, the Navy was on an upward swing 
and the seeds for what would become “The Maritime Strategy” had long been planted.188 The 
Reagan administration’s policies and people provided the top cover and the much-desired 
fertilizer. According to Lehman (2001: 121-137), “The Maritime Strategy” rested on eight 
                                                          
188
 For a discussion of the period 1945-1955, see Palmer (1988). Representative accounts on the origins of “The 
Maritime Strategy” and the underlying assumptions also by Barnett (1989a/b) and Gray (1990). Swartz (2011h: 
32, slide 64) notes that the Navy “had benefited from increased visibility during [the] last years of Carter Admin-
istration (late 1979-1981): utility of CVBGs, ARGs, sealift, preposition ships [was] recognized and funded.” 
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principles. First, it was derived from and dependent on the overall national security strategy 
established by the President. Second, that national strategy provided the Department of the 
Navy with maritime tasks such as controlling international crises, deterring war, sea control, 
access, support of land battles, and attack at the source. Those tasks – third – required mari-
time superiority, which in turn – fourth – required a disciplined maritime strategy (as the art 
of distributing and applying military means to fulfill policy ends). That strategy was impera-
tive for relating and conforming Navy and Marine Corps planning, programming, budgeting, 
and research and development efforts. The document also reoriented ship, aircraft, and weap-
ons system design plans as well as personnel and training policies. Fifth, the strategy had to 
be based on a realistic threat assessment. Sixth, it needed to be global, not sequential as a land 
campaign. Seventh, it needed to fully integrate U.S. and free world forces, including Air 
Force, Coast Guard, and Army. Eighth, the strategy needed to be a forward strategy.  
The actual document has its roots in a workshop on Soviet naval intelligence convened in 
1981. At least eight larger iterations of various length and scope were produced, both in clas-
sified and after 1986 in unclassified versions. The vetting process itself obviously produced 
numerous drafts and versions. The following table gives an overview of the documents and 
their principal drafters.  
Name Status/format Year Principle Drafters 
The Maritime Strategy Secret briefing 1982 CDR Spence Johnson, LCDR 
Stan Weeks 
The Maritime Strategy Secret publication 1984 CAPT Roger Barnett, CDR 
Peter Swartz 
Amphibious Warfare Strategy Secret publication 1985 CAPT Larry Seaquist, COL 
Phil Harrington (USMC) 
The Maritime Strategy Secret publication, 
revision 
1985 CAPT Larry Seaquist, CDR 
Wood Parker 
The Maritime Strategy Unclassified book-
let (Proceedings) 
1986 CAPT Linton Brooks, CDR 
Robbie Harris, MAJ Hugh 
O’Donnell (USMC), Dr. Har-
vey Sichermann, CAPT Peter 
Swartz, Fred Rainbow (U.S. 
Naval Institute Proceedings 
professional magazine) 
“Looking Beyond the Maritime 
Strategy” 
Unclassified article 1987 CNO staff 
The Maritime Strategy Secret publication, 
revision 
1989 CDR Mitch Brown 
Illustration 18: Main 1980s USN capstone documents (Swartz 2011g: 24-26, slides 48-52; 2011h: 69, slide 138) 
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The broad spectrum of contemporary media outlets was utilized, ranging from (classified) 
briefings to public versions and discussions in journal articles, illustrated professional maga-
zine exposures, and books. Even a VHS video was produced to distribute “The Maritime 
Strategy” to all ships in the fleet (Swartz 2011g: 6, slide 11). The character of the strategies 
was always that of a work in progress.
189
 There was never one single manuscript, but rather a 
plethora of documents. Accordingly, parallel efforts were underway to continuously improve 
and operationalize “The Maritime Strategy”. “The Maritime Strategy” publications were 
signed by CNOs Admirals Watkins and Trost in coordination with Secretary of the Navy 
Lehman and the Commandant of the Marine Corps (CMC), whose force as part of the Navy 
Department was also included in the strategic layout. A consolidation of existing thinking 
rather than a vision, “The Maritime Strategy” aspired to be an “explanation of use of current 
forces. [It] told a story; provided a narrative” (Swartz 2011g: 5, slide 10). As a comprehensive 
concept, it included peacetime forward-deployed heavy attack carriers forces for offensive 
operations in a global war and as a national power instrument for regional crises intervention 
(it was not simply a war plan against the Soviet Union) and it was so convincing that inner-
administration disagreement focused on mere semantics, i.e., whether the United States 
should aspire to ‘naval supremacy’ or ‘naval superiority’ (Rudolf 1990: 249-251, Love 
1992b: 708). 
Beside referencing numerous national overarching strategic guidance documents, U.S. laws, 
memoranda of understanding with sister services, joint documents, and allied capstone docu-
ments (i.e. from NATO), the authors of “The Maritime Strategy” could draw from a vast 
number of contemporary contextual publications. Examples included earlier documents such 
as Project SIXTY (1970) and Sea Plan 2000 (1978). Beginning in 1981, a host of public 
statements in speeches, testimony, and articles by John Lehman and other individuals, official 
reports, the output of the Strategic Studies Group, a steady flow of intelligence accounts about 
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 There are at least three strands, combining a total of twenty-four threads of possible explanatory patterns 
pertaining to the analytical genesis of Navy strategy. These include a rational strand, “like they teach you at staff 
college and the junior service college courses. How ‘the book’ says you make Strategy, or at least how you 
should” (Swartz 1996: 16); an organization strand, “like they teach you at the Kennedy School and the senior 
War College courses. How Pentagon and fleet insiders say you ‘really’ make Strategy” (ibid: 17); and a person-
ality strand, “like you read in the newspapers and memoirs and see in the movies: How the participants say they 
and their colleagues actually made Strategy.” (ibid.) Swartz, the political scientist and military staff action of-
ficer for “The Maritime Strategy”, goes on to note that “I was one of the twisters of the 24 threads. These threads 
did not flow to us on neat conveyor belts, neatly twisted into three strands. Rather, they often arrived all tangled 
in balls and knots. Sometimes they were thrown at us. […] Other times they were just rolled over, underhand. 
We had to do lots of untying and untangling. […] Other times we had to go looking for them as they flowed 
elsewhere […]. Then we had to reroute them over to our desks and lay them together to form the line we were 
making.” (Swartz 1996: 15). This realization, of course, goes back to the challenges of discerning the analysis of 
naval strategy from a political science point of view discussed in the first chapters of this dissertation.  
  
136 
the Soviet Navy,
190
 and other papers helped in the effort to explain how all the integrative 
pieces of the Navy fit together.
191
 As the strategy emerged, it was tested repeatedly in large-
scale and smaller exercises.
192
 The academic discussion of just what kind of strategy “The 
Maritime Strategy” really was, or whether it was a by-the-book strategy at all, is eventually 
futile. 
“To the developers of the Maritime Strategy in OP-603 […], and to the thinkers at the 
Naval War College, the Maritime Strategy was intended to reflect – and to drive – all 
aspects of naval policy. It was at once the Navy’s declaratory strategy, budget strategy, 
employment strategy, and programming strategy.” (Swartz 1996: 55, emphasis in orig-
inal) 
These carefully crafted moves hardened the strategy and elevated it in the public political and 
military discourse.  
The writing process then was truly “organic” (Swartz 2011g: 22-27, slides 44-54). Extensive 
socialization of the briefing material (among those who had access) allowed countless interac-
tions, both critical and supportive.
193
 In the spring of 1984, the secret document was ready for 
CNO signature. Various briefings and shorter articles followed, and in 1986 an unclassified 
version was published as a supplement to the U.S. Naval Institute’s professional journal, Pro-
ceedings.
194
 A number of semi-official writings and unofficial publications from outside, 
which escorted the conceptual processes of writing and re-writing the strategy, emerged con-
currently.
195
 Three distinct periods emerge in hindsight: Framing of the strategy under the 
conditions of secrecy and with mixed messages from the fleet and the Secretary of the Navy; 
the publication and dissemination of the strategy in an unclassified form to the public and the 
fleet; and finally the attempt to bring the strategy indoors again in attempts to enhance the 
strategy’s salience and guard its future viability. 196  
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 For a representative open-source analysis, see Frod/Rosenberg (2005). The Soviet Union was not idly stand-
ing on the sidelines of the intelligence business, as the exposure of the Walker family spy ring in the U.S. 
demonstrated. U.S. Navy Chief Warrant Officer John Walker and his associates provided information about the 
U.S. Navy to the Moscow from 1965 to 1985 – resulting in “the Navy’s biggest betrayal” (Prados 2010).  
191
 For a comprehensive list of contemporary publications, see Swartz (2011g: 16-21, slides 31-42). 
192
 See section 8.6.3 for details. See also interview with Admiral (ret.) Lyons (2012, 00:20:00 – 00:30:00). 
193
 Of note is an unofficial ‘Navy Study Group’ convened in the Washington, D.C.-area between 1983 and 1985 
by Commander Jim Stark, a graduate of The Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy at Tufts University, a Mas-
sachusetts graduate school focusing on international affairs and attracting a number of U.S. Navy officers as 
their students. This outside forum to discuss and influence naval strategy has, in various iterations and under 
different conveners, survived until today.  
194
 See Watkins (1986). This is the document that is often referred to as the “Maritime Strategy”.  
195
 For a comprehensive list of these, see Swartz (2011g: 28-29, 31, slides 55-57 and 61), and Swartz’ annotated 
bibliography on the accompanying debates in Hattendorf (2004: 185-277). 
196
 For an assessment of the threads bound together to make “The Maritime Strategy” and an appraisal of those 
that had less or no influence at all, see Swartz (1996: 109-115).  
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b) Strategic Concept 
The central innovations of “The Maritime Strategy” were its dedicated offensive approach 
and the three distinctive stages of naval force employment in peaceful presence, crisis re-
sponse, and global conventional war. Rather than sticking to the more defensive notions of 
naval force employment in previous decades, it sought to charge against the Soviet Union in 
peacetime to globalize the conflict in general war. Splitting the enemy’s forces is a classic 
military maneuver. This required forward-deployed and forward-based assets. In addition, the 
strategy sought to utilize Russia’s principally unfavorable geographic position and posture as 
a land power. To the planners, this warranted a closer look at the global choke points. The 
control of these man-made or natural narrows where commercial and military shipping has to 
pass through was a key strategic enabler for the thrust against any assertive Soviet naval 
claims. Choke point control therefore kept Soviet naval forces from exercising sea control, 
dispersing their force, controlling sea lines of communication, and supporting its troops and 
allies.  
 
Illustration 19: Crucial Naval Choke Points during the Cold War (Collins 2002: 58). 
However, this was also a high-risk strategy. In principle, “The Maritime Strategy” exposed 
the high-value aircraft carriers which were deployed near the enemy’s mainland through the 
Greenland-Iceland-U.K. gap in the West and the Sea of Okhotsk in the East. The U.S. Navy’s 
inherent strength (the orchestration of carrier task forces) could have easily translated into a 
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decapitating blow if the Soviet Union had felt provoked enough to react with force. For the 
U.S. Navy, bringing the capital units out this far also made integration with allies and over-
coming warfare unions’ squabble an imperative.  
As opposed to the proponents of the European central front scenario for the next war, where 
tactical nuclear weapons would likely be used in the very early stages of the conflict,
197
 the 
maritime strategists in their war games chiefly emphasized conventional forces and a global-
ized approach. The authors of “The Maritime Strategy” reasoned that by keeping the conflict 
nonnuclear (i.e., escalating horizontally rather than vertically), the United States’ geographic, 
military, economic, and political advantages (all of which are key components of sea power) 
could favorably underpin Washington’s grand strategy and provide for a higher likelihood of 
prevailing in the conflict. It was expected that a prolonged conventional war would wear out 
the Soviet Union’s planned economy and authoritarian regime.198  
A further major impetus to the intellectual formation of “The Maritime Strategy” was the real-
ization that Soviet military doctrine had undergone a significant change itself. Like the West, 
the Soviet Union had also become somewhat acquainted with the demands of the Cold War. 
Consequently, the USSR toned down the idea of an offensive, global nuclear war against the 
United States and its allies. Instead, Moscow focused on obtaining control of Europe. In the 
Soviet view, this would be facilitated by deterring a U.S. nuclear attack using assets like the 
SS-20 missiles and the submarine ballistic missile reserve. A defensive strategy was designed 
to protect that fleet in the hope of essentially safeguarding that deterrent. It was on these as-
sumptions that U.S. Navy planners re-energized their offensive ideas. If the navies of the 
United States and its NATO allies could overcome Soviet defenses, they could put at risk the 
Soviets’ strategic reserve. If they destroyed submarines before the submarines sailed into the 
open ocean, they could better assure the safety of NATO shipping. If they conducted amphib-
ious campaigns on Europe’s flanks in support of a ground war to hold or regain Europe, they 
would bring to a general war a great maritime asset (Baer 1994: 421). 
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 Such a scenario is unfolded in Tom Clancy’s novel “Red Storm Rising”, first published in 1986. The fictional 
story, based on actual contingency plans, follows a NATO-Warsaw Pact war which begins in Southwest Asia. 
As the conflict broadens, violent battles in Central Germany and naval campaigns in the North Atlantic and Bar-
ents Sea eventually turn the tide for the U.S. and its allies.  
198
 That, in turn, did not exclude the Navy’s forgoing of nuclear options. Improved SLBM type Poseidon and 
Trident I formed the submarine leg of the nuclear deterrence triad (with ICBM and strategic bombers as the other 
two legs). At any time, in any circumstance, the Navy was to be prepared to act more or less at any point along a 
continuum of violence whose levels ranged from display to nuclear war (Bear 1994: 432). The use of nuclear 
weapons in naval warfare has limited plausibility. They were only suitable in a general nuclear war, which would 
severely curtail the relevance of naval forces in the first place. Its only objective during the Cold War, therefore, 
was deterrence. They did so by carrier- or submarine-launched missiles (Grove 1990: 92).  
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In a protracted conventional war, the need for secure SLOCs would dramatically rise as Euro-
pean allies would expend their depots and war-fighting platforms in battles of attrition. Con-
taining and attacking the Soviet subsurface capabilities at their bastions, consequently, could 
be a prime enabler for U.S. sea control, thus securing and defending the maritime highways 
for NATO.  
In the Pacific, far away from the Central Front occupying many NATO allies’ minds, things 
stood somewhat differently. The Navy rejected the notion of the Carter years that war would 
be confined to one theatre, most likely Europe. That is the principal reason why the service 
never really warmed to the force posture earmarked for the Pacific. In the meantime, the So-
viet Pacific Fleet benefited disproportionally from the USSR’s naval build-up, focusing on the 
Sea of Okhotsk, the Kuril Islands, and two large naval bases as staging points. The Soviet 
Navy fielded SSBNs, V/STOL carriers, heavy cruisers, and amphibious assets. It routinely 
and substantially engaged in naval diplomacy and show-of-force missions in the Pacific and 
Indian Ocean regions. It could also threaten the sea lines of communication in the West Pacif-
ic, and shadow U.S. naval movements in the Pacific (i.e., the 7
th
 Fleet area of operations).  
In the days of the ‘swing strategy’, the Pacific would have been largely deserted, with grave 
strategic and political ramifications for the United States. Now, an offensive in the Pacific as 
first devised in “Sea Strike” would – given the right number of ships and suitable doctrinal 
guidance – bind Soviet forces. These would then be unavailable to be employed against 
NATO flanks, the Persian Gulf, Asia, or to threaten sea lines of communication. An American 
offensive based principally on carrier battle groups would capitalize on the Western advanta-
geous geography and forces against weaker and less geographically favored Soviet forces 
(Baer 1994: 425).  
Given its operational expertise and technological edge, the U.S. Navy was confident that it 
could master such operations. In its refocus from a secondary role in general war, the Navy 
sought to make a deliberate strategic difference by enhancing deterrence, controlling escala-
tion, solidifying the Western alliance, influencing neutral states, defending the U.S., support-
ing land campaigns, limiting Moscow’s options, and increasing Soviet uncertainties. 
Throughout, “The Maritime Strategy” promised to help gain the initiative and provide a 
strong deterrence and termination of hostilities factor (Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 192).  
Consequently, “The Maritime Strategy” was a farewell to the ‘swing strategy’ of the Carter 
years and the smaller fleet that came with it. Instead, it advocated a big fleet composed around 
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carriers and a host of smaller platforms. “The Maritime Strategy” saw itself not just as the war 
plan against the Soviet Union, but aspired to be the coordinated narrative for peace, crises, 
war, and war termination. In other words, it explained the Navy’s reasoning in war-fighting 
and in what was dubbed the “violent peace” (Cable 1989). As such, it connected the defense 
at the place of aggression to the opening of new fronts and “linked symmetric with geograph-
ic-asymmetric reactions” (Rudolf 1990: 254).  
“The Maritime Strategy” presented a coherent narrative that addressed the whole spectrum of 
naval warfare in support of overarching grand strategic goals. As the level of violence in-
creased from mere presence to surveillance, show of force, use of force, limited war, global 
conventional war, theater nuclear war, and finally strategic nuclear war, the Navy was fash-
ioning itself to play a role accordingly and to provide to policy-makers a range of options. 
The objectives of crisis response were to lend support to national policy objectives, provide 
flexible military options to the national command authority (usually the President), control 
escalation, counter Soviet encroachment, and counter state-sponsored terrorism 
(Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 161). 
In the strategy, the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ missions were intimately connected. In-
stead of separately going their own ways in sea control, power projection, or intervention, the 
two sister services were placed under wide-ranging, synthetic categories: peaceful presence, 
crisis response, and global conventional war. More precisely, surface warfare, ASW, AAW, 
EW, and strike warfare were to be thought of in a globalized manner instead from a limited 
Navy/Marine Corps or even a ‘warfare union’ perspective. “The Maritime Strategy” was also 
broad in scope, attempting to show how all the players – U.S. home and forward-deployed 
forces, U.S. Navy, sealift and prepositioning forces, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air 
Force, allied/friendly navies, and perceived neutrals such as China – might play (Swartz 
2011g: 34, slide 67). Quite significantly, “The Maritime Strategy” postulated in its 1985 ver-
sion that “naval forces prevent major global war through controlling crises and containing 
limited wars” (Swartz 2011g: 34, slide 68, emphasis in original).  
This is not to dismiss vocal critics of the Navy’s effort. On the contrary, there were substantial 
camps of individuals and groups who lobbied against “The Maritime Strategy”. Critics at-
tacked the Navy’s assumption about the nature of a general war, its assessment of likely Sovi-
et actions in such a war, the disconnection to national political objectives, and its proposed 
offensive operations. These controversies fueled the general debate in the public and profes-
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sional realm, which in turn gave the Navy a chance to make its case.
199
 The Navy was willing 
to admit certain realities right away. It was certainly true that the defeat of the Soviet Union at 
sea would not guarantee a successful defense of NATO, but it was also true – and more im-
portant – that the loss of NATO’s supremacy at sea would guarantee NATO’s defeat (Lehman 
2001: 188). 
The critics aligned along a few broad strands.
200
 The first and most fierce charge related su-
perficially to the general defense budget. The Navy’s plan of action, so the argument went, 
was absorbing money that could well go into Army and Air Force at the Central Front in 
Germany to provide deterrence and war-fighting capabilities where the Cold War could pre-
dictably turn hot soonest. Supporters of this often included former Carter administration offi-
cials (such as former Undersecretary of Defense Robert Komer).
201
 Behind such an approach 
stood the clash of the two schools of thought, of maritime vs. continental strategists which 
underwent a renaissance during the 1980s.
202
 Those critics often failed to acknowledge that 
the Navy was fully aware that “The Maritime Strategy” was merely the maritime component 
of national military strategy, and that U.S. success still relied on a complementary land com-
ponent, too. The Navy understood that the Russian center of gravity lay at land, not at sea.  
A second line of thought sought to attack the aircraft carrier. This reflected earlier debates 
about that capital class of ships during the Carter and Truman administrations.
203
 Again, the 
carrier as a platform was not ruled out altogether. Instead, critics suggested looking (again) at 
an inexpensive, somewhat smaller, conventionally-powered version to employ the Navy for a 
distant blockade of the Soviet Union (Rudolf 1990: 306). The large-deck carrier critics were 
unable to drive home their point. Navy proponents could even invoke President Carter as a 
crown witness who did not oppose the nuclear carrier after he had at first vetoed it during his 
presidency. And this time, the Navy made the case against its carrier critics that in fact both 
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 Critique was stated in various forums such as Congressional hearings and in academic journals. For a worth-
while dispute, see Brooks (1986) and Mearsheimer (1986) in an issue of International Security. 
200
 John Lehman grouped the critics of the strategy in five distinctive categories. To him, there was the OSD & 
JCS bureaucracy, which for one reason or another was hostile against the Navy; the Europeanists were nearly 
obsessive with Europe and NATO as the center of all foreign and defense policy; the reformers, who advocated 
for smaller, cheaper, low-tech ships rather than expensive high-tech units; the détentists, who were unwilling to 
confront the assertive Soviet Union; and the ad hominem critics of John Lehman himself (Lehman 2001: 145-
147).  
201
 “The guy that everyone in the Navy loved to hate.” (Captain (ret.) Robbie Harris interview 2012, 00:39:10 – 
00:39:30).  
202
 On representative musings about the continental vs. maritime debate, see Dunn/Staudenmaier (1984), Komer 
(1984), and Barnett (1987).  
203
 The same arguments are made today as were made for Forrestal-class and United States (CVA 58) in the late 
1940s: “The only thing that has changed is the names of some countries we invade, the hull number of the ship, 
and the name of the ship.” (Scott Truver interview 2012, 00:18:20 – 00:18:50) 
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were in need: the large carrier Navy would be suitable for power projection against the Soviet 
Union, while smaller sea-control platforms would serve the U.S. well in Third World inter-
ventions (Rudolf 1990: 272). In other words, the Reagan administration sought both, big car-
riers for the economy-of-scale effect and small-deck vessels (LHA/LPH/LHD) as a supple-
ment (Grove 1990: 127-128). The Navy’s view of the argument was summed up by Swartz 
(1996: 27) as such, “The Soviets may be the main enemy, Europe may be the central piece of 
geography in the global balance and the ground and air battle on the Central Front may be the 
main event, but it is not the only event.”  
The third line of argument was less strategically founded. It simply accused the Navy of put-
ting forward a ship-building and -financing strategy. The poster slang of the 600-ship Navy 
appeared arbitrary and unrelated to the needs of national security, and critics advocated 
spending that money on any other program or budget item. It does hold true that Lehman used 
“The Maritime Strategy” to sell the President, Congress, and the American people on the 600 
ships. The Navy was not unhappy with that.  
The fourth group included the operational challengers who questioned the viability of the 
main features of “The Maritime Strategy.” Why should the relative safety of practiced nuclear 
and conventional deterrence be discarded in favor of an aggressive, untested naval offensive 
action?
204
 To the critics, the Navy’s argument of a low likelihood of a Soviet anti-CVBG 
campaign seemed flawed. Critics pointed out that in sound traditional military planning, one’s 
own force and action should not be shaped by the intentions, but by the capabilities of the 
enemy – and the Soviet Navy did have tactical nuclear capabilities (Rudolf 1990: 296-297).  
A related fifth and very important strand questioned the Navy’s underlying assertion that it 
could keep the conflict with the Soviet Union conventional at all. Escalation control lay at the 
heart of “The Maritime Strategy” even though commentators had warned of inadvertent nu-
clear confrontation, stating that a nuclear exchange between the Soviet Union and the United 
States could be the unintended consequence because of the seemingly conscious decision to 
fight a conventional war (Posen 1982: 29). In fact, the dynamics of the nuclear age could spell 
diametrically opposing effects to what planners envisioned, namely that escalatory pressures 
simply overruled any conventional war plans that policy-makers harbored. NATO’s Northern 
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 The ‘love affair’ with nuclear deterrence points to a fundamental and inherently American struggle (Rudolf 
1990: 117): Throughout its history, the United States has often oscillated between engagement, reluctance, and 
disengagement in world affairs. During the Cold War, the United States embraced its role as the leader of the 
West. The nuclear bomb and its associated deterrence value vaguely promised a cold, but stable balance. In other 
words, it was a weapon to end all wars. As history showed, local wars were still the case, but the dreaded global 
World War III did not start.  
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flank was at a special risk of being the stage for nuclear escalation because U.S. naval opera-
tions (forward operations of attack submarines, offensive carrier battle group operations in the 
Barents and Norwegian Seas, and a NATO naval counterattack in defense of Norway) all oc-
curred in proximity to the Soviet ballistic missile submarines stationed in Murmansk. “The 
Maritime Strategy” significantly raised the risk that the potential belligerents were willing to 
run in order to guard their own strategic forces. The fine academic distinction between defen-
sive and offensive acts was hardly fully assessable at sea or in the fog of war (ibid: 31-34). 
Nuclear war at sea was certainly a possibility that needed to be taken into account. Accidents 
at sea (caused by routine covert operations in the vicinity of the opponent’s territorial waters 
or major naval assets, harassment for tactical military purposes, routine monitoring, or other 
brazen conduct), the attractiveness of ships as nuclear targets, the launch autonomy of naval 
commanders (especially on submarines where the order was not physical or technical, but 
doctrinal [recalling the Navy’s aversion against doctrine] and thus dependent on personnel 
and discipline), and U.S. and Soviet general doctrine for conduct of nuclear war all provided 
enough potential to trigger atomic warfare at sea (Ball 1985: 3-4).  
Often overlooked, the authors of “The Maritime Strategy” included a vital list of uncertainties 
at the end of their work (Hattendorf 2008: 193-199). These pointed out that this declaratory 
document was never designed to be an unchangeable, biblical truth. Rather, it rested on cer-
tain realities that the Navy held self-evident and for which it lobbied. The section on uncer-
tainties reflected the Navy’s disposition that it knew that “The Maritime Strategy” would be 
up against constantly changing parameters.  
“The Maritime Strategy” also needed to hedge against the incalculable aspects of the subject 
at hand. It was downright speculative if, where, and how Soviet aggression could lead to war, 
and NATO, the U.S. military, and the branches of the military were seldom followers of the 
same school. The view that war between the United States and the Soviet Union could be 
triggered in Southwest Asia (not the Pacific, the North Atlantic, or Central Europe) had some 
subscribers, not least because of the schizophrenic position in which the Navy found itself. In 
the 1980s, the Navy’s surface and air operations focused heavily on that area (see section 8.7), 
while U.S. Navy planners zeroed in on NATO areas and the West Pacific, and the subma-
riners concentrated on the Arctic (Swartz 2011h: 35, slide 69). Correspondingly, to hedge 
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against such uncertainties, naval force structural planning had to be coordinated into “The 
Maritime Strategy”.205  
8.5 Force Structure 
When Ronald Reagan took office, the first effects of a moderate naval armament and force 
recapitalization were slowly emerging. The forward-hub deployment strategy established after 
World War II continued to shape force posture, procurement, and shipbuilding. By 1980, the 
Soviet Navy was a habitual challenger to U.S. sea control in the Sixth Fleet area of responsi-
bility; a dramatic change from the more hypothetical threats that triggered the establishment 
of the forward hub in 1947. The standing Soviet presence in the Mediterranean and its routine 
challenges of U.S. Navy ships and planes required a more focused support of the force in the 
Mediterranean. The increasing demands of an emerging permanent Middle East force, alt-
hough not concurrently reflected in ship-building plans, also influenced force structure. Sev-
eral older warships, technologically outdated and often operationally worn, were decommis-
sioned or placed into the reserve fleet during the 1970s.
206
 Technological innovation and 
comprehensive computerization increasingly shaped the force and its assets.
207
 The naval 
force ascent, both qualitatively and quantitatively, intensified in the course of the decade, rest-
ing on both the workhorses of the legacy fleet and new additions to the force.
208
 The follow-
ing graph shows the general development of the size of the Navy against postulated force lev-
el goals.  
                                                          
205
 Throughout the 1980s, the U.S. Navy relied on forward-based (or rotating, forward-deployed) fleets. The 
Atlantic Fleet was significantly larger than Pacific Fleet, and more ships were stationed on the U.S. East Coast 
than on the West Coast.  
206
 Examples include the Gearing-, Fletcher- and Allen-M-Sumner-class destroyers, the Iowa-class battleships, 
World-War-II escort carriers, and old cruisers.  
207
 For a basic discussion of modern U.S. and allied warship design, technology, sensors, and armament from a 
contemporary perspective, including sectional drawings of warship classes of the U.S. Navy since the end of 
World War II, see Friedman (1978). 
208
 For an analysis on the relationship of “The Maritime Strategy” and fleet design from an interactive point of 
view that goes beyond operations research and systems analysis, see Friedman (1987).  
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Illustration 20: USN 1980s ship levels (Hattendorf 2008: 12, Swartz 2011c: 16, slide 31 & 2011h: 29-30, slides 
58-60).
209
 The 600-ship baseline was dropped towards the end of the decade pending formal review of force 
level goals.  
It must be noted that the goal of fielding 600 warships was never achieved. This pertains to 
the particulars of naval force planning and building, i.e., the substantial amount of resources 
to be invested over a long period of time for a relatively small number of units.
210
 It also 
points out that the 600-ship Navy as it was proposed was more of a sensible baseline rather 
than a strictly enforced (and perhaps sensibly enforceable) force-level goal.
211
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 The Congressional Research Service and the Naval History and Heritage Command apply slightly different 
metrics to the determination of ship inventory/fleet size. For the current metric of counting the fleet and the Na-
val Register, see Department of the Navy (2011).  
210
 From inclusion into the defense budget to keel-laying to rollout, the procurement of a nuclear-powered air-
craft carrier usually takes anywhere from 3-7 years, not including sea trials and shakedown. The timeline for 
smaller units such as conventionally-driven cruisers, destroyers, and frigates is similarly arduous. This is a 
marked contrast to procurements for the Army and the Air Force, where large quantities of material can be field-
ed comparably rapid to achieve substantial economy-of-scale effects in RD&T and procurement.  
211
 In March 1982, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report which studied four options to arrive at 600 
ships. Option I would attain these goals by 1992, which meant the ships would have to be endorsed and author-
ized no later than 1988. This was most likely the shortest period of time in which the Navy's objective could be 
reached. Congress could decide to accomplish the same goals, but over a longer time. Hence, Option II would 
expand the authorization period from six to ten years, with authorizations extending through FY 1992 and force 
goals substantially achieved by 1996. Option III would be a lower cost-alternative version of producing fewer 
ships, but one in which the kinds of warships procured would all be of the same types contained in current Navy 
plans. It would result in a substantially smaller fleet than Options I and II. Option IV would bring in some ship 
types not contained in Navy plans. It would attain numerical force levels comparable to the Navy goals at a low-
er cost than Options I or II (Globalsecurity.org 2011). The report is Congressional Budget Office (1982), Build-
ing a 600-ship Navy: Cost, Timing, and Alternative Approaches. CBO: Washington, D.C. Correspondingly the 
same institution studied the manpower demands for a 600-ship Navy in Congressional Budget Office (1983), 
Manpower for a 600-ship Navy: Costs and Policy Alternatives. CBO: Washington, D.C.  
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In fact, the number dovetailed Lehman’s political message of combat-credible forward naval 
presence. Mandated to organize, train, and equip, the Navy – or Lehman, the public face of 
the Navy’s efforts – provided Congress and the President with a detailed strategy. In order to 
carry out that strategy, the narrative continued, there was a need for 600 ships, precisely a 
number that was already under discussion during earlier force level debates. Affordability – 
specifically the claim to save costs by procuring two aircraft carriers in one single fiscal year, 
twice – was a major selling point to Congress. To the public, the ambitious yet relatively ra-
tional force-level goal seemed to integrate well into the policies of the Reagan administration. 
It also provided a sense of good stewardship of the public’s resources.212  
The 600-ship Navy plan proposed 15 carrier battle groups (CVBG) including 16 carrier air 
wings (CVW), four surface action groups centered around reactivated battleships 
(BBAG/SAG) of the Iowa-class, 100 nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), some ballis-
tic missile submarines, and suitable amphibious lift for Marine Corps elements (a Marine 
Amphibious Force [MAF] and a slightly smaller Marine Amphibious Brigade [MAB]). It was 
also to include between 100 and 110 frigates, 31 mine-countermeasure vessels (MCM), and 
support ships to match (Swartz 2011h: 31, slide 61). These numbers remained deliberately 
squishy to reflect uncertainties in budgeting and procurement, although some elements were 
publicly developed further.  
The 600-ship Navy was purposely carrier-centric, which is less surprising when one considers 
the prominent role these large platforms played in the posture of U.S. sea power since the 
early 1940s. Moreover, Lehman, the architect of the plan, was a reserve naval aviator with a 
degree of appreciation for that particular platform – and a bias. The battle group concept was 
developed to put to sea powerful force packages: CVBGs would consist of two (optionally 
nuclear-powered) cruisers, four guided-missile destroyers, and the same number of guided-
missile frigates. The carriers, the center piece of the proposed plan, would be conventionally- 
and nuclear-powered legacy platforms of the Midway-, Forrestal-, Kitty Hawk-, Enterprise-, 
and Nimitz-classes.
213
 Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) was authorized during the Carter years 
(FY80) and joined the fleet in 1986; Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) and George Washington 
(CVN 73) were both included in the FY 83 budget, joining the fleet in 1986 and 1989, respec-
tively. John C. Stennis (CVN 74) and Harry S Truman (CVN 75) were included in the FY 88 
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 On Lehman’s narrative, see Swartz’s reflections (Swartz interview 2012, 01:45:15 – 01:51:10). Swartz was 
Lehman’s “Maritime Strategy” action officer from 1984.  
213
 The advanced, significantly improved versions of the 90,000-ton carriers are also sometimes called the Theo-
dore-Roosevelt-subclass.  
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budget, but did not join the fleet until 1995/1998.
214
 To persuade congressional oversight of 
the massive national investments into two carriers in one budget year was mastery. Congress, 
which “needs to know the broad flow of events, not minute details” (James Stark interview 
2012: 00:28:13 – 00:28:46), thus adopted the general sense of the important role of sea power 
as an underpinning of global U.S. security. The question was rather ‘how much’ would be 
enough.
215
  
The surface action groups each consisted of one battleship, a cruiser, a quartet of destroyers, 
and the same number of guided-missile frigates. The four Iowa-class battleships built in the 
1940s and in action during World War II, Korea, and Vietnam, were previously seen as out-
dated for most late-Cold War naval missions. They appeared to be outmoded and given their 
large crew size were relatively cost-ineffective. But the return of these behemoths – at a frac-
tion of the cost for a newly procured warship of comparable size – demonstrated two things: 
first, it was a signal to the Soviet Union that the U.S. Navy would field these large vessels as 
part of its naval build-up.
216
 The Soviet Union, from 1980 on, added their Kirov-class nuclear-
powered battle cruiser as a powerful surface combatant of its own. As such, the battleships of 
the Iowa-class were considered a match, but more so a determined political symbol of naval 
diplomacy. Second, they were an operational addition much sought-after by the U.S. Marine 
Corps and war-planners alike. The Marines valued the precious battleship’s large guns which 
provided naval gunfire support ashore. To modify the battleships, several wide-ranging 
changes to design, armament, and weaponry were discussed. Innovations implemented aboard 
the Iowas (which were in essence anachronisms in the computer age) included modern com-
munications equipment, close-in weapons systems (CIWS) for self-defense, and Tomahawk 
cruise missiles.
217
 After all, in the words of the Secretary of the Navy, “the new naval mission 
                                                          
214
 To arrive at the large number of carriers available for strike groups, some legacy platforms received service-
life extension programs (SLEP) and extensive modernization in the 1980s. The decision to continue the pro-
curement of the enhanced Nimitz-class carriers occurred on the basis of extensive advocacy studies by the Navy 
on future carrier platforms. According to one participant, no less than 43 different versions (including operation-
al analysis) were considered at one point or another, including V/STOL, tactical and support variants, and even 
conversions of Spruance-class destroyer hulls into low-end aircraft carriers (Scott Truver interview 2012: 
00:10:40 – 00:15:00). 
215
 The defense budget division of roughly 1/3 for each service (Navy, Army, and Air Force) would remain fairly 
constant in the 1980s, as a rising budgetary tide lifted all boats.  
216
 The costs for the procurement of the large carriers consumed much of the shipbuilding budget at the expense 
of other smaller or low-end capabilities.  
217
 The major technological innovations that were mature in the 1980s included the Aegis integrated naval com-
bat system, of which the Mk-41-Vertical Launching System (VLS) was derived; the Tomahawk cruise missile, 
in its various versions (it gave the Navy an independent strike quality); the Harpoon ASuW missile; and the 
RIM-7 Sea Sparrow anti-ship/-missile missile. The 1980s contained a number of incidents such as the Falklands 
War Exocet attacks on British warships and the 1987/1988 missile threat for U.S. Navy ships in the Persian Gulf, 
which both displayed the opportunities and shortcomings of naval missiles and their respective command sys-
tems. For a detailed overview of U.S. Navy weapons systems, see Terzibaschitsch (2001).  
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was to demonstrate to the Soviet Union every day that the U.S. Navy and its allies would have 
the capability to defeat the Soviet navy and to strike hard into the Soviets’ heartland if they 
ever attacked a member of NATO” (Lehman 2012a).  
President Reagan was sold on the merits of such measures by Lehman and others. “The Mari-
time Strategy” action officers managed to insert parts of emerging rationale into his speeches. 
And so, in his address on the occasion of the re-commissioning of the New Jersey (BB 62) on 
28 December 1982, Reagan noted,  
“We can't shut our eyes to the fact that, as the Soviet military power increased, so did 
their willingness to embark on military adventures. The scars are plainly evident in a 
number of Third World countries. We're also aware that, though the Soviet Union is 
historically a land power -- virtually self-sufficient in mineral and energy resources 
and land-linked to Europe and the vast stretches of Asia -- it has created a powerful, 
blue-ocean navy that cannot be justified by any legitimate defense need. It is a navy 
built for offensive action, to cut the Free World's supply lines and render impossible 
the support, by sea, of Free World allies. By contrast, the United States is a naval 
power by necessity, critically dependent on the transoceanic import of vital strategic 
materials. Over 90 percent of our commerce between the continents moves in ships. 
Freedom to use the seas is our nation's lifeblood. For that reason, our Navy is designed 
to keep the sea lanes open worldwide, a far greater task than closing those sea lanes at 
strategic choke-points. Maritime superiority for us is a necessity. We must be able in 
time of emergency to venture in harm's way, controlling air, surface, and subsurface 
areas to assure access to all the oceans of the world. Failure to do so will leave the 
credibility of our conventional defense forces in doubt.” (Reagan 1982) 
The 600-ship Navy rested principally on a mix of new ships and legacy platforms which were 
modified to compose a large and sustainable force. The 31 ships of the 8,000-ton Spruance-
class destroyers (DD 963 through DD 997) were the backbone of the late Cold War Navy 
(Terzibaschitsch 2002: 49-54). Additionally, the 5,600-ton Farragut-class guided missile de-
stroyers (DDG 37 through DDG 46) and the 4,600-ton Charles F. Adams-class guided missile 
destroyers (DDG 2 through DDG 24) were as valuable to the 1980s Navy as the 7,800-ton 
Leahy-class guided missile cruisers (CG 16 through CG 24) and its sister ships, the 8,000-ton 
Belknap-class (CG 26 through CG 34) guided missile cruisers. Of note were six nuclear-
powered surface warships, a legacy of Admiral Rickover who tightly controlled nuclear pro-
pulsion issues in the Navy until he was retired by John Lehman in January 1982. The 9,100-
ton Bainbridge (CGN 25), the slightly smaller 8,700-ton Truxton (CGN 35), and the 11,700-
ton guided missile cruisers of the Virginia-class (CGN 38 through CGN 41) were powerful, 
large, and expensive assets to the Navy’s arsenal. On the lower end, the conventionally-
powered 2,600-ton Garcia-class frigates (FF 1040 through FF 1051), the numerous 4,200-ton 
Knox-class frigates (FF 1052 through FF 1097), and the Oliver Hazard Perry-class 4,100-ton 
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newcomer guided missile frigates (FFG 7 through FFG 61) served as the workhorses of the 
Navy (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 55-58).
218
  
A look at the procurement dates of the Perry-class frigates indicates that they began joining 
the fleet as early as the late 1970s. The Reagan administration thus was able to easily continue 
and expand procurement of these vessels, rather than having to have completely new designs 
developed. Sure enough, new designs joined the fleet in the 1980s as well, complementing the 
legacy ships. These and the additions from the 1970s to the inventory increasingly changed 
the mindset of the Navy. New and more capable platforms such as the Spruance-class allowed 
for a larger tactical and operational flexibility. As operational commanders rotated back into 
shore billets in Washington, they took with them the knowledge of the expanded versatility 
and often included that in their strategic thinking and planning. This was a textbook case of a 
“bottom-up” change in naval thinking: new weapons demanded a new operational culture 
and, along the way, amplified a new and fresh thinking about naval power.  
One of the most notable new additions to the Navy’s fleet was the 9,600 ton, Aegis-equipped 
guided-missile cruisers of the Ticonderoga-class (CG 47 through CG 73).
219
 Originally based 
on a Spruance-class destroyer hull, the ship’s capabilities were far-ranging, featuring the typi-
cal Mk-41 VLS for missile employment. Helicopters, long-since a mainstay aboard Navy 
ships, were a natural and also increased the vessel’s operational flexibility. Four guided-
missile destroyers of the 9,800 ton Kidd-class (DDG 993 through DDG 996), originally slated 
for the Shah’s Iranian navy and based on the Spruance-class, also joined the U.S. fleet. They 
featured Mk-41 VLS, too. Toward the end of the decade, preparations were made to procure 
the next-generation destroyer, named after the lead ship Arleigh Burke (DDG 51 etc., still in 
production to date) (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 39-46). 
Below the surface, the 17,000 ton Ohio-class nuclear-propelled ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBN 726 through SSBN 746) began joining the fleet (Ohio was commissioned in 1981). 
The Trident II C-4 SLBM was the standard submarine-launched ballistic missile of the time, 
greatly extending the range of its predecessors to some 4,000 miles. The 6,900-ton Los Ange-
les-class nuclear attack submarines (SSN 668 through SSN 773), of which a total of 62 units 
were procured, provided the U.S. submarine force with another powerful tool in the maritime 
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 The U.S. Navy had expurgated its inventory by 1980 of old World War II and first-generation ships, paying 
off whole classes such as the Forrest Sherman-type destroyers and the three Albany-class guided missile cruisers 
(Silverstone 2007: 70-71, 41-42).  
219
 The Aegis system is a totally integrated shipboard weapon system that combines computers, radars, and mis-
siles to establish a defense umbrella for surface shipping. They system is capable of automatically detecting, 
tacking, and destroying airborne, seaborne, and land-launched weapons (Oxford 2002: 5).  
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domain against the Soviet Navy. The Los Angeles boats joined the established 4,600-ton fast 
attack nuclear submarines of the Sturgeon-class (SSN 637 through SSN 687) to buttress the 
operational ideas of “The Maritime Strategy.”220 Arrangements were made for an improved 
Los Angeles-class SSN, the Seawolf-type attack submarine (SSN 21), which was to be the 
main submarine platform well into the 21
st
 century. Due to massive cost overruns, only three 
of the originally planned 29 units were ever procured.  
In the amphibious component, the first of eventually eight Wasp-class small carriers (LHD 1 
through LHD 8) came online. It was developed as a direct successor to the established Tara-
wa-class (LHA 1 through LHA 5), and joined the legacy fleet of Raleigh- and Austin-class 
amphibious transport docks (LPD 1 through LPD 15) and Thomaston- and Anchorage-class 
dock landing ships (LSD 28 through LSD 40). A modern equivalent, the 15,800-ton Whidbey 
Island-class (LSD 41 through LSD 48) entered the fleet from 1985 onwards (Terzibaschitsch 
2002: 82-97, Silverstone 2007: 98-105).  
Augmenting the 600-ship Navy were a variety of auxiliary vessels. To recapitalize its MCM 
fleet, the U.S. Navy procured the Avenger-class boats (MCM 1 through MCM 15). New 
ocean surveillance ships (T-AGOS 1 through T-AGOS 18), 25 maritime prepositioning ships 
(MPS), and 116 ships in the reserve supported the forward-deployed, offensive-minded strat-
egy.
221
 Military sealift program assets (robust U.S. government-owned fleets of preposition-
ing and fast sealift ships subject to CINC demand and JCS adjudication [Swartz 2011h: 53, 
slides 105-106]) included the Algol-class fast sealift vessels (T-AKR 287 through T-AKR 
294) (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 175-176) and fleet oiler replenishment ships of the Henry J. Kai-
ser-class (T-AO 187 through T-AO 204) (Terzibaschitsch 2002: 113-117). The Navy also 
welcomed two Mercy-class hospital ships (T-AH 19/20) to the fleet, both of which were con-
verted tanker hulls. These unarmed ships, painted white and sporting an oversized red cross 
on their hulls, have assisted in numerous humanitarian assistance missions and disaster relief 
since joining the fleet.  
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 Submarines have a significant value in ASW and against surface ships, but limited to impossible AAW capa-
bilities. Enemy action or technological malfunctions can quickly be fatal. Command and control limitations for 
submerged boats remain an operational challenge. They are also impractical for naval diplomacy. In short, sub-
marines are useful for sea denial and strategic deterrence, but not for sea control (Grove 1990: 132-134).  
221
 Reserve forces were augmented as well. On the Ready Reserve Force (RRF) and its sister institution, the 
National Defense Reserve Fleet (NDRF), see Terzibaschitsch 2002: 146-174. Since 1976, the RRF supports the 
rapid worldwide deployment of U.S. military forces. As a key element of strategic sealift, it primarily supports 
transport of Army and Marine Corps unit equipment, combat support equipment, and initial resupply during the 
surge period before commercial ships can be marshaled. They fall under the jurisdiction of the Maritime Admin-
istration (MARAD), management of which is overseen by DOD and DOT.  
  
151 
Regarding naval aviation, the fleet saw some major changes as well. Aircraft numbers re-
mained at a steady high rate, with the operational availability rate averaging 71 % from 1980 
to 1988. The P-2 Neptune maritime patrol/ASW aircraft, the F-4 Phantom II fighter-bomber, 
the A-7 Corsair II attack jet, and the F-8 Crusader jet were retired. New F/A-18 C/D Hornet 
multi-role aircraft and MH-53E Sea Dragon and SH-60 Seahawk multi-mission helicopters 
were incorporated into the fleet. Improved F-14B Tomcats continued to be procured in great 
numbers; A-6 Intruder attack and EA-6B Prowler electronic countermeasures aircraft took 
center stage. 
 
Illustration 21: Inventory of U.S. Navy Aircraft, 1981-1988 (cited in Hattendorf 2008: 13). This OPNAV study 
was discontinued by 1989. 
Additionally, U.S. allied navies were not dormant in the 1980s, often recapitalizing and mod-
ernizing their own fleets to reflect operational experiences and political demands.
222
 These 
allies often provided the lower-end or niche capabilities within NATO, while the United 
States was able to focus on the more costly high-end assets. “The Maritime Strategy” was 
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 The Royal Navy introduced enhanced versions of the Type 22 ASW/AAW/ASuW frigates and later commis-
sioned the heavy Type 23 multipurpose successor to modernize the fleet after the Falklands War. Some of these 
warships are still in service with the Royal Navy (Grove 1987, Brown/Moore 2003). NATO allies such as the 
West German Bundesmarine procured multipurpose ASW/AAW Bremen-class (structurally similar to the Dutch 
Kortenaer-class) frigates in comparably large quantities to field improved capabilities for envisioned escort 
operations in the North Atlantic during the Cold War. After the end of the Cold War, the eight frigates were 
extensively modified to address the more comprehensive demands of an expeditionary navy. The warships are 
currently decommissioned and will be replaced by four new F-125 Baden-Württemberg-class frigates (Kaack 
2013: 16-21).  
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parsed so that the integration of allies could be facilitated. The U.S. Navy’s fleet force struc-
ture throughout the decade presented itself as follows:  
Date 9/81 9/82 9/83 9/84 9/85 9/86 9/87 9/88 9/89 
Battleships 0 0 1 2 2 3 3 3 4 
Carriers 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 
Cruisers 27 27 28 29 30 32 36 38 40 
Destroyers 91 89 71 69 69 69 69 69 68 
Frigates 78 86 95 103 110 113 115 107 100 
Submarines 87 96 98 98 100 101 102 100 99 
SSBNs 34 33 34 35 37 39 37 37 26 
Command Ships
223
 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mine Warfare 25 25 21 21 21 21 22 22 23 
Patrol 1 4 6 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Amphibious 61 61 59 57 58 58 59 59 61 
Auxiliary 101 117 103 120 121 123 127 114 137 
Surface Total 196 202 195 203 211 217 223 217 212 
Total Active 521 555 533 557 571 583 594 573 592 
Illustration 22: U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1981-1989 (Navy History and Heritage Command 2011). 
 
8.6 Strategic and Operational Implementation: Planned vs. actual  
At the beginning of the 1980s and throughout most of the decade, the confrontation with the 
Soviet Union shaped conceptual thinking. The U.S./USSR maritime balance, according to a 
Department of Defense presentation, looked like this:  
  
                                                          
223
 Command Ships are large purposely-built or converted military vessels designed to embark a fleet command-
er. They are equipped with command and control facilities, office space, and accommodation for the admiral and 
his/her staff.  
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Factor U.S. Soviet Union 
Geography  Open access to oceans 
 Long distance to allies 
 Constrained access to 
oceans 
 Short distances to allies 
Missions  Sea control/power projec-
tion 
 Sea denial/peripheral sea 
control 
Offensive capability  Few large ships 
 Sea based aviation 
 Attack submarines 
 Amphibious forces 
 Land-based naval air 
force 
 Many small ships 
 Anti-ship missile system 
 Attack submarines 
Defensive capability  Marginal AAW capabil-
ity 
 ASW 
 Air cover 
 Marginal AAW capabil-
ity 
 Inadequate ASW 
 Inadequate sea-based air 
Sustained Operations  Excellent underway re-
plenishment 
 Worldwide base structure 
 Limited underway re-
plenishment 
 Limited overseas base 
system 
Technology  Major advantage – offen-
sive and defensive tech-
nology 
 Anti-ship missiles and 
surface ocean surveil-
lance 
Experience  Extensive exercises 
 Volunteer force 
 Wartime experience 
 Limited at-sea time 
 Manning by conscripts 
Illustration 23: U.S./USSR Maritime Balance (adapted from DoD/Ryan 1981: 182) 
Fundamental differences prevailed between the two nations, their sea power assets, and their 
respective sea-strategic concepts. While the U.S. and the Soviet Union often came very close 
– literally bumping into each other at times in the Mediterranean and the Black Sea – other 
contingencies for the U.S. dominated the operational action and expertise of the 1980s Navy. 
8.6.1 Major U.S. Naval Operations
224
 
The thrust of “The Maritime Strategy” was that it was tentatively as useful in the overarching 
objective of deterring (and, if must be, defeating) the Soviet Union as it was for lesser contin-
gencies. It was also a strategy that could be executed with available forces; it was a real-time 
strategy (Hattendorf/Swartz 2008: 140). 
“It was my firm view that conflict with the USSR was a low probability 
event…although we often found ourselves (USN) involved in ‘crisis response’ events 
possibly sparked by the USSR via its proxies. That said, the fleet was designed for a 
fight with the Soviets and our responses to various non-Soviet ‘crises’ were handled as 
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‘lesser included’ events, i.e., with the forces (fleet) designed to fight the Soviets.” 
(Robbie Harris, e-mail to author, 27 January 2014)  
On balance, the Navy and the Marine Corps responded to 47 individual crises during the 
1980s, much more than the Army and the Air Force did (Baer 1994: 446). The following is a 
discussion of three selected U.S. naval operations of the decade. Keeping in mind the particu-
lar nature of a forward-deployed fleet (it is not kept in a U.S. port until a problem arises but 
rather maintains a permanent forward presence in areas of interest), the following paragraph 
illustrates some of the ‘real-world’ engagements for the service. In the 1980s, the U.S. forces’ 
responses became more energized. This shift was manifest in high level of activity extending 
from the Gulf of Sidra in the Western Mediterranean to the Strait of Hormuz and the Persian 
Gulf. The decade was also marked by the onset of simultaneity of events. Not only was the 
United States doing more in the 1980s compared to the 1970s, it was responding to situations 
concurrently with a particular focus on Europe-Africa and Persian Gulf regions (Cob-
ble/Gaffney/Gorenburg 2005: 21). Events in Lebanon and responses to the spike in Palestini-
an terrorism in Europe and North Africa (such as airplane hijackings in 1985 and 1986, and 
the capture of the Italian passenger liner Achille Lauro in October 1985) accounted for three-
fourths of U.S. responses in the USEUCOM area (ibid: 23).
225
  
a) Lebanon (1982-1984)  
Occupying the U.S. operational focus in the first third of the decade was the civil war in Leb-
anon, a country ravaged by turmoil and armed conflict for years. After the 1982 Lebanon war, 
a multinational force consisting of U.S., French, Italian, and British forces provided a perma-
nent presence in Beirut in order to deter the outbreak of further hostilities. Israel, Syria, Leba-
non, and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) wrestled for influence as fractional 
strife continued to fuel the violent unrest (Hartmann 1990: 231-234, Lehman 2001: 302-303). 
Iran ascended as a contender in this conflict, too. The Soviet Union did not appreciate the 
Western military presence in what it considered one of its premier areas of interest and influ-
ence either (Lehman 2001: 303). In 1982, 800 U.S. Marines were stationed in Beirut as part of 
a multinational peacekeeping force. They were quickly caught in the middle of the murky 
conflict. The deteriorating security situation was not properly reflected in more appropriate 
rules of engagement. Shortcomings in intelligence collection and contradictions in the chains 
of command of inter-departmental policy and military decision-makers severely diluted the 
U.S. effort to remain outside of the raging civil war (ibid: 304-310). A more coercive, active 
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U.S. military intervention from the sea remained undone because the high-value warships 
could have been at risk from terrorist attacks and close-in weapons if they loitered too close to 
the coast. The White House, the Pentagon, and the State Department pursued incompatible 
Lebanon policies and greatly complicated assessing and addressing the situation on the 
ground properly. Fear of mission creep – an epitome of the Vietnam syndrome – led to an 
overly cautious political attitude in Washington, with disastrous results on the ground by 
1983. On 18 April, an explosion at the U.S. embassy in the Lebanese capital claimed the lives 
of 63 (17 of whom were Americans), and on 23 October the detonation of a truck-borne bomb 
at the Marine Corps barracks killed 241 U.S. servicemen.
226
 In the meantime, the recently 
reactivated battleship New Jersey (BB 62) had eventually arrived off the Levant coast. How-
ever, retaliatory strikes were not conducted until December after aircraft from the carriers 
Independence (CV 62) and John F. Kennedy (CV 67) had engaged Syrian-controlled surface-
to-air missile (SAM) positions, and the U.S. Navy lost planes and pilots.
227
 The New Jersey’s 
guns were more heavily used in February of 1984, when the decision to withdraw the remain-
ing U.S. Marines from Lebanon was flanked with a massive, but hardly strategically useful 
barrage of the battleship’s 16-inch shells at enemy positions in the Bekaa Valley west of Bei-
rut (Love 1992b: 746). This engagement was the most intense shore bombardment since the 
Korean War (in which the New Jersey, incidentally, was also used). The U.S. Navy’s en-
gagement in Lebanon revealed flaws in the uniformed chain of command, the policy objec-
tives of the mission, and the backwards-thinking of naval aviators, which eventually caused 
the catastrophic U.S. score sheet (Lehman 2001: 330).
228
 For the time being, the Reagan doc-
trine – to sustain American influence in regions of strategic interests – appeared to be under 
severe pressure (Love 1992b: 747).  
b) Libya (1981-1989) 
Libya was another key contender for 1980s U.S. naval operations. During the 1970s and 
1980s, the Libyan government under Muammar Gaddafi presented a key foreign-policy chal-
lenge to the United States, not the least because Gaddafi was staunchly anti-Israel and a ruth-
less and aggressive dictator.
229
 The extravagant ruler, who had risen to power in 1969 in the 
aftermath of a coup, supported international terrorism in the Middle East and Europe, both of 
which reached dramatic highpoints in the 1980s. He was also suspected of developing weap-
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 These lessons learned significantly contributed to the changes in all three areas that Lehman sought to imple-
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 President Reagan, in a news conference on 9 April 1986, labeled him the “mad dog of the Middle East”.  
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ons of mass destruction. The Gulf of Sidra, a large body of international waters hugged by the 
Libyan coastline, was declared subject to extensive Libyan claims of sovereignty. To uphold 
the right of free maritime passage and prevent a creeping entry into customary law by Libyan 
actions, President Reagan in August of 1981 authorized freedom of navigation naval exercises 
that would cross the self-proclaimed Libyan “line of death”. To the U.S., that action had both 
a legal and an operational connotation for because the Gulf of Sidra was the only place in the 
Mediterranean that was free of any major sea lanes or airways. For decades, the U.S. Sixth 
Fleet had depended on it for periodic live-fire exercises (Lehman 2001: 351). In the process of 
the operation, which included the carriers Forrestal (CV 59) and Nimitz (CVN 68), two of the 
Libyan Air Force aircraft that sought to intercept the U.S. force were shot down by Navy 
fighters (Siegel 1991: 43).  
U.S. forces repeatedly clashed with the Libyan military between 1981 and 1989, but the larg-
est military engagements occurred in 1986 (Love 1992b: 755-768). In response to hijackings 
of commercial airliners and the bombing of the airports of Rome and Vienna in December 
1985, Gaddafi was accused as the mastermind and financier of these perpetrations. From Jan-
uary through March 1986, the U.S. Navy used its routine challenges of unlawful Libyan terri-
torial claims to mount large-scale naval exercises. On its third incursion, a large force – con-
sisting of the three aircraft carriers Coral Sea (CV 43), Saratoga (CV 60), America (CV 66), 
the guided-missile cruisers Ticonderoga (CG 47) and Yorktown (CG 48), and “122 other 
American warships” (Lehman 2001: 356) – under the command of Admiral Frank Kelso (lat-
er CNO) sought to draw out Libyan forces. This resulted in a high attrition rate with the infe-
rior green-water Libyan navy and a demonstration of defense capabilities against SAMs. The 
U.S. Navy had benefited from the 600-ship Navy and made progress in tactical proficiency. It 
was soon ordered to terminate its war-fighting efforts prematurely. This development, alt-
hough a far cry from the problems encountered in Lebanon a few years earlier, also showed 
the limits of the Reagan doctrine in counter-terrorism operations. In early April, just weeks 
after the clash, state-sponsored terrorist attacks on the “La Belle” discotheque in West-Berlin 
(a club frequented by U.S. service members, two of whom were among the three dead) and a 
TWA flight en route from Rome to Athens (killing four Americans) could be traced to the 
Libyan regime’s brazen attempt to obtain a profit from what was seen as American hesitancy.  
The situation further escalated when, in a joint Air Force-Navy retaliatory strike on 15 April 
1986 codenamed “Operation Eldorado Canyon”, the U.S. launched a large-scale attack on 
Libyan shore targets in Tripoli and Benghazi. It utilized naval assets on station in the 6
th
 Fleet 
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AOR and Air Force elements based in the U.K., which participated despite the need for a 
concerted refueling effort and a detour around Gibraltar (France had declined the U.S. over-
flight rights for this operation). The operations in the Gulf of Sidra in 1986 marked the first 
operational employment of Aegis-equipped guided-missile cruisers and destroyers (Lehman 
2001: 174) and by-and-large discouraged Gaddafi from further acts of terrorism.
230
 Lehman’s 
gleaming conclusion in his memoirs (2001: 360) spells out,  
“It was precisely those ships, aircraft, and weapons that had been ridiculed during the 
early 1980s by the antinaval reformers in Congress and their academic camp followers 
that performed so brilliantly: the aegis cruiser, the F-14, the F-18, the A-6, the F-111, 
the Harm antiradiation missile, and the Harpoon antiship missile. […] Another obvi-
ous and strong lesson was the destruction of the myth of interservice rivalry.”  
If anything, the Gulf of Sidra clashes underlined that the Reagan administration took a much 
tougher stance against regional challenges when provoked in comparison with President 
Carter.
 At the time, the United States (after Reagan’s policy reversal) and the Soviet Union 
(under newly-elected president Gorbachev) carefully approached each other. Comparably 
minor skirmishes such as U.S. operations against Libya demonstrated the strategically vital 
position of strength from which Reagan could negotiate.231
 
 
c) Persian Gulf (1987/1988) 
The third large U.S. naval operation of the 1980s came about in the Persian Gulf, the Strait of 
Hormuz, and the Arabian Sea. Those bodies of water had been elevated to an area of major 
strategic importance since the promulgation of the Carter doctrine.
232
 The looming establish-
ment of a permanent and ready forward-deployed U.S. force
233
 and the significant utilization 
of Diego Garcia in the Western Indian Ocean signaled growing U.S. commitment to the re-
gion. They also dovetailed the global approach and thinking behind “The Maritime Strategy”. 
Meanwhile, the Iran-Iraq War broke out in 1980. The conflict, which consumed the vast ma-
jority of the decade for the belligerents, began when Iraqi ruler Saddam Hussein’s expedited 
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 Mirroring one of the first uses of naval force during the Reagan years, yet another Gulf of Sidra incident be-
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 Fleet was not established until 1995.  
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an increasingly aggressive foreign policy aimed at controlling more oil reserves in the Middle 
East.
234
 In addition to the land war, warfare also included attacks on shipping in the Gulf. 
Control of regional sea lines along with destruction of enemy merchant ships (and those of its 
allies) and the protection of oil export assets became key objectives in Iraq’s strategy and op-
erations. Since Iraq owned few maritime or naval assets that were worthwhile attacking, Iran 
responded by targeting ships trading with Bagdad’s allies in the Persian Gulf, principally Ku-
wait. 71 merchant ships were attacked in 1984 alone, compared with 48 in the first three years 
of the war (Schneller 2007: 13). Two years later, Iraq stepped up its air attacks on tankers 
serving Iran and Iranian oil-exporting facilities. At this point, U.S. interests and those of her 
allies were increasingly at risk, although Washington had officially remained neutral, only 
gradually tilting toward the Iraqis, and the Iran-Contra affair not withstanding (Love 1992b: 
773). In the fall of 1986, the government of Kuwait sought help from the international com-
munity. Its tanker fleet was affected disproportionally by the Iranian attempts to curtail oil 
revenue supports for Iraq’s war efforts (Crist 2012: 160-164). Utilizing the provisions of in-
ternational law and the terms of trade of commercial shipping, freighters were to be reflagged 
carrying U.S. flags and escorted by allied warships. The U.S. was reluctant at first to provide 
such support.
235
 In “Operation Earnest Will,” up to 30 U.S. Navy ships patrolled the Arabian 
Sea, with periodical incursions of cruisers, destroyer, and frigates through the Strait of Hor-
muz to provide escort service through the mine-infested narrow maritime highway. All the 
while, command and control problems impaired sea power action at this critical interface of 
two U.S. regional commands (U.S. CENTCOM and U.S. PACOM).
236
 Overcoming problems 
with MCM capabilities and equipment governed daily operations (Schneller 2007: 16-18).
237
 
In 1987 and 1988, the naval action that drew in U.S. Navy forces escalated decisively. First, 
on 17 May 1987, the guided-missile frigate Stark (FFG 31) was hit by two Exocet air-to-
surface missiles from an Iraqi jet, which mistook the American vessel for an Iranian warship. 
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 According to Schneller the request was also addressed to the United Kingdom, China, and the Soviet Union. 
“It was the specter of the Soviets using the escort mission to project power into the region that finally precipitat-
ed U.S. government action.” (2007: 14-15) As Love points out (1992b: 774), “American strategy was about to be 
transfigured by Kuwait’s diplomacy. Instead of having to fight its way to the Gulf, the Red Navy was now being 
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37 U.S. sailors were killed, but damage control efforts were successful in keeping the five-
year old ship from sinking. In addition, the Navy – tasked with preventing the actual distribu-
tion of Iranian mines rather than having to find and clear them once they had been laid – re-
peatedly clashed with Iranian forces in the following months. On 14 April 1988, the Stark’s 
sister ship Samuel B. Roberts (FFG 58) struck a mine. The resulting explosion injured ten 
sailors, and on 18 April the U.S. retaliated against Iranian command and control platforms 
with “Operation Praying Mantis” (Love 1992b: 787-790). Surface ships and carrier-based 
aircraft obliterated two oil platforms used by the Iranian military as command and control 
posts. In this battle, U.S. naval forces sank or damaged half of Iran’s operational navy 
(Schneller 2007: 19). But it took a tragic incident for Iran to agree to a ceasefire proposal ne-
gotiated by the United Nations. On 3 July 1988, the guided-missile cruiser Vincennes (CG 49) 
mistakenly shot down Iran Air flight 655, killing 290 passenger and crew aboard the Airbus 
A-300 (Love 1992b: 791-793).  
Politically, “the United States’ stand in the Gulf during 1987-1988 erased the negative images 
resulting from the failed Iranian rescue mission and withdrawal from Lebanon” (Schneller 
2007: 19). The U.S. Navy reduced its forces in theater down to just five warships patrolling in 
the Gulf by the summer of 1990 (ibid: 19).  
On balance, the 1980s witnessed growing U.S. involvement in the Mediterranean, the Middle 
East, and Southwest Asia. The conflicts generated by turmoil in Libya, Lebanon, and Iran 
kept the Navy quite busy. Containing the spillover-effects from these lesser-included events 
dominated U.S. response in both the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf/Indian Ocean areas. 
However, this level of activity did not preclude the forward-deployed forces from also pursu-
ing more traditional Cold War missions of deterrence and surveillance against the Soviets in 
the thrust of “The Maritime Strategy” (Cobble/Gaffney/Gorenburg 2005: 28). In fact, it was 
the combination of efforts and events that characterized American sea power between 1981 
and 1989. 
8.6.2 Relationships to sister services: Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force 
a) USMC 
The Navy’s relationship to its sister service, the Marine Corps, was generally cordial. After 
all, the 600-ship Navy included amphibious ships. Lift capability for amphibious forces - that 
is, forces capable of making a forcible invasion from the sea - was increased about 50 percent 
to provide a capability to land a Marine Amphibious Brigade, or MAB (15,500 troops), in 
addition to the current ability to land a Marine Amphibious Force, or MAF (32,500 troops). 
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The Maritime Strategy was developed with significant and continuous Marine Corps input, 
and the Marine Corps’ take on the issue co-appeared in the Proceedings issue that featured 
“The Maritime Strategy”. For the NATO flanks, especially Norway, amphibious capabilities 
and pre-positioned equipment were indispensable. The Marine Corps was also pleased to see 
the return of powerful naval gun-fire and better close-air support. These were mostly achieved 
through the re-commissioning of the Iowa-class battleships and the decision by both the USN 
and the USMC to buy and fly F/A-18s (Lehman 2001: 247). In short, the Marines’ expedi-
tionary mindset and the Navy’s strike force focus could be reconciled easily given the up-
swing of Navy budgets and coherent strategic narrative, despite the oft-cited uneasiness over 
the Navy having to pay for the Marine Corps’ transportation.  
b) USCG 
In the 1980s, the Coast Guard operated under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT) and therefore did not benefit directly from the increased DOD budget spending. 
In the realm of homeland security, absent a coastal defense role for the U.S. Navy, the Coast 
Guard had significant ASW, MCM, and reconnaissance roles against Soviet submarines that 
ventured near or into the U.S. EEZ. Beyond these maritime defense zones (codified in an 
agreement with DOD), the Coast Guard often continued to operate as an expeditionary joint 
force under the direction of U.S. SOUTHCOM (together with the Navy) in a significant num-
ber of Caribbean and South American counter-narcotics operations (Fuss 1996; Swartz 2003: 
11-12) 
c) USA & USAF 
Throughout the decade, fierce inter-service rivalry for budgets and attention continued. The 
Army and the Air Force were very focused on the Central Front contingency in West Germa-
ny. Both services had developed the AirLand Battle (ALB) doctrine which was designed for 
the conduct of operations on a non-linear battlefield. It emphasized continuous operations in 
depth and the integration of nuclear, chemical, and conventional forces and close cooperation 
between air and ground forces (Oxford 2002: 10).
238
 The Air Force and the Army were both 
skeptical of the Navy’s new ambitions.239 In a world where NATO was essentially preparing 
for World War III in Europe, Army leadership saw the Navy doing what it did in World War 
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II: Convoy escort. Consequently, misunderstandings ensued: “What the Navy calls the Ar-
my’s lack of understanding of the uses of sea-power, the Army calls a waste of resources or 
gross negligence of duty” (Swartz 1996: 41). It was a credit to the diplomacy of CNO James 
Watkins who worked with the SACEUR General Bernard Rogers (USA) in overcoming some 
Army/NATO reluctance and resistance to “The Maritime Strategy” (Lehman 2012a). 
The Air Force still remembered the carrier controversies of the past decades enough to remain 
skeptical of the Navy’s offensive, carrier-centric efforts. The generous defense budget spike 
and the renewed appreciation during the Reagan years for the military helped to overcome the 
fiercest of these competitions, at least for the time being. A naval renaissance did not come at 
the direct expense of the Army and the Air Force, although both services – with their own 
visions of the war to come – were careful to cheer for it. “The Maritime Strategy” was often 
dismissed as a tool of Secretary Lehman (the USNR aviator) and CNO Watkins (the subma-
riner) to groom their unions. Discussions of a more substantial kind – short versus long wars, 
maritime versus continental emphasis, global versus theater strategies – were muted during 
the well-funded years. The Air Force and the Army did envy the way the Navy used its vaunt-
ed flexibility to present a contemporary case that left the other services looking narrow-
minded, outdated, or tongue-tied (Baer 1994: 442-443). The Army’s and Air Force’s views 
were by no means unfounded, but they simply did not see a significant contribution of naval 
power to their overall objective.  
8.6.3 Relationships to Allies  
To the authors of “The Maritime Strategy”, the inclusion of allies was very important.240 
NATO member states were particularly crucial, although fundamentally the Navy’s effort was 
obviously one that carried American national interests, not necessarily that of America’s al-
lies. Again, the benefits of a non-static document rather than that of a cast-in-stone doctrine 
are obvious for the diplomacy part of the Navy’s effort.  
However, “The Maritime Strategy” sent a mixed message to European leaders, signaling that 
the U.S. was also willing and able to fight in the North Atlantic and the Pacific, but it was 
unclear how these two theaters were to be connected strategically. The underlying, permanent 
uncertainty about the stakes that the United States would be willing to commit to the defense 
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of Europe did not go away.
241
 Concurrently, leaders may have worried that escalation in the 
Pacific would trigger a hot war over Berlin and at the Central Front. In addition, the Navy’s 
conviction that “The Maritime Strategy” could keep any global war non-nuclear risked un-
dermining a key pillar in NATO’s flexible response strategy: If Western strategists empha-
sized in their public (and private) pronouncements that armed conflict would remain conven-
tional, the Soviet Union might feel encouraged to believe that it could easily avoid nuclear 
punishment for any conventional aggression (Posen 1982: 29).  
NATO at the time was considered as heavily nuclear- and Germany-centric, and too dominat-
ed by the battle doctrine at the Central Front in Hessen and Bavaria (Swartz 1996: 27). It fol-
lowed that the Navy’s narrative was to emphasize theaters of war against the Warsaw Pact 
that lay at the flanks, or even outside of NATO area. On the Southern flanks, the littoral states 
of the Mediterranean Sea needed to be reassured of the salience of “The Maritime Strategy”. 
The Mediterranean had been the site of repeated U.S.-Soviet naval confrontations and it was 
the operating area for Moscow’s forward-based forces, which sought to counter-balance the 
U.S. Sixth Fleet’s assets. Turkey and Greece, two NATO allies, were located at a 
geostrategically important position. On the Northern flanks, the “The Maritime Strategy” was 
reasonably attractive to allies such as Norway: The country would have been “on the wrong 
side of the barrier” (Baer 1994: 433) had a GIUK242 distant blockade strategy prevailed; on 
the other hand, Norway was at risk of being drawn into a U.S.-Soviet conflict first, and should 
not have had an interest in an escalating naval strategy (Rudolf 1990: 310).
243
 
Close U.S. allies such as the U.K. and West Germany also reviewed their posture in the peri-
od of interest. In Great Britain, the Defence White Paper of 1981 (also dubbed the “Nott Re-
view”) sought to significantly reduce British conventional military capabilities. Margaret 
Thatcher’s conservative government attempted to offset the effects of economic stagnation 
that had previously besieged Britain.
244
 The Royal Navy (RN) was slated to be affected con-
siderably, but the Argentine invasion of the Falklands Islands and Britain’s subsequent major 
expeditionary operation into the South Atlantic prevented the drawdown from taking full ef-
fect for the time being. In West Germany, NATO’s forward-defense at the inner-German bor-
der relied on a robust mix of conventional and nuclear forces. The conservative-liberal gov-
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ernment led by Helmut Kohl produced defense white books in 1983 and 1985 that very much 
reflected the particular German, land- and air-power-driven interests for national survival. At 
the same time, the German Navy’s operational thinking and its embrace of a broader contribu-
tion to NATO’s forward defense at sea (containment, defense in depth, keeping of the initia-
tive) was reflected in its landmark policy guideline of 1985. The North Sea and Norwegian 
Sea were recognized as potentially significant operating areas (The Federal Minister of De-
fense 1985: 211-220). The capstone document codified emerging German thinking of operat-
ing forward in the Baltic Sea in peacetime, conflict, and war. The Federal German Navy 
(FGN) now contributed substantially to ASW and SLOC protection in the North Sea and the 
Norwegian Sea.
245
 Because the advent of “The Maritime Strategy” did not mean a significant 
trade-off in Germany’s own security (i.e., through severe cuts in U.S. conventional ground 
and air forces in Germany), the American military strategy was generally welcomed.
246
   
Politically, European leaders in the 1980s were often very much concerned about arms con-
trol, often vocally supported by large public demonstrations and peace movements. “The Mar-
itime Strategy” neglected this issue.247 Although naval arms limitations are inherently difficult 
(Grove 1990: 154), the Soviet Union repeatedly proposed such measures. Whether this was a 
practical proposal or a political maneuver, those attempts eventually did not lead anywhere 
(Rudolf 1990: 380-383).  
To test “The Maritime Strategy” at sea (and to quell possible allied concerns about the way 
forward), a number of large U.S./NATO exercises were conducted in the context of “The 
Maritime Strategy”. Examples included Ocean Safari and Northern Wedding exercises in 
1981, where operations in the North Atlantic remained undetected by the Soviets for four 
days.
248
 In Fleet-Ex 83, three aircraft carriers operated in the North Pacific (significantly con-
tributing to Soviet nervousness in 1983). Ocean Safari 85 ran from August to September 1985 
and included convoys crossing the Atlantic and hugging the European coast from Iceland to 
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advocates and supporters of détente (Swartz interview 2012, 01:07:45-01:09:15). For a representative discussion 
on the arms control implications of “The Maritime Strategy”, see Stefanick (1986).  
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 Admiral “Ace” Lyons, who would later rise to Deputy CNO and Commander, U.S. Pacific Fleet, had com-
manded that exercise. He introduced new operational orders and attributed the fact that the Soviets could not find 
the task groups to them still holding access to the old material (as it was proven four years later when the Walker 
spy ring was busted, there was indeed a leak and the Soviets were reading U.S. Navy communications) (Lyons 
interview 2012, 00:18:00 – 00:21:15).  
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Portugal. More than 150 warships, among them the Iowa (BB 61) battleship and the Saratoga 
(CV 60), Enterprise (CVN 65), and America (CV 66) CVBGs, participated in this sweeping 
demonstration of NATO naval power. Teamwork 88 was the largest multinational exercise in 
the decade. Held in the summer of 1988, it simulated operations in the Norwegian fjords.
249
 
On the far side of the world in the Pacific, PacEx 89 was a massive naval exercise that drew 
out aircraft carriers, battleships, and numerous other warships. Allied navies from Canada, 
Japan, and the Republic of Korea routinely trained with the U.S. Navy. As “The Maritime 
Strategy” had laid out, these exercises signaled to the Soviets that if they attacked NATO in 
Europe, “they could expected us to be coming at them in the Pacific” (Lehman 2001: 364).  
8.6.4 Significant Organizational Changes  
As in other bureaucracies, the DOD/Navy organization is an institution that frequently under-
goes changes. These can have a strategic implication when they significantly pool or disperse 
major personnel resources and responsibilities (Goldwater-Nichols has previously been men-
tioned in this study as a factor). In addition, individuals can be promoted or demoted in order 
to leverage their influence on strategy, even if it might be subordinate. Such was the case with 
Admiral Hyman Rickover, who was retired in 1982. Over the several decades of his service, 
the admiral had developed a substantial power base in his crusade to turn the Navy into a nu-
clear-propelled force. He brutally controlled reactor research and technology efforts, training, 
and crewing of nuclear warships. With Congress, he repeatedly sought to make the case for 
more and more nuclear-powered warships, winning powerful followers in the process. Ricko-
ver, who had joined the Navy in 1918, also forged powerful alliances in the military bureau-
cracy, officer corps, and the U.S. defense industry. His influence and peculiar personality pre-
vented successive presidential administrations from disposing of him. By 1980, more than 
two decades after the first nuclear-powered submarine Nautilus (SSN 571) was launched, the 
Navy operated a nuclear fleet of 126 warships, including 74 attack/patrol/hunter submarines, 
41 strategic-missile submarines, three aircraft carriers, and eight guided-missile cruisers. The-
se vessels represented about one third of the Navy’s warships and the bulk of its offensive 
forces. The Navy paid a significant price because funds for the high-maintenance nuclear-
powered ships ate away at resources also desired to recapitalize the conventionally-powered 
fleet. The focus on atomic energy also meant that evolutions in technology which occurred in 
the aviation and commercial shipping world passed by the Navy until the late 1990s (Lehman 
2001: 12). Lehman made it his mission to retire Rickover, the “paradoxical visionary” (ibid: 
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 For a representative earlier discussion of the operational ramifications of “The Maritime Strategy” (in North-
ern European waters), see (VADM) Mustin (written while deployed aboard USS America) (1986).  
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8). Against the admiral’s explicit wish, Rickover agreed to retire at age 82 on 31 January 1982 
(and only after causing quite a stir at the White House described by Lehman in ibid: 1-8).  
Lehman identified some other issues, one of them not unconnected to the dismissal of Ricko-
ver. The design and procurement of the SSN 668 (the Los-Angeles-class) attack submarines 
was split between General Dynamic’s Electric Boat division and the Newport News Ship-
building and Drydock Company. The former contender offered an economically unviable 
contract that was unable to hedge against massive cost overruns caused by inflation and faulty 
engineering. In the end, the Navy had to bail out the shipyard itself so that it could put its 
boats into service, albeit at a much higher cost to the tax-payer.  
Lehman also tackled a reform of the Navy Department against the background of rising costs 
for the Navy’s new F-18 Hornet fighter jet. Naval aviation was a central cornerstone in the 
recapitalization of the Navy as the 600-ship Navy with its fifteen carriers and four Marine 
Corps air wings required double the procurement rate of tactical aircraft that had prevailed 
during the late 1970s (Lehman 2001: 220-221).
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 In order to adhere to the constitutional 
guidance of maintaining a permanent Navy, Lehman pushed forward the horizontal integra-
tion of the U.S. Naval Reserve, which had previously worked with outdated ships and tech-
nology, into the Navy (ibid. 247). Innovations within the Navy’s structure with visible impact 
on the operational and even tactical levels in the 1980s included the Naval Strike Warfare 
Center. Nicknamed “Strike-U” and based at NAS Fallon, NV, it came to life in 1984 with the 
objective of advancing the proficiency of naval aviators. The facility merged with two other 
institutions in 1993 to form the Naval Strike and Air Warfare Center. The most visible and 
perhaps far-reaching organizational change in the 1980s was the standing up of new combat-
ant commands. While the U.S. Central Command (1983), Special Operations Command 
(1987), and Transportation Command (1987) remain active until today, the Space Command 
(1987) was terminated in 2002. The U.S. Navy had opposed the establishment of each, fearing 
loss of autonomy and intra-service squabbles (Swartz 2011h: 26, slide 52). 
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 The price of Navy aircraft had been escalating between 10 and 20 percent higher than the rate of inflation 
since 1950. Cuts in the Navy’s budget amounting to 22 percent in constant dollars during the 1970s resulted in 
massive loss of capabilities. As the prices increased and the dollar value decreased, by 1980 the Navy was able 
to buy only half the number of aircraft it lost each year to peacetime attrition, a process Lehman called “unilat-
eral disarmament through price escalation” (Lehman 2001: 220-221).  
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Illustration 24: U.S. Cold War Areas of Responsibility, 1983-1991 (Collins 2002: 310). For an illustration of the 
global division of military responsibility today, see map in appendix.  
In other words, in the 1980s formal strategic efforts of “The Maritime Strategy” were accom-
panied by less visible, informal ones to create the conditions under which strategic Navy is-
sues could be addressed and implemented (Swartz 2011h: 40, slide 79). This underlines that 
the evolution of the Navy and its strategy in the 1980s was an organic and inherently dynam-
ic, multi-faceted exercise that involved dedicated inside and outside participants. 
8.7 Assessment: A Strategic Sea Power Renaissance, 1981-1989 
“The Maritime Strategy” capstone documents of the 1980s, “a tumultuous period for sea 
power theory” (Tangredi 2002: 125), represented a dedicated re-focus of the nexus of national 
and naval interests (Barnett 2009: 90). As Geoff Till pointed out, the maritime posture of the 
Cold War United States was largely dominated by three aspects in the decision-making pro-
cesses, namely, the checks and balances between the President and Congress, the state of rela-
tions between the services, and the relations between the different ‘unions’ of the Navy itself 
(1999: 252-253). “The Maritime Strategy” utilized executive/legislative branch synergies and 
overcame inter-service and inter-warfare union competition for the time being. These three 
parallel successes (otherwise often highly unlikely to be achieved concurrently) made “The 
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Maritime Strategy” a Cold War success. For the administration, as Lehman wrote in his 
memoires, it was one of the rare opportunities to hit the ground running.  
“The President had specifically called for maritime superiority in his principal national 
security campaign speech in Chicago in March 1980, and the six-hundred-ship objec-
tive was a plank in the Republican platform. The Secretary of Defense offered strong 
intellectual support, and the Senate and House Armed Services Committees were 
equally committed.” (Lehman 2001: 115) 
A post-World War II naval depression had cumulated in the 1970s, when the inability to ar-
ticulate the Navy’s strategic role in national politics, diminishing budgetary resources, an age-
ing and ever-shrinking fleet, the Vietnam War legacy, and the Soviet naval challenge on the 
high seas threatened the future of the service. The Navy was unable to develop and implement 
a suitable strategy. The attempts to recapitalize the fleet lacked direction and political support. 
During the anti-naval early Presidency of Jimmy Carter, the discrepancy between the political 
ideas of the administration and the ideas of the Navy reached a highpoint (Stallmann 2000: 
169) that was hard to overcome. 
In the 1980s, CNOs Hayward and Watkins in conjunction with Secretary Lehman managed to 
turn around the dispute and disorientation on the use of force that prevailed in the 1970s by 
tying together main elements of offensive U.S. Navy thinking into a comprehensive and easi-
ly understood narrative. None of these individuals accepted the gunboat diplomacy and spotty 
escort duties that CNO Zumwalt and Presidents Nixon and Carter had cherished. Most im-
portantly, they did not accept any naval strategy that was based on an unbuilt ship such as the 
CVV concept (Baer 1994: 430). The goal of a 600-ship Navy, an arbitrary number, served a 
political purpose of signaling the intent to pursue a global and proactive U.S. sea power role. 
The Navy’s strategic missions were in place before the goal of 600 ships in the inventory was 
informal national policy, and not the other way around as vocal critic Robert Komer would 
have it.
251
 These ideas lay dormant until the external and internal conditions were such that 
they could be awakened. The 600-ship Navy therefore dovetailed “The Maritime Strategy,” 
although it was a convenient vehicle to bolster the intellectual work of the Navy with clear 
numbers that were demonstratively beneficial for the defense industry. More than the simple 
and often scrutinized game of counting ships, “The Maritime Strategy” must therefore also be 
assessed for the deed it performed for the Navy and the nation as an intellectual exercise.  
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 Robert Komer in an interview with Peter F. Kroegh on the TV show “American Interests” (29 November 
1986).  
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“The Maritime Strategy” connected the naval missions of power projection and sea control by 
building on a forward naval force.
252
 For the moment, this eclipsed the ballast that decades of 
prevalent air power doctrine, massive retaliation, the threat of nuclear annihilation, and sharp-
ly limited understandings of sea control had burdened the Navy with. The format of “The 
Maritime Strategy” provided objectives (deterrence, escalation control, and favorable war 
termination), spoke to the forces involved (current and future forces, and joint/combined op-
erations), and was promoted as a global coalition strategy that raised the nuclear threshold. It 
showed that the Navy had a vital role to play in protracted, conventional wars. For that, it 
drew on forward posture, high readiness, and technological advantages (Hattendorf/Swartz 
2008: 140). The service was able to obtain the initiative in strategically communicating a 
causal ways-means-ends relationship, employing the constituents of functional and institu-
tional seapower, and explaining to the senior policy-makers that it could exploit naval flexi-
bility and mobility for larger national ends.  
The Navy’s compelling strategic narrative tracked with the White House, Capitol Hill, the 
Pentagon, allies, and the public. “The Maritime Strategy” was also very much aligned with 
the strategic culture of the Navy. It boosted the service’s confidence to engage eagerly in dis-
cussion, by arguing for build-up of naval forces of all types and by aligning with national de-
fense policies (Swartz 2011g: 45, slides 89-90). Its offensive nature projected power to the 
flanks of Europe. It integrated naval aviation to help discourage a Soviet drive westward, and 
to destroy Soviet attack submarines, thereby guarding the oceanic sea lines of communication. 
That move exposed the Soviet strategic ballistic missile submarine fleet in its bastions. As 
Seth Cropsey (2013: 97), Deputy Undersecretary of the Navy for the Reagan and the Bush 
administration, exuberantly summed up the effects of “The Maritime Strategy” as follows:  
“This strategy was disputed, criticized, and disparaged. It proved immensely success-
ful. It offered a coherent and sensible raison d’être that took full advantage of all the 
Navy Department’s capabilities. The new maritime strategy undertook missions that 
supported the other military services and advanced the United States’ interest in op-
posing U.S. strengths to Soviet weaknesses for the purpose of achieving strategic ad-
vantage over the Soviet Union. It was comprehensible, capable of being articulated, 
and inseparable from the navy’s successful effort to increase the fleet from its forty-
year nadir of 464 combatants to nearly six hundred ships in less than a decade.”  
How effective and successful “The Maritime Strategy” really was remains challenging to 
qualify. Stallmann (2000: 213-214), for example, remains outspokenly skeptical about the 
possible success of conventional U.S. forces in (a) disabling 300 Soviet submarines, (b) secur-
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 It also added sealift as third component of U.S. seapower and it was flanked by the introduction of fitting 
platforms into the fleet (Grove 1990: 98). 
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ing the SLOCs in the Pacific and the Atlantic, (c) advancing into the area within reach of 
land-based naval aviation in order to attack military bases, and (d) influencing potential 
events at the Central Front by way of an amphibious landing. Neither was it tested in World 
War III with the Soviet Union, nor did it succeed in the broad scope of reformulating the 
Reagan administration’s national policy and strategy to match the innovations proposed by 
“The Maritime Strategy.”253 In addition, some of the assertions of “The Maritime Strategy” 
must be questioned. Its conviction that global war with the Soviet Union would remain con-
ventional may appear convincing in hindsight, e.g., given the extensive reforms under Gorba-
chev from 1985 on, but it was a deliberate bet that – given events such as in 1983 – amounted 
to brinkmanship.  
“The Maritime Strategy” that appeared in the January 1986 issue of Proceedings “lurked in 
embryo of ‘Sea Plan 2000’ of 1978” (Gray 1995: 202). It was driven by the Navy’s convic-
tion that it could contribute more to making a strategic difference in the next war than by ad-
hering to the defensive sea control and maritime highway safeguarding that the Carter admin-
istration foresaw – a role in which “the U.S. Navy was disinclined to confine its strategic am-
bitions to the role of a maritime railroad company” (ibid.). It was Admiral Holloway’s opposi-
tion to Carter’s swing strategy that helped pave the way; successive CNOs embraced Hol-
loway’s views. The edge that the Soviet Union was seemingly gaining as it strove to become 
a full-spectrum blue-water navy was countered by building more U.S. warships and by adopt-
ing an offensive wartime strategy that would allow the U.S. to seize the initiative early in a 
great-power war (Love 1992: 716). “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s attempted to draw 
both from Mahan (it stressed the decisive war-fighting and political capabilities of navies) and 
from Huntington (it provided a purpose and the according resources to the Navy of its place in 
national defense) to formulate a sound, diagnostic narrative. The document also accurately 
reflected the Zeitgeist of the early 1980s.
254
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 Although President Reagan never signed “The Maritime Strategy”, it was in line with his way of handling the 
presidency. He mentioned it in some speeches, which was enough as far as most of the Navy was concerned. In 
fact, Reagan’s relative non-involvement in naval issues was a contrast to President Carter, and perhaps provided 
the right amount of breathing-space for the seapower ideas to take shape. “The Maritime Strategy” dovetailed the 
national security directives. If it ever sought to influence and decisively shape overarching national security 
strategies, it failed – overtaken by the course of world events, hampered internally by transitions in high offices 
(and subsequent agenda-changes) and the fact that it never aspired to be a vision.  
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 As has been pointed out before, seapower is not only a military concept to control events at sea. Moreover, it 
serves to influence events ashore. It controls international trade and commerce. The use of naval force in wars is 
subject to certain opportunities (and some limitations). Navies are instruments of diplomacy, deterrence, and 
political influence in situations below hot conflict (Tangredi 2002b: 114).  
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The scope and legacy of “The Maritime Strategy” can only be assessed by putting it into the 
context of the Navy’s efforts at making a strategic difference in the 1970s, the 1990s, and the 
2000s respectively. In the 1970s, with morale, ships, and planes worn out after Vietnam, a 
consensus on the Navy’s sense of direction emerged only very slowly. It was flanked by suc-
cessive CNO course corrections, an administration that displayed a lukewarm attitude to the 
service, and a defense budget squeeze (Swartz 2011h: 97, slide 193). Without a naval strate-
gic baisse, there could not have been a naval renaissance. Using Hartmann’s description more 
pointedly, one could therefore speak of a naval strategic renaissance, which played out under 
the Reagan administration’s agenda. After all, the Navy embraced established missions, con-
cepts, and practices that were on the shelf rather than inventing something completely new 
(Owens 1999: 167). Additionally, from the 1960s on the Navy began fielding the ships and 
aircraft that formed the backbone of “The Maritime Strategy”. “The Maritime Strategy”, the 
logical step under the Reagan administration, was a process that built on a restoration of a 
sound narrative that ranged from Hayward to Watkins and Lehman. The action officers were 
able to vitalize the overarching visions. The articulate timing and its narrative allowed the 
arguments to have maximized impact. In the early 1980s, the course was set for a more coher-
ent, codified Navy narrative that was thoroughly socialized and tested (Swartz 2014: 17). 
During the Carter years, the strategic ideas of the Navy collided with the strategic priorities of 
the civilian Pentagon leadership (Rudolf 1990: 260). In the 1980s, internal consensus on the 
Navy’s rationale, a warm administration attitude towards the service, a continuity and indeed 
unity of thought across CNO tenures, intelligence community unanimity, and ballooning de-
fense budgets changed the framework significantly (Swartz 2011h: 97, slide 193). The first 
Reagan administration’s defense plans helped overcome previous uncertainties. It also offered 
the budgetary and intellectual vigor that allowed “The Maritime Strategy” to unfold. As a 
proactive capstone document, it elevated the role of American sea power visibly (and in fact, 
also seapower) as a political and military tool in the Cold War. To the public, the actual con-
flicts and missions that occupied the Navy in the 1980s bore little resemblance to the high-end 
global plans of “The Maritime Strategy.” Still, every bit of naval engagement must be under-
stood to have influenced Soviet naval aspirations, whether the U.S. was actively and directly 
involved (Libya, Lebanon, Persian Gulf) or not (Falklands). 
The Navy ended the 1980s with considerably higher morale and consensus on its rationale 
than it had entered the decade. There was upbeat triumphalism as the Warsaw Pact unraveled. 
The Navy was reasonably confident in its strategy- and policy-making ability (not least be-
cause their capstone document retained the same name and format for identification purposes) 
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and its operational and tactical competence. It displayed confidence in the modernity of its 
systems and the fleet-deployment strategy and fleet readiness (Swartz 2011h: 96, slide 192). 
The strategy’s accomplishment was not so much caused by radical, new ideas; instead, “The 
Maritime Strategy” succeeded in clearly articulating where naval strategy and naval forces 
should fit into the broader national military strategy and the more detailed plans and opera-
tions of regional commanders. Equally significant was that the strategy provided a lucid target 
for planning and decisions on naval forces and force structures (Weeks 1992: 30). Additional-
ly, the public image and support of the Navy went through the roof, which in turn boosted 
service cohesion and morale.
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For the moment, these positive aspects were larger than some other dawning concerns.
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Immediate problems such as leveling ship numbers toward the end of the 1980s, the still un-
satisfactory state of ASW and MCM platforms and capabilities, and the 19 April 1987 turret 
explosion on the Iowa (BB 61), which killed 47 sailors, paired with broader challenges. The 
Navy lost its bureaucratic battles against centralization and the momentum of “The Maritime 
Strategy” slowed down considerably towards the end of the decade as action officers rotated 
to other billets. The White House was not enthusiastic about fully replacing its grand strategic 
posture of deterrence and caution with that of an offensive Navy as relations with the Soviet 
Union thawed. The Reagan administration was also occupied fighting for its own political 
survival in the wake of the Iran-Contra affair.  
Therefore, the “The Maritime Strategy” should not be confused with a maritime grand strate-
gy; as a service strategy, it was subordinate to the continental grand strategy of preventing 
domination of the Eurasian landmass by an adverse or hostile power (Owens 1993: 11). The 
Navy had anticipated it could validate major acquisitions for an offensive carrier and subma-
rine fleet, and that it did. It could also reasonably hope that, after debate, a new national strat-
egy for a global maritime war would emerge, a strategy in which this offensive force would 
be the main naval component. That did not happen. The legacy of “The Maritime Strategy” is, 
therefore, that of a sound and timely revival of the Navy’s strategic thinking and articulate 
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 After all, some of the most iconic popular culture products of the decade have a dedicated Navy component. 
Examples include the 1986 blockbuster movie “Top Gun” about heroic naval aviation training, starring Tom 
Cruise, Val Kilmer, and the score of Giorgio Moroder; Tom Clancy’s debut novel “The Hunt for Red October”, 
first published by Naval Institute Press in 1984 and subsequently turned into a successful movie (1990) starring 
Alec Balwin and Sean Connery; and the 1989 hit song “If I Could Turn Back Time” by Cher, which featured a 
jubilant music video (the major artistic and marketing platform of the 1980s) filmed aboard the battleship Mis-
souri (Bruns 2010a).  
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 For a stern warning about the future of “The Maritime Strategy” from an end-of-decade perspective, see 
O’Rourke (1988). The author cautions that the Navy should address the critics of the strategy or risk turning into 
a lucrative target for Congress and the other branches of the military, esp. in budget terms.  
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purposefulness. It was not the Navy’s attempt to capitalize on budget and zero-sum game the-
ories versus the other branches of the military. It was not simply a ship- and technology-
procurement strategy. After all, Luttwark pointed out that the political effectiveness of navies 
is governed by the political context, not the tactical capabilities (cited in Grove 1990: 159). 
“The Maritime Strategy” provided a global offensive orientation and a nuclear counter-force 
strategy. Internally, it served as a base for research, development, and procurement. It was a 
framework for operational planning, tactics, training, and exercises; against the geostrategic 
background, it did not present itself as countering the continental strategy (Rudolf 1990: 329). 
The Navy, in the words of CNO Watkins, was seen “singing from the same sheet of music” 
(cited in Baer 1994: 432) and “The Maritime Strategy” served as a marching direction. Addi-
tionally, as much as it was an offensive military strategy and a Navy narrative, “The Maritime 
Strategy” was therefore a self-supportive, offensive bureaucratic measure for Congress, the 
White House, and the American people. 
The international context shifted dramatically between 1989 and 1991, essentially nullifying 
the business model on which “The Maritime Strategy” rested. It once again raising the ques-
tion ‘What do we need a Navy for?’After “the Navy’s Cold War zenith” (Haynes 2013: 42), 
American sea power for the 1990s would have to be reconsidered.  
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9 Managing Strategic Change and Embracing a New World Order (1989-
2001)  
The powerful images of thousands of East and West German citizens climbing the Berlin 
Wall on the night of 9 November 1989 hold their place as an iconic and peaceful moment of 
the 20
th
 century. The rapid and revolutionary disintegration of the East German authoritarian 
regime, epitomized by these images televised to a worldwide audience, triggered a process 
that quickly led to Germany’s unification. Contrary to a prevailing view, little suggests that 
the Cold War ended as abruptly for the rest of the world as it did for the divided country in the 
heart of Europe that night. Conquest of the symbol of the Iron Curtain notwithstanding, the 
termination of the superpower conflict was a process that began much earlier than 1989. 
Likewise, it did not end that night in Berlin, but perhaps more precisely with the formal disso-
lution of the Soviet Union on 26 December 1991.
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The emergence of what was to come next resembled much more of a precarious process 
fraught with uncertainty than a chapter from international relations textbooks. The political 
events had historic military and geostrategic ramifications. The U.S. Navy had neither a peer 
naval competitor nor a superior maritime adversary; further, a credible naval adversary could 
not be discerned in the foreseeable future (Hattendorf 2006: 1). For U.S. leaders, the tectonic 
developments stemming from the “German question” had to be handled with statecraft, di-
plomacy, and persuasion.
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 Other real-world events – some of them associated, others un-
connected to the unraveling of the Soviet empire – continued to demand the attention of sen-
ior policy and military decision-makers. For the U.S. Navy, the lasting relevance and indeed 
growing importance of sea power under the American umbrella of underwriting the emerging 
post-Cold War world order needed to be freshly assessed. These results needed to be chan-
neled and transformed into applicable capstone documents that reflected the increasing con-
solidation of the defense establishment into a growing joint and efficiency-driven system.  
In the past – during the World Wars and the late Cold War – enemy submarines, surface, and 
enemy naval aviation (even if they resumed the form of defensive and partial sea control only) 
threatened the survival of U.S. military and commercial shipping in times of crises. By impli-
                                                          
257
 For this chapter, it is helpful to understand the decade as “the long 1990s”, framed by the pivotal events of the 
fall of the Berlin Wall on the one hand and the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 on the other. Both events 
serve to remind the analyst as well as the senior decision-maker of strategic uncertainty. For an expanded discus-
sion of U.S. foreign and national security policy during that period, see Chollet/Goldgeier (2008).  
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 For the best review of the process of German unification and European reconciliation, see Rice/Zelikow 
(1997). Condoleezza Rice served as an advisor to President George Bush Sr. on national security affairs (1989-
1991); she was National Security Advisor (2001-2005) and Secretary of State (2005-2009) for President George 
Bush Jr.  
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cation, American access to areas of interest on the far sides of the globe and political and mili-
tary influence (in short: power projection) were potentially inhibited. The U.S. Navy there-
fore, for decades, invested considerable financial and intellectual resources into a force that 
was designed to meet and rise above that naval threat. When the Soviet Union faded away 
from the world stage, it took with it the powerful blue-water Navy that Moscow had main-
tained. Most of the niche-capability Warsaw Pact naval assets, principally directed against 
American and allied ships, submarines, and aircraft, went away with it. Consequently, U.S. 
Navy leaders almost immediately faced hard questions in Washington as to what its role and 
functions were in the future against less maritime capable and politically assertive targets.  
At the core of the debate was the question of just how much the future development of naval 
forces would cost (Hattendorf 2006: 1). Once again, the Navy was tasked with formulating an 
institutional expectation as to what the next war would look like and how it would be won by 
a significant contribution of American sea power. Without the framework of the Cold War, 
world order and the understanding of national security were in revision. The direction that the 
service took was not always clear, not least because semantic confusion about doctrine, poli-
cy, strategy, etc., reigned. The Navy needed to unify for a multi-front campaign against Con-
gress, the White House, and the other branches of the military. Mindful of Huntington’s 1954 
warming that a military service needed a strategic concept in order to make sense to itself and 
to the public, successive Navy declaratory capstone documents went about seeking to explain 
the broad purpose for American security and the future development of the service.  
9.1 Prelude 
On 2 August 1990, President George Bush, Sr., gave a much-noticed speech in Aspen, Colo-
rado. The address focused on the emerging new geopolitical conditions and reflected the pres-
ident’s desire to drastically re-shape U.S. military posture. Acknowledging that the danger of 
a Soviet-led invasion of Western Europe was remote and Warsaw Pact forces were in a rapid 
decline and withdrawal, Bush proclaimed that, 
“The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can and must be 
different. [...] What matters now, then, is how we reshape the forces that remain. Our 
new strategy must provide the framework to guide our deliberate reductions to no 
more than the forces we need to guard our enduring interests -- the forces to exercise 
forward presence in key areas, to respond effectively to crisis, to retain the national 
capacity to rebuild our forces should this be needed. The United States would be ill-
served by forces that represent nothing more than a scaled-back or a shrunken-down 
version of the forces that we possess right now. If we simply prorate our reductions, 
cut equally across the board, we could easily end up with more than we need for con-
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tingencies that are no longer likely, and less than we must have to meet emerging chal-
lenges. What we need are not merely reductions but restructuring.“ (Bush 1990a)  
In other words, the president called for a drastic makeover of the U.S. military (a top-down 
approach that was designed to leave no stone unturned). At the time, the military maintained a 
peacetime forward presence in Europe, the Pacific, the Mediterranean, and the Persian Gulf. It 
was designed for crisis response and surge ability. It retained an edge in developing and field-
ing advanced weapon technology. Although the country continued to hedge against a poten-
tial renaissance of Soviet-style large-scale conflict, the President announced a comprehensive 
restructuring of its all-volunteer forces over a period of five years. Bush’s speech came at a 
very peculiar time. On the same day that he spoke in the Rocky Mountains resort town, half-
way around the world Iraq invaded its neighbor Kuwait. That was precisely the sort of region-
al contingency, unrelated to the U.S.-Soviet relationship but affecting U.S. national interests 
that Bush had described as a consequential national security issue in the post-Cold War era. 
Within days, the U.S. decided to deploy troops to the Persian Gulf to guard Saudi-Arabia 
against continued Iraqi military aggression and to expel Saddam Hussein’s troops from oil-
rich Kuwait. Seeking the imprimatur of the international community, the administration also 
deliberately involved the United Nations.
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 Bush’s Aspen speech signaled the dawn of a new 
decade, and the events of that day – Bush’s rhetoric, his ideas on restructuring the military, 
and the Iraqi aggression against Kuwait – set a defining tone for the early 1990s.  
In an address before a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990, the President under-
scored his thinking using the notion of an emerging “New World Order” (Bush 1990b). He 
lobbied heavily for his course of action in the Persian Gulf region, one that saw the U.S. Navy 
once again engaged in the Middle East waters. Strategically the Navy, whose highest-ranking 
officer, the CNO, in May 1990 had still defended “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s, 
stood before a pile of shards. Just as the president outlined a drastically different “New World 
Order”, the Navy declared to the public (and itself) that its policy was “Steady as she goes”. 
Haynes (2013: 66) unapologetically infers that, “‘The Maritime Strategy’ was too tainted and 
too rooted in the past to be of much use in an environment in which only self-proclaimed 
‘new’ ideas could be assured a hearing.”  
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 For a short introduction on the role of the United Nations in U.S. policy on Iraq in the run-up to the Gulf War 
1990/1991, see Bruns (2008: 37-74). For a general and worthwhile analysis of the role of the U.S. Navy in U.N. 
peace-keeping operations, see Allison (1995). 
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9.2 U.S. Navy Strategy 1989-2001: The Macro Level  
At the outset of the first post-Cold War decade, precisely because the antagonist was gone, 
the U.S. Navy was not necessarily out of business. Along with the end of the Cold War, the 
perpetual threat of quick, decisive global nuclear war, and mutually assured destruction re-
ceded.
260
 Since the late 1940s, the nuclear duopoly between the East and the West had been a 
major challenge to factor in war-planning. In the early 1990s, the world suddenly looked 
much different.
261
 In the words of Colin Gray (1992: 290), “[t]he demise of one of the super-
powers eliminate[d] for a while the most nominally persuasive of threats to the strategic utili-
ty of sea power: the peril of a war so brief and destructive that sea power’s enabling action 
would be short-circuited.”  
In other words, naval forces could now be more important than ever because they could pro-
vide for a variety of missions beyond pure ship-on-ship combat or nuclear deterrence. As 
Lundesgaard (2011: 6) points out, it is the naval forces’ “ability to exploit the international 
commons, their mobility and their status as symbols of power that make them useful for any-
thing from diplomatic missions to a full-scale naval battle between peer competitors.” The 
demise of the Soviet Union brought a “unipolar moment” (Krauthammer 1990) that opened a 
window of opportunity for the triumphant U.S. to remake the post-Cold War order.
 
For the 
time being, the Navy failed to utilize the momentum. Even worse, the service continued to use 
the way of rationalizing and explaining its force structure and mission set using the template 
global, forward operations against the Soviet Union when it should have highlighted the value 
of sea power in lesser contingencies. Previously, the Navy had paid comparatively little atten-
tion in its justifications to the smaller contingencies of presence and coercive diplomacy.
262
 
The senior leadership wanted a demonstration that the Navy had understood the vastly altered 
environment.  
Nevertheless, the fundamental change of an ocean without a rival eventually forced the Navy 
to undertake a significant strategic change in its culture and outlook. It was a rare moment of 
“top-down” revolution brought about by a systemic shift that made obsolete many of the con-
victions that held dear. In this respect, Rosenberg’s pointing out the problem of transforming 
an armed service as complex as a navy in the face of momentous geopolitical shifts is worth 
noting. While shifting international geopolitics creates new policy challenges and potentially 
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 The U.S. retained the sea-borne submarine leg of its nuclear deterrence triad. 
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 It should be noted that the nuclear threat did not disappear, but rather regionalized, replacing the global war 
scenario. Examples for regional nuclear aspirations in the 1990s can be found for North Korea, Pakistan, India, 
Iran, China, and some successor states of the former Soviet Union. 
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 For a study on smaller-scale contingencies and the forces that shape the Navy, see Swartz/McGrady (1998).  
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new military adversaries, twentieth century navies remained technology-based, manpower, 
and capital-intensive institutions which could not be transformed quickly, and whose basic 
employment requires a great deal of time and effort to master (Rosenberg 1993: 144-145).  
The new threefold challenge, therefore, consisted of [a] the short-term goal of assessing how 
rapidly the old Cold War military threats were declining so as to draw down forces rationally, 
[b] the medium-term test of assessing the residual military threat and of crafting an overarch-
ing policy to address it, and [c] the long-term task of defining what manner of military threat 
might force the U.S. to reconstitute all or some part of the military-industrial base that it was 
planning to disassemble (Smith 1999: 11). At the same time, it was by no means clear what 
this unraveling world order would look like: a “clash of civilizations,” (as Samuel Huntington 
outlined in 1993), the “end of history” (as Francis Fukuyama suggested in 1989), or a murky, 
undistinguishable mixture of different futures?  
9.2.1 Global Trends & Challengers to U.S. Security  
It is not without some degree of irony that “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s – the con-
cise, offensive sea-control-minded, and clearly articulated strategic plan for confronting the 
Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact – was never fully tested. The early 1990s saw the demise 
of the very global constellation on which the U.S. Navy’s capstone documents of the 1970s 
and 1980s (and American national security posture of the Cold War) rested.  
The bipolar system ceased to exist. It was replaced by a consolidating and increasingly eco-
nomically interdependent system that had emerged slowly over the past decades and now in-
tegrated fiercely. As CNO Trost noted in an article (1990: 93), “Global economic interde-
pendence is a fact of life.” This proclaimed fact of life yielded an increasingly tightly-knit 
community of market economies. Presumably, nations from the former Second and Third 
World (the Warsaw Pact and the non-aligned developing nations, respectively) were freed 
from the shackles of Cold War days. They could improve their societies and economies with 
better competitiveness and a larger degree of assimilation in global markets. As a dominant 
economic world power, the United States could embrace the increasing globalization of goods 
and services.
263
 From the moral high ground after “winning” the Cold War, to the U.S. it ap-
peared that the advancement of democratic systems would be beneficial to everyone involved. 
This was first outlined by the support of the Bush administration for democratization process-
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 This was also facilitated by the emerging, then towards the end of the decade rapidly expanding World Wide 
Web. The internet, originally developed with a military purpose in mind, dramatically affected people’s lives – 
and, as the 2000s showed, not least military doctrines, people’s security concerns, and warfare.  
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es in Eastern Europe after the end of the Soviet Union. Later, under President Bill Clinton, the 
post-containment policy was expanded. The new strategy was coined in a speech that Antho-
ny Lake (Clinton’s National Security Advisor) gave on 21 September 1993 in Washington, 
D.C. In his remarks titled “From Containment to Enlargement”, Lake outlined four aspects of 
the emerging U.S. grand strategy: The strengthening of the community of large market de-
mocracies, the help and support for new democracies and market economies, the countering 
of aggressive states hostile to democracy and markets, and pursuing a humanitarian agenda 
that anchored the liberalist market ideas in regions of concern. Lake cautioned that this should 
be done pragmatically and carefully.
264
  
With the prospects and promises of globalization, maritime trade experienced a considerable 
growth rate. The triumph of the twenty-foot equivalent unit (TEU) container enabled the eco-
nomic use of the seas for just-in-time transport and delivery.265 The growth in maritime trade 
underlined the indispensable economic dimension of sea power: The maritime highways, 
which often passed through choke points, require sustained investments in maritime safety 
and security.
266
 This also concerned conditions ashore. According to this line of thinking, safe 
and stable conditions ashore facilitate the security of adjacent shipping lanes. Consequently, 
the protection of sea lines of communication (Mahan’s classic notion) was broadened and 
redefined, therefore outlining an old, but potentially vastly expanded field of activity for naval 
forces. 
The international system expanded markedly in the 1990s. Thirty countries joined the United 
Nations as full members between 1990 and 2000. NATO, absent a rival military bloc, began 
to expand along the Baltic Sea to include the former German Democratic Republic (East-
Germany) upon German reunification on 3 October 1990. Poland joined the alliance in 1999. 
At the same time, the European Union expanded when it welcomed Austria, Finland, and 
Sweden in 1995. The G-7, the group of the seven largest industrial nations, was expanded to 
the G-8 by the inclusion of Russia in 1998.
267
 This complemented the United States’ position 
as the sole remaining global superpower. The U.S. enjoyed economic primacy and sported the 
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 For the address, see Lake (1993). An analysis of the foreign policy implications can be found in Keller 
(2008a).  
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 The overwhelming number of the ships that transported these goods across the vast oceans, however, was 
built in the Far East. Shipyards in Korea, Japan, and China eclipsed their commercial shipbuilding competition 
in America and Europe, leading to a deep-rooted consolidation of the shipbuilding markets.  
266
 Choke points are those artificial or natural bottlenecks such as canals and narrow straits where maritime traf-
fic converges and the potential for disturbing the flow of goods is significantly elevated. 
267
 Russia’s participation was revoked on 24 March 2014 in the aftermath of the Crimean Crisis 2014. The origi-
nal forum participants (Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States) recon-
vened in the G-7 format.  
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world’s largest economy. The US-Dollar served as the global reserve currency and American 
investment banks dominated world financial markets well into the 2000s. The United States 
also boasted military primacy. It still fielded the most powerful military, it supplied the high-
est defense expenditures, and it served as one of the worldwide leaders in defense technology 
and research. The U.S. enjoyed primacy in the global commons: the sea, the air, space, and 
the emerging cyberspace. The United States continued its forward global conventional mili-
tary posture, deepened and expanded its military alliances and partnerships, and sustained its 
nuclear deterrence.  
In the 1990s, U.S. national security – and the ways it served grand strategy – was re-defined. 
Nuclear-tipped intercontinental ballistic missiles aimed at U.S. cities and command and con-
trol facilities ceased to be a significant threat (although Russia retains to this day the capabili-
ties of nuclear deterrence, albeit to a much less confrontational degree than in Cold War 
years). Russia, the largest state of the dissolved Soviet Union, was on rapid downturn. A 1991 
coup d’état, still under the Soviet Red Star, attempted to displace Michael Gorbachev. His 
successor Boris Yeltsin fended off a constitutional crisis in 1993 and engaged in desperate 
attempts to halt the disintegration of the country, for example, by military intervention in 
Chechnya (1994). Meanwhile, the Russian economy was ailing badly and its military (not 
least the venerable surface and nuclear submarine fleets) deteriorated rapidly.
268
 The Strategic 
Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I, a bilateral treaty between the United States and the Soviet 
Union, was signed in July 1991. It cut – rather than limited, as previous treaties of similar 
effect had attempted – strategic offensive nuclear warheads on both sides. Intrusive verifica-
tion regimes were agreed upon. Three U.S. Navy strategic submarines were converted into 
SSN on the building-ways, and the overall number of U.S. Navy SSBN was reduced from 18 
to 14 after four of the Ohio-class boats were converted to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles 
(Silverstone 2007: 36).  
The dissolution of the Soviet Union posed the immediate risk of transferring nuclear weapons 
and related material from the newly-independent former Soviet republics back to Moscow, to 
dismantle it on-site, and to contain proliferation of radioactive material and other Soviet lega-
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 The first official port visits (some of which conducted under the umbrella of the annual Baltops exercise) by 
U.S. warships to Russia in the early 1990s provided the sailors with unique revelations about the state of the 
Russian Navy: Decaying former Soviet warships rested on the bottom of the naval bases, left to decay at their 
own peril. In another instance, Captain Harris recounts that on a visit with the cruiser Yorktown (CG 48) and the 
flagship O’Bannon (DD 987) in 1992 to Severnmorsk, during a tour of the large Russian battlecruiser Kirov 
(065) he encountered vastly outdated 1960s/1970s technology in the Command Information Center (CIC) – and 
a large mouse-trap. Neither rodent pests nor clunky machinery were problems in the USN CICs (Harris interview 
2012, 01:10:00 – 01:17:00).  
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cy technology to rogue states. These rogue states – Iran, Iraq, North Korea, Libya, Syria, Su-
dan, or Afghanistan – kept the United States busy throughout the decade. Conduct (or proxy 
support of) inter-state and civil wars, support for terrorism and insurgency groups, and insta-
ble and failing statehood emerged as post-Cold War security problems. Some of these coun-
tries had benefited from Soviet economic and military support throughout the Cold War, for 
example diesel-electric coastal submarines, capable missile boats, mines, or anti-ship rockets. 
On the high end, more and more countries acquired ballistic missile capabilities; the People’s 
Republic of China, North Korea, Iran, India and Pakistan come to mind (Gormley 2010: 177-
184, Kan 2014: 1-50).
269
 In East Asia, China slowly emerged as a maritime player in the re-
gion, at first expanding its small coastal defense fleet to a more blue-water oriented offshore 
navy. Maritime incidents throughout the decade in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Strait 
signaled Beijing’s growing assertiveness. In 1998, under a cover-up, it acquired the derelict 
Soviet aircraft carrier Varyag to underline its quest for power-projection assets.   
Absent a significant threat to U.S. (and indeed, global) survival, a spotlight turned on emerg-
ing civil wars, some of which had been under a blanket for the duration of the Cold War. In-
ter-state warfare, although still prevalent during the decade, was complemented by emerging 
concern for transnational and global problems. These included, but were not limited to, terror-
ism, organized crime, and climate change. Natural disasters increasingly demanded signifi-
cant attention. Associated famines, refugee waves, and other humanitarian catastrophes often 
provided an impetus for U.S. consideration and involvement. Organized crime infiltrated 
many parts of societies around the world, and modern piracy (chiefly in Southeast Asia 
around the Strait of Malacca for the time being) slowly moved into focus. Although the 1980s 
had seen a significant rise in the number and quality of terrorist activity, the 1990s featured 
some lethal incidents as well.
270
 The terrorist network Al-Qaida emerged as a major facilitator 
of attacks against U.S. targets. It stood behind the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center 
in New York. Five years later, two nearly simultaneous explosions directed against the U.S. 
embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998 killed 224 and wounded more than 4,000 
others. Finally, on 12 October 2000, at 11:18 a.m. in the Yemeni port of Aden, suicide bomb-
ers detonated an explosive-laden boat directly against the port side of the guided-missile de-
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 The latter two formally joined the club of nuclear powers by conducting atomic bomb tests in May 1998. 
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 Remarkable attacks include the 1993 bombing of the World Trade Center parking garage in New York City 
(6†, more than 1,000 injured), the 1995 bombing of a federal building in Oklahoma City by U.S. right-wing 
militants (168†, more than 600 injuries), and the Sarin nerve gas attack on the Tokyo subway by the Aum 
Shinrikyo cult the same year (13†, more than 6,000 injured). 
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stroyer Cole (DDG 67). The resulting blast tore a large hole in the ship’s hull, killed 17 sail-
ors, and wounded 37 others (Pearl/O’Rourke 2001: CRS-2).  
In summary, national security was increasingly defined in a broadened, more comprehensive 
sense than before. The territorial perception of security and the according way of warfare 
were complemented by a more diffuse, elusive, and transnational nature of events and threats. 
Globalization of goods and services, in other words, also offered a flip side: the globalization 
of challengers and dangers no longer confined to a particular country or military pact.  
9.2.2 Conflicts, Crises, and Wars  
The major conflicts, crises, and wars of the decade partially reflected such developments. The 
U.S. intervention in Panama in December 1989 in the shadows of the geostrategic events in 
progress in Central and Eastern Europe was a relatively minor incursion.
271
 It was a different 
case with the Gulf War. “Operation Desert Shield”, mounted after the Iraqi invasion of Ku-
wait on 2 August 1990, and “Operation Desert Storm” (the offensive action from January 
1991 to expel Saddam Hussein’s force from the sheikdom in accordance with United Nations 
resolutions and as a part of an allied coalition effort) were the first larger post-Cold War mili-
tary operations. The Gulf War had obvious strategic ramifications. It featured clear regional 
aggression and incursion by a rogue power into a neighbor’s territory; it occurred in a world 
region of supreme strategic interest regarding resources; and former Cold War adversaries and 
a reunited Germany participated (to various degrees) on the same allied side.
272
  
In another expedition to buttress the “New World Order”, U.S. troops were ordered into So-
malia in 1992 to contain a civil war, which broke out after the demission of Somali dictator 
Mohamed Siad Barre in 1991. The images of human suffering on the Horn of Africa were 
picked up by international media, generated public interest and concern, and eventually trig-
gered a series of U.N.-led operations. The Bush administration was pressed to provide troops. 
Images of U.S. Marines wading ashore in Somalia unopposed were widely dispersed, but at 
the same time created a mounting expectation for an equally smooth and swift military opera-
tion. As the events unfolded, this was not the case. In what became known as the Battle of 
Mogadishu, U.S. units (supported by allied forces) fought Somali militia particularly vicious-
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 The invasion of the Central American country was designed to unseat the ruling regime of General Manuel 
Noriega. “Operation Just Cause” contained limited military objectives (removal of Noriega and stability for the 
country which was of obvious strategic interest to the U.S. due to the Panama Canal). The Panama Canal Zone 
was principally U.S.-controlled territory. In 1977, the Carter administration agreed to relinquish control over the 
area adjacent to the Canal by 1999. The operation contained only some Navy/Marine Corps assets and rested 
primarily on the shoulders of the Army, Air Force, and Special Operation Forces (Phillips 2004: 5-49).  
272
 See chapter 9.6.1 for details.  
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ly on 3 and 4 October 1993. The operation – a tactical draw but a strategic U.S. defeat of the 
kind that the United States had not witnessed since the Tet Offensive (1968) – was aborted 
amidst heavy casualties on both sides. The gruesome media coverage of fallen American sol-
diers being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu unsettled the American public.
273
 This 
contributed to the U.S. decision not to intervene in the equally bloody genocide in Rwanda in 
1994, where ethnic Hutus murdered hundreds of thousands of ethnic Tutsis. American inabil-
ity to contain the Somali civil war shaped the global perception of U.S. military capabilities 
and informed skepticism regarding the American political will to accept casualties. It rein-
forced the impression that the U.S. would rather withdraw ground troops and reduce com-
mitment than actively and aggressively seek a favorable decision by force and diplomacy. Not 
unlike the U.S. policy after the Beirut barracks bombing of 1983, such perception can em-
power an adversary’s opinions and policies to undermine American leadership. In the harsh 
assessment of Haynes (2013: 133), Somalia was therefore nothing less than “a fiasco, a geo-
political knockdown, and a nightmare for [Bill, S.B.] Clinton […]”.  
The new president inherited a number of regional crises when he took office in January 1993. 
Bill Clinton’s activist foreign policy sought to reframe the understanding of and approach to 
security and national defense. Consequently, American military engagement in the armed 
conflicts of the decade remained selective and heterogeneous at best. Iraq continued to be a 
regional nuisance that kept U.S. military forces disproportionally busy. In Haiti, America’s 
backyard, the U.S. did intervene.
274
 On the other side of the world, the People’s Republic of 
China challenged the Republic of China (commonly known as Taiwan) over the “One China 
policy”.275 Things were more complicated in the Balkans, an area which American foreign 
and defense policy devoted considerable attention to throughout the 1990s. As Yugoslavia fell 
apart after the end of the Cold War and a violent and bloody civil war ensued, NATO and the 
U.N. mounted military-backed efforts to pacify the region.
276
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 The incident was part of the larger “Operation Gothic Serpent”. More commonly, the events are also often 
referred to as the “Black Hawk Down” incident, named after the loss of two name-giving Sikorsky UH-60 heli-
copters. The battle was described in a 1999 book of the same name, and popularized through a commercially 
successful movie which was released in 2001. For a review of the operation from the U.S. Army’s perspective, 
see Stewart (2002).  
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 Mandated by U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, a multinational American-led force conducted “Opera-
tion Uphold Democracy” to do away with the illegitimate military regime on the Caribbean island. The joint and 
combined operation was a swift and decisive success (Kretchik et al. 1998). See chapter 9.6.1 for details.  
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 In response to Chinese missile test firings and naval exercises in the vicinity of Taiwan in 1995, President 
Clinton in March 1996 ordered the deployment of two Navy aircraft carrier strike groups to deter Beijing from 
aggressive action against the island and thus to contain the crisis (Ross 2000). See chapter 9.6.1 for details.  
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 The flanking international military response included substantial conventional assets such as a naval block-
ade, a no-fly zone over former Yugoslavia, and an air campaign dubbed “Operation Deliberate Force” (Au-
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The 1990s, in essence, witnessed a series of crises and smaller (but often protracted) wars. 
None of them occurred against a global challenger to fundamental U.S. security interests. 
Therefore, each crisis had to be assessed on its own merits by American policy and strategic 
leaders. Bush’s “New World Order” aspiration and the high morale in the West after the end 
of the Gulf War quickly ran out of momentum when President Bush lots in the election cam-
paign of 1992. Clinton came into office focused on the economy and not necessarily on inter-
national security. In principle, he was an inward-looking, domestic president who relied on 
his advisors to make and shape foreign policy. The emerging global security environment was 
outlined comprehensively in an article by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin in the February 
1993 issue of “The Officer” Magazine. The list, which was reprinted in a work by two Chi-
nese authors (Liang/Xiangsui 1999: n.p.), is characterized by its remarkable foresight (alt-
hough the aspects of the strategic environment naturally were broad-brush). To date, it pro-
vides the basis for many discussions on contemporary national security challenges. The 
changes in the geopolitical environment were so fundamental that they necessitated a fresh 
look at the threats they produced and, in turn, their implications for the use of U.S. military 
force. The emerging environment was distinctively more uncertain because it transcended the 
bipolar bloc-centric conditions that had been well-established since the late 1940s. This had 
consequences for military and political alliances and coalitions. At the beginning of the 
1990s, the NATO, the European Union, and the United Nations seemed poised to be suited to 
facilitate peaceful and sustainable solutions to the multiplying number of threats that 
emerged. For the military, Aspin noted, the new threats translated into a more focused, target-
ed approach limited in scope. Aspin’s observations implied nothing less than a fundamentally 
challenged strategic environment and military mindset:  
  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
gust/September 1995) when U.S. and NATO aircraft pounded Serbian strongholds in Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(Office of the Historian of the Department of State 2013). NATO jets returned to the Balkans from March to 
June 1999 when it conducted air strikes against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia in response to the Kosovo 
War. To air power proponents, it validated the utility of planes and missiles in the coming wars. In contrast to 
the military campaign a few years earlier, this NATO operation could not rely on a U.N. Security Council man-
date (Legault 2000) (the naval side of all of these military operations will be discussed in more detail in chapter 
9.6.1).  
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A Comparison of the New and the Old Security Environment 
1. In Regard to the Geopolitical Environment 
OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Bipolar (rigid) Multipolar (complex) 
Predictable Uncertain 
Communism Nationalism and religious extremism 
U.S. the number one Western power U.S. only the number one military power 
Permanent alliances Temporary alliances 
A paralyzed United Nations A dynamic United Nations  
2. In Regard to Threats faced by the U.S. 
OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Single (Soviet) Diverse 
Threat to U.S. survival Threat to U.S. interests 
Clear Unclear 
Deterrable Non-deterrable 
Europe-centered Other regions 
High risk of escalation Little risk of escalation 
Use of strategic nuclear weapons Terrorist using nuclear weapons 
Overt Covert 
3. In Regard to the Use of Military Force 
OLD SECURITY ENVIRONMENT NEW SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 
Attrition warfare Decisive attacks on key targets 
War by proxy Direct reinforcement 
Reliance primarily on high technology Integrated use of high, medium, and low 
technology 
Forward deployed Power projection 
Forward based Home based 
Host nation support Reliance on own strength 
Illustration 25: Old and New Security Environment (Les Aspin, "On the Sea Change in the Security Environ-
ment", The Officer Magazine, February 1993, cited in Liang/Xiangsui 1999, not paged) 
This was the context that U.S. leaders were confronted with in the early 1990s. Some of these 
aspects were amplified in the course of the decade while others receded in importance and 
impact.  
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9.3 Personalities, Domestic Conditions, and National Security Strategies 
9.3.1 Presidents, Secretaries, and Policy/Strategy Leaders 
George Bush Sr. had handily won the November 1988 Presidential election and was sworn in 
as 41
st
 President of the United States in January 1989. His vast experience in the field of in-
ternational politics and his tenure as Reagan’s Vice President enabled him to manage many of 
the unforeseeable events of the tumultuous years ahead.
277
 As his Vice President, Bush chose 
Dan Quayle, a Congressman from Indiana. The Republican administration carefully managed 
the disintegration of the Soviet Union with many face-saving measures for the crumbling So-
viet Union and without ballyhoo. Bush was a staunch ally of German Chancellor Kohl in the 
drive for German reunification and full NATO membership for Germany. The president oscil-
lated between more assertive grand strategic aspirations of a new world order and the imme-
diate task at hand: the management of the successful end of the U.S.-Soviet confrontation. As 
his secretary of defense, Bush chose Richard (“Dick”) Cheney. Cheney came to Washington 
in 1969 as part of the American Political Science Association’s fellowship program. He had 
served in the Nixon and Ford administrations in the 1970s. He was a Washington insider and, 
by all accounts, a hardliner. Cheney served in the House of Representatives (representing a 
district in Wyoming from 1979 to 1989) and joined the Bush cabinet after the President’s pre-
vious nominee for the position of Secretary of Defense failed to be confirmed by the Senate. 
He oversaw the re-setting of the course and posture of U.S. defense policy after the end of the 
Cold War. As secretary of state, Bush nominated James Baker (1989-1992) and, later, Law-
rence Eagleburger (1992-1993). Baker, a reserve Marine, served as White House Chief of 
Staff (a position he returned to during the final year of the Bush administration) and Secretary 
of the Treasury under Reagan. He was instrumental in leading the State Department in sup-
port of German reunification, management of the Soviet Union’s disintegration, and the Gulf 
War. The military coalition in the war would have been unattainable without Baker’s diligent 
efforts (Hacke 2005: 456-520).
278
 His successor Eagleburger (the only career diplomat to ad-
vance to the top of the State Department) had a considerably shorter track record. The disinte-
gration of Yugoslavia dominated his time in office.  
In the Pentagon, the national security team was complemented by Secretary of the Navy Hen-
ry L. Garrett. Less publically vocal about strategic matters than the CNO, Garrett resigned in 
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 On Bush’s comprehensive reflections of his tenure in the national security arena and the defense issues at 
stake, see Bush/Scowcroft (1998). On foreign relations, the end of the Cold War, and the Bush presidency, also 
see Hurst (2000) and Maynard (2008).  
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 For the Secretary’s own views on his tenure, see Baker (2008).  
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June 1992 after three years in office in the aftermath of an investigation of the “Tailhook ‘91” 
scandal.
279
 The scandal unseated the Navy’s strategic culture. It fueled internal distortions and 
preempted social changes that affected the service throughout the remainder of the decade.
280
 
At the time, women were increasingly integrated into the ranks of the male-dominated naval 
aviation community where some of the behavior displayed at such conventions was previous-
ly seen as utterly normal and part of the natural swagger. Garrett’s (acting) successor for the 
remainder of the Bush Sr. presidency (1992-1993) was Sean O’Keefe, a former Congressional 
staffer and Pentagon analyst. Service secretaries and CNOs throughout the 1990s spent a con-
siderable amount of time righting the public image and internal well-being of the Navy after 
“Tailhook ’91”, but the scandal became emblematic for a hollowed-out, morally discredited, 
and macho military service in disarray (Vistica 1997).  
Admiral Frank Kelso III was appointed as Chief of Naval Operations, succeeding the more 
strategically versed Carlisle Trost. Kelso served as CNO from June 1990 to April 1994, thus 
working for two presidents, three secretaries of defense, and three secretaries of the Navy. 
Kelso also was the third submariner in a row to rise to CNO and he was a product of early 
career-specialization under Admiral Rickover. He had participated in developing and testing 
“The Maritime Strategy” as a flag officer and in one of his previous commands in the U.S. 
Sixth Fleet oversaw combat operations against Libya in 1986. Kelso was an honest and prag-
matic but hardly an ambitious leader. His major task was to transition of the military from the 
Cold War posture to an uncertain post-Cold War design. In his view, that called for new poli-
cies, but not a whole new strategy.  
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 The annual symposium of the “Tailhook Association”, a fraternal non-profit group of naval aviators, held in 
Las Vegas (Nevada) in September 1991 was overshadowed by at least 90 cases of sexual harassment and physi-
cal abuse during the conference. 83 of the victims were women. The Secretary of the Navy and the new CNO 
Admiral Frank Kelso both attended that particular symposium. The resulting investigation stained the Navy’s 
public image and shed a light on internal proceedings of the naval officer corps. It cut short (and in many in-
stances practically ended) the careers of some 300 officers and 14 admirals, including the tenures of the Secre-
tary of the Navy and with two years delay CNO Kelso (Vistica 1997). Former Secretary of the Navy Jim Webb, 
speaking on the occasion of a visit to the U.S. Naval Academy five years after the incident, compared the com-
prehensive punishment of a whole cohort of naval aviators to the anti-communist McCarthyism witch hunts of 
the 1950s (Webb 1996).  
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 One of the most prominent examples of social distortion within the military is the uneasy handling of homo-
sexuality. Gay and lesbian lifestyle was to be muted by the persons affected under the controversial “Don’t Ask, 
Don’t Tell” policy established by the Clinton administration. Why, it was then asked, was a dismissive treatment 
of women socially accepted within the military whereas same-sex orientation was not? The Navy failed to ad-
dress the resulting social problems accordingly (certainly not to offer explanation or justification, but at least to 
alleviate the problems). Consequently, it let outsiders dominate the future of the service in that particular policy 
area and charge against the Navy’s self-perception. “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” was eventually repealed military-
wide in 2011.  
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The most important strategic leader of the Bush years in the military realm was arguably 
General Colin Powell (USA), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. By utilizing the provi-
sions laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the general was turning the Pentagon’s decision-
making process on its head. In order to hedge against coming post-Cold War draw-downs and 
budget cuts, Powell decisively changed the process by which U.S. strategy was determined 
(Haynes 2013: 47). Instead of global conflict with the Soviet Union, the emerging security to-
do list included now a stronger emphasis of presence, crisis response, and regional (limited) 
conflict missions for the military. This was a far-reaching shift that was flanked with a notable 
desire by Congress to obtain a peace dividend through reduced spending on a considerably 
smaller military. This led to a force and a strategy determined by the Congressional budget 
instead of (ideally) having it the other way around. Aware of the legislative branch’s desires, 
Powell attempted to retain the existing institutional balance among the military services and 
to avoid an indiscriminate dilution of rational strategic objectives (ibid. 48). In such a strate-
gic and diplomatic approach, Powell clearly outshone the service chiefs and the service secre-
taries.
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 He utilized the power granted to him as the principal military advisor to the Presi-
dent, and aimed to provide integrated, joint strategic direction of his own (he lacked faith that 
presidential guidance and service planning would be effective in downscaling U.S. defense 
posture rationally). The price was that seemingly non-integrated service concepts such as 
“The Maritime Strategy” were dropped in favor of strategic defense-planning coming from 
the Joint Staff.  
The 1992 presidential elections brought William J. “Bill” Clinton into the White House, sig-
naling a generational change in the American presidency. The young, charismatic Clinton 
(who would occasionally entertain impressionable audiences as a saxophone player) reflected 
the desire by many Americans who had voted for him to overcome the militarized Cold War 
mindset and its dominance of foreign affairs in favor of concentrating on the economy and on 
social well-being. As his running mate, Clinton selected Congressman Albert “Al” Gore (who 
had represented Tennessee in the House of Representatives from 1977 to 1993). Gore had 
some expertise in foreign affairs (and unsuccessfully ran for President in 1988 and again in 
2000). The Clinton administration replaced containment of the Soviet Union with a strategy 
of enlargement and political-economic engagement built around the idea that mutually con-
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 According to Haynes (2013: 53-54), however, “Powell was among those that did not fully ‘understand’ or 
‘appreciate’ the Navy’s continuing role. Powell had an incomplete understanding of the Navy. […] Powell did 
not understand the nature of the Navy’s thinking during the Cold War. He did not understand the reasons for the 
Navy’s generic operational flexibility approach […].”  
  
188 
nected, prospering nations would not aspire to regional hegemony and become threats or chal-
lenges to the U.S. Clinton’s first National Security Strategy consequently postulated:  
“Our national security strategy is based on enlarging the community of market democ-
racies while deterring and containing a range of threats to our nation, our allies and our 
interests. The more that democracy and policy and economic liberalization take hold 
in the world, particularly in countries of geostrategic importance to us, the safer our 
nation is likely to be and the more our people are likely to prosper.” (The White House 
1994: 2).  
This hardly altruistic approach yielded broadening and strengthening existing alliances such 
as NATO, while retaining American leadership and military contingency planning in nuclear 
and conventional terms. It included opening new avenues of cooperation with countries 
around the world (such as NATO’s Partnership for Peace program with Eastern Europe) and 
in the near neighborhood, such as the trilateral North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) among Canada, the United States, and Mexico (signed into law in 1994). Clinton’s 
approach also pointed to the concept of military intervention on humanitarian grounds. Clin-
ton’s last National Security Strategy of 2000 summed this up as follows:  
“In some circumstances our nation may act because our values demand it. Examples 
include responding to natural and manmade disasters; promoting human rights and 
seeking to halt gross violations of those rights; supporting democratization, adherence 
to the rule of law and civilian control of the military; assisting humanitarian demining; 
and promoting sustainable development and environmental protection. The spread of 
democracy and respect for the rule of law helps to create a world community that is 
more hospitable to U.S. values and interests. Whenever possible, we seek to avert hu-
manitarian disasters and conflict through diplomacy and cooperation with a wide 
range of partners, including other governments, international institutions and non-
governmental organizations. This may not only save lives, but also prevent crises from 
getting worse and becoming a greater drain on resources.” (The White House 1999: 2) 
As his Secretary of Defense, Clinton selected Les Aspin, a Representative from Wisconsin 
and former chairman of the House Committee on Armed Services (HASC). Aspin faced a 
number of daring challenges after he joined the administration. These included policies re-
garding the role of women and homosexuals in the military, the future posture of the force, 
the size of the defense budget (Aspin initiated a “Bottom-Up Review” of force structure in 
1993), and the perennial closing of military bases throughout the country and abroad. The 
Navy anxiously awaited the results of Aspin’s policy decisions. In his confirmation hearing 
before the Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC) on 15 January 1993, Aspin stated that 
U.S. naval forces “should be sized and shaped not only for armed conflict, but also for the 
many other important tasks we call upon them to do. Forward presence is certainly a key in-
gredient of this mix, along with such missions as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, de-
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terrence and crisis control” (cited in Davis 1993:17). Aspin faced increasing pressure because 
of crises that unfolded in the course of 1993, cumulating in the embarrassing defeat of U.S. 
forces in the Battle of Mogadishu. Consequently, Aspin stepped down after just one year at 
the helm of the Department of Defense.  
His successor was William Perry, an experienced businessman and defense policy insider, 
who served from 1994 to 1997. Perry coined a “preventive defense” approach to deemphasize 
the nuclear deterrence focus of Cold War days. The policy sought to prevent threats from 
emerging in the first place, but if that failed, to deter and if need be to fight such threats deci-
sively using military force. Geographically, this pulled the military forward. Like his prede-
cessors, Perry was confronted with a host of post-Cold War crises abroad (the Balkans, Haiti, 
and the Persian Gulf) as well as on the home front (mainly the budgetary battles). Increasingly 
frustrated with the Republican-controlled House of Representatives, Perry resigned shortly 
after Clinton won another Presidential term in the 1996 elections (Historical Office, Office of 
the Secretary of Defense 2014). He was succeeded by William Cohen, an experienced Repub-
lican Congressman from Maine who stayed for the remainder of Clinton’s tenure. As Secre-
tary of Defense, Cohen had to deal with the Kosovo War (including the dismissal of then-
SACEUR GEN [USA] Wesley Clarke in 2000), cruise missile strikes against Iraq, the U.S. 
embassy bombings in Africa, and the terrorist attack on the destroyer Cole in Yemen. Clin-
ton’s Department of State was led by Warren Christopher during the first term (1993-1997) 
and Madeleine Albright, the first female U.S. Secretary of State, during the second term 
(1997-2001). Christopher, a lawyer by training from California who had served the Johnson 
and Carter administrations, needed to manage the broad and diffuse challenges that the United 
States faced in the early 1990s. Albright held a PhD in Political Science from Columbia Uni-
versity and previously served as U.S. ambassador to the United Nations. Her experience in 
international diplomacy endeared her to Clinton. The Balkans and Iraq remained focal points 
of her time in office (Office of the Historian, Department of State 2013).  
From 1993 to 1998, the Navy Department was headed by Secretary of the Navy John H. Dal-
ton. A businessman with a five-year career on active duty in the Navy as a nuclear submarine 
officer (and later as a reservist), Dalton came into public office just as the Navy was recover-
ing from the fallout of the “Tailhook ‘91” scandal. Dalton’s call for CNO Kelso’s resignation 
in the wake of the subsequent investigation was overruled by SECDEF Aspin and the White 
House (Healy 1993), although Kelso eventually did retire in 1994. For the remainder of his 
service, Dalton concentrated on managing the fallout of the embarrassment. He also dealt 
  
190 
with issues arising from the further integration of women into the Navy (Bowman 1998). His 
immediate focus on smoothing and integrating the service culture is emblematic of Dalton’s 
unwillingness to engage in larger strategic visions. He left the office after five years, an unu-
sually long period of time for a Secretary of the Navy, and was replaced by the Richard Dan-
zig, a former Undersecretary of the Navy. Danzig’s official biography describes his profes-
sional objectives while in office as,  
“Treating Sailors and Marines as skilled workers (ridding the Services of ‘a conscript 
mentality’) and directing new capital investments and personnel systems to better sup-
port them; achieving better synergy between the Navy and Marine Corps; strengthen-
ing the ability of the sea services to influence events on shore; and embracing infor-
mation age and other new technologies that can better achieve these goals” (Depart-
ment of the Navy 2000) 
To achieve these goals, Danzig, a more energetic strategist than his predecessor, adopted an 
increasingly activist, bi-partisan approach to strengthening the Navy. He stayed on for the 
remainder of Clinton’s second presidential term.  
As much as continuity could be observed in the civilian leadership of the department, the top 
military management was in rather dire straits. CNO Kelso, who was active on the capstone 
documents for the service but mismanaged the “Tailhook” fallout, left office in April 1994. 
Kelso was replaced by Admiral Jeremy “Mike” Boorda, who was selected to restore the Na-
vy’s public image, rebuild service morale, and reestablish good relations with Congress 
(Haynes 2013: 135). These had deteriorated over the past few years. Boorda was the first per-
son who rose through the enlisted ranks to the top position in the U.S. Navy. He enjoyed good 
standing as a “Sailors’ Sailor” with most of the Navy, and his operational record with NATO 
Mediterranean operations let him stand out as unique and practically tested. His relationship 
to the top Navy brass (especially Naval Academy graduates and naval aviators) was less spar-
kling due to Boorda’s career background and his sweeping handling of the “Tailhook” af-
fair.
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 Personally, he took a lot of criticism over his right to wear valor markings on combat 
service medals from service during the Vietnam War. On 16 May 1996, after just two years in 
office, Boorda killed himself in his Washington Navy Yard residence in part over those alle-
gations (Shenon 1996). His suicide at age 56 was a shock for President Clinton. The Navy 
now had to deal with yet another addition to the long, agonizing series of scandals and embar-
rassments. It would be up to Boorda’s successors to steer the service into calmer waters and 
restore public, inner-service, and Congressional confidence.  
                                                          
282
 A Baltimore Sun article on the occasion of Boorda’s death insinuated the relationship between the service’s 
culture and the admiral’s personal problems (N.N. 1996).  
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Admiral Jay Johnson, a naval aviator, was selected to straighten the Navy’s course. Johnson 
largely shied away from publishing major declaratory strategies. Instead, he focused on im-
plementing the “…From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward…From the Sea” (1994) capstone doc-
uments that his predecessors had issued. To restore the Navy’s technological edge, he also 
directed efforts to develop the next generation of warships, aircraft, and information systems. 
He improved the quality of life and work in the Navy by directing changes in the inter-
deployment training cycle (the period of time between deployments), by trimming at-sea time, 
and by measures to reduce wear and tear on the equipment. He optimized procedures 
throughout the bureaucracy of the service so that sailors could spend more time ashore with 
their families and enjoy increasing benefits in pay, health care, and housing (Naval History 
and Heritage Command 2008).  
Increasingly inward-oriented to calm service culture and reassure Congress, CNOs did little to 
infringe on the turf of the CJCS. Over the course of the 1990s, the Chairman was always a 
U.S. Army general. Powell, John Shalikashvili, and Hugh Shelton oversaw a period in which 
the joint staff became deeply involved in defense-planning and strategy-making. This dove-
tailed an increasing oversight role of the civilian bureaucracy over U.S. military planning 
(Swartz 2012b: 26, slide 52). The Navy seemingly lost the ability and the informal responsi-
bility to be the master of its own strategic fate to fellow military men and to civilian claims. 
Congressional influence on strategy-making and defense-planning also rose considerably due 
to Goldwater-Nichols, most prominently displayed by the mandate to submit a Quadrennial 
Defense Review (QDR) beginning in 1997. Capitol Hill, after a conservative landslide victory 
in the 1994 midterm election, featured a strong Republican voice in that of Speaker of the 
House Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.). Republicans for the first time in forty years controlled a ma-
jority in both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Divided government provided a 
considerable problem for Clinton who was forced to battle the Republicans on many occa-
sions instead of being able to focus more on foreign policy.  
9.3.2 Domestic Conditions  
By 1990, the United States was the single remaining political, military, and economic global 
power. The U.S. (and with it the capitalist-driven market economy) had demonstratively pre-
vailed over the Soviet-style, socialist, planned economy. A low inflation rate and low unem-
ployment numbers (after a small spike amidst a short recession in 1992, the overall numbers 
went down progressively) helped considerably in sustaining U.S. momentum. A stock market, 
housing, and credit boom set the tone for an increasingly energized and globalized private-
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capital financial trade business. Highly speculative internet businesses drew an overwhelming 
majority of capital, resulting in the bursting of the “dot-com bubble” in March 2000. The U.S. 
pushed several free trade offensives (NAFTA mentioned above) and it co-founded the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 (Mildner 2012: 176-177). The industrial and defense sec-
tor at home, on the other hand, consolidated. This was related to the restructuring of the mili-
tary and budgetary reduction. The Bush Sr. administration and in particular the Clinton ad-
ministration reduced overall government spending on defense. The military budget went 
down significantly from its Cold War heights, although the Navy was able to retain roughly 
one third of the share among the services. The following illustration outlines the declining 
defense expenditures in absolute and relative terms.  
  
Illustration 26: 1990s U.S. Defense Budget, FY 1991-2000, Navy share in FY 12 billion US-$; GDP DoD share 
in % (Swartz 2012b: 20, slide 39 and 35, slide 70) 
Of the multitude of defense companies, through mergers, acquisitions, and bankruptcies, only 
five larger firms remained (Lockheed Martin, General Dynamics, Raytheon, Northrop-
Grumman, and Boeing). Affecting the defense sector as well were several rounds of base rea-
lignment and closures (BRAC), signaling the withdrawal of the military from some parts of 
the country. BRAC rounds usually eliminated corresponding jobs in the military as well as in 
the local and regional industry and service sectors. While it was justifiable to reduce two 
thirds of the troops in Europe (given the lack of any credible threat to the Cold War/Central 
Front areas of strategic primacy such as the Fulda Gap, the Goslar Corridor, or the Göttingen 
Gap), a significant number of military bases in the United States were closed and abandoned 
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as well. Just like the Army and the Air Force, the Navy was also affected. In 1991, three naval 
stations were closed; in 1993, one government-owned shipyard, 12 naval stations, three naval 
hospitals, and a variety of other installations were shut down. Two years later, in 1995, four 
additional shipyards in Charleston (South Carolina), Long Beach (California), Mare Island 
(California), and Philadelphia (Pennsylvania) folded. Only the facilities in Norfolk (Virginia), 
Pearl Harbor (Hawaii), Portsmouth (Maine), and Puget Sound (Washington) remained 
(Swartz 2012b: 60, slide 120). In the states affected by closures, this added to an overall dis-
mal public image that the Navy had to increasingly cope with. A series of bad press incidents 
plagued the service at the time. Beginning with the turret explosion aboard the battleship Iowa 
(BB 61) in 1989, the fallout of an FBI anti-corruption investigation involving Department of 
the Navy and defense industry individuals, lawsuits over the cancelled McDonnell Douglas 
all-weather A-12 carrier stealth bomber in the early 1990s, the “Tailhook ‘91” scandal and the 
following investigations (the Navy lost some 15 percent of its flag officers in the course of 
demotions and forced retirements), a cheating scandal at the U.S. Naval Academy in 1994, 
and Boorda’s suicide in 1996 cumulated to paint the Navy in a devastating state of affairs. All 
of that affected Navy morale, retention rates, and public standing. This was terrifying for a 
service that was proud of its traditions, its heritage, and its gallantry (Vistica 1997). The prob-
lems contributed to the impression that the Navy neither had the integrity nor the vision to 
serve as a key tool for U.S. foreign and security policy ends.  
9.3.3 Selected U.S. National Security Policies, Doctrines, and Capstone Documents 
The “long 1990s” saw an endless stream of national security policy revisions, doctrinal doc-
uments, and capstone strategies. As the world order was redefined, successive administrations 
and their policy and military leaders attempted to grasp the imminent changes and frame 
America’s role in the post-Cold War world. Trying to make sense of the present and plan for 
the future occurred amidst real-world defense and national security developments. Goldwater-
Nichols mandated submission of an annual senior-level security strategy by the President. 
Except for 1992 (when the Bush administration did not published an NSS), these strategies 
served to establish and reiterate the strategic choices that Bush or Clinton faced in support of 
American grand strategy. These documents naturally were the product of a vetted, interagency 
process. As such, they were carefully crafted, but often only resembled a low, whitewashed, 
common denominator. The tight schedule between NSS documents – after staff produced one 
document, they immediately began work on next year’s document – put immense pressure on 
the authors and robbed the document of the really new and ground-breaking insights and 
ways-means-ends causalities to influence public and political discourse. To complement top-
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level guidance, the White House submitted a steady stream of National Security Directives 
(NSD, Bush Sr.) or Presidential Decision Directives (PDD, Clinton), respectively. These na-
tional security memos were often used to clarify administration policies.
283
 
In addition, the joint staff was also very active in producing series of documents. National 
Military Strategies (NMS) were submitted in 1992, 1995, and 1997. U.S. strategy reports on 
East Asia appeared in 1990, 1992, 1995 and 1998. Joint doctrinal publications continued to 
stream from the Joint Staff, most prominently the conceptual documents “Joint Vision 2010” 
(1996) and “Joint Vision 2020” (2000). The Pentagon still submitted its annual Defense De-
partment reports. The Contingency Planning Guidance (CPG) – written by the Secretary of 
Defense, approved by the President, for the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff – sought to 
tie together the guidance given in NSS and the Defense Planning Guidance (DPG). In turn, 
the CPG served as the principal source document for the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan 
(JSCP). Finally, periodic analyses such as the National Intelligence Council’s Global Trends 
Report 2010 (November 1997) and Global Trends Report 2015 (December 2000) added to the 
multitude of documents. A few documents stand out from this bouquet, that is, from the per-
spective of this study and consequently deserve discussion in more detail. These are, in 
chronological order, the 1991 Base Force Report, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the 1997 
Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).  
Soon after the fall of the Berlin Wall, CJCS General Powell and his staff produced a concept 
titled Base Force and developed in the 1992 National Military Strategy (Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs of Staff 1992: 17-25).
284
 It was designed to replace the global containment strategy 
whose objective was fading away with the new era. It advocated a more nuanced, regional 
focus for the emerging threats of the post-Cold War world, including a distinct regional and 
surge focus (to that end, the Base Force concept contained strategic, Atlantic, Pacific, and 
contingency forces). The growing federal deficit also demanded action by prudent military 
planners. From a congressional perspective, it was the hope for a ‘peace dividend’ (a rerout-
ing of funds for military and defense items to social welfare programs) that made budget cuts 
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 In the national security and military realm specifically for the Navy (some were referenced in the capstone 
documents), the following directives are of note: NSD-49 (12 October 1990) on freedom of navigation issues; 
NSD-74 (24 November 1992) on peacekeeping and humanitarian relief policy; PDD-25 (6 May 1994) on U.S. 
policy regarding multilateral peace operations; PDD-26 (9 June 1994) on U.S. Arctic policy; PDD-32 (23 Janu-
ary 1995) on freedom of navigation issues; PDD-56 (May 1997) on administration's policy on managing com-
plex contingency operations; and PDD-60 (November 1997) on nuclear weapons employment policy. The full 
texts of the memos can be found at the website of the George Bush Presidential Library and Museum 
(http://bushlibrary.tamu.edu/research/nsd.php) and the William J. Clinton Presidential Library 
(http://www.clintonlibrary.gov/pdd.html). 
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 For an in-depth discussion of the Base Force, see Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner (2001), pp. 5-39.  
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very attractive. Accordingly (and in part to push back across-the-board un-strategic spending 
cuts), the Base Force called for substantial financial and manpower reductions (while retrain-
ing a sensible base) within a short period of time to make the U.S. military ready for the 
changing strategic environment. To offset capability gaps and leverage efficiencies, the report 
also put an emphasis on more and honest jointness (Swartz 2012b: 27, slide 53). The report 
provided a floor for future planning. Its objective was to outline the minimum force needed to 
execute the new U.S. strategy, to continue to meet obligations stemming from enduring na-
tional security needs, and to preserve American interests in the changing world. It also hoped 
to retain some capabilities should a resurgent Soviet Union once again challenge the U.S. and 
the West (which at the time seemed like a distant, but still possible outcome). The Base Force 
outlined four elements of U.S. defense strategy, namely strategic deterrence, forward pres-
ence, crisis response, and the ability to reconstitute the U.S. military quickly. Rather than fo-
cusing on the ultimately unpredictable future engagements and threats specifically (thereby 
dismissing a threat-based strategy), the report used a capabilities-based analysis to arrive at 
the defined, balanced base force.  
The report remained the conceptual force structure document for the remainder of the Bush 
administration. Its underlying principles by General Powell (dubbed the “Powell Doctrine”) 
built on the principles as laid out in the Weinberger Doctrine a few years earlier, including 
clear provisions on the U.S. use of military force (Powell had worked for Weinberger before 
rising to the top military position of the Joint Staff).  
The Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of 1993 was the second major force structure review, just a 
couple of years into the decade (Department of Defense 1993).
285
 It was directed by Secretary 
of Defense Les Aspin. While the report can be explained partially by the incoming admin-
istration’s desire to distance itself from the work of its predecessors, it also points toward the 
high level of uncertainty that cloaked defense planning in the 1990s. Sensible strategic plan-
ning in the face of uncertainty was obviously in higher demand than ever, but at the same time 
it was still largely unclear just how that could be facilitated. Successive administrations now 
used the force structure setscrew to go about that business. The Bottom-Up Review was even 
more assertive and wide-reaching in terms of force and budget reduction, proposing cuts of up 
to one third, thereby surpassing the Base Force’s 25% reductions. In addition, this review’s 
most serious shortcoming from the Navy’s perspective was that it downplayed the capability 
of U.S. naval forces to shape the strategic environment through forward presence. Instead, 
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 For an in-depth discussion of the Bottom-Up Review, see Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner (2001), pp. 41-81. 
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Secretary Aspin’s approach was explicitly threat-based (Owens 1993: 16-17). Importantly, the 
BUR preempted Clinton’s first national security strategy of 1994 in that it called for an in-
creasing operations tempo and a higher deployment rate of a significantly smaller military. In 
setting the political and rhetorical stage for U.S. participation in multilateral operations, it 
signaled the intent to increase burden-sharing among allies and drive efficiencies, or in other 
words: “to do more with less”.  
The Bottom-Up Review cautioned that in strategic planning, external threats were important 
but needed to be compared with the nation’s resources. This was a marked change from the 
abundant defense spending during the Cold War. Much to the Navy’s relief, the BUR report 
acknowledged the vital role of presence and peacetime engagement. Both are traditional roles 
for naval forces (Swartz 2012b: 27, slide 53). It noted four overarching priorities for the U.S., 
namely, (1) defeating aggressors in major regional contingencies (MRC); (2) deterring re-
gional conflict and provision of stability in areas of strategic interest; (3) conducting of small-
scale interventions (peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster 
relief); and, (4) deterring attacks against the U.S., its forces, or its allies by WMD (Lar-
son/Oletzky/Leuschner 2001: 46-48). The document further assumed that U.S. forces would 
need to be designed so that four sets of tasks could be achieved abroad. To that end, it used a 
two major regional contingency force-sizing metric. In other words, it called for troops of a 
quantity and quality that could engage decisively in two major regional conflicts somewhere 
in the world in parallel (for example North Korea and the Persian Gulf). In addition, the report 
incorporated smaller-scale conflicts or crises (that would require U.S. forces to conduct peace 
enforcement or intervention operations), overseas presence (the need for U.S. military forces 
to conduct regular peacetime operations in critical regions of the world), and deterrence of 
attacks with weapons of mass destruction, either against U.S. territory, U.S. forces, or the ter-
ritory and forces of U.S. allies (Department of Defense 1993: 13).  
The U.S. military would continue to be tasked with addressing the range of the spectrum of 
conflict across all these categories, making the post-Cold War peacetime operations and crisis 
response in all likelihood a busy, but – so it was hoped – relatively manageable task for the 
U.S.
286
 The central struggle for planners would be to balance the war-fighting capabilities of 
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 The established model of the spectrum of conflict for the military consists of notional phases in a serial chain. 
The pattern describes a conflict’s dynamics and the role that the U.S. military intends to play. In its most com-
mon way, it consists of six phases. Phase Zero is known as the “Shape” phase in which prevention and contin-
gency preparation are undertaken. Phase I, “Deterrence”, is a defined crisis that needs to be met by capable ac-
tions and means. Phase II, the “Seize” part, contains the assurance of friendly freedom of action and access to a 
theater’s infrastructure. Phase III, “Dominance”, establishes powerful force capabilities to achieve full-spectrum 
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the force on the one hand with the presence requirements as mandated by the report on the 
other hand. When the Bottom-Up Review was implemented, it occurred to leaders that mili-
tary deployments and engagements as well as political commitments were “from a historical 
perspective, more frequent, larger, and of longer duration than had been seen in the past” 
(Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner 2001: 59). During its first term, the Clinton administration failed 
to prioritize the use of the U.S. military but actually used it as an active and often indiscrimi-
nate foreign policy tool instead. These lesser contingencies took a toll on the force and almost 
equaled the stress of one MRC. That was one of the major reasons why during the second half 
of the presidency, Clinton went from a more interventionist approach to economizing the 
military just to win wars. In addition, the ambitious promotion of democracy and market 
economy slowed considerably (e.g., with respect to Russia and China [Bierling 2003: 224-
226]). Clinton needed to concentrate on domestic issues, not least around his impeachment in 
1998/1999. A careful global engagement was once again replaced by regional wars prisms as 
the overriding planning metric. 
The third major capstone document of the decade came in 1997 with the Quadrennial Defense 
Review.
287
 It was mandated by Congress in 1996 and had its roots in a report of the Roles and 
Missions Commission of the Armed Forces (1995). One of its major motivations was to bal-
ance the defense program needs with budgetary provisions and to strengthen the role of the 
legislature. Central to this approach was to offset one of the key problems that had developed 
during the previous years, namely, the mitigation of funds from modernization accounts to the 
funding of ongoing operations. This was especially crucial in the face of more expensive 
technology and procurement given the advanced weapons, sensors, and command and control 
systems that were moving into place (a process that widely became known as transformation 
of the military). The QDR replaced the MRC model with the 2-Major-Theater-Wars (MTW) 
force-sizing metric, recognized adversary asymmetric means in warfare, and emphasized 
peacetime engagement and smaller-scale contingencies (SSC).
288
 Nevertheless, end strength 
decreased. CJCS General John Shalikashvili came out with the report before the civilian lead-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
superiority. Phase IV is the “Stabilize” round where security is established and pre-conflict services (such as 
governance, infrastructure, etc.) are restored. Phase V contains the transfer of responsibility to a civilian authori-
ty and the military’s redeployment; it is known as “Enable Civil Authority”.  
287
 Department of Defense (1997). For an in-depth discussion of the Quadrennial Defense Review 1997, see 
Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner (2001), pp. 83-120. 
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 In 1998, the National Defense Panel (NDP) Report, a congressionally-mandated alternative vision to the Pen-
tagon’s QDR, remained skeptical of the two-MTW Metric as strategy. Instead, it argued for ‘transformation’ and 
experimentation as immediate US defense priority (Swartz 2012b: 27, slide 54).  
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ers of OSD were able to influence it significantly. Secretary of Defense William Cohen had 
little leverage within the policy process (Larson/Oletzky/Leuschner 2001: 83-84).  
These three national strategic capstone documents (Base Force, Bottom-Up Review, and 
Quadrennial Defense Review) underlined the broad consequences that changes in global cir-
cumstances and presidential administrations can have on military planning. In addition to the 
tectonic political and geostrategic rifts, the overarching capstone documents of the 1990s 
were increasingly informed and influenced by technology-based war-fighting concepts some-
times perceived as revolutionary. Full-spectrum dominance, dominant battle-space 
knowledge, rapid decisive operations, shock and awe, halt phase, network-centric operations, 
and effects based operations (EBO) became a familiar and increasingly popular vocabulary 
(Swartz 2012b: 23, slide 45).  
9.4 Developing and Promulgating USN Strategy 1989-2001  
While “The Maritime Strategy” was a series of documents under one name and one large geo-
strategic naval concept, the 1990s was not afforded such luxury by the Navy. Accordingly, 
rather than discussing the evolution of the documents and the sea-strategic concepts behind it 
sequentially, this chapter will present each document’s genesis and evolution followed by the 
analysis of its strategic scope. A synopsis at the end of this chapter will point out aspects of 
continuity and change. 
The April 1990 issue of Proceedings, the U.S. Naval Institute’s professional magazine, fea-
tured a strikingly candid illustration that was aimed directly at the ‘steady as she goes’ men-
tality of some admirals. The photograph showed a print of “The Maritime Strategy” being 
consumed by flames (Golightly 1990: 33). As the 1980s capstone document of American sea 
power went up in flames, it provided the opportunity for a fresh start. This do-over resulted in 
several attempts by the Navy leadership to promulgate core thinking about the role of naval 
power in this new world.
289
 In the process, however, the Navy’s message diluted. The cap-
stone documents were not addressing a naval way of thinking about the political ends of war. 
Instead, they increasingly limited themselves to how the Navy would fight the next war. With 
little in the way of major threats or peer competitors on the horizon, the defense establishment 
was hard to convince why a large, balanced Navy was necessary in the first place. Two suc-
cessive presidential administrations did not help to push back such concerns. The service’s 
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 It was flanked by a notable increase in books from third parties on topics of American and world naval histo-
ry including strategy, military innovation, and tactics (for a list, see Swartz 2012b: 50-59). In part, this intellec-
tual-academic influence strove to explain how the U.S. Navy had dealt with strategic change before, hoping to 
provide some template for the 1990s force- and strategic-planning communities.  
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strategies were often no longer comprehended as how to make a strategic difference akin to 
“The Maritime Strategy”, but rather as simple war plans and justifications for its force struc-
ture. 
 Name Self-titled format Year Status 
The Way Ahead Vision 1991 unclassified 
The Navy Policy Book Policy 1992 unclassified 
… From the Sea Vision 1992 unclassified 
Naval Warfare (NDP1) Doctrine 1994 unclassified 
Forward… From the Sea Strategic Concept 1994 unclassified 
Navy Operational Concept Operational Concept 1997 unclassified 
Anytime, Anywhere Vision 1997 unclassified 
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance Strategic Planning 
Guidance 
1999 
2000 
secret 
unclassified  
Illustration 27: Main1990s USN capstone documents (Swartz 2012a: 2, slide 3, 75, slide 149, 98, slide 195).  
These capstone documents also struggled with a secondary rationale, namely, providing the 
Navy internally with a sense of cohesion much like “The Maritime Strategy” had achieved. 
Initially, U.S. Navy expectations for its post-Cold War role were relatively far-reaching and 
widely optimistic. The Navy leadership considered its political and operational postures and 
the way it did business as very adaptable to the aftermath of the superpower conflict. It could 
be reasonably confident that by all indications (and providing an unchanging if not larger 
share of the budget) that it would be very, if not most relevant in the future security environ-
ment (Swartz 2012b: 8, slide 16).
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 This amounted to political wishful thinking on the part of 
the Navy. The Navy misjudged the persuasive power of geostrategic shifts, public expecta-
tions toward post-Cold War peace and serenity, and of two successive administrations. Presi-
dent Bush’s “New World Order” ideas were cut short by his surprising defeat after one term 
in office (Bush acknowledged not subscribing to “the vision thing” in the first place 
[Bush/Scrowcroft 1998: 16-18]; in fact, he sought a much more pragmatic approach to na-
tional defense affairs). President Clinton’s attempt at a single cohesive and comprehensive 
idea of integrating economic and political enlargement eventually faltered mostly due to do-
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 A view that epitomized in an article penned by the outgoing CNO titled “Maritime Strategy for the 1990s” 
(Trost 1990).  
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mestic political dynamics and the persistently violent nature of international relations. Hence-
forth, in particular during Clinton’s second term, international problems were considered 
without applying a larger template or idea. Consequently, none of the single crises and chal-
lenges that the U.S. faced in the 1990s proved compelling enough to threaten U.S. national 
survival. The role of the military in general and the Navy in particular in addressing these 
threats was a one-off as the definition of American interests. The Navy was eventually unable 
to drive home to Congress and the American public the need to keep up a large force, as use-
ful and sound their arguments for a balanced fleet may have sounded to themselves. 
9.4.1 The Way Ahead (1991)/The Navy Policy Book (1992)  
a) Evolution 
The 1991 document drew significantly from an informal working group of Navy Department 
staff officers which got together on a regular basis to discuss Navy and Marine Corps is-
sues.
291
 Parallel to a few non-starting formal efforts, an informal association of Navy and Ma-
rine Corps officers – the self-titled “Ancient Mariners” (consisting of OPNAV and outside 
staff) – took it upon themselves to come up with a new concept to address the changing 
world. A meeting on a Saturday morning in March 1990 featured presentations by action of-
ficers for a large audience that included many flag officers. It yielded a number of themes that 
provided insight for the changing strategic landscape. The concept was consequently tested 
and expanded and “thus, this early developmental work became an ancestor to the series of 
statements that were soon to follow” (Hattendorf 2006: 11). One of them was “The Way 
Ahead”, published as an article in the April 1991 issue of Proceedings magazine. It was 
signed by the Secretary of the Navy Garrett, CNO Kelso, and the Commandant of the Marine 
Corps, General Alfred Gray. Therefore, it provided overarching bureaucratic and intellectual 
clout without fully discarding “The Maritime Strategy” (which so many admirals still held 
dear) in the process. Hedging against a resurgent Soviet Union remained an objective because 
it was unclear what the next steps for Moscow’s decaying empire would look like. Despite the 
momentous geopolitical shift of 1989-1991, neither CNO Trost nor CNO Kelso asked for a 
formal replacement of “The Maritime Strategy”.  
“The Way Ahead” identified three overriding challenges for the Navy Department. These 
were the identification of efficiencies and the cost-effectiveness of the industrial base, the 
force size (in light of a foreseeable adverse fiscal situation), and the shape and size of the 
twenty-first century Navy (Garrett/Kelso/Gray 1991, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 24-26). 
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 This paragraph is based on John Hattendorf’s lucid description of the process (2006: 7-11). 
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Navy leaders at the time were indifferent to a really comprehensive new maritime strategy, 
whereas mid-level naval strategists – strategically-thinking staff officers with tours in the OP-
603 branch and experience in the fleet – saw the need for an ambitious post-Cold War docu-
ment almost immediately (Haynes 2013: 76). To Kelso, cost-effectiveness was more desirable 
than a grand-strategic marching direction for the Navy. For this reason the CNO lobbied 
heavily on the publication of “The Navy Policy Book”, a 1992 medium length internal U.S. 
Navy booklet whose audience was the officer corps and the enlisted ranks of the Navy. Kelso 
saw it as a complementary work to “The Way Ahead” and “The Maritime Strategy” (which 
was officially shelved). With the trio of publications as an intellectual foundation, Kelso 
sought to implement business-world inspired “Total Quality Leadership” principles in the 
Navy. Published shortly before the 1992 Presidential election but three years into the post-
Cold War world, the “Navy Policy Book” (reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 39-86) was drafted 
in the CNO’s office (Captain James Stark) and received input from the Navy’s strategic 
branch, OP-603 (Captain Dick Diamond). In response to a number of bad press issues for the 
Navy – catastrophic technology failures, bribery, and sexual assault scandals mentioned pre-
viously – it focused heavily on the Navy as an organization, its values, traditions, and herit-
age. As a guideline policy document, it sought to explain the Navy – to the Navy. Its en pas-
sant mentioning of the USMC and the clear lack of an ambitious way-means-ends correlation 
contributed to its limited influence and, consequently, it was never updated or repeated. It was 
soon overshadowed by the course of events: Secretary of the Navy Garret left office just one 
month after the publication of “The Navy Policy Book”. In November 1992, four months after 
its printing, a new capstone document was presented, one that would have considerably more 
lasting influence.   
b) Strategic Concept 
“The Way Ahead”, as noted above, drew on some catalyst ideas and themes discussed in an 
informal D.C.-based Navy study group in 1990. Their ideas included the Navy-Marine Corps’ 
understanding of itself as an enabler for follow-on operations and a decisive crisis response 
capability by its inherent forward presence and expeditionary nature. It also discarded one of 
Mahan’s most sacred principles in that it postulated that the U.S. Navy’s future was seen in 
supporting the land battle, not exclusively the conduct of war at sea (although ASW and 
AAW were to be maintained to shield against future capable sea-going adversaries) 
(Hattendorf 2006: 9, Haynes 2013: 76-77). Those concerns were motivated principally by the 
U.S. experience of the Gulf War, notwithstanding that the Navy was left somewhat marginal-
ized in the actual fight. The Navy’s ideas continued to be groomed by these staff and flag of-
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ficers, who tested them for various audiences in the greater politico-military community until 
they were ready for prime time. The Base Force study call for of 450 Navy ships served as the 
definite bottom line for the Navy’s deliberations. The Base Force designed U.S. military ob-
jectives along four principles: deterrence, forward presence, crisis response, and force recon-
stitution. The Navy heavily focused on the first three aspects. “The Way Ahead” called for 
sea-based strategic forces for deterrence of a nuclear attack, coordinated surge forces designed 
to react rapidly to any crisis, coordinated forward-deployed expeditionary forces with com-
prehensive logistic, medical, and repair support, and a sea-based maritime prepositioned force 
(reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 30). It also emphasized humanitarian assistance, nation-
building, security assistance, peacekeeping, counter-narcotic/ -terrorism/ –insurgency opera-
tions, and crisis response (Swartz 2012a: 14, slide 27).
292
 Sea control, a longstanding and 
well-established naval mission, was only mentioned in passing. This reflected a Navy senti-
ment that its control of the sea, at least on the high seas, would be uncontested in the near- 
and mid-term. Amid criticism of its lack of priorities and the perception that the Navy’s ideas 
were not radical enough, “The Way Ahead” by all accounts had negligible influence and im-
pact (not least because the Air Force and the Army came out of the Gulf War with considera-
bly higher morale and sense of achievement, pushing over the Navy’s initially optimistic post-
Cold War standpoint of attaining more influence and budget share).  
“The Navy Policy Book” was aimed at an internal Navy audience. It focused on “policy”, not 
“strategy” or “strategic concepts”. It vaguely discussed naval missions but did little to connect 
the dots. In addition, it failed to address such crucial issues as the nature of U.S. enemies, the 
role of naval force in the broader maritime arena (e.g., with the Marine Corps, Coast Guard, 
and the merchant marine), and to provide a link to force-level planning, programming, and 
budgeting (Swartz 2012a: 28, slide 55).  
9.4.2 …From the Sea (1992) 
a) Evolution 
“…From the Sea” was the work of subsequent working groups, using a standardized OP-603 
strategy brief as a basis for continuous refinement between October 1991 and March 1992.
293
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 Swartz notes that “‘The Way Ahead’ was ‘way ahead’ of its time. [It was] A vision for the early 2000s, but 
not for the 1990s” (Swartz 2012a: 19).  
293
 The name is a clear attempt to provide something that would stick and be marketable and the three dots and 
the capital ‘F’ are a deliberate play on readers’ expectations. The initial product was designed to have different 
titles such as “Power from the Sea”, “Diplomacy from the Sea”, or “Engagement from the Sea”. Based on sug-
gestions of Admiral Kendall Pease, it also included warfare areas from the sea (“Naval aviation… from the Sea”, 
“Amphibious warfare… from the Sea”, “Submarine warfare… from the Sea”) (Scott Truver interview 2012, 
00:53:11-00:53:50) . According to Admiral Smith, it was him who realized one morning at breakfast upon glanc-
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With the memories of the Gulf War fresh on their minds, the Center for Naval Analyses host-
ed a project called Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort (NFCPE). The NFCPE brought 
seasoned naval officers together with civilian academics, Congressional staffers, and people 
from the think tank community. The group’s goal was to exert upward pressure. It sought to 
position the Navy and the Marine Corps in national strategic plans and provide long-range 
perspective for mid- and long-term national security threats. Using a historical interval case 
study, the participants assessed the future environment and the Navy’s role in it. The group 
utilized what became known as the “Manthorpe Curve,” a graph briefed by Captain William 
H.J. Manthorpe. He had determined that historically, the period between the end of one global 
hegemonic power and the rise of another was roughly twenty years. In other words, the next 
one would materialize around 2011, and if it were not a resurgent Soviet Union, it would be a 
Eurasian power, or a coalition of states. Independent of that cycle, there was a second dynam-
ic connected to a continuous, low level of conflict (i.e., limited wars) that drew in larger pow-
ers. Extrapolating from the wars in Korea (1950-1953), Vietnam (1965-1975), and the Gulf 
War (1990-1991), Manthorpe calculated that crisis interval to be fifteen years. That gave the 
U.S. roughly until 2005. The study concluded that the U.S. had some time until the next glob-
al threat emerged. For the time being, it was at liberty to concentrate on the-rest-of-the-world 
threats (Haynes 2013: 98).  
How these challenges were to be addressed remained more controversial. Warfare area spe-
cialists brought forward different arguments, underlining their respective platform or operat-
ing area’s particular relevance. Analysis of past Navy/Marine Corps crisis response had 
shown even in a volatile, Cold War bipolar environment, American sea power had over-
whelmingly been applied to counter land-based threats, not fight the decisive battle at sea. 
This was surprising even to seasoned naval officers, given that “The Maritime Strategy” had 
focused extensively on the global at-sea struggle against the Soviet Union. For their work, the 
authors from the NFCPE utilized that revelation.
294
 It was relatively safe to assume that the 
trend for sea power to influence events ashore, driven by geopolitical developments and poli-
cy decisions in Washington, D.C., was likely to continue and even deepen. In consensus, it 
was thus argued that regional wars and the related instability they conveyed, but not great-
power competition was the most pressing problem for the United States.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ing at his open briefcase which contained these drafts that “it could be anything from the sea. So why don’t I just 
put three dots down here: ‘…From the Sea.’ You can fill in what you want. And I did it. […] I mean, the name 
just grabbed hold and everybody loved it.” (Stillwell, Leighton W. Smith interview #9, 13 March 2006: 644) 
294
 For a list of participants of the NFCPE, see Hattendorf (2006: 88, footnote *). 
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In the course of spring and summer 1992, “…From the Sea” was further sharpened by exten-
sive, multi-personality re-writing iterations to turn it from an internal paper into a publication 
and, according to Vice Admiral Leighton Smith, to make sure that people on the Hill under-
stood it (Stillwell 2006).
295
 The drafts were unclassified and designated “For official use on-
ly” (FOUO) to broaden the eventual audience as much as possible. Thus, it was thus not only 
an internal paper for the Navy, but largely an attempt also to gain national political attention 
in the White House and traction on Capitol Hill. Contributors included flag and staff officers 
as well as outside contractors, but the recurring themes of forward presence and power projec-
tion remained. With the new Secretary of the Navy Sean O’Keefe as a co-signer, “…From the 
Sea” was pushed out in the November 1992 issue of Proceedings magazine and the Marine 
Corps’ counterpart, the Marine Corps Gazette (Kelso/O’Keefe/Mundy 1992, reprinted in 
Hattendorf 2006: 87-99). The Navy and the Marine Corps sought to present themselves as 
having had understood and principally embraced the defense posture policies of the Bush ad-
ministration. This would enable them to retain their services’ say for the next four years – not 
only in response to the changed geopolitical landscape, but also because the U.S. Air Force 
had recently published its own document with bumper sticker potential and significant politi-
cal traction, “Global Reach, Global Power” (Department of the Air Force 1990). The content 
of the “…From the Sea” had been distributed previously as a press release. It is remarkable 
how timely the publication was, given the Presidential election of the same month. However, 
it was clearly driven by the need to get at least something out by election day. The results of 
the vote sent the Republican administration out and put a Democratic administration in. Con-
sequently, the naval services made sure that unsigned copies of “…From the Sea” were circu-
lated after Clinton’s inauguration (Swartz 2012a: 32, slide 63).296 The Navy wanted the publi-
cation to grab people’s attention just like the Air Force’s pamphlet had done. Thus it needed 
to be presented in an attractive (although somewhat budget-consuming) format.
297
 The Janu-
ary 1993 version, the third and final iteration of “…From the Sea”, reiterated the themes of 
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 Scott Truver noted that he came on as an outside contractor overseeing draft 19B, seeing it through draft 65C 
(Interview 2012, 00:39:30 – 00:40:40). Admiral Smith’s quotation stems from that discussion.  
296
 The signature of Bush’s political appointee O’Keefe would not have helped. In fact, it would have conveyed a 
politicized impression to the incoming defense and national security staff. One of the contractors tasked with 
finishing the draft aptly called that process the act of “de-Bushifying” the document. The job after the election 
was to find out what Clinton had said about the Navy, a task that yielded little substantive results. As a candi-
date, Clinton had only made two speeches with Navy relevance, one in Charleston (South Carolina) and one in 
Groton (Connecticut) (Scott Truver interview 2012: 00:44:15 – 00:45:05).  
297
 Truver recalls that the Navy was not pleased by the initial appearance of the publication. The version that had 
been sent out on 30 September 1992 was not proof-read very closely, and software issues complicated the for-
mat. A reworked produced a second version dated 15 October, which was sent up the chain of command to ap-
prove it. The signatures of the Secretary of the Navy, the CNO, and the CMC were obtained by copy & paste 
from an earlier version (Truver interview 2012, 00:41:45 – 00:44:10).  
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the original drafts. The Navy now had a white paper with glossy pictures and illustrations that 
positioned it in the policy community. Although the selection of illustrations conveys the im-
pression that the Navy consisted of surface and naval aviation mostly (submarine images do 
not appear until well into the brochure), “…From the Sea” tracked. It remained the Navy’s 
primary post-Cold War strategic and comprehensive approach for the rest of the decade.
298
  
b) Strategic Concept 
The working group that drafted “…From the Sea” emphasized the value of command of the 
sea (absent a peer-competitor, the broader ‘command of the sea’ became popular again, often 
used in conjunction with the narrower ‘sea control’). Earlier drafts of the paper (based on the 
output of projects like the Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort, the cradle of “…From the 
Sea”) acknowledged command of the sea as the indivisible basis for protection of U.S. citi-
zens and territory. Forward, sea-based operations to guard U.S. interests and promote com-
mitment abroad were emphasized. Additionally, command of the sea was described as the 
basis for deterrence, power projection, and crisis response. All of these were long-standing 
constants in the U.S. Navy’s mission mindset. This effort energized the Navy’s thinking. In-
stead of reactively describing what the Navy would do different from the Air Force or the 
Army, the authors of “… From the Sea” sought to lay out the broad and flexible capabilities 
of the Navy. This narrative related naval purpose to warfighting as well as to broader Ameri-
can diplomatic and economic interests. Although naval force structure is primarily structured 
for war, the group asserted, holding and using command of the sea could very well influence 
events ashore at any time. The authors concluded that naval forces must, therefore, conduct 
geographically forward-deployed operations and focus increasingly on the coast and littoral 
areas instead of the high seas (Hattendorf 2006: 97).  
While global sea control did not seem to be an issue for the Navy anymore, local and regional 
sea control in confined and shallow waters (straits, canals, or the littoral regions) were elevat-
ed to higher strategic importance. Consequently, “…From the Sea” focused on strike and 
power projection (underlining for example the use of the Tomahawk missile for surface and 
land attack). It deemphasized ASW and blue-water engagements, which primarily served 
winning and exercising sea control against peer enemy forces (ibid: 14). 
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 In his official portrait painting on display at the Pentagon, Secretary of the Navy O’Keefe – whose tenure was 
cut short to just a few months by the change from the Republican to the Democrat administration – is seen carry-
ing the “…From the Sea” magazine, thus illustrating and embracing the document’s thrust and scope.  
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Still, the final version of “…From the Sea” contained no less than six maritime capabilities: 
powerful presence, strategic deterrence, sea control, extended crisis response, power projec-
tion from the sea, and provision of sealift. It later cited four traditional operational means 
(forward deployment, crisis response, strategic deterrence, and sealift) to which it affixed an-
other four required key operational capabilities (command, control, and surveillance, battle 
space dominance, power projection, and force sustainment) (Swartz 2012a: 45-46, slides 90-
92). “…From the Sea” did not mention a particular country as a specific threat, but the con-
text of its publication showed clearly that the Gulf War was seen as a template for future op-
erations in that theater. It clearly raised the role of the Marine Corps to co-equality with the 
Navy, something that critics dismissed the undue influence of the USMC. To them, traditional 
and more comprehensive naval tasks on the high seas were unjustifiably overshadowed by the 
(smaller) effect-ashore faction. Additionally, the fact that sea control seemed to be taken for 
granted raised some eyebrows (ibid: 52, slides 103-104). Admittedly, the document displayed 
a much broader focus on political viability in Washington than on operational salience. When 
Clinton came into office, forward presence and peacetime crisis response in “…From the Sea” 
were deemphasized. They were considered to lack traction with the new decision-makers in 
the White House and on Capitol Hill. In essence, they were costly diversions from what the 
incoming administration perceived as a need to field a downsized, a less aggressive, and less 
ambitious American military posture worldwide. To the Navy, “…From the Sea” offered a 
sharpening of its outlook on the world. To policy-makers, the strategic concepts offered as-
pects that tracked with their general outlook on the world.  
9.4.3 Naval Warfare (NDP1) (1994) 
a) Evolution 
Among the tasks proposed by “…From the Sea”, the restructuring of the Navy to carry out the 
new strategy was a high priority. This included the establishment of a new Naval Doctrine 
Command (NAVDOCCOM) in Norfolk (Virginia), home to the Navy’s largest fleet installa-
tions (and one of the largest naval bases worldwide). To support the concepts laid out in 
“…From the Sea”, the new command rolled out its first in a series of publications in 1994.299 
NDP1 “Naval Warfare” attempted to provide a guideline account of official operational Navy 
behavior. It also responded to the prevalent “jointness and joint doctrinal frenzy” (Swartz 
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 The following other doctrinal publications were released: NDP2 Naval Intelligence, NDP4 Naval Logistics, 
NDP5 Naval Planning, and NDP6 Naval Command & Control. NDP 3 Naval Operations was never published 
over disagreements regarding command relationships between Navy and Marine Corps (Swartz 2012a: 63), a 
consequential event that undermined the other five volumes, the Naval Doctrine Command’s status, and the 
expectation that the Navy could develop coherent doctrine (Haynes 2013: 158).  
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2012a: 59, slide 117) amidst the implementation of Goldwater-Nichols. With NDP1, the Navy 
sought to find a vehicle to explain itself and what it did to other services where doctrine (and 
the appreciation for doctrine) constituted elementary parts of the strategic culture. Therefore, 
NDP 1 used a format similar to that of the joint publications. This displayed that the Navy 
really wanted to arrive at a more coherent and joint articulation. It also conveyed that it under-
stood the diction and the dynamics of the modern military. This capstone document during the 
tenure of CNO Frank Kelso was entirely drafted and published at NAVDOCCOM. This was a 
deliberately far cry from the bureaucratic power politics in the Pentagon and in Washington. 
Additionally, NDP1 did not seek outside contractors as advisors and it forfeited early-on par-
ticipation of the Naval War College in the process. However, the Navy’s general uneasiness 
with written doctrine and how the publication was written contributed to its limited traction 
within the service. NDP1 also illustrated, as much as how the preceding three capstone docu-
ments did, Kelso’s limited strategic aspiration. In the face of General Powell’s accumulated 
power as CJCS, Admiral Kelso did not think he was responsible for much more than equip-
ping, training, and organizing the force.  
Admiral Kelso’s perspective was that his job, like that of OPNAV, was to focus on the means. 
The White House, OSD, and now the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff determined the 
ends. The CINCs and their naval component commanders determined the ways. In the CNO’s 
view, strategy – the relating and orchestration of ways, means, and political ends – was some-
one else’s job (Haynes 2013: 87). Navy strategy by default did not work. Kelso departed of-
fice in April 1994 (shortly after NDP1 was issued). His successor as CNO was Jeremy 
Boorda, the first surface warfare officer in that position in 20 years.  
b) Strategic Concept 
NDP 1 was the fourth (and final) capstone document signed by CNO Kelso. The Navy’s 
somewhat uneasy relationship with doctrine (in contrast to other branches of the military), the 
problematic relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps, and the eventually incom-
plete roster of publications notwithstanding, NDP1 laid out naval objectives along the broad 
lines of maneuver over attrition warfare. It used historical examples from naval history to 
convey its key ideas and “its purpose was to explain the inherent nature of the enduring prin-
ciples of naval force and to translate the vision and strategy of ‘…From the Sea’ into doctrinal 
reality” (Hattendorf 2006: 101). In citing Admiral Turner’s four missions of 1974 (sea con-
trol, projection of power ashore, naval presence, and strategic deterrence), NDP1 subsumed 
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established roles of naval forces and also spoke to general principles of war.
300
 Those were 
not new by any means; they were simply restated as the underlying objectives that naval war-
fare needed to keep in mind. More importantly, NDP1 listed a number of principles and mis-
sion-sets that previously had not been featured as prominently, including naval operations 
other than war.
301
 As such, NDP1 had some potential, but it was too broad in scope and wide-
ly seen as a product that let nowhere. To its critics, it was a diluted, goalless paper that emit-
ted from a command down in Norfolk, not in Washington. It did not seem to be informed by 
any measureable input from major makers and shapers of American seapower, and NDP1 was 
eventually eclipsed by rival documents, “…From the Sea” (1992) and “Forward …From the 
Sea” (1994).   
9.4.4 Forward…From the Sea (1994) 
a) Evolution 
Prior to being nominated as CNO, Boorda served as Commander in Chief Allied Forces 
Southern Europe and as Commander in Chief, U.S. Naval Forces Europe. In that capacity, he 
had commanded all NATO forces engaged in the Adriatic Sea. He was a naval officer unique-
ly experienced in conducting the real-world U.S. naval operations after the collapse of the 
Soviet Union. Just months after Boorda’s ascension to the Navy’s highest billet, the Decem-
ber 1994 edition of Proceedings featured “Forward… From the Sea” (Boorda/Dalton/Mundy 
1994, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 149-158). This strategic concept article had already ap-
peared in the Marine Corps Gazette two months earlier and was published as a stand-alone 
12-page booklet as well. “Forward…From the Sea” originated in N513, the Strategy and 
Concepts Branch of the Navy Department. It was signed by the CNO, CMC General Mundy, 
and Secretary of the Navy Dalton. “…From the Sea” was not outdated, but the Navy looked 
to utilize the momentum brought about by the change in the White House and picking up on 
the surprisingly good reception of “…From the Sea”. This indicates the higher political intent 
of “Forward…From the Sea”. In addition to serving as a yardstick of the incoming CNO, the 
document provided a testimonial of naval strategic thinking to the new (Clinton-
administration) Secretary of Defense Perry and Secretary of the Navy Dalton. “For-
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 These were: objective, mass, maneuver, offensive, economy of force, unity of command, simplicity, surprise, 
and security (Hattendorf 2006: 128-130).  
301
 They included the conduct of contingency operations, noncombatant evacuation, combat of terrorism, aid to 
host nations through security assistance and foreign internal defense, assistance of other nations’ defenses, en-
forcement of U.N. sanctions, participation in peace-support operations, interdiction of vessels engaged in illegal 
migration, disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, civil support operations, coordination of public health opera-
tions, and counter-drug operations (Hattendorf 2006: 115-116).  
  
209 
ward…From the Sea” was, therefore, designed to enable a Democratic imprint on a previous, 
Republican-signed strategy.
302
  
As previously discussed, the Clinton administration had conducted the “Bottom-Up Review” 
of the Defense Department in 1993 and the President published his “National Security Strate-
gy of Engagement and Enlargement” in 1994. The military services needed to align with these 
documents and reflect the overarching demands. In particular, the Navy sought to link force 
structure changes (the 1993 review) to forward presence demands (the 1994 NSS). The ser-
vice wanted to demonstrate that it understood force structure consequences and policy de-
mands of the new era.
303
 With “Forward…From the Sea”, Navy planners attempted to deliver. 
Nevertheless, in retrospect, the document was more of a political response than a larger strat-
egy. “Forward… From the Sea” aimed to utilize the momentum of the “Bottom-Up Review” 
and to secure the Navy’s force structure, unmindful of the Marine Corps’ demands. “For-
ward… From the Sea” was not aligned with the presidential or Joint Staff planning cycles 
which hampered the work because the Navy could not reasonably predict what the Joint Staff 
might prioritize in the next go-around. Worse yet, the Navy believed it had now dealt suffi-
ciently with proving its relevance to the political leadership. Consequently, strategy-making 
moved toward the bottom of the Navy’s priorities list. Instead, a focus on new platforms and 
keeping an otherwise low profile characterized Navy behavior for the remainder of the dec-
ade. 
With five genuinely Navy-only capstone documents in just four years (not counting related 
documents and aborted efforts), the Navy had been incredibly busy continuously portraying 
itself to the post-Cold War senior political leadership. To the defense establishment and the 
bureaucracy – the Joint Staff, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense – 
as well as the public and on Capitol Hill, this amounted to the equivalent of a capstone docu-
ment feeding frenzy. The Navy was increasingly blindsided by the jointness crowds. It was 
difficult and downright foolish to justify ad-hoc single-service thinking and planning in the 
increasingly joint, coordinated, and integrated force. In the future, a closer alignment to the 
overarching documents and planning cycles and a more formalized process inside OPNAV 
would be needed for the Navy’s strategic planning. For a service proud of its uniqueness and 
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 Haynes (2013: 136) concedes that “(Secretary of the Navy, S.B.) Dalton’s problem was straightforward” and 
citing Dalton’s speechwriter, then-Lieutenant Commander Sam Tangredi, “Critics would say that ‘For-
ward…From the Sea’ was really no different than ‘…From the Sea’ (except emphasizing forward presence). 
They were right. It was not meant to be different, it was meant to be signed.” 
303
 As previously mentioned, the “Bottom-Up Review” replaced the “Base Force” concept of the Bush years 
which had outlined a future military that would wage two simultaneous regional conflicts at once. The “Bottom-
Up Review” saw the military engaged in two nearly simultaneous conflicts. 
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whose strategic culture was deeply rooted in the past, this promised to be a monumental chal-
lenge.
304
  
Even here, the Air Force and Army strategic cultures and operational validations provided the 
Navy with headwind. The Gulf War had seemingly validated the Army’s AirLand Battle con-
cept and the Air Force’s strategic bombing doctrines. In addition, both services’ institutional 
influence (Army general Shalikashvili was a vocal Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) 
were overwhelmingly influential in the constitution of joint doctrine. Whether the Navy liked 
it or not, the forces of the time worked against the Navy, and the Navy in turn was unable to 
free itself and think more conceptually about its role in national defense. The overall dismal 
strategic state of play of the Navy affected the service’s standing, morale, and momentum. 
b) Strategic Concept 
“Forward…From the Sea” restructured and expanded the strategic concepts of “…From the 
Sea”. It postulated power projection from sea on land, sea control, maritime supremacy, stra-
tegic sealift, and strategic deterrence as key enduring naval roles. That echoed the mission 
sets that Admiral Stansfield Turner postulated in the 1970s (and that John Lehman and others 
in the 1980s reiterated). “Forward…From the Sea” then added another enduring and funda-
mental function: naval presence. This notion of being-on-scene globally complemented the 
emphasis on regional threats. Its organizing construct, in a clear nod to “The Maritime Strate-
gy” absent in most other post-Cold War Navy capstone documents, emphasized the continu-
um nature of forward operations. These ranged from peacetime presence to crisis response to 
regional conflict (with a merely academic distinction between the phases, not necessarily an 
operational or even strategic one). Forward-deployed (permanent or rotating) naval forces 
were hailed as a well-suited instrument of U.S. foreign policy to buttress American grand and 
military strategy. 
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 The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) signaled another demand of a new way of thinking for the Navy 
and the other services. The mutual relationship between technology in military affairs and the means to apply it 
for warfare – or in other words, compelling doctrine – has been subject to increasing interest in the literature. 
Innovation in peacetime offers unique challenges and opportunities for military breakthroughs that are likely to 
take some time (Rosen 1994). Historically, navies have often been less enthusiastic about adopting paradigm 
shifts in military technology that changed doctrine and organization of land warfare. This is rooted in their 
unique strategic culture and the established missions that were long considered unchanged and uninhibited by the 
latest fashion of armies (and later air forces). An exception to that observation is the advent of nuclear propulsion 
and the nuclear bomb, which from the 1940s for the first time gave the Navy the ability to strike the adversary’s 
center of gravity and thus decide global war (Tritten 1995: 130). Parsed to enhance military effectiveness, the 
RMA was about embracing technologies of the information age and implanting them into the heart of joint doc-
trine. In other words, advanced technology was supposed to shape doctrine. The RMA’s objective was to allow a 
smaller, but highly effective high-tech military to enable swift and decisive victory on the battlefield with com-
paratively few casualties. In general, the U.S. military in the 1990s experienced a bent towards reductionist war-
fare theories, jointness, and RMA. These big ideas drove defense thinking in the 1990s (Sloan 2002, Fitschen 
2007). Inevitably, their advancement soon became an end in itself (Haynes 2013: 151-152). 
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Recognizing this relationship, which had been implied by the Clinton administration, was a 
central enabler for the Navy’s narrative to unfold. “Forward…From the Sea” also embraced 
jointness and combined operations.
305
 The political objective was an emphasis on conflict 
prevention rather than on contingency fighting, which the Navy said it would certainly also 
do. These presence requirements would have consequences for Navy force structure that 
needed to be addressed. It was simply not enough to rely on stand-off strike capabilities such 
as the Tomahawk missile alone. Instead, by implication the Navy wanted and needed a bal-
anced fleet that featured both (and more of), high-end and low-end capabilities. Such a force 
mix could in turn only by exploited if the Navy actually was forward-deployed. Presence ful-
filled the regional commanders’ requirements and provided a reason for the large fleet (due to 
the dynamics involved, it usually takes three vessels to keep one forward-stationed or forward 
deployed). The service realized that there was an opportunity in the Bottom-Up Review that 
needed to be transformed into a development that benefited the Navy. Nevertheless, “For-
ward… From the Sea” differed from “From the Sea” in several respects. It had a global per-
spective, not a regional, littoral, tactical, or overly expeditionary focus like its predecessor 
(Department of the Navy 1994). Terms such as “broad oceans”, “transoceanic”, and “high-
ways of the seas” conveyed a global perspective that had been absent in “…From the Sea” 
(Haynes 2013: 140).  
Unfortunately for the Navy, what began as an attempt to flesh out some concepts and improve 
“…From the Sea”, had a contrary effect. “Forward… From the Sea” clouded many of the 
achievements that “…From the Sea” already had provided. As Captain (ret.) Joe Bouchard 
recalls,  
“‘…From the Sea’ was a very important document. They got it right. It really had sig-
nificant impact on the Navy. Significant change in direction. ‘Forward… From the 
Sea’ was a waste of time – there was nothing new in it. And in fact, it was regressive. 
It eliminated some of the bold thought that ‘…From the Sea’ showed and tried to do 
more to preserve the Navy’s classic way of operating – in that sense, it went back-
ward.” (Interview 2012, 00:59:30 – 01:00:30)  
At the same time, the Navy opened itself up to criticism from Congress and its sister services. 
In particular, ‘presence’ was attacked. Its diplomatic and military effects were hard to quanti-
fy, and naval forces, so the critics argued, were designed, sized, and budgeted for war-fighting 
requirements, not peacetime engagement. It looked too much like the Navy’s Cold War way 
of doing business with others. Some cautioned that the Navy would be first in line for force-
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 A combined operation is an operation conducted by forces of two or more allied nations acting together for a 
single mission (Oxford 2002: 91). 
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level cuts if politics mandated a scaling-back of presence missions, whereas others noted re-
gional challengers fielding anti-access and area-denial capabilities (such as sewing mines and 
maintaining capable diesel-electric submarines) could very well inhibit forward U.S. Navy 
presence. The Navy’s label “combat-credible forward presence” challenged some strategic 
convictions of the other military services. The Air Force considered its firepower more robust 
than that of the Navy. The Army hailed boots on the ground as the probable tool of influence. 
The Marine Corps could easily misinterpret the strong Navy role in the “Forward…From the 
Sea” capstone document as a step back from “…From the Sea,” although former deliberately 
stressed its connection to the latter. This infighting underscored that the military services bat-
tled continuously for resources and national attention. In addition, the warfare unions them-
selves were individually attempting to reverse the downsizing since the end of the Cold War, 
with the submariners arguing for more boats, the naval aviators for air wings for 15 carriers, 
and the surface warfare community producing a landing zone of 360-380 surface combatants 
(cruisers, destroyers, and frigates). This beauty contest hardly served the overall goal of the 
Navy as a whole to do better in the budgetary processes. Consequently, the impact of such 
wish lists remained minimal at best. 
9.4.5 Navy Operational Concept (1997) 
a) Evolution 
The Navy Operational Concept (Chief of Naval Information 1997, reprinted in Hattendorf 
2006: 159-170) was published as a consequence of the Navy and the Marine Corps’ inability 
to overcome their operational differences. These substantial frictions (rooted in the Corps’ 
strategic culture and its perception of “Forward… From the Sea”) came to a head in the mid-
1990s when a new concept (intended to operationalize “Forward…From the Sea”) was devel-
oped. The first such attempts in 1995/1996 proposed a Navy-Marine Corps Naval Operations 
Concept (naval = Navy and Marine Corps). It was intended to serve as a connector between 
the “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the Sea” capstone documents, providing method-
ology and a modus operandi that the NDP series fed into. Ferocious struggles between com-
peting commands and individuals led the Navy, which sought to emphasis its blue-water, 
high-seas capabilities much to the Corps’ disdain, to the abortion of this common plan in the 
course of 1996. In parallel, the CNO Executive Panel (N00K) headed by Captain Ed Smith 
drafted another white paper with the name “2020 Vision”, a companion piece for a “Navy 
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Long Range Planning Objectives” memorandum that was due to be signed later in 1996 
(Haynes 2013: 162-166).
306
  
When Admiral Jeremy Boorda took his own life in May 1996 amidst public allegations over 
his display of two Vietnam War service medals, these efforts were came to a halt.  
Admiral Jay Johnson, Boorda’s successor as CNO, struck a markedly calmer note during his 
tenure. He discarded his predecessor’s two draft strategic planning documents.307 His unen-
thusiastic indifference to the arsenal ship scuttled that particular idea as well. Johnson, “who 
was not a visionary or an innovator” (ibid. 177), instructed N513 (OPNAV’s Strategy and 
Concepts branch) under Commander Joe Bouchard to start over and draft a Navy-only opera-
tional concept. It was designed to provide guidance for programmers in OPNAV’s N8 branch, 
support training, and help with tactics, techniques, and procedures. Working together with 
Vice Admiral Art Cebrowski of the Space, Information Warfare, and Command and Control 
(N6) branch, the term ‘network-centric warfare’ was introduced into the discourse. A single-
service Navy (not naval) Operational Concept was the result. It was not intended as a re-
placement for “Forward…From the Sea”, but rather as a complementary document. It was 
rolled out in January 1997, signed by Admiral Johnson, and distributed via e-mail, the inter-
net, and later in Sea Power, the professional magazine of the Navy League (a civilian, non-
profit military organization). Reflecting the general sentiment toward and the particular style 
of the document, its lead author concedes that, “It was less ambitious, but it worked” in 
providing a conceptual, programmatic underpinning for the Navy’s range of activities (Bou-
chard interview 2012, 01:13:40 – 01:13:45).  
b) Strategic Concept 
The Navy Operational Concept recognized that “…From the Sea” and “Forward…From the 
Sea” continued to drive the U.S. Navy’s destiny. In limiting its own level of ambition (and 
scope), the document merely pointed out that naval force could have a decisive role in small-
scale contingencies and could be integral to bigger joint campaigns. In addition, the concept 
underscored that the Navy also saw a role in post-conflict situations as well, e.g., to secure 
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 “2020 Vision” translated Admiral Boorda’s idea of an arsenal ship (yet to be designed and developed) into 
practice. The arsenal ship would have provided a massive barrage of sea-launched precision strikes against ene-
my command and control infrastructure and other targets. With it, the Navy would have again emphasized a shift 
in its focus from the littoral to a more regionally dispersed, blue-water approach (see Scott 1996, Federation of 
American Scientists 1999).  
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 According to Scott Truver, the “2020 Vision” did make its way on Johnson’s desk eventually – through a 
backdoor. The draft was reworked slightly and incorporated into the annual Navy program guide “Vision, Pres-
ence, Power” (formerly “Force 2001”) as the chapter on strategy and policy: “In effect, Johnson signed out 
Boorda’s ‘Vision 2020’ [sic] and didn’t know it.” (Truver interview 2012, 01:00:55 – 01:02:30)  
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withdrawal of troops or to control sanctions regimes. The Navy Operational Concept present-
ed two interconnected ideas. Naval operational maneuver (an idea lobbied by Captain Bou-
chard) and speed of command (Vice Admiral Cebrowski’s brainchild). Both were to invigor-
ate network-centric warfare (a doctrine that translates information advantage provided by su-
perior technology into an operational advantage on the battlefield). This required investments 
in advanced weapons, sensors, and platforms, and a naval force large enough and equipped to 
cater to the demands on the whole six-phase spectrum of conflict. The paper was notably si-
lent of naval missions. As an operational document, it deliberately shied away from even dis-
cussion the larger strategic effects of naval force.  
9.4.6 Anytime, Anywhere (1997) 
a) Evolution 
Just six months after the doctrinal publication, 1997 saw the second of three capstone docu-
ments produced under CNO Johnson. But in the meantime, two key policy documents had 
been interposed. The first congressionally-mandated QDR and an updated NMS were released 
in May of that year. On “Anytime, Anywhere”, which appeared in the November issue of 
Proceedings magazine (Johnson 1997, reprinted in Hattendorf 2006: 171-176), the CNO Ex-
ecutive Panel staff (N00K) (specifically Captain Ed Smith and Captain Robby Harris) took 
the helm in drafting the document. The ad-hoc working group undertook an effort to move the 
Navy’s focus away from over-emphasizing presence, and therefore stressed kinetic and war-
fighting measures. This was especially crucial against the backdrop of the QDR’s stated goal 
of a U.S. Navy force-level goal of between 305 and 310 ships. With ever-declining budgets 
and single-digit procurement rates for new Navy ships per year, the service needed to under-
line its capabilities on the higher end of the conflict spectrum in order to rationalize itself to 
Congress and the American people. However, the short four-page statement did not gain 
much traction, mostly because it did not align itself very well with a national defense policy 
that increasingly emphasized non-military approaches. The self-proclaimed decisive role for 
U.S. naval forces in conflict was not validated in later campaigns such as the Kosovo War 
(1999). In essence, its “catchy title had more influence than [its] content” (Swartz 2012a: 131, 
slide 262).  
b) Strategic Concept 
“Anytime, Anywhere” showed remarkable continuity with its predecessors “…From the Sea”, 
“Forward…From the Sea”, and the “Navy Operations Concept”. “Anytime, Anywhere” fo-
cused on deterring conflict and shaping the conflict environment. It attempted to bolster the 
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Navy’s role with a focus on more sizeable missions. Instead of concentrating too heavily on 
presence, the paper emphasized power projection, sea control, and war-fighting as the ser-
vice’s chief strategic and contributions to political ends. These were traditional Navy mis-
sions, principally again echoing Admiral Turner’s position. Littoral warfare, deterrence, the 
enabling capability of naval forces, sealift, and the Marine Corps were only mentioned in 
passing.  
This reflected the drifting apart of the Marine Corps’ and the Navy’s strategic approaches and 
operational realities. The Marine Corps was increasingly busy in the 1990s (three times the 
number of deployments than in the Cold War), with a range of messy operations across the 
low- and mid-intensity spectrum of conflict. Concurrently, the Marine Corps developed what 
became known as the “three-block war” description for the demands of modern conflict. In 
military operations other than war (MOOTW), the modern soldier needed to be trained and 
equipped to sequentially and even simultaneously conduct war-fighting, peacekeeping, and 
humanitarian operations, all within the range of three city blocks. This recognition was not 
simply a metaphor; it reflected the Marine Corps’ operational experiences of the previous 
decade. The Marines embraced these new challenges and the realities of the 1990s settled in 
the minds of the USMC planners.
308
 At the same time, the Navy – with “Anytime, Anywhere” 
– conceptually went back to the 1970s. While this was a markedly different approach in com-
parison to the Marines, the Navy also positioned itself against the Air Force and the redeem-
ing promises of the Revolution in Military Affairs (Haynes 2013: 188).  
9.4.7 Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (1999/2000)  
a) Evolution 
The final set of documents for Admiral Johnson’s tenure as CNO, and the last for the remain-
der of the decade, came out in 1999 and 2000. The Navy Strategic Planning Guidance 
(NSPG) documents were a set of two rather voluminous publications (the 1999 document had 
55 pages, the 2000 one had 90).
309
 Both papers were drafted in OPNAV N51 under Rear Ad-
miral Joseph Sestak, who had already been deeply involved in “Forward…From the Sea”. He 
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 General (USMC) Charles Krulak, Commandant of the Marine Corps from 1995 to 1999, introduced the 
“Three Block War” concept in an essay for the January 1999 issue of Marines Magazine. In conjunction with 
describing the realities which Marines faced, Krulak argued that leadership had to be organized lower and lower 
in the chain of command in order to better reflect the demands of a complex operational environment. Ultimate-
ly, the responsibility would land on the corporal, the lowest-ranking non-commissioned officer, whose leader-
ship decisions would bestow upon him a strategic function, thus creating the notion of the “Strategic Corporal” 
(Krulak 1999).  
309
 The NSPG 1999 was classified due to its substantial intelligence section, making it the only secret Navy de-
claratory capstone document of the decade. The NSPG 2000 (Chief of Naval Information 2000, reprinted in 
Hattendorf 2006: 177-266) was unclassified to facilitate a broader discussion at home and abroad.  
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and his staff utilized several earlier, aborted naval strategy drafts circulating in OPNAV. The 
NSPG represented the attempt for a continuous, cyclical update that was attuned to geostrate-
gic and world environment changes, joint planning, and the QDR (the next of which was 
scheduled for 2001). In addition, it was intended as a link to the Planning, Programming, and 
Budgeting System (PPBS). As such, it would provide a long-term and truly strategic planning 
basis instead of one that simply looked to fulfill CINC demands. The 2000 version discussed 
the incipient process of globalization and the ascent of regional challengers to U.S. security 
and maritime access to key regions of the world. In keeping with the Manthorpe curve, it did 
not foresee that a peer competitor would arise until 2020. Until then, the fleet was to hedge 
against land-based rogue actors and their militaries. The NSPG 2000 underlined the Navy’s 
purpose to be maritime power projection. It proceeded to explain a means-ways-ends causali-
ty for the use of naval force. Significantly, it also proposed an innovative institutional process 
addressing long-term strategic planning objectives, thus making true strategic planning wor-
thy of its name and a customary habit. The new format and the new vocabulary ceased to exist 
after the second go-around, although it was planned to be published annually. It was another 
failure to institutionalize a format, and the long document lacked traction with the Secretary 
of the Navy. Additionally, key figures in OPNAV and the CNO would soon move on from 
their respective postings. Admiral Vern Clark, a surface warfare officer, became the new 
CNO in July 2000 and immediately introduced new priorities. That year, a Presidential elec-
tion year, it was particularly uncertain what the next four years would look like.  
b) Strategic Concept 
The “Navy Strategic Planning Guidance” documents were framed by Clinton National Securi-
ty doctrine regarding selective U.S. military engagement (The White House 1999) and the 
anticipation of a new administration after the upcoming November 2000 general election. In 
addition, the NSPG was published in the middle of the four-year cycle of the Quadrennial 
Defense Reviews. The QDR 1997 experiences were absorbed and the QDR 2001 was loom-
ing ahead. These factors explain why the capstone documents were largely directed at an in-
ternal audience and intended to convey that the Navy understood its place in time. At the 
same time, the (unclassified versions of the) NSPG 1999/2000 spent considerable time on 
developing a new organizational framework for the core-strategic causal relationship among 
ways, means, and ends. Maritime power projection became the overarching strategic impera-
tive of naval forces. The naval means were forward presence and knowledge superiority. The 
ways were control of the battlespace (a newly introduced term), battlespace attack, and 
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battlespace sustainment. The four ends were: regional stability, deterrence, timely crisis re-
sponse, and war fighting and winning (Swartz 2012a: 145, slide 290).  
The documents provided a wealth of ideas that tied together established and novel missions 
(including homeland defense, information operations, maritime interception operations, coun-
ter-terrorism and counter-drug tasks, and humanitarian operations), identified rogue states and 
non-state actors as threats, made specific reference to the (rapidly evolving) process of global-
ization, emphasized the need for cooperation with other government and non-governmental 
security actors, and framed the Navy as an enabling force that focused on the littorals and 
beyond (ibid: 144-146, slides 287-292). The price for such an ambitious and comprehensive 
strategic document was its voluminous size which rendered it useless in the minds of many 
decision-makers. Another challenge lay in identifying the NSPG’s priorities. What were they, 
amidst the host of lists? The critics further asserted that the NSPG merely introduced yet an-
other short-lived vocabulary into the debate. The NSPG also was never institutionalized and 
with the impending arrival of a new CNO, little momentum was generated. The established 
force structure left little room to accommodate the aspirations implicated in the NSPG’s wide-
ranging claims. Its shortcomings were emblematic of many 1990s Navy capstone documents 
in its limited sustainability and its sense of disorientation.  
For an overview of the sea-strategic missions – or core capabilities – that these documents 
declared, the following table is provided. It lists the strategies and, where applicable, the mis-
sions they (in their own words) foresaw for employment of U.S. sea power to attain strategic 
ends.  
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Name Year Missions Identified  
The Way Ahead 1991  
The Navy Policy Book 1992 20 characteristics of naval operations 
including sea control, projection of 
power, naval presence, strategic deter-
rence (“classic 4” from ADM Turner 
1974) 
… From the Sea 1992 6 capabilities (“classic 4”, crises, sealift) 
Naval Warfare (NDP1) 1994 10 characteristics of “what we do”, in-
cluding “classic 4”  
Forward… From the Sea 1994 5 fundamental and enduring roles 
(“classic 4” and sealift)  
Navy Operational Concept 1997  
Anytime, Anywhere 1997 4 broad missions (“classic 4” expanded): 
sea and area control, power projection, 
presence, deterrence (sea control as the 
prerequisite)  
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance 1999/2000 10-part multilevel model, including 
“classic 4” missions 
Illustration 28: 1990s Capstone Documents and Navy Sea-Strategic Concepts (based on Forster 2013: 21). 
For comparison: “The Maritime Strategy” envisioned only three primary missions. These 
were sea control, power projection, and sealift (two of which were among Turner’s ‘classic 
4’).  
On balance, the process of writing strategy between 1989 and 2001 was not nearly as organic 
as the one in the previous decade. The evolution of U.S. Navy capstone documents in the 
1990s resembled a number of persistent trial-and-error processes. There was a sense of conti-
nuity despite changing geostrategic circumstances, alternating presidential administrations 
and leadership styles, rapid technological advancements, and shifting budgetary priorities. 
The strategic-planning efforts were complicated by inner-Navy rifts, inter-service rivalries, 
public backlash at Navy scandals, and a shrinking force. Individuals and organizations 
worked together or separately to create ever-new documents and ideas. To policy-makers, 
these lacked the coherence and thrust that is crucial for political deliberations in Washington. 
The Navy worked increasingly hard to shed its Cold War thinking and posture, but had diffi-
culties in keeping up with the pace of the Air Force and the Army. Both of these services 
were fortunate in displaying their capabilities and how they made a strategic difference during 
a number of crises of the 1990s, something that the Navy could not realistically claim.  
  
219 
9.5 Force Structure 
The U.S. Navy came out of the Cold War with a large fleet of almost 600 ships and a global 
strategy that rested on the division of the world into distinct areas of responsibility along the 
lines of the world oceans. In the 1990s, jointness, integration, and new command structures 
increasingly subordinated Navy prerogatives.
310
 The Base Force proposal of 1990 curbed any 
expectations that the high count in ship numbers would be politically viable in the aftermath 
of the Soviet Union’s break-up. The Navy, as much as the other branches of the military, 
would have to cut back. For the Navy, it meant reducing the fleet from 540 to 451 ships, 
which was the size of the fleet in 1977, and the number of carriers from 15 to 12 (Haynes 
2013: 50). The floor number of the desired force was eventually reduced even further to 416 
ships. The Base Force study calculated a basic need for 55-80 SSN, 12 aircraft carriers (con-
ventional/nuclear powered), about 150 surface combatants, and 51 amphibious ships (Swartz 
2012b: 37, slide 73). CNO Trost continued to advocate a large high-end fleet, stating that, 
“Survival […] requires advanced electronics and weapon systems and does not allow 
the luxury of ‘low-mix’ platforms. The ‘hi-tech,’ advanced military capability of the 
world’s nations is underscored by the British experience in the South Atlantic [Falk-
lands War, in particular Royal Navy losses to Exocet missiles, S.B.] and our own in 
the Persian Gulf [the Exocet missile attack on Stark, S.B.].” (Trost 1990: 94) 
To the Navy, the Cold War tactic of relying on the self-fulfilling prophecies of advanced 
technology and associated concepts was the most promising route in the budgetary process 
(Haynes 2013: 11). The Navy’s capstone document “…From the Sea” (1992) rested signifi-
cantly on this predisposition (although the feeling was that this document did not fully justify 
the force that the Navy really wanted). The Bottom-Up Review (1993) was the first to state 
the obvious, namely, the disappearance of the Soviet Union as a threat. More important (and 
unlike the Base Force study), the Bottom-Up Review promised unequal cuts among the ser-
vices in the wake of projected defense budget savings, inflation-adjusted, of up to 40%. The 
Bottom-Up Review slashed the military by a third (the Base Force had cut only a quarter) and 
especially dug into funds and materiel for expeditionary operations at a time when the mili-
tary’s overseas missions skyrocketed. The Navy was disproportionally carrying that burden.  
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 At the same time, the fragmentation of the world ocean as distinctive theater(s) of war, especially the Atlantic 
Ocean, continued. Oceans were no longer seen as Navy theaters, but considered parts of functional and geo-
graphical commands. The world ocean was now divided among five different regional, multi-environment thea-
ter combatant commanders; the Atlantic and Indian Oceans were divided among three regional commanders; the 
Pacific and Arctic Ocean were still shared by two regional commanders (Swartz 2012b: 31, slides 61-62). In 
addition, the U.S. Strategic Command, established in 1992, obtained operational command of the Navy’s ballis-
tic-missile submarines.  
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The tally of the BUR – the self-acclaimed “comprehensive review of the nation’s defense 
strategy, force structure, modernization, infrastructure, and foundations” (Aspin 1993: iii) – 
recommended 346 ships, among which were just 45-55 SSN, 11 carriers (plus 1 in reserve), 
~124 surface combatants, and 36 amphibious vessels (a disappointing low total in the eyes of 
many naval strategists). The 1997 QDR, the third major force structure review, had implicitly 
accepted that downsizing. The Navy provided a rationale for 50-55 SSN, 11 carriers (plus 1 in 
reserve), 116 surface combatants, and 36 amphibious vessels.
311
 The Navy’s force-level goal 
eventually tallied at 305, later adjusted to 310, ships (merely half the number of ships that 
Secretary Lehman and others had lobbied for just over a decade before).  
Throughout the 1990s, the size of the Navy was driven by the requirement of meeting rota-
tional needs of a 2.5 carrier presence globally – one in the Persian Gulf, one in the Western 
Pacific, and a half (that is, half a year in aggregate) in the Mediterranean, which signaled the 
changed geostrategic focus of the Navy that emerged over the post-Cold War era.
312
 The 
Mediterranean, absent a Soviet squadron (or any other challenger of its kind) to stir up the 
that body of water, rapidly lost geopolitical relevance to most strategic planners (even if the 
Balkan wars of the 1990s showed the utility of having strong naval forces and at least one 
aircraft carrier in the region to conduct crisis response). The regional war prism (North Korea, 
Iraq) was the prevalent metric and mandated a stronger, consistent, carrier-augmented pres-
ence in the Persian Gulf and the West Pacific.
313
 Traditionally thinking more globally than 
many civilian geostrategists, the Navy began to emphasize the Pacific and the Indian Ocean 
long before the term “Pivot to Asia” or the notion of a ‘rebalancing to Asia’ even entered pub-
lic discourse. At the same time, the focus on military operations other than war (MOOTW) 
intensified.
314
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 A 2000 Department of the Navy Shipbuilding Report slightly upped those numbers, partially in preparation 
for the next QDR due in 2001, to 50-66 SSN, 11-15 active carriers (nuclear/conventional), 116-133 surface com-
batants, and 36-42 amphibious ships (Swartz 2012b: 37, slide 73).  
312
 For a forward-deployed, rotational force such as the U.S. Navy, for any ship that is on station, two more need 
to be available. A second unit returns from a deployment and is being refurbished, while a third unit parallel 
prepares for a deployment or undergoes major maintenance.  
313
 Such transitions hardly went smooth. For instance, the U.S. Navy had to bear its share of BRAC closures, as 
described above. The withdrawal from Subic Bay (Philippines) in 1992, the largest U.S. naval base in Asia, 
meant a shift of 7
th
 Fleet activities to Guam (U.S. territory) and Japan. On the far side of the Indian Ocean, in 
Bahrain, base expansion and modernization to welcome the newly-established 5
th
 Fleet ensued.  
314
 Evidently unmindful of Samuel Huntington’s warning (1954) that “A military service may at times, of course, 
perform functions unrelated to external security, such as internal policing, disaster relief, and citizenship train-
ing. These are, however, subordinate and collateral responsibilities. A military service does not exist to perform 
these functions; rather it performs these functions because it has already been called into existence to meet some 
threat to the national security.”  
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The following graph shows the various U.S. Navy force-level goals and the actual numbers. 
Again, the CRS and the NHHC use slightly different metrics to arrive at their fleet tally.  
 
Illustration 29: USN 1990s ship levels (Swartz 2012b: 35-37, slides 70-73). The Base Force and the QDR did not 
postulate a single number as a force goal but rather opted for a ‘landing zone’ quantity.  
The graph illustrates that force level goals, with the exception of the last couple of years in the 
decade, were progressively lower than the actual Navy inventory. In other words, the Navy 
had more ships than the political planners granted it. The following table breaks down the 
total numbers of the inventory.  
Date 9/90 9/91 9/92 9/93 9/94 9/95 9/96 9/97 9/98 9/99 9/00 
Battleships 4 1 - - - - - - - - - 
Carriers 13 15 14 13 12 12 12 12 12 12 12 
Cruisers 43 47 49 52 35 32 31 30 29 27 27 
Destroyers 57 47 40 37 41 47 51 56 50 52 54 
Frigates 99 93 67 59 51 49 43 42 38 37 35 
Submarines 93 87 85 88 88 83 79 73 65 57 56 
SSBNs 33 34 30 22 18 16 17 18 18 18 18 
Command Ships 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 - 
Mine Warfare 22 22 16 15 16 18 18 18 18 18 18 
Patrol 6 6 6 2 7 12 13 13 13 13 - 
Amphibious 59 61 58 52 38 39 40 41 40 41 41 
Auxiliary 137 112 102 110 94 80 67 52 57 57 57 
Surface Total 203 188 156 148 127 128 123 122 109 106 128 
Total Active 570 529 471 454 404 392 375 359 344 337 318 
Illustration 30: U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1990-2000 (Navy History and Heritage Command 2011). 
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Two distinct challenges arose for the Navy. First, it needed to balance high-end capabilities 
with the demand for low-intensity conflict prevention. Conceptually, the Navy moved faster 
into the littorals than it could field corresponding technology. Second, the Navy did not give 
up on the blue-water focus. Therefore, it needed to modernize its assets accordingly, also pre-
senting an old-vs.-new dichotomy. Against the background of the RMA and shrinking, ever-
finite military budgets, this spelled hard choices for the Navy.  
The cost-and-manpower-intensive battleships of the Iowa-class were retired, but only some of 
their capabilities would be replaced by modern ships. Battle at sea, after all, was highly un-
likely and the concept of a battleship was seen as anachronistic.
315
 With the behemoths of 
World War II also went all ships whose major task in Cold War days was fleet air defense 
(Terzibaschitsch 2002: 33). On occasion, this included relatively new ships that still had some 
time to serve the Navy. All nine nuclear-powered cruisers (CGN) and the Leahy- and Belk-
nap-classes were decommissioned; the Ticonderoga-class remained as the only cruiser type in 
service and as an indispensable asset to the fleet. Consequently, 22 of the 27 ships were se-
lected for a comprehensive weapons-systems upgrade and modernization in 1999. Another 
Aegis-capable addition to the fleet in the 1990s was the 9,000-ton guided missile destroyer of 
the Arleigh-Burke-class (DDG 51 etc.), today’s backbone of the U.S. Navy surface fleet (and 
the numerically strongest class of destroyers in any navy worldwide). The lead ship joined the 
Navy in 1991. These destroyers, much like the larger cruisers, were equipped with VLS 
launch tubes to carry cruise missiles. The most dramatic shift occurred in the mission area of 
ASW operations and programs.
316
 A wide-ranging dismantling of Cold War ASW capabilities 
stripped the Navy of whole classes of ships. For example, all 46 Knox-class frigates were de-
commissioned. The Kidd-class destroyers and ocean surveillance ships of the T-AGOS-type 
were eased out, and the SOSUS array was shut down. The numbers of attack submarines, 
Perry-class frigates, maritime patrol aircraft, carrier-based ASW planes (i.e. S-3 Viking) and 
helicopters (i.e. SH-3 Sea King) were cut back considerably (Swartz 2012b: 41, slide 81). The 
decade was also characterized by transformative technology. Ballistic missile defense (BMD) 
research, development, and testing began in earnest. Widespread use of personal computers, 
cell phones, and networks dramatically changed the way the Navy did business. In terms of 
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 The Marines, however, criticized the capability gap that now occurred in naval gun-fire support (NGFS). 
Shelling of shore targets became an issue that the cruisers and destroyers could only marginally deliver. With the 
addition of the new DDG-1000 into the fleet from 2014, this shortcoming is hoped to be offset, although only 
three units of the futuristic vessel will be built. Closing the NGFS capability gap will likely continue to be a 
central objective for future naval planning. 
316
 The U.S. Coast Guard had an important role in Cold War ASW. Absent an enemy submarine threat, it lost its 
ASW missions and equipment.  
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tactics, visit/board/search/seizure (VBSS) capabilities were increasingly developed and tested 
for maritime security operations. Capable software supported the development and use of pre-
cision guided munitions, a revolutionary aspect first demonstrated to a broader audience dur-
ing the Gulf War. The Tomahawk cruise missile was the premier standoff weapon against 
long-, mid-range and tactical targets. Software also empowered the networking of ships, sen-
sors, and systems that was previously unseen and unheard of.  
In the 1990s, the Navy’s undersea roster included the last boats of the Ohio-class. At the same 
time, the four oldest SSBN (SSBN 726 through SSBN 729: Ohio, Michigan, Georgia, and 
Florida) underwent a conversion to guided-missile submarines, retaining their pennant num-
bers (SSGN).
317
 After the costly procurement of the Seawolf-class submarines (SSN 21 
through SSN 23) – a product of the Cold War that was ultimately cut to only three units – the 
Virginia-class nuclear-powered fast attack submarines (SSN 774, etc.) entered service. They 
were a cheaper and timelier alternative to the Seawolf.
318
 They followed (and ultimately will 
replace) the Los-Angeles-class fast attack submarines that were procured until the mid-1990s.  
In the surface fleet, the Whidbey-Island-/Harpers-Ferry-class dock landing ships (LSD 
41/LSD 49) helped sustain the vertical and horizontal insertion capabilities of the Marine 
Corps, providing well decks and deck space for the new tilt-rotor V-22 Osprey aircraft that 
appeared towards the end of the decade.
319
 Much larger than the LSD (and designed to replace 
the older tank- and dock-landing vessels of the Newport-, Austin-, and Anchorage-classes) 
was the new San-Antonio-class amphibious transport dock. The first four vessels of that 
24,900-ton type were procured in FY 1996, 1999, and 2000 (2) respectively.
320
 Dry cargo 
ships of the Lewis-and-Clarke-class (T-AKE 1 through T-AKE 14) were also procured, 
providing one platform for transport and supply of ammunition and combat stores previously 
divided on separate classes of auxiliary ships.  
Rapid technological innovation, the sweeping transformation of the military, and the con-
trasting ideas for the size and design of the 21
st
 century fleet spurred the growth of debate 
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 For more on this conversion, see O’Rourke (2008). 
318
 For more information on the Virginia-class attack submarines, see O’Rourke (2014a).  
319
 With its innovative and technologically complex design, the aircraft combines the functionality and V/STOL 
capability of a helicopter with the long range of a conventional turboprop airplane. Its tilt rotors allow a combi-
nation of both functions. The V-22 underwent an extended testing and training phase. To date, only the U.S. Air 
Force and the U.S. Marine Corps operate this model. The USMC makes heavy use of the multi-mission airframe. 
It will eventually replace the Corps’ CH-46 Sea Knight twin-rotor helicopter. The Navy has not yet ordered V-22 
aircraft although the service is looking for future replacement for its C-2 Greyhound carrier onboard delivery 
(COD) aircraft. Future Navy missions for an organic V-22 could also include SAR, ASW, and transport.  
320
 For more information on the program, see O’Rourke (2011).  
  
224 
about future platforms. The 1990s witnessed some ambitious design and procurement plans 
for a new generation of warships. A new class of command ships, the JCC(X), was studied, 
but never built. The Surface Combatant for the Twenty-First Century (SC-21) program pro-
posed three main ship types designed for naval gunfire support. This fell in line with the Na-
vy’s strategic and operational power projection into the littorals. The SC-21 study envisaged a 
future destroyer-like combatant for power projection ashore, a cruiser-like warship for ballis-
tic missile defense and carrier battle group operations, and an arsenal ship. The latter, a com-
pletely new type of warship, was proposed to be much more cost-effective than the high-
maintenance battleships of the past. This combatant would have up to 500 VLS tubes for 
cruise missiles, ride low in the water, and have a drastically reduced crew. Deploying such a 
ship to a crisis area would, in the mind of the new platform’s supporters, signal U.S. resolve 
without endangering too many American lives (Federation of American Scientists 1999). 
With cost overruns and conflicting ideas about the future force, all but one of the concepts 
was abandoned by the early 2000s. The DDG-1000, the single surviving concept, will remain 
a sliver class. The more feasible replacement of such drastic and perhaps all-too-innovative 
ideas came in the form of the SSGNs conversions and, more importantly, new flights of 
Arleigh-Burke-class destroyers.  
Naval aviation was undergoing modernization as well. The new A-12 Avenger II carrier-
based stealth aircraft was cancelled amidst dramatic cost overruns in 1991. Instead, the Navy 
picked the F/A-18 E/F Super Hornet to replace the A-6 Intruder attack plane and the F-14 
Tomcat fighter aircraft.
321
 Meanwhile, new versions of Sikorsky’s Seahawk MH-60 helicopter 
joined the fleet and replaced older models in missions such as transport, MCM, and ASuW. 
During the 1990s, the U.S. Navy’s conventional and nuclear forces declined in real numbers, 
tonnage, and construction/upkeep budgets. Smaller units were decommissioned more often 
than larger ones, yielding an imbalance in the fleet toward the capital units. It is ironic that the 
Navy, which would have been better suited for most Clinton-era policies than, e.g., the Air 
Force or the Army, was disproportionally affected by the drawdown in numbers and capabili-
ties. Still, with the fleet inventory and the investment into research of future platforms, the 
United States remained the world’s dominant naval force.  
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 With the F/A-18 E/F, the Air Force-only F-22 Raptor, and the proposed F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fight-
er, the Department of Defense had no less than six tactical aircraft in design, production, and procurement during 
the 1990s. The F-35, built in three variants for the Air Force, the Marine Corps, and the Navy, emerged from 
plans in the early 1990s to develop a joint forces airplane (Gertler 2014).  
  
225 
9.6 Strategic and Operational Implementation: Planned vs. Actual  
U.S. Navy operations throughout the 1990s continued to be shaped by the requirements of 
forward-based (U.S. Seventh Fleet) and forward-deployed naval forces (U.S. Fifth and Sixth 
fleet). Two more fleets at the U.S. East and West Coast, respectively, allowed for routine de-
ployment schedules. The Navy’s considerably high operational tempo rested on experience 
and expertise gained over the final years of the Cold War. The majority of combat operations 
were against shore targets, while warfare and, consequently, experience at sea were minimal 
(Swartz 2012b: 38, slide 76). The introduction of Tomahawk land attack cruise missiles 
(TLAM) throughout the fleet altered operations. During the Clinton years, the missile quickly 
emerged as the number-one weapon for convenient strike operations – for example, against 
Iraq, but also against Sudan and Afghanistan in response to the U.S. embassy bombings in 
Africa in 1998.
322
 The Gulf War marked the operational debut of these weapons which could 
be delivered from cruisers, destroyers, attack submarines, and even battleships (Friedman 
2006: 565-568). As it were, TLAM became a strategic weapon at the discretion of the Presi-
dent that could be used indiscriminately. It saved the president from making hard choices re-
garding the deployment of ground troops or order air force bombers. Concurrently, there were 
now more expeditionary operations that the Navy had to cater. 
9.6.1 Major U.S. Naval Operations
323
 
Between 1989 and 2001, the U.S. Navy remained active, engaged, and forward-operating. On 
balance, there are at least four major naval operations (or series thereof) that characterized the 
1990s from a U.S. Navy operational perspective with strategic ramifications. American sea 
power was directed as a natural extension of U.S. grand strategic goals and postulations – 
sometimes powerful, often hesitantly and dosed. As in the 1980s, the U.S. relied on techno-
logically advanced, forward-based or forward-deployed assets and a blue-water fleet grouped 
around the capital ships. Unlike the 1980s, the pretext for these uses of naval force was nei-
ther a bipolar conflict nor an adversary fleet. Sea control outside of the littorals was uncon-
tested, but the littoral zone mandated a conceptual and intellectual strategic shift in Navy 
thinking and operations. Consequently, the 1990s demanded a conscious appreciation of the 
fuller range of sea power measures across the whole spectrum of naval operations.  
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 TLAMs were the preferred weapon for strafing Iraq in the 1990s. Concerted cruise missiles strikes against 
Iraq were conducted in 1993, 1996, and 1998. 
323
 Major naval operations understood as the sustained commitment of forces engaged in expeditionary opera-
tions against a shore or a fleet. On the problem of definitions, see Vego (2008: 7-39). In this chapter, these are 
selected naval operations designed to illustrate the real-world operations that the U.S. Navy conducted in the 
1990s. For a chronological list of Navy-Marine Corps crisis response and combat actions in the period between 
January 1991 and 9/11, see the U.S. Navy’s 2004 Program Guide (Department of the Navy 2004: 169-173).  
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a) The Persian Gulf (1990-2000) 
The Gulf War at the transition from the Cold War to the emerging new world (dis-)order was 
one of the largest U.S. Navy operations of the post-World War II era. The Navy fielded up to 
seven aircraft carrier groups and two battleships groups. The conflict essentially consisted of 
four phases.  
 “Operation Desert Shield” featured a defensive phase of Saudi-Arabia (August 
through October 1990) and 
 Preparation for the offensive against Hussein’s troops (November through mid-
January 1991).  
 “Operation Desert Storm” was the designation for the push of Iraqi troops from Ku-
wait. It featured a four-week air campaign against Iraqi targets in Kuwait and Iraq that 
began on 17 January 1991, followed by a 100-hour ground war.  
 The aftermath of the war kept the U.S. disproportionally busy for the rest of the dec-
ade.
324
  
The Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, and the eastern Mediterranean served as staging areas for the 
naval component of the broad international military coalition that Bush Sr. and his senior ex-
perts assembled; naval supply routes were essential in ferrying supplies into the theater.
325
 
Iraq at the time fielded (at least on paper) the world’s fourth largest army and the sixth largest 
air force. Its considerably smaller navy (a coastal defense force) consisted of 165 warships 
and boats. In the course of the war, Iraq – encircled by adversaries, threatened by a land inva-
sion, and cut off from the Gulf (its only maritime supply route) – conducted increasingly des-
perate attacks against coalition military, but the Navy’s ability to control the seaways and lit-
torals to and project power ashore proved critical to the success of Desert Shield (Schneller 
2007: 20). There was a robust U.S. political and military push-back of Iraqi aggression, alt-
hough the Joint Staff initially was much more inclined to safeguard Saudi-Arabia rather than 
to fight (or plan for fighting) for Kuwaiti liberation (Rearden 2012: 509-510).  
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 For an overview over U.S. Navy engagement with Saddam Hussein’s regime post-Gulf War, see Schneller 
(2007: 31-37, 59-62). For the U.S. Navy’s role in sustained maritime interdiction operations (MIO) in the Arabi-
an Gulf region in cooperation with allied navies between 1991 and 2003, see Barlow (2013). 
325
 The logistics train that spanned from the U.S. into the Persian Gulf region carried over 2.3 million tons of 
equipment, more than 535,000 tons of supplies, and 4.3 million tons of petroleum products during the Desert 
Shield and Desert Storm phases of the conflict. The Military Sealift Command (MSC) fielded a total of 393 
cargo ships to facilitate this (Schneller 2007: 23-24).  
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Within days after the Iraqi incursion into Kuwait, two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups cen-
tered on Independence (CV 62) and Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN 69) were on station in the 
Gulf of Oman and the Red Sea, respectively. The naval armada that was assembled through 
early 1991 eventually consisted of more than 150 warships from 14 allied countries. The U.S. 
Navy contributed 108 of these vessels, including the carriers Midway (CV 41), Saratoga (CV 
60), Ranger (CV 61), America (CV 66), John F. Kennedy (CV 67), and Theodore Roosevelt 
(CVN 71).
326
 Carrier aviation accounted for almost 1/3 of anti-Iraqi coalition air forces 
(Pemsel 2006: 1287). The aircraft carrier once again underlined its operational and strategic 
utility even as the geopolitical landscape was shifting from global superpower conflict to re-
gional wars. Two battleships, 13 submarines, and a large amphibious force complemented the 
overwhelming display of American sea power.
327
 282 cruise missiles were launched through-
out the war.
328
 
The Gulf War was the first major test of integrated planning, interoperability, and procure-
ment as laid out in the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Navy’s strategic culture of independence 
from the other services was severely tested during the military campaign. The coalition air 
component commander’s Air Tasking Order (ATO), a flight operations management system 
to coordinate and integrate the air campaign, had to be flown out to the carriers every day 
instead of being transmitted electronically. The Navy simply did not field the systems to pro-
cess these orders automatically. In addition, the Navy’s commander in theater preferred to be 
on his flagship instead of being at the U.S. HQ ashore. This issue amplified the Navy’s joint 
organizational and operational problems in the modern combat environment (Schneller 2007: 
22). The swift military victory, “one of the most decisive victories in military history” (ibid: 
30), overshadowed other subsidiary Navy-related concerns that occurred, such as the missile-
boat threat
329
 and the enduring challenge of mine warfare.
330
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 The Navy used ten of the eleven available aircraft carriers either in Desert Shield or as replacements for for-
ward-deployed carriers (Love 1992: 813).  
327
 The other primary mission of U.S. naval forces in the Gulf – next to supporting the air war – was the staging 
of an amphibious invasion on Iraq’s southern flank, thus rendering a massing of Iraqi troops on the main battle 
line (Kuwait/Saudi-Arabia) impossible. The Marines were used for a deception operation in February 1991.  
328
 A comprehensive summary report of U.S. Navy in Desert Shield/Desert Storm including a chronology of 
events is the CNO’s report (Office of the Chief of Naval Operations 1991). Also see Love (1991: 808-837). 
329
 Most Iraqi missile boats were neutralized (sunk or rendered unusable) in January 1991, effectively establish-
ing uncontested U.S. sea control in the Northern Persian Gulf. Notably, the battleship Missouri (BB 63) and 
accompanying smaller units were targeted by an Iraqi land-based Silkworm missile on 25 February, in the mid-
dle of the ground campaign to expel Hussein’s forces from Kuwait. One of the missiles fell short while the other 
one was shot down by the British destroyer (HMS) Gloucester (D 96) (Schneller 2007: 30). 
330
 On 18 February 1991, within three hours and just ten nautical miles apart, the veteran amphibious assault ship 
Tripoli (LPH 10) and the two-year old AEGIS guided-missile cruiser Princeton (CG 59) struck mines while 
conducting operations in the northern Arabian Gulf. Both vessels sustained extensive damages, but no loss of life 
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Containment of Iraq remained on the forefront of U.S. strategic interests in the Persian Gulf 
region throughout the 1990s, with naval forces as a major leveraging tool toward that objec-
tive. Throughout the 1990s, U.S. military aircraft enforced a no-fly zone over parts of Iraq 
(“Operation Northern Watch”/ “Operation Southern Watch”). U.S. cruise missiles pounded 
Iraq in June 1993 and September 1996. From October to December 1994, U.S. forces were 
rushed into the Persian Gulf region to hedge against another possible Iraqi assault on Kuwait. 
In December 1998, coordinated U.S. cruise missiles and air strikes codenamed “Operation 
Desert Fox” targeted infrastructure in response to the Iraqi regime’s repeated failure to coop-
erate in the enforcement of the U.N. sanctions regime and to adhere to the no-fly zones (Min-
istry of Defence 2009: 2-7). 
b) The Adriatic Sea (1993-1996, 1999) 
In 1991, the disintegration of Yugoslavia and the ethnic conflicts that followed pitted newly 
independent states against each other in a violent civil war. The conflict, which unraveled as a 
result of the end of the Cold War and the demise of Yugoslav ruler Josip Broz Tito, required 
concerted international military engagement including naval assets. After the outbreak of hos-
tilities, NATO and West European Union (WEU) member states began to provide assets to a 
U.N. force in the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to enforce a no-fly zone over Yu-
goslavia (now only consisting of Serbia and Montenegro). When it became evident that Serbi-
an aggression against its neighboring states was not deterred and European nations by them-
selves would be unable to achieve a peaceful outcome of the conflict, a weapons embargo was 
imposed (Prince/Brett 2013: 48-49). On 15 June 1993, NATO and the WEU began a com-
bined maritime mission in the Adriatic Sea called “Operation Sharp Guard”. Its objective was 
to monitor and enforce sanctions and to provide leverage for U.N. Security Council resolu-
tions to that end. “Operation Sharp Guard” was significant in that it constituted the alliance’s 
first out-of-area mission.
331
 The mission drew forces from established multinational naval 
command structures, namely Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), Standing 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
had to be reported. Coalition forces undertook substantial mine countermeasure operations throughout the war. 
The amphibious assault ship New Orleans (LPH 11) was used as a mine-countermeasures flagship (i.e. fielding 
CH-53E Super Stallion mine-clearing helicopters), degrading the flexibility and range of the Navy’s amphibious 
component. As Brigadier General Peter Rowe, Commander, 5
th
 MEB, remarked (1992: 131), “I don’t think the 
ripple effect of removing a ship from an amphibious task force is understood well enough, where it really mat-
ters.”  
331
 It was also one of the first major out-of-area missions of the German Bundeswehr since the country was reu-
nited in 1990. For “Operation Sharp Guard”, the German Navy continuously provided maritime patrol aircraft 
and two warships (frigates of the Bremen-class and/or destroyers of the Lütjens-class) on a rotating, four-month 
base. The important verdict of the Federal Constitutional Court concerning German out-of-area military opera-
tions (12 July 1994) fell right into the on-going operation. For a concise analysis of “Operation Sharp Guard” 
from a German perspective and the implications for the German Navy’s transformation from a Cold War escort 
Navy to a 21
st
 century expeditionary navy, see Schiel (2012).  
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Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED), and the Western European Union Contin-
gency Maritime Force (WEUCONMARFOR). Airborne early warning aircraft such as NATO 
AWACS E-3A jets featuring a multinational crew patrolled the skies and provided surveil-
lance, command, control, and communication. Necessary operational arrangements were put 
into place to overcome tensions stemming from conflicting U.N. and NATO objectives for 
their respective Balkans missions. These measures also reduced the frictional loss among na-
vies due to their differing rules of engagement (ROE).  
To U.S. naval planners and operators, “Operation Sharp Guard” provided a markedly differ-
ent example of naval engagement for the 6
th
 Fleet AOR than in the years of the Cold War (cf. 
chapter 8.7.1). Over the course of the operation, the U.S. Navy dispatched guided missile 
cruisers (such as Dale [CG 19] and Monterey [CG 61]) as well as destroyers (such as Comte 
de Grasse [DD 974]), frigates (e.g. Boone [FFG 28], Nicolas [FFG 47], and Samuel B. Rob-
erts [FFG 58]),
332
 and numerous P-3C maritime patrol aircraft to the area of operations.
333
 In 
its 43 months of activity before being terminated in June 1996, “Operation Sharp Guard” and 
its preceding missions challenged 74,192 merchant vessels en route to Balkan ports and 
boarded over one-twelfth of them in search of contraband. More than 1,400 ships were divert-
ed away for further inspection and six violators of U.N. sanctions were identified. Maritime 
patrol aircraft flew over 7,000 sorties. Sharp Guard, NATO’s first combat operation, was a 
large-scale and successful effort (Papadopoulos 2013: 95).
 334
  
In parallel, NATO and the United Nations conducted “Operation Deliberate Force” between 
30 August and 20 September 1995 to guard U.N.-designated safe areas from attack by Bosni-
an Serbs. 400 NATO aircraft participated in the operation. They launched precision strikes 
against Serb-held positions and installations in Bosnia, served C4ISR needs, and provided 
aerial refueling. The naval contributions to the operation included three aircraft carriers (the 
French Foch [R 99], the Royal Navy’s Invincible [R 05], and the U.S. Navy’s America [CV 
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 This frigate stands emblematic for the enormous versatility of U.S. Navy vessels and the broad range of mis-
sions that the service undertakes. The ship, known colloquially as “Sammy B”, was (as previously described) 
subject to a mine hit on 14 April 1988, while deployed in the Persian Gulf in support of the U.S. operations in 
the “Tanker War”. The warship returned the Persian Gulf after repairs in time for participation in allied opera-
tions against Saddam Hussein as part of Operation Desert Storm (1991). Years later, it operated in the embargo 
operations in the Mediterranean described here. In 1996, the Navy’s workhorse vessel participated in joint inter-
agency task force (JIATF) drug interdiction operations in the Caribbean, the Eastern and the South Pacific with a 
number of sister ships. As of 2014, the frigate is still in active service. 
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 For a concise review of the U.S. Navy’s contribution to “Operation Sharp Guard” and the context of joint and 
combined operations, see Papadopoulos (2013). 
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 A lessons-learned report (Reddy 1997: 1) formulated with considerable foresight that, “Operation Sharp 
Guard proved that NATO and WEU can work well together, at least on joint naval operations and under NATO 
command. However, until the EU matures and can present a common front on foreign policy issues with more 
regularity, the U.S. should not expect the WEU to take on an operational task and go it alone.”  
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66]) in the Adriatic Sea and Tomahawk cruise missile launches against Serbian targets. 
NATO forces were under the command of U.S. Navy admiral Leighton Smith in his role as 
Commander, Allied Forces South. Smith subsequently commanded the NATO-led Implemen-
tation Force (IFOR) for Bosnia (Stillwell interview with Smith, 2006/2010).
335
  
U.S. and coalition forces returned to the Balkans in 1999 when the Kosovo War led NATO to 
conduct a sustained air campaign against Serbia. Here, the U.S. Navy’s contribution to “Op-
eration Allied Force” (March-June) and its follow-up peace-keeping “Operation Joint Guardi-
an”, a standalone case of air power exclusively achieving political results, included the carri-
ers Enterprise (CVN 65) and Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71) CVBGs as well as the Kearsarge 
(LHD 3) ARG. Carrier aviation provided a part of military leverage against Serbian targets in 
the 78-day-long campaign. The presence of U.S. warships after the conclusion of hostilities 
deterred Serbia from attacking Kosovo again.
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 These operations underlined that continued 
U.S. engagement in European security affairs remained imperative due to the lack of organic 
European capabilities and, perhaps more importantly, political will (Hendrickson 2006).  
c) Haiti (1994-1996)  
In America’s backyard, the early 1990s held yet another crisis for the new Clinton administra-
tion. In Haiti, a Caribbean island some 1,200 km from Florida, a coup d’état by the Haitian 
military ousted the democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide and placed a se-
ries of de-facto rulers in the leadership of the country. In 1994, the U.N. Security Council 
adopted a resolution that authorized the establishment of a multinational force (MNF). The 
United States planned for two military contingencies: a forced entry (codename “Operation 
Restore Democracy”) and a permissive entry (codename “Operation Uphold Democracy”) to 
reinstate Aristide’s presidency. The operation was designed as a comprehensive joint and 
combined operation, including at the high-point more than 20,000 service members from the 
Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, and Coast Guard (and more than 5,000 troops from 24 
U.S. allies on the line as well). The Navy’s role began in June 1993 when the international 
embargo against the regime in Port-au-Prince began to be enforced. The Navy conducted mar-
itime interception operations to put pressure on the Haitian government. In addition, the Navy 
and the Coast Guard supported the interdiction and processing of some 75,000 refugees who 
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 For an analysis of the operation, see Ripley (1999).  
336
 For a lessons-learned report, see U.S. Congress (1999), in particular testimony by Vice Admiral Daniel J. 
Murphy, Jr., Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet and Striking and Support Forces, Southern Europe; Brigadier General 
Robert M. Flanagan, Deputy Commander, II Marine Expeditionary Force; and Vice Admiral James F. Amerault, 
Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), excerpted at Naval History and Heritage Command 2004 
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had attempted to flee the conflict-torn country, often on sea-unworthy vessels.
337
 U.N. Securi-
ty Council Resolution 940 (31 July 1994) allowed member states to make use of all necessary 
means for the removal of the military government and to re-establish order and legitimate 
rule. 
On 18 September 1994, within hours of conduction a military invasion, President Clinton 
dispatched a last-minute diplomatic task force headed by former president Jimmy Carter, 
(former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) General (ret.) Colin Powell, and Senator Sam 
Nunn to Haiti. The effort was an eleventh-hour success (most of the paratrooper force was 
already airborne and en route to the drop areas when the solution came through) and the 
forced entry turned into a compliant intervention (the tight timetable has prompted some to 
describe “Operation Uphold Democracy” as an “intervasion”). A potential reprisal of the 
Mogadishu events a year before was averted and the operation took on much more of a hu-
manitarian, almost altruistic face (catering to the idealist strain of U.S. foreign-policy think-
ing). An exit plan, echoing the Weinberger and Powell doctrines discussed previously, pro-
vided a schedule for the reduction of U.S. forces and eventual transition of peacekeeping 
functions within the MNF to the United Nations. The international military coalition was able 
to ensure a peaceful restoration of Aristide’s government, restore governance and good order 
on the island, and prepare for general elections in 1996. For the U.S. military, Haiti provided 
a demonstration of a joint campaign (it still identified some problems to overcome in planning 
contingencies). The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard worked in close partner-
ship (recalling the diplomatic, military, and constabulary uses of the ‘use of the sea’ triangle). 
The maritime services’ contributions included the America (CV 66) and Dwight D. Eisen-
hower (CVN 69) carrier battle groups, the Wasp (LHD 1) amphibious ready group, 14 RRF 
vessels crewed by civilian seafarers in support of the American troops, Seabees (USN military 
construction battalion), and various Coast Guard assets. The operation underlined that multi-
mission capable naval forces could provide a range of options even in a joint, inter-agency, 
and coalition environment (Siegel 1996, Kretchik et al. 1998).  
d) Taiwan Strait (1994-1996) 
Another series of highlighted U.S. naval operations occurred in the West Pacific in 1995 and 
1996 in the context of American-Chinese confrontations over Taiwan.
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 Since the Chinese 
civil war between 1927 and 1950 and the ensuing division of the country, the Communist-
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 The main processing point ashore for refugees was the U.S. naval base at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba.  
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 This section substantially draws on Marolda’s comprehensive and lucid description of the Taiwan Strait crisis 
(2012: 113-118). 
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held mainland (the People’s Republic of China) and the democratically-ruled island (the Re-
public of China) emerged as two de-facto states that laid claim to representing the legitimate 
government of China. U.S.-Chinese relations had blossomed cautiously since the late 1970s 
when diplomatic relations between Washington and Beijing were first established. Subse-
quently, U.S. recognition of core China shifted from Taiwan to China. When the Soviet Union 
disintegrated, China did not require as close a relationship with the United States as before 
and began increasingly assertive actions against Taiwan and others. The massacre on Bei-
jing’s Tiananmen Square in June 1989, amidst the thawing Cold War in Europe, furthered the 
deterioration of Chinese standing in the region and the world.  
In the mid-1990s, Taiwan emerged as a free-market economy and a booming Asian economic 
powerhouse. A democratic leadership that openly discussed Taiwanese independence com-
peted with Beijing’s claim to reunite the nation on mainland Chinese terms. A visit by Tai-
wanese president Lee Tung-hui to the United States in May 1995 for a commencement ad-
dress at his alma mater tipped the situation over the edge. During July and August, the Chi-
nese PLAN undertook missile launches and live firings less than 130 kilometers from the 
Taiwanese mainland to inhibit Taiwan and send a strong signal to the U.S. administration that 
it disapproved of Washington’s de-facto recognition of Taiwanese independence. 
That December President Clinton ordered an aircraft carrier group led by Nimitz (CVN 68) 
through the strait separating Taiwan from China. In January 1996, the amphibious assault ship 
Belleau Wood (LHA 3) also transited the choke point. Both instances signaled to Beijing 
American intent to defend Taiwan’s right of self-determination. Dispatching Air Force or 
Army units to achieve a similar effect would have been considerably more difficult than em-
ploying the naval assets forward-deployed in the area. However, China was hardly deterred 
and commenced a major exercise the next month. Beginning in February 1996, nuclear and 
conventionally powered submarines, destroyers, frigates, patrol craft, and amphibious vessels 
from each of China’s three fleets converged on the coast of Fujian Province across from Tai-
wan. 150,000 Chinese troops were deployed along with hundreds of capable fighters, bomb-
ers, and attack planes (Marolda 2012: 115).  
In preparation for the week-long presidential campaign in March of that year, the Chinese 
military conducted concerted large-scale exercises, some of which were barely outside of 
Taiwanese territorial waters. This time, the American response was considerably stronger. 
Days after diplomats condemned Chinese coercion, the aircraft carrier Independence (CV 62), 
the guided missile cruiser Bunker Hill (CG 52), the destroyers Hewitt (DD 966) and O’Brien 
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(DD 975), and the frigate McClusky (FFG 41) had assumed station near Taiwan. A second 
carrier group – led by Nimitz and consisting of the guided missile cruiser Port Royal (CG 73), 
the destroyers Oldendorf (DD 972) and Callaghan (DD 994) as well as the frigate Ford (FFG 
54), two attack submarines (Columbus [SSN 762] and Bremerton [SSN 698]), and a couple of 
support ships – was dispatched to the region 24 hours later. Although there is no indication 
that the carriers actually transited the Taiwan Strait, the U.S. naval commitment sent a strong 
signal to China that the leadership in Beijing had failed to anticipate.  
However, cordial Chinese-American relations were soon restored, not least for economic rea-
sons. Taiwan emerged from the crisis unscathed (and has begun to consider closer ties with 
mainland China in recent years); the U.S. underlined its unambiguous commitment to Taiwan; 
and it brought closer ties between the U.S. and other Asian nations such as Singapore and 
Japan, the latter historically a competitor with China for regional influence. Forward-
deployed naval assets (including a forward-based aircraft carrier) in the 7
th
 Fleet AOR had 
sent a strong signal to the countries affected. They provided options that only sea power could 
offer.  
9.6.2 Relationships to Sister Services: Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force 
a) USMC 
With its closest sister service, the Navy continued to practice operational cooperation. This is 
remarkable given that at the strategic level, some conceptual, bureaucratic, and budgetary 
differences between the Navy and the Marine Corps hardened. In principle, the services had 
differing views of the littoral area. Whereas the Navy considered amphibious operations as 
one mission among many on or from the sea, the Marine Corps saw its dominance in the litto-
ral. To the Marines, the high seas simply functioned as a staging area for such amphibious 
operations and they wanted to shape their strategic plans accordingly (Swartz 2012b: 82-83, 
slides 164-165). This conceptual division is most visible in the USMC’s non-involvement in 
Navy capstone documents of later part of decade. Instead, the Marines produced its own 
statements of declaratory intent. Intellectually and strategically, the Marine Corps and the 
Navy parted ways for the second half of the decade as the Marines emphasized thinking about 
the littorals when the Navy oscillated between a reemphasize of traditional sea control opera-
tions thinking about the littorals (Lundesgaard 2011: 13-15).
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 The Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl Mundy Jr., co-signed “The Way Ahead”, “… From the 
Sea”, “NDP 1”, and “Forward… From the Sea”.  
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The 1990s witnessed numerous amphibious operations across the whole range of the conflict 
spectrum. These ranged from actual combat to show of force, peace operations, and humani-
tarian assistance/disaster relief in such diverse regions of the world as Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, the 
Balkans, Bangladesh, and the Caribbean. In many ways, the Marine Corps achieved a sense of 
parity and equality with the Navy – not least because the Corps’ proportion in the Navy’s bat-
tle force stabilized with the advent of seven amphibious assault ships of the Wasp-class (LHD 
1 through LHD 8), the largest such warships in the world (Swartz 2012b: 77, slide 154). 
b) USCG 
The Coast Guard remained under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation 
throughout the decade. Stripped of its Cold War missions, the service continued to be engaged 
in counter-drug operations in the Caribbean, and Cuban and Haitian refugee handling. In ad-
dition, law-enforcement detachment (LEDET) teams served as an adjunct to U.S. Navy mari-
time security and safety missions. For example, they supported VBSS operations during the 
Gulf War. Port security was another increasingly important subject and the Coast Guard’s 
involvement in the military intelligence community subsequently deepened. In 2000, a com-
prehensive, presidentially-mandated interagency review of U.S. Coast Guard roles and mis-
sions in the future security environment was published (President’s Interagency Task Force 
on United States Coast Guard Roles and Missions 2000), codifying many aspects of the deep-
ening relationship between the Navy and the Coast Guard (Swartz 2012b: 88-93, slides 176-
185).  
c) USA & USAF 
During the 1990s, jointness emerged as the new norm pursuant to the Goldwater-Nichols pro-
visions. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Combatant Commanders 
(COCOMS) wielded increasing influence over strategic military planning.  
The demise of the Soviet Union and its Navy shifted interest in the Navy and the Air Force 
toward strike operations and forward presence. Previous emphasis on strategic deterrence, sea 
control and counter-sea operations and capabilities receded in importance (Swartz 2012b: 94, 
slide 187). With the Air Force, the Navy deepened the integration of carrier aviation with 
land-based Air Force strike forces. Navy-Air Force operations over Iraq and Bosnia and Her-
zegovina (“Southern Watch” and “Deliberate Force”, respectively) demonstrated organically 
the value of deeper integration (Haynes 2013: 171-172) after the Navy had been sidelined by 
the USAF for much of the Gulf War. After suboptimal operational relations during that con-
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flict, the Navy sought closer cooperation and even joint integration with the Air Force on a 
number of fields (Swartz 2012b: 94, slide 188).  
With the Army, the Navy’s relationship was a bit rockier. The Army, as much as the Navy, 
was subject to tremendous budget cuts. Operationally, the Navy provided partial ground sup-
port for the Army when requested. But the Navy now increasingly focused on influencing and 
orchestrating events on land (the traditional Army domain) whereas in the Cold War, the Na-
vy had principally limited its strategic view to the oceans and the sea. Three Army four-star 
generals (Powell, Shakilashvili, and Shelton) served as Clinton’s Chairman of the Joint 
Chiefs. This further raised Army morale, reputation, and visibility within the administration in 
comparison to the other services (Swartz 2012b: 110-115, slides 220-229).  
9.6.3 Relationships to Allies
340
  
The Navy’s relationship to its international partner services was tested repeatedly in the 1990s 
in real-world contingencies. As much as on the joint front, combined operations were now 
also increasingly more common and integrated (not merely coordinated). Naval action in the 
Persian Gulf in 1990/1991 set the tone, and other multinational naval operations such as in the 
Adriatic Sea – the first real-life NATO contingency since the Cold War – followed. Allies 
were increasingly interested in investing resources in technologies, sensors, and platforms 
developed by the United States (a prominent examples for the 1990s is the introduction of the 
U.S.-made Aegis system by the Japanese Self-Defense Maritime Force [JSDMF] in 1993 on 
their Atago- and Kongo-class destroyers [Kim 1999: 18-45, Cole 2013: 61-77] and later the 
Spanish and Norwegian navies). In turn, the U.S. Navy also began to be interested in ad-
vanced allied systems such as air-independent propulsion submarines or high-speed catama-
rans.  
Many European partners radically cut their defense budgets, often in hope of re-distributing 
substantial Cold War military expenditures into more popular social welfare programs. Navies 
were obviously affected as well by these indiscriminate cuts. At the same time, the U.S. Navy 
continued to practice and engage with allied nations, most visibly in such long-standing exer-
cises as BALTOPS in the Baltic Sea and RIMPAC in the Pacific. Remarkably, the “…From 
the Sea” capstone document was cited in Australian, British, Canadian, and Indian capstone 
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 Author’s note: In contrast to the “The Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s, the various U.S. Navy strategies of 
the 1990s were less outspoken about their global aspirations and often treated the integration of allies as second-
ary topics. In lieu of an analysis of every single Navy capstone document’s relationship to U.S. allies, this sec-
tion briefly outlines the most enduring trends across the decade instead.  
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documents between 1997 and 2007 (Swartz 2012a: 56, slide 111) and thus indicated the quali-
ty and lasting impression of that document in allied naval forces.  
9.6.4 Significant Organizational Changes  
To reflect the changes in the security environment, the 1990s witnessed wide-ranging changes 
to bureaucratic structures and processes. Most of all, this reflected the Goldwater-Nichols 
Act’s taking full effect. It shifted power from the branches – i.e., the Navy – to OSD, the Joint 
Staff, and the CINCs. In essence, it reduced the purpose of the services to that of a force pro-
vider. In 1992, a major OPNAV reorganization and re-designation was implemented to reflect 
the expansion and vision of the Joint Staff. A substantial reorganization resulted in the break-
ing of the previously powerful warfare community barons (surface, submarine, and aviation). 
Instead, programming offices gained substantial power. N8, the newly-designated branch for 
strategic programming, subsumed 400 of the 1,200 personnel assigned to OPNAV (Swartz 
2012b: 43-45, slides 86-89), dubbed “Super N8”.  
Admiral Kelso’s changes were significant in that they implemented the joint thinking into the 
Navy bureaucracy, with sweeping consequences. Instead of basing priorities on naval warfare 
areas (such as antisubmarine or strike warfare), they were now based on joint warfare areas. 
Program sponsors now had to justify their programs across all seven of these joint mission 
areas (Haynes 2013: 124).
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 Kelso’s successors, Boorda and Johnson, fine-tuned many of the 
processes that were kicked off in the early 1990s. While the changes in the Navy and OSD 
bureaucracy were significant in their own right, one of the more immediately visible innova-
tions was the creation of the U.S. Fifth Fleet in 1995, a dedicated fleet responsible for the 
Arabian Sea, the Red Sea, the Persian Gulf, and the Strait of Hormuz. This was a direct lesson 
of the large-scale contingencies during the Gulf War, where U.S. Navy assets and organiza-
tion were deemed unfit for handling the major operation.
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9.7 Assessment: American Sea Power in a Decade of Uncertainty, 1989-2001  
From a strategic point of view, the long 1990s were a challenging period for the Navy. Navy 
budgets shrank, ship and aircraft numbers went down, manpower was reduced drastically, and 
new warship procurement was reduced significantly. At the same time, the fleet was in high 
operational demand. Crises such as in Iraq, Somalia, and Haiti were exactly the kind of brush-
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 These were Joint Strike, Joint Littoral Warfare, Joint Surveillance, Joint Space and Electronic War-
fare/Intelligence, Strategic Deterrence, Strategic Sealift/Protection, and Presence. 
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 The establishment of the Fifth Fleet complemented the 1983 installation of the U.S. Central Command and 
the subsidiary Naval Forces Central Command. Until the creation of its own numbered fleet, the naval part of 
USCENTCOM had relied on forces temporarily assigned to it. The Gulf War surge forces came from the U.S. 
home fleets and were 6
th
/7
th
 Fleet assets.  
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fires that the Navy anticipated after shelving “The Maritime Strategy”. Navy capstone docu-
ments of the 1990s are characterized by the attempt to grasp this new geostrategic and geopo-
litical environment and translate those implications into declaratory strategies. The considera-
bly higher number of strategies (and different names and designs to them) in comparison to 
the single “Maritime Strategy” of the 1980s reflected growing uncertainty about the environ-
ment and what the next war would look like.  
At the same time, the sheer number of documents – eight – is a function of changes in leader-
ship and associated (actual or anticipated) changes in priorities. In part, the collection reflects 
the desire by the Navy as well as a by individuals to have their own defining statements 
(Hattendorf 2006: 4). To a degree, such measures are necessary when political administrations 
change, but they run the risk of introducing new vocabulary and different points of reference 
along the way, thus providing more confusion than clarity. A document’s half life can be se-
verely curtailed under such circumstances.  
Transformation was neither the inevitable consequence of changes in the international envi-
ronment nor dictated by individuals or groups outside of the naval service (Trubowitz/Rhodes 
1999: 8). The Navy needed to balance high-end capabilities with low-end scenarios (that it 
did right) and also balance high-end capabilities with the need for numbers (that it did not 
achieve as a look at the ship procurements of the decade will illustrate). In addition, the pro-
cesses of formulating capstone documents in the 1990s for the Navy were often confusing, 
ineffective, repetitive, and erratic. Therefore, strategic adjustment – or in other words, the 
transformation of the service – rested principally on the institutionalization of ideas in the 
Navy itself. 
Only after “The Maritime Strategy” was dropped, the Navy was able to muster intellectual 
capital and utilize timing to draft the white paper, “…From the Sea”. It was a lucid, strategic 
concept in Samuel Huntington’s sense. The most important message contained in “…From the 
Sea" was that the Navy now concentrated on naval operations in the framework of a joint task 
force involved in a major regional contingency rather than engaging in a global conventional 
war as a a semi-independent force (Tritten 1995: 132). “…From the Sea” also marked a de-
parture from a classic naval strategy that concerned itself with blue-water events. Instead, it 
shifted the focus. Sea control was not an end in itself, but should better enable land control, 
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thereby broadening the Navy’s naval scope to a more comprehensive, even maritime one 
(which assumed increasing jointness and combined arms operations).
343
  
As a conceptual framework, it organized unified efforts from the sea toward the land, empha-
sizing the focus on strike and littoral operations. Unlike many other documents of the 1990s, 
it also gave the Navy a sense of institutional rationality. Its lasting influence can be explained 
by the real innovation that it brought intellectually for the service and by acknowledging that 
the Navy was increasingly silent – at least strategically – for the remainder of the decade. In a 
move reminiscent of behavior in the years after World War II, the 1990s American defense 
establishment focused on how the military fought, not why (Haynes 2013: 189).  
Burdened by inter- and intra-service rivalry and a diminished public image in the wake of 
high-visibility scandals, the Navy increasingly looked inward. Goldwater-Nichols brought a 
joint operational environment that was dominated by the CINC force requirements. These 
demands reflected and also fueled a much more regional operational instead of a necessary 
global strategic-political outlook. Meanwhile, the promises of new technology lured the Navy 
further away from comprehending and explaining to others how it sought to make a real stra-
tegic difference in the next war. Instead, technology increasingly shaped traditional naval op-
erations and missions. This was relatively easy to sell to Congress. Emphasizing pricey gear 
was a tactic that allowed the Navy to procrastinate on more strategic ambitions, e.g., what its 
geopolitical roles and missions were, and how it could contribute to the political ends of sea 
power.  
Bush and Clinton began with foreign policies that contained interventionist notions. Both also 
put a prime on increasing diplomacy and economic engagement as tools for foreign and secu-
rity policy ends. In theory, this would have put the Navy into the spotlight, given sea power’s 
inherent opportunities (such as presence, maritime security, etc.) and the fact that naval forces 
have the luxury of providing an inherently more diplomatic military tool that armies or air 
forces cannot afford (Forster 2013: 14). The opportunity for transitioning to a truly maritime 
American grand strategy which diplomatically would have allowed the U.S. to assume the 
role of an off-shore “balancer” and a “grand-facilitator” (Owens 1993: 13) was missed. Ironi-
cally, both presidential administrations (sensing public and Congressional desire to draw 
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 Breemer (1994: 45-46) declared „… From the Sea“ to be the end of naval strategy as the world knew it (em-
phasis added), although he was not quite sure how final that end would really be given the inherent uncertainty 
that surrounds strategy (ibid: 48).  
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down the American military posture after the Cold War) engaged in substantial across-the-
board spending cuts, with the Navy disproportionally affected. 
The lack of a template for American sea power in the 1990s let the Navy to manage itself in-
stead of reflecting on what it was organized, trained, and equipped for in the first place. A 
systemic role for the Navy emerged only very slowly toward the end of the decade when the 
effects of globalization began to be felt. After all, the American-led liberal economic and po-
litical system had prevailed – “a system whose designers understood the notion that economic 
power is the father of military power” (Haynes 2013: 2). For the time being, little was done to 
disseminate that observation and introduce such observations into its capstone documents or 
even national, overarching concepts to make U.S. grand strategy for the 1990s truly maritime. 
Instead, the Navy increasingly went in medias res, for example with “Naval Doctrine Publica-
tion 1” (NDP1). Of note is the naval services’ embrace of the levels of warfare, the 
Clausewitzian concepts of center of gravity and critical vulnerability, and the principles of 
armed conflict. None of these were truly doctrine, but all of which were major statements be-
cause they signaled that the Navy embraced jointness (Tritten 1995: 132).  
The Navy ended the decade with mixed morale. It was understandably proud of its operation-
al record. Its intellectual focus on forward presence and the emphasis of strike capabilities 
from different platforms invigorated the service. The Navy was successful in fielding a num-
ber of new ship types that began to form the backbone of the fleet for years to come. In addi-
tion, the Nimitz-class aircraft carrier continued to be procured and operated. Shedding legacy 
platforms as part of the mandated reductions was a necessary but ultimately helpful exercise. 
The Navy was able to have the defense establishment accept and embrace the consensus that 
buttressed “…From the Sea”, particularly its primacy of power projection. However, there 
was a concern about further waning ship numbers and the degree of readiness. ASW and 
ASuW capabilities were declining at a time when regional powers such as China or Iran be-
gan to concentrate on A2AD measures to keep the U.S. Navy at bay. A physical and intellec-
tual restructuring of the blue-water fleet to focus more on constabulary and diplomatic roles 
did not occur.  
After the attack on the Cole, force protection became a major concern for operators, emblem-
atic of the Navy’s overall focus on sub-strategic issues during the better part of the 1990s. The 
Navy strategies of the 1990s were, therefore, an expression of a desire to comprehend the 
complex post-Cold War world in transition. They sought to give strategic direction to a tech-
nological-enhanced Navy, while trying to strike a conceptual balance between the ‘high end’ 
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conventional high-seas capabilities and dawning ‘low end’ littoral proficiency, asymmetric 
challenges, and other hybrid missions. The 1990s were replete with challenges related to mili-
tary and political planning in the face of uncertainty. Those dynamics interposed the careful 
crafting of a truly maritime national strategy, and the Navy only occasionally achieved some 
success in their subordinate naval programs. The American fin de siècle was characterized by 
scattered crises, conflicts, wars, and policy conditions at home which bore little resemblance 
to the Cold War days. This illustrates that strategy often emerges pragmatically. There are 
inherent limits to designing it academically. Numerous demands or events may lure strategic 
planners to shed any strategic aspirations whatsoever. Scandals, lack of direction (deliberate 
or accidental), or simply the wrong people at the wrong time inhibit the most logical and sen-
sible strategic-planning template. The art of strategy needs talent, and talent needs to be 
groomed. If conditions are adverse, even the most motivated artist will eventually be discour-
aged.  
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10 Implementing a Sea Power Rationale for the 21st Century (2001-2011) 
As the view went forward in 2000 as to what the 21
st
 century may hold, the full ramifications 
of the information age and the consequences of globalization were emerging slowly. And cer-
tainly hardly anyone was considering the impact of a series of coordinated terrorist attacks, 
beginning with 11 September 2001, which effectively ended the first post-Cold War decade 
and, as some would have it, America’s “holiday from history”344 in the 1990s. 
10.1 Prelude 
For America and much of the rest of the world, the election of George W. Bush as 43
rd
 Presi-
dent of the United States reigned in the new decade politically. Due to the chaotic course of 
the November 2000 election, the Bush team had substantially less time than previous admin-
istrations to transition into office. It is not without a degree of irony that Bush’s initial foreign 
and national security policy until 11 September 2001 bore little resemblance to the policies 
that followed after the terrorist strikes. In fact, Bush was more domestically focused, even 
nationalist, than his predecessor. Much like all presidents, Bush was relatively cautious on the 
international scene. The Bush administration had focused its foreign policy attention on Rus-
sia and China,
345
 on determining whether a Middle East peace settlement was in the cards, 
and on building a ballistic missile defense system (Leffler 2011). Rogue states (like Iraq) as 
emerging challengers were also discussed, not least because Saddam Hussein continued to be 
a nuisance (vast amounts of military resources were being tied up enforcing the northern and 
southern no-fly zones as well as the sanctions program).  
Initially, no single dominant threat emerged for the Bush team. Radical Islam, for one, was 
not seen as a major challenge, and international terrorism was not perceived as a major na-
tional security or defense issue per se (Naftali 2006). Instead, Bush saw an opportunity to im-
plement an ambitious program of domestic military transformation driven by a sustained be-
lief in modularity, precision-guided ammunition, information technology, high-tech weapon-
ry, and stealth, in short: Transformation. In essence, this concept tied together the promises of 
network-centric warfare with the range of state and non-state actors that were seen as having 
potential to undermine American security. It promised cost-effectiveness and reduced the 
likelihood of the U.S. being dragged into murky wars and conflicts with substantial ground 
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troops. As it were, military transformation was increasingly not evaluated by its contribution 
to political goals, but slowly morphed into becoming an end in itself. Once again, this touched 
the delicate question that every president has to find an answer for: Just what kind of armed 
conflict the United States would use its military for? For a president that had underlined in his 
campaign that the military should not be used for nation-building purposes, hailing the prom-
ises of transformation fit well into an idealistic outlook (Bush 1999). 
10.2 U.S. Navy Strategy 2001-2011: The Macro Level  
10.2.1 Global Trends & Challengers to U.S. Security  
One of the most striking developments, at least in hindsight, is the relatively quick narrowing 
of the power and influence gap between the implicit leader United States – the benevolent 
hegemon – and other nations. The web of interdependencies that was created significantly 
influenced political leverages.
346
 Economic globalization induced political dependencies (and 
vice versa). The sea-borne proportion of global trade leveled off at approximately 90%, un-
derlining the importance of maritime security to facilitate trade and exchange. The cyber do-
main finally evolved into a global common akin to sea, air, and space. With its vast opportu-
nities also came the increasingly visible threat of cybercrime by organized syndicates and 
even states, as well as comprehensive surveillance and tracing opportunities for federal au-
thorities.  
The far-reaching global financial crisis of 2008 signaled an end to unipolarity, the post-Cold 
War arrangement that replaced the bipolar U.S.-Soviet bloc order. It gave way to a diffuse 
form of multipolarity (which the incoming Obama administration initially embraced as a 
foundation for its defense policy only to witness its limits militarily in operations such as 
“Odyssey Dawn” against Libya in 2011, or the crisis management in the Eastern Mediterrane-
an and Black Sea littorals 2013/2014). This order substituted predominant U.S. primacy with 
the emergence of more than one power center.
347
 Between 2001 and 2011, a number of re-
gional blocs and relationships increasingly integrated to qualify, and sometimes hinder, U.S. 
influence. The world witnessed mounting competition over natural resources and intangible 
goods such as knowledge, education, and access to markets and regions. Demographic shifts 
in the composition and displacement of the population entered the minds of decision-makers 
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as a factor for strategic planning. China built up its military, especially its naval forces. In 
2001, China founded the establishment of the Shanghai Cooperation Initiative (SCO), a Eura-
sian political, military, and economic organization headquartered in Beijing (Boland 2011).
348
  
U.S. relations with Russia were less cordial than in the 1990s, when Moscow was fervently 
attempting to halt the disintegration of what was left of the post-Cold War political influence 
and coherence. The Arctic emerged as a potential area of contention between Russia, the U.S., 
and other littoral states. The balance of power in Europe between 2001 and 2011 was stable 
and by-and-large favorable to U.S. security interests (the recent, relatively unforeseen resur-
gence of Russian military power in the 2014 Crimea/Ukraine crisis may change that) (Stent 
2014). U.S. military forces held a sustained presence with peacekeeping efforts on the Bal-
kans. In addition, NATO and the EU underwent increasing consolidation, integration, and 
political expansion (while their militaries shrank at precipitous rates) (Giegerich 2012, 
Weidenfeld 2013).
349
  
The Middle East and the African continent, however, remained among the most chaotic and 
dangerous regions of the world. Rogue states such as Syria challenged American (and by im-
plication Western) primacy regionally. North Korea emerged as a new, albeit unofficial and 
certainly very much unwelcome member of the exclusive club of countries fielding a nuclear 
arsenal (Niksch 2010, Chanlet-Avery/Rinehart 2014). Iran, on the other hand, continued to be 
suspected of pursuing a nuclear weapons program (Crist 2012: 489-491). Both countries al-
legedly thrived from a proliferation network administered by a Pakistani nuclear scientist. 
Undoubtedly, such powerful weapons in the hands of aggressive rogue regimes posed a sig-
nificant threat to U.S. security and global well-being, not least because they serve as tools to 
dominate regional balances of power. The problem was amplified when such states were on 
the verge of collapse, and/or provided their nuclear material to non-state rogue actors. Failing 
or failed states spawned a number of problems and potential threats that informed and moti-
vated U.S. action under the umbrella of a “Global War on Terrorism” (GWOT) (Feickert 
2005).
350
 While American dominance of world affairs was visibly waning by the end of the 
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decade, the U.S. remained the only comprehensive superpower for much of the time. It re-
tained the ability to field the most advanced military and, until the deep and sustained eco-
nomic crisis 2007-2009, rested on an economic preponderance.  
Five broad challenges to U.S. security characterized the first decade of the 21
st
 century. First, 
states like China, Iran, and North Korea remained focal points in military planning and Iraq 
drew a lot of attention. Before 9/11, the military was in a holding pattern, waiting for some-
thing bad to happen. With the events of 9/11, terrorism – the second broad challenge – took 
center-stage. Prior to the attacks in New York and Washington, terrorism in the eyes of the 
Department of Defense was primarily a law-enforcement task. The attack on the guided-
missile destroyer Cole (DDG 67) in Aden (Yemen) on 12 October 2000 began to change that, 
not least because this particular act of maritime terrorism was in retaliation to cruise missile 
launches against Sudan in 1998, which in turn were ordered after the embassy bombings in 
Kenya and Tanzania that year (see chapter 9). Connecting the dots, however, was an arduous 
task and did not yield palpable results before 9/11. Terrorism in its new form – unlike the first 
generation in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s which often centered on political representatives 
of a system although a lot of civilians lost their lives, too – targeted Americans per se, often in 
frustration about perceived or actual backwardness in the Islamic world (Hacke 2005: 635). 
The high number of civilians killed in a single attack and the means of hijacked commercial 
airliners were fundamentally novel. It was quickly determined that al-Qaida leader Osama 
bin-Laden and his organization were behind the attacks that killed 3,000 people.
351
 Al-Qaida’s 
sanctuary was Afghanistan, a Central Asian country ravaged by decades of Soviet interven-
tion from 1979 to 1988 and a subsequent bloody civil war. The Taliban, a radical Islamic 
group that ruled large parts of the country since 1996, provided al-Qaida with a safe haven. 
Even with this sanctuary routed, pockets and regional affiliate of al-Qaida spawned. In the 
process, al-Qaida utilized weak, failing, and failed states to establish regional terrorism organ-
izations that participated in a religiously-motivated global campaign against “the West”. Ex-
amples include al-Qaida in the Maghreb, on the Arab peninsula, and loosely-organized Islam-
ic subsidiaries in several other regions of the world (Krause 2014: 21-24). The number of 
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transnational terrorist incidents (some of them maritime) climbed from 2001 and their lethali-
ty soared.
352
  
A third major challenge arose from the ascent of the BRICS, a loosely organized group of 
countries consisting of Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. These rising or resurg-
ing powers are understood as coming contenders in the markets of information technology, 
defense industry, and other vital areas. In contrast to the G-7/G-8, this group is often consid-
ered as a counterweight to more developed economies. Their rapid ascension usually rests on 
dynamics inherent in these particular developing countries, including favorable demographics 
(with the exception of Russia), inexpensive labor, and centralized systems of government 
(Looney 2014).  
The fourth challenge came with the proliferation of nuclear weapons (as well as, negligibly, 
biological and chemical agents). While the safety and security of the arsenal of established 
nuclear powers and signatories to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) continued to be 
an objective, the first decade of the 2000s saw an increasingly worrisome trend of rogue 
states, renegade regimes, terrorist networks, and non-state actors attempting to obtain such 
ultimate weapons of mass destruction. The fear of proliferated nuclear, biological, or chemical 
weapons (or components thereof) drove the implementation of the Proliferation Security Initi-
ative (PSI) in 2003. From an American point of view, it was the prospect of rogue regimes, 
organized criminals, or terrorists fielding a bomb – even if it was a crude (“dirty”) one – 
against U.S. or allied targets (Medalia 2011).  
A fifth challenge to U.S. national security arose from overstretching America’s funds, forces, 
and political capital in the wake of 9/11. A complex amalgam of the costly wars in Afghani-
stan and Iraq (both in capital and in human costs), the large investments in security and safety 
on the home front, an impending recession, and a rising unwillingness of the people to sup-
port the ground wars in Southwest Asia contributed to an overstretched and increasingly hol-
lowed American position. While the U.S. retained military and economic primacy, it also 
learned the limits and legacies of costly, sustained military nation-building campaigns 
(Bilmes 2013, Katz 2014).  
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These roughly sketched global trends and the related challengers to U.S. security once again 
determined what kind of wars America wanted to fight and what kinds of conflicts it would 
contend with.  
10.2.2 Conflicts, Crises, and Wars  
“I can hear you. The rest of the world hears you.  
And the people who knocked these buildings down will hear all of us soon!” 
(President George W. Bush speaking to rescue workers  
on 14 September 2001 at ‘Ground Zero’, New York City) 
The armed conflicts that characterized the decade in most fundamental geopolitical and doc-
trinal terms were the U.S.-led interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq. Although both wars were 
in principle conducted under the umbrella of the global campaign against terrorism, there are 
obvious fundamental differences between the two. What does hold true for both is that the 
collective shock and anger that the U.S. experienced over the attack on America on 9/11 
(which earned compassion and solidarity with the United States around the world immediate-
ly following the catastrophe) dramatically changed American politics and policies.
353
 After 
9/11, the U.S. was determined to target regimes that actively supported or even harbored ter-
rorists, fully aware that strikes against elusive non-state adversaries such as al-Qaida would be 
significantly more difficult to conduct than to go after their sponsors. Following that notion 
and based on intelligence available and processed immediately after 9/11, the Taliban regime 
in Afghanistan was identified as providing al-Qaida with an impeccable safe haven. On 7 Oc-
tober 2001, little under a month after the terrorist attacks, the U.S. launched military strikes in 
an effort to unseat the regime in Kabul and rid the terrorist network of its major sanctuary. In 
conjunction with British forces and in support of a drive by the Northern Alliance (a loose 
anti-Taliban coalition) toward the Afghan capital, the primary objective was quickly achieved 
(Woodward 2002). However, al-Qaida and in particular its leader Osama Bin Laden remained 
on the run as the fighting shifted into the ungoverned mountainous areas of the border be-
tween Afghanistan and Pakistan.
354
 After the quick military victory over the Taliban regime in 
Afghanistan, U.N. Security Council resolution 1386 (December 2001) paved the way for the 
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International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whose objective was training and support of 
indigenous Afghan national security forces. More than 40 countries ultimately contributed 
forces or other support for the mission. In 2003, NATO assumed the responsibility for ISAF. 
The U.S. continued to contribute, but the bulk of forces remained under a separate, national 
(American) command (Dale 2011). Under pressure from the resurging violent Taliban move-
ment, foreign extremists infiltrating the country, diverging and contradicting political and 
military objectives in the coalition and in civil-military affairs, ravaging corruption in the Af-
ghan government, and mounting costs and casualties for ISAF, the comprehensive nation-
building attempt came to a grinding halt. The international community remained increasingly 
bogged down in Afghanistan (Dale 2014).
355
 By late 2002 the United States had already 
opened a second major front in its global campaign against terrorism (Woodward 2004).  
In the course of that year, it became apparent that the Bush administration focused on Saddam 
Hussein and Iraq as the subject of regime change. This time, the international community was 
divided about the path forward. Like his father, Bush enlisted the United Nations as a forum 
to obtain an international mandate for removing Hussein from power.
356
 After the U.N. Secu-
rity Council remained unconvinced of Hussein’s alleged weapons of mass destruction plans 
and his connection to international terrorism, the United States forfeited a legal mandate and 
assembled a “coalition of the willing” instead. While European allies like the U.K., Spain, 
Denmark, or Poland sided with the U.S., others such as France and Germany remained in op-
position. The U.S.-led intervention dubbed “Operation Iraqi Freedom” (OIF) succeeded in 
quickly driving Hussein from power and routing Iraq’s regular military forces.357 In a speech 
aboard the nuclear-powered aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) on 1 May 2003, a 
triumphant President Bush declared major combat operations over. However, Iraq soon de-
scended into a violent civil war. The U.S. military and political leadership found itself unpre-
pared for the unexpected insurgency that ensued. The transition from a large standing Cold 
War military to a smaller, agile, and flexible posture to address 21
st
 century warfare demands 
was in full swing, but post-invasion planning and the nation-building challenges remained 
largely unaccounted for in 2002 and 2003. Only after a concerted effort to revamp U.S. mili-
tary thinking and operations – a process that yielded the development of a 21st century coun-
terinsurgency doctrine between 2005 and 2007 – could the violence in Iraq be contained 
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(Ricks 2006). A similar approach was attempted for Afghanistan, where the insurgency had 
substantially different characteristics.
358
  
The deepening of tensions in Iraq especially between 2004 and 2006 shifted valuable re-
sources and public attention away from Afghanistan. The Iraq War, an Albatross around 
America’s neck, formally concluded in December 2011 with the withdrawal of the last U.S. 
military advisors. In his Presidential campaign in 2008, Democratic candidate Barack Obama 
promised to end the costly and widely unpopular U.S. deadlock in Southwest and Central 
Asia.
359
 Accordingly, once elected as President, he decided to send an additional 30,000 com-
bat troops to Afghanistan to focus on that particular arena (Gates 2014). Recognizing the 
asymmetric nature of the conflict, the overwhelming American military edge, its technologi-
cal innovation, and the potent military-industrial base at home drove an intensification of the 
campaign using increasingly more covert and technologically advanced methods (i.e., intelli-
gence, Special Forces, and unmanned systems). Notwithstanding the focus areas of Afghani-
stan and Iraq, the global nature of the war on terrorism remained in place. For example, “Op-
eration Enduring Freedom” (OEF) featured operations off the Horn of Africa, in the Philip-
pines, in the Sahara, in the Caribbean, and in Central America. In addition, the U.S. intensi-
fied military, intelligence, and anti-terrorism cooperation with many allied and friendly na-
tions worldwide. The number of al-Qaida-related terrorist attacks rose visibly between 2001 
and 2011. It included high-profile attacks on civilian targets in Indonesia (2002), Tunisia 
(2002), Turkey (2003), Saudi-Arabia (2003), Spain (2004), and Great Britain (2005). Numer-
ous other plots were thwarted. At the same time, al-Qaida and affiliates dispersed from their 
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bases in Afghanistan and Pakistan and spread out to other areas including North Africa, So-
malia, and the Arabian Peninsula (Rollins 2011).
360
  
The strategic landscape that formed the focal point of the Global War on Terrorism had a co-
lossal maritime and littoral dimension. From East to West, it encompassed the world’s most 
important maritime chokepoints (such as the Strait of Gibraltar, the Bosporus/Dardanelles, the 
Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden and Bab-el-Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Straits of 
Malacca), major trading and transit routes, extensive coastlines, and most importantly a sig-
nificant portion of the world’s oil reserves. The concurrence of Islamist fundamentalism in 
areas indispensable to the global economy spelled a theoretical scenario in which isolated 
small-group terrorist actions could single-handedly curtail or even stop the flow of petroleum 
and throw the international system (in particular in the Western Hemisphere where depend-
ence on Middle East natural resources is paramount) into chaos (Murphy 2008: 183-375). 
Such a threat-oriented perception yielded the insight that national and systemic security – that 
is, the national security of the United States on the one hand, but also the systemic security of 
the international order that the U.S. underwrote in part by its military might – were so subtly 
intertwined as to be indistinguishable in practice. This had fundamental consequences for pol-
icy planners and military leaders if the military’s purpose should accordingly be viewed in 
relation to systemic requirements (Haynes 2013: 283).   
Even when the war against terrorist networks and their sponsors as well as the two expedi-
tionary campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan notoriously dominated America’s security con-
cerns, more traditional dynamics of power play returned to center-stage. The short Russo-
Georgian War (2008) highlighted a more assertive Russia in Eastern Europe that routinely 
used military and economic coercion to attain political objectives. In Southeast Asia, where a 
devastating tsunami in December 2004 provided insight into the force and fallout of a natural 
disaster, China and North Korea desired continued attention as their regional military aspira-
tions fueled crises and concerns. China increasingly fielded global power and influence and 
American-Chinese economic interdependence deepened significantly by 2008.
361
 China’s 
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military modernization drove sustained change in East Asia, with conflicts over dominion in 
the East and South China Seas but one example. While the U.S. Navy carefully eyed Chinese 
naval growth with a mixture of uncertainty and professional interest, other states in the region 
such as Vietnam, Indonesia, and Singapore quickly began to modernize their military forces 
(in particular their navies) in the 2000s (Till/Chan 2013).
362
 For example, India began a com-
prehensive update and expansion of its naval force (most recently by laying the keel for its 
first indigenously-built aircraft carrier Vikrant, and commissioning its first SSBN in 2009). 
Japan and South Korea, uneasy about China’s ascendance, began to upgrade their forces as 
well. In addition, North Korean hostility against Japan, South Korea, and the U.S. continued. 
Diplomatic efforts to limit the North’s nuclear capabilities and attempts for détente yielded 
little progress. The development of nuclear weapons and their testing (9 October 2006 and 25 
May 2009, respectively) signaled the regime’s desperate conviction that only nuclear capabil-
ity would significantly offset its own collapse. This occurred against the backdrop of a con-
tinued change of conventional power on the peninsula in favor of South Korea, which became 
a major economic and military player in East Asia, increasingly fielding blue-water naval 
forces with oceanic reach (including three Aegis-equipped destroyers and a helicopter carrier) 
(Till 2012).  
More militarily subtle but nevertheless fundamental global issues rose in urgency throughout 
the 2000s: Increasing globalization underlined the imperative to hedge against the widening 
gap (and resulting conflict potential) between the poor and the rich. Climate change (the 
scope of which is still a hotly disputed issue in some U.S. political quarters) signaled by a 
significant rise in natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, droughts, and devastating 
storms, could potentially undermine fragile societies and thus create security and stability 
problems (Burke et al. 2008). In addition, after the 2000 Millennium Summit in New York 
the U.N. called attention to addressing major fundamental grievances of the Third World 
population. The eight Millennium Development Goals (MDG) were a blueprint in a hope to 
eradicate extreme hunger and poverty, achieve universal primary education, combat major 
diseases, and achieve global sustainability by the year 2015. In the classical sense, these did 
not concern military (much less naval or maritime) strategy; in the contemporary understand-
ing of networked and comprehensive security, one that contributes to stabilizing the global 
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system, they are very much of relevance to strategic planners (Blanchfield/Lawson 2010, 
Archer/Willi 2012). 
10.3 Personalities, Domestic Conditions, and National Security Strategies 
10.3.1 Presidents, Secretaries, and Policy/Strategy Leaders 
The presidency of George W. Bush (‘Bush 43’ in the American differentiation) drew on a 
number of seasoned individuals who had served in national security related positions reaching 
back to the administrations of Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan, and George H.W. 
Bush (‘Bush 41’ in the American differentiation). The expertise that Bush 43 thus was able to 
enlist helped propel the national security roster of the former Texan governor (who was by 
and large inexperienced in security policy and defense affairs) to substantial quality. As a for-
eign policy novice, he relied heavily on his experienced team that offset his public image. His 
relatively casual managerial style at first fell in line with a more nationalist foreign policy 
plan that echoed Bush’s election campaign in 2000. After 9/11, and in particular in the 2004 
Presidential campaign, he pursued a very activist foreign and security policy underwritten by 
a Manichean philosophy and fashioned himself a war president.
363
 Throughout his presidency, 
Bush left considerable leverage to his more experienced cabinet and staff (Woodward 2002, 
Woodward 2004, Mann 2004).  
Vice President Richard “Dick” Cheney consolidated conservative influence and considerable 
shaping power of Bush’s foreign policy.364 Cheney had been Secretary of Defense 1989-1993 
for Bush 41 and in that capacity oversaw the end of the Cold War and “Operation Desert 
Storm” (Cheney had also been White House Chief of Staff during the Ford Presidency). Don-
ald Rumsfeld joined the Bush 43 administration as Secretary of Defense (2001-2006) after 
having served in the same capacity (1975-1977) under President Ford.
365
 Rumsfeld was an 
ardent supporter of the Revolution in Military Affairs, which promised a far leaner, more ag-
ile, and principally smaller military footprint in support of U.S. security and defense objec-
tives. He was also highly motivated to re-assert civilian control over the Joint Staff and the 
military services. For him, the military leaders could produce doctrine and vision statements 
and were encouraged to think in global terms, but they could not and should not do strategy. 
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For the services to develop strategic concepts on their own amounted to gross insubordination 
(Haynes 2013: 227). The Deputy Secretary of Defense was Paul Wolfowitz, a former Under-
secretary of Defense for Policy for Bush Sr. At the State Department, Colin Powell – former 
Reagan National Security Advisor (1987-1989) and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff un-
der Bush 41 (1989-1993) – took the lead. Richard Armitage (among others, former Assistant 
Secretary of Defense under Reagan and a former naval officer involved in the evacuation op-
erations of South Vietnam in April 1975) became Deputy Secretary of State.
366
 As his Na-
tional Security Advisor, George W. Bush picked Condoleezza Rice, the former professor at 
Stanford University who as an NSC staffer had played a key role in managing the end of the 
Cold War and relations with the Soviet Union for Bush’s father. In January 2005, she re-
placed Powell at the top of the State Department (Rice 2011).  
In short, Bush 43 fundamentally relied on people whose outlook was shaped by their experi-
ences during and toward the end of the Cold War. With a few notable exceptions such as Sec-
retary Powell, many of these seasoned “Cold Warriors” were also part of a resurging intellec-
tual movement. These so-called neoconservatives were an idealistic and missionary group 
whose ideas rooted in disappointment with liberalism and protest against counter-culture. 
Their central security-policy views included a push for a strong military, the call for unilateral 
U.S. interventionism to safeguard national interests, and criticism of international forums. 
Bush 43’s foreign and security policy advisory circle (dubbed the “Vulcans” after a statue of 
the Roman god by the same name in Condoleezza Rice’s Alabama hometown) found consid-
erable overlapping of their own career views and these intellectual currents.
367
 With problems 
looming large for the administration when the campaign in Iraq did not progress as envi-
sioned, changes were made in the administration’s line-up during the second term. Most 
prominently, these included Rumsfeld’s demission; he was replaced by Robert “Bob” Gates 
in December 2006. Among other things, Gates made the troops surges in Afghanistan and 
Iraq his immediate priority. He also oversaw the production of the 2010 Quadrennial Defense 
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 A critical acclaimed study of that mission led by the Knox-class frigate Kirk (FF 1087) is Jan Herman’s The 
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 In his study on the idea’s influence on U.S. foreign policy, Patrick Keller argued that Bush was hardly an 
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Except for Powell and Rice, many members of the Bush administration were also directly involved the Project 
for a New American Century (PNAC). In 1998, this think tank issued an open letter to President Clinton. In it, a 
team of well-known conservatives called to remove Saddam Hussein from power to offset the threat of weapons 
of mass destruction and wide instability and insecurity to the Middle East and American interests. Signatories 
included Armitage, John Bolton, Francis Fukuyama, Robert Kagan, Zalmay Khalizad, William Kristol, Richard 
Perle, Rumsfeld, James Woolsey, and Wolfowitz. The letter was widely regarded as a blueprint for the 2003 
invasion of Iraq. Many of the supporters of the letter rose to important positions in the administration of Bush 
43. 
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Review. Gates, who previously had a career with the Central Intelligence Agency, remained 
in office until July 2011. He thus became the first Secretary of Defense to serve successive 
Presidential administration from opposing political parties.  
Barack Obama, previously a Democratic Senator from Illinois, was elected as 44
th
 President 
of the United States in November 2008. His charisma and eloquence allowed him a stellar rise 
inside his party and his popularity with many Americans (and very significantly with people 
all over the world) soared. Obama’s election promised a renewed political spirit and a less 
militaristic foreign-policy tone. He focused strongly on overcoming what was perceived as 
the spirit of the Bush years. Obama invested considerable personal and political capital in the 
establishment of a general health care system in the United States which ate away at the time 
and energy to be spent on foreign policy. Ironically, Obama pursued very idealist, almost uto-
pian goals in the international arena. Obama – a novice to this area like so many of his prede-
cessors – promised, among other things, closing the terrorist detention facility in Guantanamo 
Bay, ending the U.S. military involvement in Iraq, extending an outstretched hand to the Mus-
lim world, an effort to dismantle all nuclear weapons worldwide (“Global Zero”), and a re-set 
in U.S.-Russian relations. The sheer aspiration of all of this earned him the Nobel Peace Prize 
in 2009.  
His security policy team included Secretary of Defense Gates and Chairman Mullen (both of 
which were carried over from Bush 43). Hillary Clinton (Obama’s presidential primary rival) 
served as Secretary of State.
368
 With such a seasoned staff, the president aimed to offset his 
foreign policy inexperience and create a bipartisan thrust to clear the strategic and military 
problems that the U.S. faced. He also hoped to create momentum that supported his decision 
to send 30,000 more troops to Afghanistan by mid-2010. As such, Obama sought to equili-
brate his new ideas with the enduring political, military, and strategic demands of a nation 
that at the time had also been at war for more than five years. This balancing act strained the 
Obama presidency as the crisis of the U.S. economy deepened. His foreign policy until 2011 
was seen increasingly unenforceable and considered lacking direction and traction. That was 
exacerbated by a White House team that was often perceived as too young, isolated, inexperi-
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 Gates was succeeded by Leon Panetta (2011-2013) who in turn was relieved by Chuck Hagel (since 2013). 
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for Middle East peace.  
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enced, and distrustful of a military altogether, which it increasingly sought to micromanage 
(Gates 2013).  
On Capitol Hill, the Bush administration could count on a Republican majority in the Senate 
from 2003 to 2007 and the House of Representatives from 2001 to 2007. In the 110
th
 Con-
gress (2006-2008), the Democrats wrested control of both chambers from the Republicans 
and for two years, with newly-elected Democratic President Obama in the White House, that 
party enjoyed a brief period of united government (through the 111
th
 Congress, 2008-2010); 
the 2010 midterm (for the 112
th
 Congress) elections then brought a landslide victory for Re-
publicans, which won a substantial majority in the House. A major driver behind that devel-
opment was the ascendency of the so-called Tea Party, a conglomerate of libertarian and con-
servative interest groups that sought to roll back government influence, taxation, and social 
welfare program spending. Often vigorously opposed to President Obama as an individual, it 
began to dominate many Republican primaries and the political day-to-day discourse (Jacob-
son 2011).  
Back in the Pentagon, the Department of the Navy witnessed considerable continuity in the 
early 2000s. Gordon England, who had had a career in the defense industry, served as the 72
nd
 
and as the 73
rd
 Secretary of the Navy (2001-2003, 2003-2006) (Department of the Navy 
2009).
369
 England’s priorities were a focus on current operational demands (e.g., the war on 
terrorism, humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, and homeland security) and maintenance of 
a surge capability. “Naval Power 21…A Naval Vision” (2002) was the only Navy strategic 
capstone document that England co-signed. Despite spending almost as much time as Secre-
tary of the Navy as his Reagan-era predecessor John Lehman, England was considerably less 
activist in formulating the strategic importance of American sea power. After five years in the 
top civilian position of the Navy, England ascended to Deputy Secretary of Defense for the 
remainder of the Bush presidency. His successor at the top of the Navy Department was Don-
ald Winter, a businessman who held the top civilian position of the Department of the Navy 
from 2006-2009. Winter continued the focus on the ongoing wars in Afghanistan and Iraq and 
taking care of veterans and their families, building of the future fleet of ships, and acquisition 
reform (Department of Defense 2009). None of the capstone documents of that period bore 
Winter’s signature. After the transition to the Obama Presidency, Ray Mabus, a former gov-
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 His tenure was interrupted by an eight-month period in 2003 when England became the first Deputy Secretary 
of Homeland Security, the new department established in the wake of the terrorist attacks of 9/11. 
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ernor of Mississippi, was confirmed as Secretary of the Navy in 2009. Mabus still holds that 
position today.  
Admiral Vern Clark served as Chief of Naval Operations for the first half of the decade. From 
2000-2005, Clark oversaw the aftermath of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, and the 
global campaign against terrorism. In contrast to many of his predecessors, Clark embraced 
jointness in that he did not see the Navy as responsible for developing its own strategic narra-
tives. In addition, Clark wanted to carefully groom the politically important relationships to 
the Pentagon leadership. The first CNO with a Master in Business Administration (MBA), he 
sought to optimize many of the Navy’s habitual business procedures. He was an advocate of 
the Lean 6 Sigma management philosophy, a business principle that focused on eliminating 
inefficiencies. Although Clark’s interest in a glossy strategy publication was limited, it oc-
curred to him that he still needed a tool to broadcast his priorities. During his tenure, no less 
than five OPNAV offices worked on U.S. Navy strategic statements and similar projects sim-
ultaneously (Swartz 2011i: 4, slides 7-8). Clark co-signed major capstone documents such as 
“Sea Power 21” (2002), which concentrated on projection of sea power from the littorals 
ashore. The “Fleet Response Plan” (2003), which Clark also signed, altered the way the Navy 
deployed (it introduced surging the fleet from its continental U.S. bases in times of crisis as a 
complementary measure to dogmatic forward naval presence). Under Clark’s direction, the 
Navy introduced the concept of an Expeditionary Strike Group (ESG). This was a new task 
force built on the previous Amphibious Ready Group (ARG), which now integrated amphibi-
ous warships and the U.S. Marine Corps with combat power delivered by guided-missile 
cruisers and destroyers, a frigate, and a fast-attack submarine. These improved operational 
formations complemented, and in some case compensated for, aircraft carrier groups (CSG) 
centered on big-deck carriers. Clarke was the second-longest serving CNO when he retired in 
2005 (Department of Defense 2005). His successor was Admiral Michael “Mike” Mullen 
(previously Commander, Allied Forces Europe, and Commander, Allied Joint Force Com-
mand Naples).
370
 A surface warfare officer, Mullen was a strategically sensitive CNO with an 
appreciation for integration of capabilities and resources. Mullen actively engaged and presid-
ed over the development of a new strategy that included a principally system-centric ap-
proach, be carried by the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard, and feature new 
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 A tour that was crucial to Mullen’s take on the military, as Haynes (2013: 278) states: “Mullen blossomed 
intellectually during his tour as commander of U.S. Naval Forces Europe. Given that he basically had no shops 
to command, he had to find more nuanced ways to advance U.S. security policy. He grew to appreciate […] ‘soft 
power’ […] through personal relationships […] with officials from other nations, U.S. federal agencies, and 
international organizations, governmental and non-governmental alike.”  
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global initiatives under the umbrella of cooperation and common responsibility. Before sub-
mitting the strategy that became “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” (or CS-
21), Mullen’s tenure as CNO was cut unexpectedly short when he (as the first naval officer 
since the end of the Cold War) was nominated as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in 
2007. Admiral Gary Roughead, who succeeded Mullen as CNO, built on his predecessor’s 
ideas before submitting CS-21 (and other signature policies), and held the position as CNO 
between 2007 and 2011. Roughead, with experience as fleet commander in the Pacific and the 
Atlantic under his belt, was the third surface warfare office in a row to serve as Chief of Naval 
Operations. He was able to build on Mullen’s previous work, although he made some signifi-
cant alterations to his predecessor’s initiatives, both in wording and substance (Fellman 
2011).  
General Richard Myers (USAF) held the top military position as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs 
from 2001 to 2005. He had relieved General Hugh Shelton (USA), who served as CJCS from 
1997-2001. Myers was tasked with the initial planning and execution of the operations in Af-
ghanistan and against Iraq, in which the Air Force played a pivotal role. Myers’ successor was 
General Peter Pace (USMC), the first Marine to hold the position of Chairman in the history 
of the Joint Chiefs. Pace officiated from 2005-2007. After one term, he was – unexpectedly to 
many observers at the time – replaced.371 Secretary of Defense Gates recommended Admiral 
Mullen’s nomination as Chairman to President Bush in 2007 and to President Obama in 
2009.
372
 Mullen’s priorities were the advocacy of a wider security and defense focus beyond 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the reconstitution of the strained force (in particular the Army and the 
Marine Corps), and an embrace of the virtue of global partnerships and networks to confront 
the broad range of threats to U.S. security and interests. 
Mullen’s nomination was the most visible in a series of naval flag officers rising to elevated 
national security and combatant command positions. Others included the selection of Vice 
Admiral Mike McConnell as Director of National Intelligence (serving from 2007 to 2009), 
Admiral William “Bill” McRaven as Commander, Special Operations Command (since 
2011), Admiral William “Fox” Raven as Commander, Central Command (the first naval of-
ficer in that position, serving from 2007 to 2008), and Admiral Jim Stavridis as Commander, 
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 Pace’s comments over the progress of the Iraq War cost him the second nomination. There were also grave 
concerns that the confirmation hearings in the Senate would have turned into a tribunal by the Democrats to 
attack the Republican foreign and security policy under Bush 43 (Gates 2014: 64-66).  
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European Command and Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR) (serving from 
2009 to 2013).
373
  
10.3.2 Domestic Conditions  
Gallup public opinion polls showed a steady decline in the perception of terrorism threats 
between 1996 and 2001, but the number unsurprisingly rose sharply after 9/11. It leveled off 
at roughly 40 % of the participants being “worried” or “somewhat worried” (Gallup 2014). 
Domestically, the terrorist attack led to the strengthening and expansion of the national securi-
ty state. This included increasing funds for surveillance, intelligence collection, data compil-
ing and analysis, border security, and other law enforcement measures.
374
 A number of organ-
izational reviews and realignments after 9/11 revealed critical gaps in counter-terrorism poli-
cy. In response, the Department of Homeland Security was created in March 2003. It pooled 
many responsibilities for national disaster preparation and relief (among which was the U.S. 
Coast Guard, previously under the jurisdiction of the Department of Transportation). Addi-
tionally, the national intelligence and security apparatus was substantially expanded and inte-
grated. These measures reflected the momentary elevation of anti-terrorism to the top position 
of the U.S. national interest grid. This hardly changed, but certainly temporarily overshad-
owed established patterns of strategic decision-making. Security and military strategy were 
for the time being increasingly dominated by the new threat assessment. More and more funds 
poured into programs that could be justified as anti-terrorism measures. However, such wide-
ranging decisions borne from fear of terrorist attack were also a visible demonstration of the 
mixing up of internal and external security. The “War on Terrorism” was the desperate at-
tempt to fight an idea and a tactic by using military means. In effect, for many incidents that 
occurred in the 2000s, terrorism (and by implication fundamental Islam) was a convenient and 
often used template to frame such attacks, thus serving the broader narrative of the truly glob-
al struggle against terrorism. Undoubtedly, the domestic threat was real as a number of avert-
ed attacks suggest.
375
 By far, terrorism – or the perceived threat thereof to the homeland – was 
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 These tenures were not always free of confrontation with senior leadership. Mullen had complained in public 
that the war in Iraq drew necessary resources from the war in Afghanistan, Fallon had urged not to go to war 
with Iran, and McConnell gave an interview for The New Yorker in which he characterized the controversial 
interrogation tactic of water boarding as torture, all of which did not fare well with President Bush (and prompt-
ing the president to ask his secretary of Defense, ‘What is it with these admirals?’) (Gates 2014: 187).  
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Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001) which was signed into 
law on 26 October 2001. It yielded comprehensive counter-terrorism policies. The Act has been extended several 
times since, including by President Obama.  
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 For a list of 40 foiled terrorism plots on American soil since 11 September 2001, see Carafano/Zuckerman 
(2011). One of the most significant events that could not be averted, although it was not conducted by al-Qaida 
directly, was the rampage at the Fort Hood (Texas) army base on 5 November 2009. Major Nidal Hassan, a U.S. 
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not the only domestic event of note that created a new sense of national security. Natural dis-
asters also played a role in underlining the growing concern for homeland security. Two visi-
ble examples with distinct maritime dimensions were Hurricane ‘Katrina’ (August 2005)376 
and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill (April-July 2010).
377
  
Economically, the time between 2001 and 2011 was a tumultuous decade for the U.S. includ-
ing stock market crashes, deep recessions, and rising income inequality. Despite that, the U.S. 
GDP climbed by more than 10% across the decade (2000: $12.68 trillion, 2010: $14.94 tril-
lion, inflation-adjusted). Against the backdrop of a low inflation rate, modest economic 
growth during the first Bush administration was followed by a deep recession. It began as a 
subprime mortgage crisis in the summer 2007 and evolved into a full global banking and fi-
nancial crisis by the summer of 2009.
378
 In the U.S., where the jobless rate was at a modest 
rate of 4.6% in 2006 and 2007, the numbers rose sharply to 9.3% (2009) and 9.6% (2010) as 
several million jobs were lost. The problem was magnified by the return of fiscal deficits 
caused by extended government outlays. It was compounded by Bush-era policies such as tax 
cuts and increasing defense-budget spending to cover the on-going costs of overseas opera-
tions.  
For the 2009-2010 budget cycle this left the incoming Obama administration with one of the 
highest deficits since World War II (Montgomery/Connolly 2009). To bail out struggling in-
dustries such as the U.S. automobile branch, and to fund ambitious but contentious social wel-
fare programs, the Obama administration followed inclinations of deficit spending. Conse-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Army psychiatrist, killed 13 and wounded more than 30 others. It was a the deadliest shooting on a U.S. military 
base, with the rampage by a civilian contractor at the Washington Navy Yard on 16 September 2013 which left 
12 dead and 8 others wounded a close second. Hassan had been in an e-mail exchange with the American-
Yemini Islamic militant Anwar al-Awlaki, an al-Qaida associate. The incident confounded the internal and ex-
ternal dimensions of the long, straining war on terrorism and the effect that this could have on susceptible indi-
viduals. 
376
 The category 5 storm pummeled the Gulf of Mexico littorals in the summer of 2005. It devastated large areas 
in the Caribbean and from Louisiana to Florida, killing more than 1,800 people on its track and destroying large 
parts of New Orleans, Louisiana. The U.S. Navy assisted in the joint disaster response by dispatching search and 
rescue (SAR) assets and deploying a more than twenty ships – including the amphibious assault ship Bataan 
(LHD 5), the aircraft carrier Harry S Truman (CVN 75), the hospital ship Comfort (T-AH 20), and an expedi-
tionary strike group centered on Iwo Jima (LHD 7) – within days after the catastrophe. 
377
 In April 2010, not far from where the hurricane had made landfall five years earlier, the oil-drilling platform 
Deepwater Horizon exploded and sank in the Gulf of Mexico. The event left 11 dead, but the ensuing oil spill – 
the largest in U.S. history – gushed until July and polluted vast areas of the U.S. Gulf Coast. It was estimated 
that about 4.9 million barrels were uncontrollably released into the sea. The Navy’s response included 60 skim-
ming ships and boats as well as more than 300 personnel. For a detailed report of the Navy’s response to the 
Deepwater Horizon incident, see Naval Sea Systems Command, Office of the Supervisor of Salvage and Diving 
(2011).  
378
 The financial and economic collapse had its roots in flawed mortgage underwriting practices masked by com-
plex derivative financial instruments. With many U.S. citizens bogged down in debt, consumption collapsed and 
the ensuing demand shortfall created massive unemployment. 
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quently, the budget deficit situation for the U.S. has worsened continuously amidst deepening 
political infighting between Congress and the White House. To fund the operations in Af-
ghanistan, Iraq, and elsewhere, the defense budget nearly doubled, rising from $408 billion in 
2001 to $713 billion by 2010. Considerable chunks of the budget were also devoted to in-
vestments in defense procurements and the military buildup during the decade. Since 2003, 
the long-standing rule of thumb that the Army, the Air Force, and the Navy budgets would be 
roughly equal, was broken. The Army and the Marines were subject to increasing demands 
stemming from their central role in the ground wars on terrorism abroad, and consequently 
they were allocated more money. With that came a substantially increased public and political 
focus on these two branches of the military. According to Gallup polls, the Navy was seen as 
least important to national defense, ranking fourth behind the Marines, the Army, and the Air 
Force (Goldich/Swift 2014). The Navy’s story and its strategic place, it appeared, did not 
have a desired effect with the wider public, which increasingly began to grow accustomed to 
the Army and the Marines bearing the brunt of casualties in the “War on Terror”. In losing 
public support, the Navy risked undermining of the two of the three elements of a military 
service; namely (first) its purpose or role in implementing national policy and (second) the 
human and material resources it required to implement a strategic concept (Huntington 1954).  
 
Illustration 31: U.S. Defense Budget, Department of the Navy share, FY 2001-FY 2011, in FY 12 billion US-$; 
GDP DoD share in % (Swartz 2011j: 28, slide 56 and 57, slide 113). Congress failed to pass the budget for the 
FY 2011 (October 2010 – September 2011) by the deadline (30 September 2010) and the federal government 
operated on a series of continuing resolutions which kept spending at or near FY 2010 levels. The legislative 
deadlock cumulated in the threat of a government shutdown, but the budget bill was eventually enacted on 15 
April 2011.  
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Three fundamentally domestic trends regarding the composition of the force, its reputation 
across the country, and the military-industrial base are also worth of mentioning.  
 First, there was a further consolidation of the U.S. defense sector. It still centered on 
five large companies that offered across-the-board products and services (Boeing, 
General Dynamics, Lockheed Martin, Northrop-Grumman, and Raytheon).  
 Second, 2005 saw another base realignment and closure (BRAC) round.379  
 Third, the American public generally supported the comprehensive military reaction to 
9/11 and the buildup of forces that came with it. Large-scale anti-war protests were 
relatively rare occurrences, unlike the mass protest against the Vietnam War more than 
three decades earlier. However, the despicable human rights violations at the Abu 
Ghraib prison (Iraq) in 2003 and 2004, the questionable conditions at Guantanamo 
Bay Naval Base (Cuba), and the widespread practices of “enhanced interrogation prac-
tices” (or in other words, torture) caused a significant dent in the reputation of military 
and civilian leaders in the U.S. and worldwide (Hersh 2004).  
The national security consensus that emerged after 9/11 remained by-and-large intact, alt-
hough the war in Iraq became so unpopular that ending the U.S. engagement became one of 
the chief campaign issues in the 2008 Presidential election. U.S. postwar planning for Af-
ghanistan and more so for Iraq had been conducted on partially flawed expectations of short, 
decisive campaigns that could shed any nation-building tasks and quickly enable and empow-
er democratic structures. As neither the troops nor their military and political leaders seemed 
to be prepared enough for the quagmires that emerged in Southwest Asia, discontent with the 
way the wars progressed began to grow. On the home front, the flood of wounded warriors 
overwhelmed hospitals and care facilities. Extended tours for servicemen and women put se-
vere strains on many military families. It also appeared that the government bureaucracy 
(namely, the Department of Veterans Affairs) was ill-prepared for the massive numbers of 
veterans that returned from the battlefields (Gates 2014: 135-142).  
10.3.3 Selected U.S. National Security Policies, Doctrines and Capstone Documents 
It is instructive to consider the initial administration policies of the incoming Bush 43 admin-
istration in 2001 in order to understand the fundamental scope of his changed policy after the 
terrorist attacks in New York and Washington. His distinctively nationalist policies – some of 
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 In addition to merging single-service installations to create joint bases, this round eliminated or relocated 
naval air stations in Maine, Pennsylvania, Illinois, and Texas. The Naval Submarine Base in New London, Con-
necticut, and the Portsmouth Naval Shipyard in Kittery, Maine, were both removed from the initial BRAC target 
list.  
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which survived the 9/11 watershed – marked a significant contrast to the Clinton years. Early 
examples include pursuing a national missile defense (NMD) shield, dismissing the Kyoto 
Protocol (an international agreement committing signatories to reduction of greenhouse gas 
emissions in order to offset the effects of climate change), and a refusal to accept the Interna-
tional Criminal Court (ICC) as a legitimate body of international law. Bush also abrogated the 
Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. In addition, the administration did not make an effort to 
ratify the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which had been rejected by the 
U.S. Senate in 1999. The U.S. Senate also prevented the ratification of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea treaty. Perhaps most strikingly, the administration initially 
discarded the objective of nation-building as a task for the military. Instead, it proposed lean-
er, smaller, more agile forces fielding technological superiority to deter aggressors and quick-
ly attain military ends in a future conflict. In the view of the president, the military’s purpose 
was not to engage in vague, aimless, and endless deployments. Instead, the future U.S. mili-
tary was to deter wars and win the wars it was inevitably drawn into if deterrence failed.  
After 9/11, Bush’s rhetoric and many policies changed visibly. Increasingly, a dialectical 
view not unlike the one from the Cold War days came to dominate the discourse. The threat 
this time was not the Soviet Union, but international terrorism administered by the al-Qaida 
network. In his address before a joint session of Congress on 20 September, just nine days 
after the attacks, Bush began to break down the complexities of the new threat into a simpli-
fied rationalization (Bush 2001). The world consisted of two irreconcilable camps, who were 
either with the U.S. or with the terrorists; a military strike at al-Qaida was to be imminent. 
Infused with a high degree of public empathy and international support, the swift and success-
ful removal of the Taliban from power in Afghanistan seemed to vindicate the administra-
tion’s approach. Empowered by the progress, American grand strategy post-9/11 gradually 
changed to now include a stronger emphasis on regime change, preemptive warfare, and pro-
motion of democracy abroad. In the minds of the decision-makers in Washington, such 
“Wilsonianism in boots” (a term coined by the French political scientist Pierre Hassner) un-
derpinned global U.S. primacy. This approach hardened the Bush administration’s defense 
and national security policies. Buttressed by increasing spending on military hardware and 
research, development, and testing of the next-generation materiel, U.S. primacy in the global 
commons – the sea, the air, space, and cyberspace – was declared an open goal. Technological 
transformation to make use of 21
st
 century resources was paired with an intellectual transfor-
mation to adapt to the global theater. In the American view, both served to change the world 
for the better by empowering the military to face the challenges it met in the global theater. 
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This required a new mixture of conventional and unconventional warfare. After all, transna-
tional terrorist networks, the newly encountered enemy, were certainly hard to deter by nucle-
ar force, although the latter obviously remained a steadfast pillar in the American policy arse-
nal just as the U.S. sought to cover the full spectrum of warfare and deterrence.
380
  
The necessities of adapting to the new environment, however, came at an intellectual cost. 
Previously, in the early months of the Bush presidency, the focus of strategic thinking in the 
defense realm rested principally on the revolution in military affairs. Shock-and-awe strikes, 
effects-based operations, the willingness to accept certain risks, network-centric warfare, and 
precision-guided munitions were cornerstones of this loosely defined post-Cold War force 
transformation. The 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review declared (Department of Defense 
2001: 29):  
“Transformation results from the exploitation of new approaches to operational con-
cepts and capabilities, the use of old and new technologies, and new forms of organi-
zation that more effectively anticipate new or still emerging strategic and operational 
challenges and opportunities and that render previous methods of conducting war ob-
solete or subordinate.”  
“Transformation mania” (Haynes 2013: 223), a post-1990 process amplified after 2001, swept 
through the Pentagon. It quickly became the singular yardstick by which all military services 
needed to demonstrate their relevance on the battlefield of the future. By contrast, classic ob-
jectives of a forward-deployed global military such as power projection, control of vital sea 
lanes, and deterring nation states became almost a subordinate category in the thinking inside 
Washington. In principle, this constituted yet another major challenge to the Navy’s strategic 
narrative. It had to demonstrate its relevance (once again) to a public and politicians who in-
creasingly lost sight of and appreciation for sea power means and ends.  
The 2001 QDR, the second of its kind after 1997, was essentially driven by the RMA’s trans-
formation goal (Department of Defense 2001). It focused strongly on the capabilities instead 
of the threats as the yardstick against that defense planning would occur. A new strategic ob-
jective was introduced: Dubbed the 1-4-2-1 approach, the U.S. military would be postured to 
defend the homeland (an aspect hastily introduced into the force-planning metric after 9/11), 
deter threats in four critical regions worldwide (Europe, Northeast Asia, the Pacific, and the 
Middle East), be able to conduct two major combat operations (MCO), and win one of them. 
For the Navy, it included a requirement for 12 active aircraft carriers and a force-level goal of 
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 The naval leg of the U.S. nuclear triad remained a combination of Boeing E-6B Mercury airborne command 
post and relay aircraft and the SSBN fleet.  
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310 ships. In principle, this national capstone document remained rooted in pre-9/11 thinking. 
Consequently, its influence was curtailed during the tumultuous times in late 2001 and the 
emergence of a personality-focused policy that emerged over the course of 2002.
 381
 The Bush 
doctrine (understood as a set of dogmatic ideas about the importance and consequentiality of 
American principles and interests in 21
st
 century world politics [Keller 2008b: 177]), was laid 
out in his State of the Union address in January, his speech at the U.S. Military Academy at 
West Point on 1 June, and the National Security Strategy published in September. The speech 
before a joint session of Congress was the first of its kind in a number of years that focused 
heavily on foreign and security policy (traditionally, State of the Union addresses usually fo-
cus on domestic issues). In it, the President established the ground rules for the “War on Ter-
rorism”. Bush framed it in boastful non-partisan terms, reminding his audience of the ongoing 
principaled fight of good versus evil and America’s purpose in finding and bringing to trial 
those who perpetrated the attacks of September 11. He also singled out three countries in par-
ticular: North Korea, Iran, and Iraq.  
“States like these, and their terrorist allies, constitute an axis of evil, arming to threat-
en the peace of the world. By seeking weapons of mass destruction, these regimes 
pose a grave and growing danger. They could provide these arms to terrorists, giving 
them the means to match their hatred. They could attack our allies or attempt to 
blackmail the United States. In any of these cases, the price of indifference would be 
catastrophic. […] And all nations should know: America will do what is necessary to 
ensure our nation's security. We'll be deliberate, yet time is not on our side. I will not 
wait on events while dangers gather. I will not stand by as peril draws closer and clos-
er. The United States of America will not permit the world's most dangerous regimes 
to threaten us with the world's most destructive weapons.” (Bush 2002a) 
The argument devised a link between weapons of mass destruction and terrorist networks. 
Such grim rhetoric signaled a forceful, preemptive, and activist global policy underwritten by 
superior military force to deter and defeat such challengers. The singling out of three U.S. 
adversaries in particular turned the page toward more military operations beyond the opera-
tions in Afghanistan. Bush’s speech at West Point (2002b), five months after his State of the 
Union address, fleshed out some of his previous points such as the reasoning for preemptive 
warfare (“We must take the battle to the enemy, disrupt his plans and confront the worst 
threats before they emerge”) and his dichotomous world view (“We are in a conflict between 
good and evil. And America will call evil by its name“). Those notions were codified in the 
2002 National Security Strategy (The White House 2002), the third cornerstone of the Bush 
Doctrine. The document identified the combination of terrorism, tyranny, and technology – 
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i.e., weapons of mass destruction – as the key threat to U.S. security (Haine/Lindström 2002). 
It recognized the vulnerable state of U.S. hegemony and proposed a grand strategy that would 
defeat terrorism in the long run. That required an assertive use of military force on short no-
tice and the assembly of make-shift coalitions beyond practiced and established forums of 
security cooperation and mutual defense. The American military, as part of the U.S. foreign 
policy toolkit, would be employed in time-consuming, long-lasting nation-building efforts 
that – in accordance with the preemptive and preventive war mantra – needed to undertaken 
swiftly. 
The NSS 2002 elevated transnational terrorism to the top of the list of threats. Actually, ter-
rorism had been an increasingly important part in the National Security Strategies in Clinton’s 
second term. It figured high on the calendar of the National Security Council meetings, in 
particular after the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam and Nairobi in August 
1998. During the Clinton years, al-Qaida as a trans-national network was considered a bigger 
(terrorism) threat than any single terrorism-sponsoring country. In part motivated by their 
Cold War mindset, the Bush administration instead went back to a classic Reagan-era focus 
on nations as terrorism-sponsors. The thinking behind this was that a transnational terrorist 
organization could not sustain itself without the resources of a sponsoring government some-
where. More so, the Bush administration charged the Clinton administration with failing to 
control the behavior of other nations, which in their eyes resulted in the emergence of al-
Qaida and terrorist threats in the first place. Captain (ret.) Joe Bouchard characterized this as 
“the most bizarre, strategically inept conclusion […] since Pearl Harbor.” (Interview 2012, 
02:10:20 – 02:11:00) Evidence suggests that Iraq was not involved in any major terrorist at-
tack, and that it neither owned nor planned to obtain operational weapons of mass destruction 
(it did, however, have a history of employing chemical weapons in the Iran-Iraq War, 1980-
1988). Iraq’s containment had become increasingly costly and ineffective since the termina-
tion of the Gulf War and regime change in Baghdad was seen as the best way to solve that 
problem. The Iraq War began on 20 March 2003.  
The National Military Strategy (NMS) 2004, produced by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff and the National Defense Strategy (NDS) 2005, issued by the Secretary of Defense, fur-
ther elaborated on the NSS’s goals in that they supported the protection of the U.S. against 
external attacks and aggression, prevention of conflict and surprise attack, and prevailing 
against adversaries. In the face of the insurgency that began to plague Iraq in late 2003, the 
Bush Administration in March 2004 produced a major (and at the time classified) document 
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called the Strategic Planning Guidance. It laid the foundation for the NDS 2005 in that it 
forcefully shifted the American planning from transformation and reliance on expensive, ad-
vanced technology to the immediate task at hand, namely to win the simultaneous campaigns 
in Afghanistan and Iraq by conducting counterinsurgency campaigns. This effectively under-
mined the goals of the RMA. In fact, the military underwent two transformations at the same 
time. The problem was that both were leading into opposite directions. The top-down trans-
formative demands triggered by the global war on terrorism mandated a reappraisal of coun-
terinsurgency tactics and technology; these could include high-tech as much as low-tech as-
sets on the murky ground, all of which seemed long forgotten. The bottom-up transformative 
demands triggered by the revolution in military affairs (the original “transformation”) hailed 
next-generation high tech and a lean, swift, stand-off force. Together, this was an expression 
of the more complex environment where a ‘one-size-fits-all’ military was not suitable. The 
early days of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq had seemingly validated the promises of the 
revolution in military affairs, but the later stages of the wars showed the flawed assumptions 
that senior military planners had fallen prey to. Pressed by realities on the ground, U.S. strate-
gy needed to concentrate on asymmetric warfare at the expense of more established military 
roles. By all indications from the civilian leadership, this was a necessary and sensible way 
forward, because it was largely expected that the U.S. stood in the early stages of a genera-
tion-long conflict that would keep the American military very busy. In contrast, those who 
cautioned that future planning also needed to take into account other, more conventional and 
state-centric threats, had to push back against the dismissal of their arguments.  
The National Military Strategy and the National Defense Strategy top-level documents were 
the attempt to square that circle. They remained the principal statements on the military’s role 
in the ways-means-ends relationship described by the NSS. Among other things, they called 
for more fully integrated, expeditionary, networked, decentralized, adaptable forces that 
would master decision superiority and provide lethality when needed. This occurred against 
the background of the ongoing war against terrorism, the further enhancement of joint war-
fighting, and the transformation of the force for the future (Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of 
Staff 2004: viii). The 2003-2004 realization that the war in Iraq (after major combat opera-
tions were declared over) might not go as planned for the U.S. provided an unwarranted but 
timely shock to policy and strategic planners.  
Bush secured a second term as President of the United States (after defeating Democrat can-
didate John Kerry in the 2004 election). Against the background of a deteriorating security 
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situation in Iraq and the ongoing global war on terrorism (including the hunt for Osama bin 
Laden), preparations for the next QDR went ahead. The Bush White House published its (se-
cond) National Security Strategy in mid-March 2006, a month and a half after the QDR (The 
White House 2006; Department of Defense 2006b). Traditionally, whereas the QDR focuses 
on national defense in general and defense procurement issues in particular, the NSS takes a 
strategic perspective in the broadest of terms. It is thus remarkable that the overarching 
whole-of-government National Security Strategy was presented only after the Department of 
Defense strategy, when the causal and logical chain of events should have been the other way 
around. In the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense England (Department of Defense 2006a: 
3), the QDR was designed to enable the Pentagon to “continue to move in the direction of 
speed, agility, precision and lethality in force posture, shifting emphasis farther away from the 
Cold War construct.” However, the responses to the terrorist attacks chastened the momentum 
for transformation of the military. Instead, doctrines such as a 21
st
-century counterinsurgency 
plan (then in development) were increasingly occupying the minds of senior planners.  
The QDR 2006 was, at its core, a capstone document developed during wartime. Neverthe-
less, the QDR’s new threat matrix of four challenges to U.S. security – irregular, catastrophic, 
traditional, and disruptive – committed the military to increase cooperative measures with 
each other and develop and deepen partnerships with other nations as well. For the military, 
the QDR prescribed a combination of extended expeditionary operations that expanded the 
focus beyond fighting two nation states nearly simultaneously. Its objective was to better ad-
dress the four major challenges of defeating terrorist networks, defending the homeland, shap-
ing the actions of rising powers like China, and preventing state and non-state actors from 
gaining access to weapons of mass destruction (Gunzinger 2013: 10). In addition, the QDR 
proposed to increase forces in the Pacific, effectively preempting the “rebalance to Asia” that 
filled many commentators’ notepads in the 2010s.382 The Navy planned to adjust its force 
posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and sustainable CVNs and 
60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence, and deterrence (De-
partment of Defense 2006b: 47). The 2006 National Security Strategy reaffirmed the theme of 
a nation at war. The concepts of the previous, 2002 National Security Strategy were reiterated 
and progress in selected areas was assessed. Significantly, the close link between the promo-
tion of democracy and economic participation worldwide on the one hand and U.S. security 
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 The Department of Defense’s Global Defense Posture Review from 2002-2004 had already mandated an 
increase in Pacific bases while conducting a drawdown in European bases. It also demanded a more adaptive and 
flexible network of operating locations (Swartz 2011j: 43, slide 86).  
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and well-being on the other hand was underlined. Such emphasis placed a premium on the 
systemic value of joint and interagency forces, i.e., those working to improve good govern-
ance in areas of interest and those – naval/maritime forces – that would secure and keep open 
maritime trade routes.
383
 This system was understood as one based on rules, and maritime and 
naval forces were consequently seen as most appropriate means to enforce these rules. 
The QDR and the NSS 2006 were the two last major grand strategic and national defense cap-
stone documents of the Bush era.
384
 The major national capstone documents of the new 
Obama administration (during the first half of the first term) included the National Security 
Strategy and Quadrennial Defense Review that were issued in 2010 (The White House 2010, 
Department of Defense 2010). The NSS struck a markedly more somber, less ambitious tone 
than Bush’s documents had. As Obama’s first such work, it tried “to blend the idealism of Mr. 
Obama’s campaign promises with the realities of his confrontations with a fractious and 
threatening world” (Sanger/Baker 2010). The QDR was the sixth full-scale post-Cold War 
force review after the 1990 Base Force analysis, the 1993 Bottom-Up Review, and the three 
previous QDRs completed in 1997, 2001, and 2006. The 2010 QDR’s objectives included 
recalibrating U.S. defense priorities to support the ongoing campaigns in Southwest Asia, 
while trying to strike a balance between the established two-aggressor standard that had been 
used as a force-sizing measure and a broadened approach. The force review outlined four na-
tional security objectives – prevailing in today’s wars, prevention and deterrence of conflict, 
preparation to defeat adversaries in a wide range of contingencies, and preservation and en-
hancement of an all-volunteer force. Regarding the Navy, the QDR described a force size for 
the fiscal years 2011-2015 of 255-289 ships plus strategic ballistic missile submarines, ships 
with prepositioning equipment, and 51 strategic sealift vessels (Swartz 2011j: 43, slide 85). 
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 On 20 September 2005, the Bush administration released its first “National Strategy for Maritime Security” 
(the only such document to date) (The White House 2005). The year before, the Departments of Defense (for the 
Navy/Marine Corps) and Homeland Security (for the Coast Guard) were directed by the President to develop a 
comprehensive policy to coordinate and integrate their respective policies regarding threats to security and good 
order at sea and in port stemming from illegal activity such as terrorism, organized crime, and sabotage. For the 
Navy, these activities fall under military operations other than war (MOOTW). The strategy signaled the devel-
opment of eight individual plans on key areas of maritime security. The National Strategy for Maritime Security 
is not a Navy capstone document per definition because it lacked the sustained involvement of the Navy De-
partment’s strategy shop and the signature of the CNO or the Secretary of the Navy. Its level of ambition is dif-
ferent from that of the capstone documents discussed here.  
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 Beyond the principal period of research interest to this study, the flow of overarching strategic defense docu-
ments continued into the 2010s (for a list of Bush and Obama era national security directives and policy reviews, 
see Swartz 2011j: 50-56, slides 100-112 The latest QDR (2014) and the Defense Planning Guidance (2012) offer 
points of reference and their influence and relevance to American sea power but remain beyond the focus of this 
study.  
  
268 
10.4 Developing and Promulgating USN Strategy (2001-2011)  
The Navy’s first capstone document came out in the year after the assaults of 9/11. Over the 
course of the decade, the U.S. Navy published fourteen capstone documents of strategic, de-
claratory intent (some of which remain classified and thus unavailable to public analysis), 
almost twice the number as in the 1990s. They were self-titled visions, concepts, strategic 
plans, strategic guidance, or just a simple plan (speaking once again to the overwhelming and 
confusing power of semantics in the world of military and U.S. Navy strategy). A list of these 
strategic documents from 2001 to 2011 (including their classification status) is below.  
Name Self-titled format Year Status 
Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS Vision 2002 unclassified 
Naval Power 21 … A Naval Vision Vision 2002 unclassified 
Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations Concept 2003 unclassified 
Fleet Response Plan Plan 2003 unclassified 
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 
 
Strategic Plan 
 
2006 
2006 
secret 
unclassified 
Naval Operations Concept Concept 2006 unclassified 
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 Strategic Plan 2007 secret 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century 
Seapower 
Strategy 2007 unclassified 
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (Ch 1) Strategic Plan 2007 secret 
Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11 Strategic Guidance 2009 secret 
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 Strategic Plan 2009 secret 
Naval Operations Concept  Concept 2010 unclassified 
Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare Doctrine 2010 unclassified 
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 Strategic Plan 2010 secret 
Illustration 32: USN capstone documents 2001-2011 (Swartz 2011i: 2, slide 3, 77, slide 153, and 140, slide 280).  
The large number of documents reflected the broad uncertainty that surrounded the Navy’s 
role in coping with the political and military consequences of 9/11 and the attempt to develop 
a larger maritime and more systemic narrative regarding the use of sea power (toward the end 
of the decade). Both aspects in part echoed divergent expectations in the Navy and the Penta-
gon about what the future of U.S. military engagements worldwide would look like (in other 
words, whether the United States needed to plan for a long, asymmetric, generational war 
against terrorists and other hybrid state/non-state actors, or whether the post-9/11 expedition-
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ary operations reflected a departure from the norm of planning for state-on-state conflicts). 
The plurality of documents is thus also a function of an environment where Secretary 
Rumsfeld reasserted civilian management over the Joint Staff and the services. During the 
Rumsfeld years, Admiral Vern Clark, an emphatically operations- and resources-oriented 
CNO, played along. To the CNO and many of his senior staff, strategy that went beyond the 
next budget submission (designed to legitimize the Navy’s programs) was a lesser-included 
task at best. Consequently, Clark’s selective actions in establishing strategic-thinking subor-
dinate offices were erratic and weakened strategic naval planning when it was arguably need-
ed most in the years of the emerging Bush Doctrine. In addition to N51 (the Strategy and Pol-
icy Division itself) there were no less than four separate offices under the OPNAV umbrella 
working on five partially overlapping strategy projects during 2002 and 2003.
385
 Consequent-
ly, confusion and rivalry ensued. Effective strategy-making was impoverished. Clarke’s ten-
ure was characterized by a significant disparity between the number and quality of strategic 
planners in the Navy and their actual, lasting, and sustainable output (Haynes 2013: 225-226). 
After Rumsfeld’s demission and with CNO Mullen at the helm, the Navy was reenergized.  
Only in the second half of the decade, with the preparation and publication of “A Cooperative 
Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower” (2007) and the subsequent “Naval Operations Concept” 
(2010) under CNOs Mike Mullen and Gary Roughead, respectively, did the fog of war lift 
with respect to Navy strategic thinking. Products were better coordinated and streamlined. 
Processes were optimized, thus ending a period of strategic under-ambition and naval-
strategic disarray.  
10.4.1 Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS 
a) Evolution 
The first concerted effort to create a strategy for the 21
st
 century resulted in “Sea Power 21”, a 
multi-volume series of articles including a global Concept of Naval Operations (CONOPS) 
(Clark 2002b). “Sea Power 21” was signed by CNO Clark and other admirals. It originated 
from the Strategic Action Group (N00K) and the Assessments Division (N81). As an unclas-
sified vision, it appeared in the Navy’s professional magazine, Proceedings, in back-to-back 
issues between October 2002 and January 2004 (Clark 2002a, Corbett/Goulding 2002, 
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 These were “Deep Blue”, the Navy’s former QDR cell which was expanded after 9/11 to evolve into a dis-
tinct operationally focused multi-purpose think tank; N00Z, the code for the Strategic Actions Group which like 
“Deep Blue” also reported directly to the CNO and which took over a number of tasks from the CNO’s executive 
panel, code-named N00K; N00K itself, which retained some strategy-making projects; the Strategy and Con-
cepts branch (N513) which was still tasked with the big picture of connecting strategy and operations; and N81, 
the Assessments Division that held the important access to integrated program planning (Haynes 2013: 225-
226).  
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Bucchi/Mullen 2002, Dawson/Nathman 2002, Moore/Hanlon 2003, Mayo/Nathman 2003, 
Mullen 2003, Harms/Hoewing/Totushek 2003, Natter 2003, and Mullen 2004). In parallel, it 
was posted on the internet and published as a stand-alone pamphlet. In referencing the three 
most influential Navy strategies to date – “The Maritime Strategy” (1986), “…From the Sea” 
(1992), and “Forward… From the Sea” (1994) – “Sea Power 21” forged a bridge to what it 
considered efficient declarations of naval intent and placed itself in a historical context. It was 
also tied to previous documents such as the “Naval Strategic Planning Guidance” 
(1999/2000). The publication date reflected that the Bush administration had settled in office 
and that it continuously pushed its transformation agendas. With “Sea Power 21”, the Navy 
presented itself as fully integrated into the joint force. It finally (at least on paper) embraced 
the mandate of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act. Critics, however, found a number of prob-
lem areas, including budgets. They slammed the Navy for pursuing an unattainable budget 
goal in light of available funds (although defense spending was substantially on the rise fol-
lowing 9/11). The 375-ship goal that was the hallmark of CNO Clark’s plan was never 
reached. The tactical focus of “Sea Power 21” and its companion piece (Global CONOPS) 
was also subject to criticism. The recital of concepts and programs potentially overshadowed 
the core messages of the capstone document (Haynes describes it as a “complex, sprawling, 
and multi-faceted beast” [2013:233] and “janus-faced” [ibid: 239]). “Sea Power 21” neverthe-
less retained considerable influence within OPNAV and other Navy commands. It instigated 
internal frameworks and organizing templates within OPNAV for the rest of the decade. It 
was promoted by referring to it frequently in speeches and congressional testimony by senior 
Navy leaders throughout the 2000s. It was also relatively catchy and easy to remember; but in 
all of that, the document was much more influential inside the service than as an external 
statement of Navy vision (Swartz 2011i: 27-30, slides 53-60).  
b) Strategic Concept 
“Sea Power 21” emphasized presence of naval forces in a given theater of operations, perhaps 
in part energized by the Navy’s swift role in the military response to 9/11. Within hours, naval 
assets had redeployed to provide the initial capabilities for the combat action that were to fol-
low. The Navy was able to demonstrate to senior military leaders that their organic, carrier-
borne strike warfare was just as good as that of the Air Force, yet had exceptional advantages 
in flexibility, sustainability, speed, and diplomatic ramifications courtesy of sea power. Such 
joint assimilation dovetailed with the promotion and value of naval presence. It echoed con-
cepts of the Cold War derived from the understanding that forward defense-in-depth as well 
as sea and area control required geographically-pulled forward forces.  
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Based on this rationale, it was assumed that with the rising threat of terrorist attacks and 
WMD proliferation, U.S. bases ashore might be increasingly at risk. Therefore, “Sea Power 
21” elevated sea-basing (using the sea as a staging area) to a preferable course of action. 
Thus, “Sea Power 21” represented a confirmation of the close affiliation between the Navy 
and the Marine Corps to command the littorals and project power ashore.
386
 The return to fo-
cus on global joint operations signaled a farewell to the previous planning metric (just two 
“major” combat operations) and its more regional focus (Swartz 2011i: 18, slide 36). The 
Global CONOPS underwrote such developments visibly. It served to implement the QDR 
2001’s “1-4-2-1” planning metric, but it emphasized global presence and dispersed combat 
striking power, and it also downgraded the importance of forward hubs (a convenient cover-
up of the Navy’s inability to maintain and the political leadership’s unwillingness to fund 
three forward hubs as it did during the Cold War: the Mediterranean was the one to give way). 
The force repackaging (with the integration of SSGN submarines and BMD surface ships) 
was designed to provide flexible combat response capability. “Sea Power 21” used the easily 
identifiably prefix “Sea” to convey its networked and integrated thinking. At sea, Sea Strike 
(power projection, ISR, information operations, force delivery/insertion), Sea Shield (sea-
based theater and strategic defense, and homeland defense), and Sea Basing (enabler for Sea 
Strike and Sea Shield) were to be facilitated by FORCEnet (the only deliberate divergence 
from the prefix), which in turn was understood as the information-age integrating glue that 
would bind the three former concepts together. Sea Warrior (the recruitment of the future 
force), Sea Trial (research, development, testing, and rapid fielding of superior equipment), 
and Sea Enterprise (streamlining the Navy’s business practices to identify efficiencies in eve-
ry part of the service) were designed as the ashore components. These measures were rooted 
in the hailed management principles of Lean 6 Sigma. Behind this fancy vocabulary lurked 
established naval missions: sea control, deterrence, power projection, forward presence (Ad-
miral Turner’s ‘classic 4’), and sealift.  
“Sea Power 21” was an ambitious attempt to square a circle: it attempted to innovatively ad-
dress both the strike warfare demands of combatant commanders in theater and those ashore, 
and at the same time identify cost efficiencies to fund the expansion of the fleet. Its legacy is 
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 One of the key assets to this was the USMC-backed Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future) – or MPF(F) – 
concept. It argued for the construction of tailored vessels to continue the strategic forward-stationing of materiel 
around the globe in regions of U.S. interest. In some Navy circles, making sea basing a pillar of the Navy’s cap-
stone document represented an unwarranted concession to the USMC (Swartz 2011i: 26, slide 51).  
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therefore more of a managerial, internal one.
387
 Compared to previous Navy statements from 
the 1990s, it benefited from the higher degree of certainty regarding the threats that the U.S. 
faced: Terrorism, failing states, conventional (asymmetric) warfare, A2AD, organized crime, 
and WMD and their direct relation to (U.S.) homeland security were all encompassed in “Sea 
Power 21”. The document represented an important step of the U.S. Navy toward becoming a 
“post-modern” force (Lundesgaard 2011: 18). Such systemic navies do not limit themselves 
to the classic roles of naval forces (i.e., protection of sea lanes, delivery of combat power 
ashore, etc.), but also guard the global system and its underlying values. They do so by sea 
control, expeditionary operations, enforcing good order at sea, and a broad cooperative 
maintenance of the maritime consensus (Till 2009: 7). Precision-strike warfare, however, re-
mained at the core of even the most post-modern navies. This emphasizes that naval strategy 
was evolutionary, not revolutionary. It also underlined the comprehensive tasks navies had to 
deal with in the beginning of the 21
st
 century. Finally, it suggested how difficult it can be for 
navies to adapt to rapidly changing environments.  
10.4.2 Naval Power 21 … A Naval Vision 
a) Evolution 
The following capstone document, “Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision” (England et al. 2002) 
struck a similar note. It was signed by Secretary of the Navy England, CNO Clark, and the 
Commandant of the Marine Corps, General James Jones. The unclassified short pamphlet was 
distributed exclusively via the internet. In principle, this document sought to staple the mes-
sages of the Navy’s “Sea Power 21” and the Marine Corps’ own “Strategy 21”388 together and 
distinguish them with the Secretary’s endorsement – who saw the benefit of thus promoting 
his own agenda. It was the first truly joint Navy-Marine Corps (naval) strategic capstone doc-
ument since “Forward… From the Sea” (1994). The six-page self-ascribed vision was au-
thored by OPNAV’s “Deep Blue” think tank, securing contribution from OPNAV N513. Per-
sonalities involved included the Secretary of the Navy, Captain Will Dossel (N513), and Rear 
Admiral – later full admiral, Commander U.S. European Command (USEUCOM), and Su-
preme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) – James G. “Jim” Stavridis (the document, for 
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 This is not necessarily a negative verdict keeping in mind that the promulgation of strategy must go hand in 
hand with its implementation, or in other words: Making strategy and executing it are two sides of the same coin. 
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 “Marine Corps Strategy 21” was published on 3 November 2000. It emphasized readiness, expeditionary 
culture of the service, combined arms (air, ground, and logistics) approach, and the Task Force organization of 
the Corps. Moreover, it reaffirmed the Corps’ intimate relationship with the Navy, promulgated the capability of 
integrating it into the Joint Force, emphasized the value of reservists, and spoke to providing – with the Navy – 
forcible entry from the sea (in other words, amphibious capabilities and vertical/horizontal insertion) (Depart-
ment of the Navy 2000b: 2).  
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lack of conceptual leverage, remained most remarkable for the involvement of these individu-
als and the signatures of the three Navy Department and service leaders) (Swartz 2011i: 33, 
slide 65).  
b) Strategic Concept 
 “Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision” (2002) fell far behind strategic aspirations. Its limited 
impact inside and outside the Navy can be attributed to its unfortunate timing – it was simply 
overshadowed by other Navy-related capstone documents. In addition, Secretary England did 
little to rally consensus for his document. The cost-effectiveness measures that the document 
proposed had little leverage in the big picture (and the proposed growth in fleet size by 25% 
not even closely materialized). More precisely, “Naval Power 21” worked with a force-
planning metric that reiterated ideas that could be found in preceding documents, but these 
were not strategic missions. Its 3/4/8 framework contained three fundamental pillars – assured 
access, fighting to win, and continuous transformation – as well as four “fundamental quali-
ties of naval forces”: decisiveness, sustainability, responsiveness, and agility. It also reiterated 
the seven distinct concepts that were already seen in “Seapower 21” (Sea Strike, Sea Shield, 
Sea Basing enabled by FORCEnet, and Sea Warrior, Sea Trial, and Sea Enterprise) (Swartz 
2011i: 38, slide 75). On balance, the impact of “Naval Power 21” on other Navy strategic 
capstone publications, the Navy, or the strategic community was minimal at best. It did initi-
ate the next capstone document, however. 
10.4.3 Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations  
a) Evolution 
The development of a new operational concept was a task that was identified in “Naval Power 
21” (2002). Consequently, a concept that addressed the Navy’s and the Marine Corps’ joint 
operational contribution to national defense was signed in April 2003 by CNO Clark and the 
(new) CMC General Michael Hagee (USMC) (Department of the Navy 2003a). It was unclas-
sified and published on the web shortly thereafter. The “Naval Operations Concept for Joint 
Operations” aimed to close the ranks of the Navy and the Marine Corps in that it was de-
signed as the Navy Department’s consensual contribution to the “Joint Operations Concepts” 
(JOC).
389
 Drafted by OPNAV’s N513 and the Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
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 The JOC was published by Secretary Rumsfeld in November 2003. It outlined how the U.S. military intended 
to operate in the coming 15 to 20 years, proposing to link the larger strategic guidance of the Bush administra-
tion to the integrated application of military capabilities. As such, it presented itself as the conceptual framework 
and guidance for future joint operations and across-the-board concept development and experimentation. This 
would include “the development and acquisition of new capabilities through changes in doctrine, organization, 
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(MCCDC) in 2002, the paper was completed by the Naval Warfare Development Command 
(NWDC) and MCCDC in 2003. It proposed to outline how the two naval services would op-
erate across the spectrum of military operations through the year 2020. Whereas the document 
sought to meet the “1-4-2-1” metric mandated by overarching strategic documents (QDR 
2001, NSS 2002), it drew criticism for its inability to set real priorities. As Swartz noted 
(2011i: 51, slide 102), the Navy and the Marine Corps covered nothing less than the whole 
playing field. The operating concept wanted to provide a rationale for surge forces at home 
and forward presence, outlined near-term, mid-term, and long-term (to 2020) visions, dis-
cussed how to meet conventional and unconventional threats, and surveyed nation-state and 
non-state adversaries. The document cited and underscored the ideas that were proposed in 
“Sea Power 21” and the Global CONOPS. Not unlike “Naval Power 21”, it had little lasting 
impact beyond the doctrinal commands. “Naval Power 21” and the “Naval Operating Concept 
for Joint Operations” were small pieces in a larger puzzle, namely how to generate more effi-
cient and effective combat naval input for U.S. strategy; these documents did not speak to the 
larger political roles and goals of naval forces in peace, crisis, and war and thus remained lim-
ited in impact.  
b) Strategic Concept 
The document pitched a long-term temporal horizon (until 2020), but its primary focus was 
the currently serving Navy and Marine Corps officers corps. That internal audience, so the 
reasoning went, needed to be brought on the same page regarding their joint operations, not 
their strategy (that could happen later). Such a technical, sea-operational paper that sought to 
strengthen the Navy-Marine Corps consensus on issues like sea-basing provided little in the 
sense of a larger sea-strategic concept; it simply reaffirmed what had been said before, thus 
providing little emotion and innovation (the specific linkage to Special Operations Forces 
[SOF] concepts can be considered an exception to prove the rule). If anything, the “Naval 
Operating Concept for Joint Operations” advocated a more capability-based approach versus 
generic state/non-state, conventional, and unconventional threats. This essentially reprised the 
Navy’s long-standing narrative, but lacked any more comprehensive explanation of American 
sea power. In the following months and years, the document foundered because it was hardly 
embraced by the Navy Department leadership. It was seldom mentioned in successive 
speeches and testimony and was eclipsed by larger strategic capstone documents such as “Sea 
Power 21”.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
training, materiel, leadership and education, personnel and facilities (DOTMLPF)” (Department of Defense 
2003: 4).  
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10.4.4 Fleet Response Plan 
a) Evolution 
It was up to the “Fleet Response Plan” (FRP) to address a looming shortcoming connected 
with the Navy’s traditional forward-deployed culture (Department of the Navy 2003b). Prior 
to 2003 (from about 1986), the Navy dispatched its carrier groups on the predictable basis of 
the 18-month Inter-Deployment Training Cycle (IDTC). Mandated by the complexity of a 
deployment in an overseas area of operations (with the Fifth, Sixth, and Seventh Fleet), the 
associated maintenance and work-up (including training, equipping, and manning) were cali-
brated so that a given unit had a relatively secure planning schedule. Between their six-month 
long tours on station, there was a total of twelve months reserved in the schedule for post-
operational power-down, repairs, and preparation until the carrier (and its escorting ships) put 
to sea again.
390
 On the one hand, this was sensible to reduce wear and tear on the machinery, 
and allow relatively reliable personnel planning. On the other hand, it appeared that the surge 
potential of the force was not being utilized. In the words of Bush-era Undersecretary of De-
fense for Personnel and Readiness David Chu, “There is in the Navy and Marine Corps a sub-
stantial portion of the structure that is unavailable to the president on short notice, short of 
heroic measures” (citied in Swartz 2011i: 64, slide 128).  
The “Fleet Response Plan” was designed to modify that. Its focus on readiness and speed of 
response were planned to better align the Navy’s culture and operational practices with the 
crisis response and anti-terror needs of the Bush administration. Preemptive military action 
was a hallmark of the 2002 National Security Strategy – much like Operation Iraqi Freedom 
(2003) – and required a substantial surge capability on the part of naval forces. In the minds 
of the planners, such actions hardly allowed a 12-month planning schedule. Instead, anticipa-
tion of more short-notice campaigns like OIF reigned. For that, the Navy needed to be ready 
and deployable. Consequently, OPNAV’s “Deep Blue” cell developed – and later passed on 
to the Commander, Fleet Forces Command (then Admiral Robert Natter) for refining – a con-
cept that altered maintenance and deployment cycles accordingly. As a warranted side effect, 
it would henceforth also be more difficult for American adversaries to pre-calculate U.S. car-
rier presence off their coast. The “Fleet Response Plan” appeared in the spring of 2003 and 
included a metric that had six carrier strike groups (CSG) deployable within 30 days (with 
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 This schedule explains the demand for three warships of a certain class/type if one unit is to be operational 
and deployed at any given time; the second unit is on post-deployment stand-down while the third warship is on 
pre-deployment work-up.  
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additional surge of CSG within 90 days).
391
 The new readiness mandate was accompanied by 
a public relations campaign and comprehensively tested in the exercise Summer Pulse 04 
which incorporated the near-simultaneous forward operation of seven CSGs around the world. 
In the exercises Valiant Shield 2006 and 2007 in the Pacific, three CSGs tested their simulta-
neous operating capabilities.  
This demonstrated that the Navy embraced short-notice surges as a coming fact of life. These 
aspects form the true legacy of the program, the last capstone document that bore the signa-
ture of CNO Clark. However, it could only thinly veil that by 2004 the Iraq War exposed and 
unraveled the American strategic approach to war-fighting. The U.S. military for too long 
hailed its transformed, reductionist and even minimalist strike warfare based on information 
dominance. In the face of the mounting insurgency in Iraq, the U.S. military had to redefine 
the larger political purpose for which wars would be undertaken in the first place. Even 
though the NDS 2005 (with its focus on forward-deployed defense-in-depth homeland de-
fense, security of access to strategic regions, building and fostering of alliances, and estab-
lishment of favorable security conditions worldwide) presented the Navy in principle with a 
chance to underline its inherent capabilities through orchestrating military, constabulary, and 
diplomatic roles, it was unable to embrace that. More dramatically, the strategic shift that 
drove the NDS 2005 rendered the Navy’s “Sea Power 21” focus on precision-strike power 
projection warfare unfashionable. Consequently, the service descended into its most funda-
mental institutional crisis since the 1970s (Haynes 2013: 262-263). To add insult to injury, the 
Navy also faced a dramatic budget and shipbuilding cutback. Shipbuilding had been low on 
Clark’s list of priorities because he was more concerned with readiness and cost efficiencies. 
However, the money his activities saved was not reinvested in the Navy and went to fund 
U.S. Army and Marine Corps operations in Iraq instead.  
b) Strategic Concept 
On the sea-strategic level, naval presence can be a valuable asset for deterrence, coercion, and 
defense-in-depth policy; for example, the leading role of naval forces in the early stages of 
OEF and OIF, respectively, had demonstrated that to U.S. policy-makers. For the Navy, the 
regional commanders had already based their requirements for assets on the notion of “com-
bat-credible forward presence”. But if presence became an end in itself, it risked being too 
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 From 2007, it included three CSG on deployment, three more deployable within a month’s notice, and one 
deployable within 90 days. The same year, the rigorous scheme was somewhat relaxed for the carriers as the 
“Fleet Response Plan” was extended to the Expeditionary Strike Groups and the total number of Navy carriers 
fell from 12 to 11 between 2004 and 2007. John F. Kennedy (CV 67), although in commission, did not deploy 
(Swartz 2011i: 68, slides 135-136).  
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predictable and detached from the larger strategic picture. Under a national policy that re-
quired services to be better prepared for more surged deployments in an era where one third 
of overseas bases were slated for closure, the Navy’s whole force structure was threatened. 
The president’s strategic direction meanwhile was not so much concerned about where a fu-
ture enemy would fight, but how. Consequently, the “Fleet Response Plan” (2003) signaled an 
intellectual change from the Navy’s cultural fixation on scheduled forward presence towards 
emphasizing the surge capabilities of the fleet. The plan’s main thrust – presence – spoke for 
itself; larger strategic rationales were not discussed. Such a forced, top-down cultural re-
education can be a problematic exercise for it requires the generic change that often rapidly 
alters the ground rules which the individuals at the bottom signed up to. For example, extend-
ed readiness status undermined the planning reliability of sailors, which in turn had an ad-
verse effect on retention. Conceptually, one of the major shortcomings of the “Fleet Response 
Plan” was that the war on terrorism was its only policy driver. It was too narrowly focused on 
readiness to surge instead of framing it within a comprehensive Navy narrative (Swartz 2011i: 
70, slide 140). It was too carrier-centric and hardly mentioned other components of the bal-
anced fleet and the routine deployments that could bring about strategic effects as well; in 
short, it did not situate itself well into the broad American sea power narrative.
392
 With the 
publication of the Pentagon’s Security Cooperation Guidance (which underlined the need in-
creased cooperative focus of the U.S. military with foreign defense establishments), the Navy 
found itself on a fine line between having to demonstrate its surge capabilities while continu-
ously fulfilling forward presence cooperative needs (Haynes 2013: 250-251).  
Interregnum: The influx of fresh ideas  
It was up to Vice Admiral John Morgan Jr., from August 2004 on serving as the new Director 
of OPNAV’s N3/N5 division (Plans, Policies, and Operations), to provide the Navy with a 
broader and fresher perspective on the strategic environment and, more importantly, the fun-
damental role of American sea power in it. He was the key driver within OPNAV for a genu-
inely new maritime strategy that went beyond annual reports or budget requests. Morgan ar-
gued that the Navy needed a coherent, overarching strategy that would place the service – or 
in other words, naval assets in the broadest sense – into the maritime overall component, 
which in turn buttressed U.S. military and grand strategy. He and his staff developed a narra-
tive that would reach from the bottom end to the higher echelons.  
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 Still, the Navy’s program was well-received with senior policy-makers such as the Secretary of Defense. 
Consecutive naval leaders would also return to the “Fleet Response Plan” in their own speeches, testimonies and 
documents (especially the surge portion) for the remainder of the decade although it has yet to be fully endorsed 
and implemented as a national policy, part of the joint force (Swartz 2011i: 75, slide 149). 
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In January 2005 Morgan and Rear Admiral Charles Martoglio (Director of OPNAV’s Strate-
gy and Policy Division, N51) briefed a new initiative that set out to rearrange the Navy’s joint 
capabilities. It became known as the “3/1 Strategy” (although its accompanying slide remind-
ed many of a feral limb, thus coining the more colloquial description of ‘Bear Paw’ [Depart-
ment of the Navy 2005]). Although it never made it beyond draft status, it served as a point of 
departure for the capstone documents that followed. The paper’s fundamental innovation was 
that it reshaped the understanding of the Navy’s principle missions. Along with the enduring 
need to be prepared for major combat operations, the new model described Homeland Securi-
ty and Defense, Stability Operations, and the Global War on Terror as three distinct areas that 
demanded specialized capabilities. They could – and indeed should – no longer be understood 
as subsets of the pre-9/11 planning metric that had outlined two major regional con-
flicts/major theater wars as governing force-planning. Such a bold move emphasized that the 
Navy could succeed in the traditional and the non-traditional mission set, but only when it 
was forward-deployed. Inside the Navy, such notions met some concerted resistance, for in-
stance by those blue-water navy advocates who found that the service had indeed adapted to 
use high-end capabilities being used for lesser tasks.  
Under Admiral Mike Mullen, the new CNO from July 2005, the Navy gravitated toward a 
more formalized and structuralized process of drafting its capstone objectives. Once in office, 
Mullen aggressively pursued an analysis of the Navy’s composition, fleet size, and according 
shipbuilding budget.
393
 The Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 (2006) was the first document 
that Mullen was responsible for. Two signature initiatives, the “1,000-ship Navy” and “Global 
Fleet Stations” were developed at the time by CNO Mullen and his major collaborator, Depu-
ty CNO Morgan. These were a departure from the strike focus and a fundamentally novel 
version of U.S. power projection.  
The “1,000-ship Navy” was based on the understanding that maritime security was the re-
sponsibility of likeminded, international partners. In an environment that had gained vast 
complexity through the interdependencies that were created by globalization, the “1,000-ship 
Navy” was the tool that knit together navies, coast guards, and maritime constabulary units in 
a self-organizing and self-governing cooperative security network. Together, this global coast 
guard could pursue the protection of ports and harbors, territorial waters, the high seas and the 
international straits from terrorists, pirates, illegal migration, human smuggling, drug traffick-
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 He also publically fired Vice Admiral Joe Sestak, Deputy CNO for Warfare Requirements and Programs 
(N6/N7), a protégé of Mullen’s predecessor CNO Clark. 
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ing, environmental abuse, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (Mor-
gan/Martoglio 2005: 14).
394
 “Global Fleet Stations” (GFS), another project shepherded by 
Vice Admiral Morgan, was a project that emerged from N00Z and N5’s Strategy and Con-
cepts office (N5SC) in OPNAV. In an unpublished draft White Paper (cited in Haynes 2013: 
297), the concept was described as a self-sustaining base comprised of one of more large am-
phibious ships that (safe for the occasional port visit) lingered off a country’s coast to play 
host and coordinate the activities of U.S. small-craft and riverine boats, helicopters, trainers, 
engineers, explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) teams, salvage divers, medical teams, U.S. 
federal agencies, NGOs, and others. GFS were to operate in cooperation with host nations and 
support those ships and units of other nations that cooperated with the U.S. Navy in a particu-
lar region. For both ends, maritime domain awareness, or MDA (the pooling and sharing of 
actionable intelligence accumulated from commercial maritime traffic identification systems 
such as automated identification systems [AIS]) was promoted as a measure to track ships at 
sea and significantly improve the situational picture. Knowing what happened at sea was de-
signed as a means for drastically improved understanding and oversight. It also offered the 
opportunity to cooperate with likeminded navies and coast guards worldwide. In principle, 
such an approach substantially limited the need for a costly and potentially politically conten-
tious footprint ashore. Such support functions were now elevated to reflect the conceptual 
adaptation to the demands of the early 2000s. That vocabulary and the underlying concepts 
that were behind it – although the “1,000-ship Navy” was quickly changed into a less-
unilateralist (and perhaps less-Reagan-era) sounding “Global Maritime Partnership” – reso-
nated throughout the Navy and its capstone documents. Many foreign partners (some of them 
still troubled by the Iraq War) remained skeptical of the concept. It reminded them of Ameri-
can unilateralism, militarization of foreign and security policy, and canon-boat diplomacy.  
10.4.5 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08  
a) Evolution 
The “Navy Strategic Plan” was designed to support the FY 2008 budget submission and the 
2006 QDR, both of which were due within a few weeks (Department of Defense 2006c). That 
put a high degree of pressure on the drafters, a momentous task given the need for collabora-
tion, coordination, management buy-in, and consensus-building in a wired and complex bu-
reaucracy such as OPNAV. Although the capstone document was a single-service, top-down 
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 The challenge of how to respond if the new cooperative concept drew out navies that were not exactly allies, 
such as the Chinese, was not openly addressed. On particular challenges of building and maintaining the “1,000-
ship navy” capabilities, see Ratcliff (2007) and Reveron (2007).  
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strategic and policy guidance, it took almost one year from the initial task (July 2005) to the 
publications of the two versions in April 2006 (for the secret, 42-page version) and May 2006 
(for the unclassified, 23-page version). The plan’s intellectual underpinning was the “3/1 
strategy” (Vice Admiral Morgan) from 2004/2005, which stated that the Navy’s stability, an-
ti-terrorism, and homeland defense missions were not merely lesser-included cases and sub-
sets of major combat operations, but instead critical mission sets in their own right, demand-
ing their own dedicated force structure and strategic (as well as budgetary) attention (Swartz 
2011i: 91, slide 181). That approach was not without its critics. Led by Admiral John 
Nathman, Commander of the Navy’s Fleet Forces Command (FFC), this group charged 
against what they saw was an unjustified focus on the low-end, asymmetric, systemic roles 
and missions of the Navy. They advocated looking beyond current operations (OEF, OIF) – in 
that, their view did not substantially differ from that of Vice Admiral Morgan and his team – 
and argued that a concentration on high-end competition against nation-states was the Navy’s 
future. Despite a number of rewrites and the pushback from Admiral Nathman and his com-
mand (which by all accounts engaged in constructive criticism), the position of the CNO and 
his deputies eventually prevailed. A major support for Mullen’s and Morgan’s position came 
from the “National Strategy for Maritime Security”, a collaborative effort by DOD and DHS 
signed by President Bush in September 2005. That document supported Mullen’s and Mor-
gan’s arguments on the relationship among sea power, cooperative maritime security, and 
global systemic affluence (Haynes 2013: 298).  
b) Strategic Concept 
As a reapplication of the “3/1 strategy”, the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08” was funda-
mentally a proclamation that was designed to inform investments. It also reflected the funda-
mental change in U.S. strategy brought about by the post-9/11 response (the 2006 QDR later 
codified that shift in that it proclaimed that the United States needed to be as competent in 
waging irregular conflicts as it was in fighting and winning conventional wars). The “Navy 
Strategic Plan” leveraged the QDR in that it picked up on the three mission sets that this over-
arching document proposed. These focus areas were the “Global War on Terror” and its asso-
ciated irregular warfare, homeland security and defense (e.g., the Navy’s role in the war on 
drugs, border security, and national disasters), and conventional campaign mission sets. The 
Navy document emphasized the systemic value of liberalist, hegemonic sea power that served 
the international system. It also provided its audiences – principally U.S. Navy program and 
planning officers – with three maritime focus areas for the future force. These were (1) the 
Western Pacific (in particular Southeast Asia), (2) the Middle East and Southwest Asia, and 
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(3) the Mediterranean (the increasing responsibility of NATO in that area, it was noted, freed 
up U.S. assets for operations elsewhere) (Swartz 2011i: 95, slide 189-190).
395
  
This tied what the Navy did and where it did it together. It provided a rationale for its 313-
ship force-level goal. At the same time, the paper called for significantly smaller force pack-
ages (such as SEALs and independent Marine Corps, Coast Guard, or Navy expeditionary 
teams operating on ships and submarines), once again reflecting the operational realities of 
OEF and OIF. These forces were to be used in regions of secondary strategic importance like 
Africa, the Indian Ocean, and the Eastern Pacific. The Navy now recognized that it need not 
only move into the littorals, but also into coastal and internal, green- and brown-water areas. 
The document’s focus on stability operations (constabulary roles of sea power such as anti-
piracy operations, sanctions, embargo enforcement, peacekeeping, counter-drug, counter-
terrorism, and others) overshadowed the conventional deterrence and war-fighting missions 
for the time being. The paper did succeed in making a case for the merits of naval forces in 
shaping the environment and providing leverages which air forces or armies could not. At the 
same time, in relating U.S. military force to larger and more systemic goals (something that 
the NSS 2006 had also argued for) it helped a more population-centric view inside the Navy 
gain increasing traction. The “Strategic Plan” document provided the “means” and another 
declaratory statement of strategic intent named the “Naval Operations Concepts” – the “ways” 
– was already underway.396 
10.4.6 Naval Operations Concept (2006) 
a) Evolution 
The Naval Operations Concept (NOC) was first drafted as a single-service Navy Operation 
Concept in December 2005. It sought to identify the determining principles that were at the 
core of contemporary naval operations with those overarching strategic demands that the sen-
ior civilian leaders in OSD and the White House set forth (e.g., homeland defense, conven-
tional and nuclear deterrence, war on terrorism, irregular warfare, conventional campaigns, 
security and stability operations). The paper was overseen by senior Navy and Marine Corps 
flag officers. However, for the Navy, responsibilities shifted throughout the process and while 
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 Although the creation of U.S. African Command in 2006 signaled the increasing importance of the continent, 
it was not identified as a maritime focus area.  
396
 This trifecta sequence was established only in hindsight with the drafting of the 2007 “Cooperative Strategy 
for 21
st
 Century Seapower” (= “the ends”). In November 2007, VADM Morgan (quoted in Swartz 2011i: 142, 
slide 284) admitted that the logical chain had been turned on its head before, “We knew we were doing the pro-
cess [of formulating strategy, S.B.] in a backwards way. […] Now… we want the strategy to lead.”The charac-
terization of the “Navy Strategic Plan”, the “Naval Operations Concept”, and “CS-21”as sequential integrals to 
overall U.S. naval strategy is also used by Haynes (2013: 307-315). 
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USN-USMC relationships were relatively smooth, there was some friction within the Navy 
over ownership of the document (Swartz 2011i: 115, slides 229-230).
397
 The final document 
was signed by CMC General Michael Hagee (USMC) and CNO Admiral Mullen. It was pub-
lished in September 2006 and formally succeeded the “Naval Operating Concept for Joint 
Operations” (2003). General James Conway (USMC), the incoming CMC, endorsed the pub-
lication and thus provided some consistency over service leadership transition (Department of 
the Navy 2006). 
b) Strategic Concept 
Although the “Naval Operations Concept” focused on the same long-standing areas of U.S. 
naval force engagement (the Mediterranean, the Arabian Sea, the Western Pacific) and the 
same three emerging areas of operations (the Gulf of Guinea, East Africa’s littorals, and Latin 
American waters) as the “Naval Strategic Plan ISO POM 08”, it broadened its level of ambi-
tion considerably. It referred to the traditional, irregular, catastrophic, and disruptive chal-
lenges to American national security identified in Secretary Rumsfeld’s National Military 
Strategy (2005). It cited three guiding principles from the “National Strategy for Maritime 
Security” (2005) (preservation of the freedom of the seas, defense of free movement of sea-
borne goods, and cross-U.S.-border situational awareness), and it discussed the mission set 
construct of the 2006 QDR (homeland defense, war on terror/irregular warfare, conventional 
campaigns). The authors of the paper thus sought to demonstrate that the Navy had under-
stood and embraced the geostrategic, military, and operational realities of the 21
st
 century.  
The downside was that the document overreached. It identified no less than 13 naval missions 
for the Navy and the Marine Corps.
398
 It named nine permanent naval principles.
399
 On top of 
that, it mentioned four foundations of its narrative (including global maritime and littoral do-
main awareness [understanding and processing of anything related to the maritime domain]), 
nine methods (including globally networked operations, adaptive force-packaging [modular 
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 The paper itself fed from the USMC’s own “Marine Corps Operating Concepts for a Changing Security Envi-
ronment (MOC)”, published in March 2006; a corresponding Navy-only operating concept was debated, but was 
never drafted. 
398
 In addition to the “classic 4” from Vice Admiral Turner (forward naval presence, power projection, sea con-
trol, and strategic deterrence), it called for crisis response, maritime security operations, security cooperation, 
civil-military operations, counterinsurgency, counterterrorism, counter-proliferation, air and missile defense, and 
information operations. Notably absent from the list was one of the three key missions of “The Maritime Strate-
gy”: sealift. Some of these were long-standing tasks that the Navy had considerable experience in; other reflected 
the emerging security environment of the 1990s and in particular the Navy and Marine Corps’ operations after 
9/11. 
399
 These were: agility, adaptive force packaging, coordinated global influence, precision, ability to deploy and 
employ forces, speed, interoperability, a persistent presence, and unpredictability for adversaries (as well as 
reliability for allies).  
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platforms, equipment, and gear that can be assembled quickly and connected swiftly to pro-
vide the most-fitting military package for a given operation or mission], aggregation and dis-
aggregation, sea-basing, and cultural awareness [the knowledge and ability to interact with 
people from different cultures and socio-economic milieus]), and five strategic objec-
tives/outcomes (support in winning the nation’s wars, establishment of favorable security 
conditions, securing of strategic access and retaining global freedom of action, strengthening 
of alliances and partnerships, and securing the U.S. from attack). The capstone document en-
compassed, for the first time, maritime security operations as a distinct and genuine mission 
area. It recognized globalization as a driving force of global change, and briefly mentioned 
hybrid forms of conflict and warfare. However, the document is notably unspecific regarding 
which countries or non-state actors really were meant by this large scope. The NOC 2006 is 
also mute on such other important naval issues as mine warfare, convoy and blockade opera-
tions, and strategic sealift (Swartz 2011i: 120-121, slides 239-242).  
While the document’s scope is laudable, its mentioning of strategic objectives demonstrates a 
broader consideration of the naval services’ strategic effects, and it elevation of the Navy’s 
constabulary role in relation to its military and diplomatic ones was remarkable (Haynes 
2013: 314-315), its methodology produced too many lists to remember and to use practically, 
let alone understand. Consequentially, for the time being the paper had limited influence out-
side of the Navy, although it informed drafts for such follow-up documents like CS-21 and a 
revised NOC in 2010. However, in elevating the diplomatic and constabulary roles of naval 
forces, which to many sailors and officers were already deep-seated experiences of the post-
Cold War operational world, the NOC 2006 embraced the gradually changing nature of sea 
power from combat at and from the sea to include the littorals. In this, the document partially 
reflected the intellectual journey that the Navy had undertaken (albeit with some detours and 
occasional hesitance) since the end of the Cold War.  
10.4.7 Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 (September 2007) 
a) Evolution 
Before CS-21 entered the stage, another publication was slated to appear: the secret, single-
service “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10”.400 Just like its predecessor (2006), it was de-
signed to inform the Department of the Navy’s leadership, the programmers, and the budget 
staff about the future direction of the service. The memo for the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO 
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 The discussion of this particular document’s procedural evolution and its strategic scope is based on the open 
information provided by Swartz (2011i: 126-140, slides 252-279).  
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POM 08” had directed that the process to draft a strategic plan, once established, was to be 
repeated at least biennially. The 2007 version happened to be the first Navy capstone docu-
ment to be finalized after Robert Gates succeeded Donald Rumsfeld as Secretary of Defense. 
Gates’ initial objectives focused heavily on providing the troops in the ground wars in Af-
ghanistan and Iraq with the right amount of material and political support; he was not a strate-
gic aspirant. At the time, both the irregular warfare challenges (in Iraq and Afghanistan with 
the development and implementation of a revised counterinsurgency doctrine) and the more 
conventional security challenges (such as the anticipated recovery of Russian nationalism or 
the North Korean and Iranian nuclear programs) signaled a murky and challenging environ-
ment for the application of military force. The process of writing the document was overseen 
by those in N3/N5 (such as Vice Admiral Morgan), with considerable input from N81 (the 
programming division). Through the end, it remained a Navy-only concept. It appeared before 
the (public) unveiling of CS-21, therefore lingering in between more publicized documents. It 
was rushed and signed by Admiral Mullen during his last week on the job as CNO prior to 
becoming the 17
th
 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 
b) Strategic Concept  
The document was designed to “translate national strategic guidance into USN guidance; 
translate new concurrently drafted maritime strategy into a plan to inform Navy investments; 
[and] continue to build consensus in Navy around new strategic ideas” (Swartz 2011i: 128, 
slide 256). It was intended to serve as a bridge to “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century 
Seapower” (2007) and the “Naval Operations Concept” (2006). Unfortunately, its classified 
status prohibited any wider distribution and discussion of strategic effects. The document’s 
far-reaching assessment of the strategic context confronting the Navy remains unavailable for 
this study. The concept’s impact, for all purposes of this dissertation, is negligible.  
10.4.8 A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower 
a) Evolution 
In the summer of 2006, at the annual Current Strategy Forum at the Naval War College in 
Newport (Rhode Island), Admiral Mullen publically called for the development of a new mar-
itime strategy for all sea services. This was not just a Navy effort, but a comprehensive mari-
time (Navy, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard) document with a clear nod to “The Maritime 
Strategy” of the 1980s. Commander Bryan McGrath, an experienced surface warfare officer 
with previous tours on a cruiser and in command of the guided-missile destroyer Bulkeley 
(DDG 84), was selected by Vice Admiral Morgan (once again a major facilitator for a strate-
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gic effort) as the lead action officer on the Navy side. Together with action officers from the 
Marine Corps and the Coast Guard,
401
 McGrath formed a core team that fleshed out the strat-
egy over the course of one and a half years. The authors were provided with a wealth of re-
sources and also given freedom of action in order to devise a strategy that did not simply ra-
tionalize the Navy’s current or future force levels. In fact, they were encouraged to follow the 
notions that an American maritime strategy was indeed a national U.S. strategy, thus allowing 
exertion of upward pressure through the bureaucratic layers. The sea services, it was hoped, 
could develop a narrative for Congress, the White House, and the American people to support 
the Navy’s energetic and assertive ideas.402 In the first phase (August 2006-January 2007), 
drawing from strategic history and a number of generic models of international relations, five 
strategy models were developed and discussed among the group, senior naval strategy aca-
demics, and senior flag officers. These options were:  
 A primacist strategy (which focused force on areas of particular strategic interest);  
 A sea control strategy inspired by Corbett (which included a focus on countering ene-
my naval forces and commerce, the protection of the sea lines of communication, and 
the establishment of superiority in a joint environment for areas of naval operations); 
 A global systems strategy (which highlighted the cooperative safeguarding of the 
globalized system of integrated trade and security),  
 A high-low mix strategy built around Admiral Zumwalt’s 1970s idea (that borrowed 
from legacy forces to stiffen the high-end and low-end capabilities), and; 
 A minimalist, offshore-balancing strategy (which limited standing U.S. naval deploy-
ments to the Arabian Gulf while the rest of the fleet was maintained in readiness and 
surged as the situation required and the senior leaders directed).
403
  
The latter two were eventually eliminated and McGrath and his team in a second phase 
(March-June 2007) created a hybrid strategy. This utilized the big, system-centric idea (that 
only the United States could reasonably secure), integrated the primacy idea (for the Far East 
and the Arabian Sea), and combined that with the sea control and partnership notions. These 
ideas were carefully fleshed out by vetting them through the chains of command, incorporat-
ing the Naval War College for war-gaming, conducting various briefings and symposia (with 
                                                          
401
 Colonel Doug King (USMC) and Captain Sam Neill (USCG) were the principle drafters for their service, 
respectively.  
402
 Although the Navy, the Coast Guard, and the Marine Corps were equal and demonstrated solidarity, the Navy 
as the largest of these institutions was be the one that would dominate the public understanding and political 
discourse and consequently have the most ownership. 
403
 On the development of these maritime strategy options, see McGrath (2007) and Haynes (2013: 325-333).  
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institutions such as CNA), enlisting feeder articles, and by testing them in a number of execu-
tive seminars, conferences, and other public forums (dubbed “Conversations with the Coun-
try”). In the third stage, the core team (the “Strategic Action Group” in OPNAV N3/N5) 
eventually became the writing team and set out to finalize the strategy between June and Oc-
tober 2007.  
The title that was chosen for the document could speak volumes on the scope of the strategy. 
In what has been established in the course of this study, the spelling and capitalization could 
be interpreted as deliberate references to the institutional, systemic dimension of sea power; 
the ultimate tie-in of universal functional, geographic, and institutional dimensions of naval 
power. Even if such reasoning was sound, the position of the strategy’s lead author is equally 
compelling: “[I] Deliberately [used] one word, deliberately capitalized [it]. I am unaware of a 
distinction between the concepts of a one word or two word version, I just liked one bet-
ter.”404  
As the third member of the family of documents that NOC 2006 and the “Navy Strategic 
Plan” had begun, CS-21 was able to draw from these previous documents and use their frames 
of reference to structure its own ambitions. Only once the document neared completion in the 
summer of 2007 was Secretary of the Navy Winter briefed; he was by all accounts not pleased 
with what he saw as an overemphasis on “soft power.”405 Consequently, the CNO directed 
that some aspects of the document be hardened to emphasize the “hard power” spectrum as 
well. Eventually, the new strategy was signed by the CNO, Admiral Gary Roughead, CMC 
General James Conway (USMC), and the Commandant of the U.S. Coast Guard, Admiral 
Thad Allen in October 2007.
406
 The same month, the strategy was unveiled publically (alt-
hough the process had been unclassified and inclusive from day one) at the Naval War Col-
lege. The final product, which at its heart is a 16-page booklet available on the Navy’s web-
site, was disseminated widely (the Chief of Navy Information, the highest Navy public rela-
tions officer, in charge) (Department of the Navy/U.S. Coast Guard 2007). This included arti-
cles in professional magazines and journals, CNO testimony before Congress, brochures, 
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 Bryan McGrath, e-mail to author, 22 July 2014. 
405
 Soft power is an approach in international relations that emphasizes persuasive economic and cultural influ-
ence. It is complementary to the more coercive, often military-heavy hard power. Soft power as a concept was 
introduced by Harvard University political scientist Joseph Nye (Nye 1990).  
406
 It was thus the first capstone document signed by all three service chiefs, and the first unified strategy since 
“The Maritime Strategy”. 
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downloadable posters, a video clip,
407
 and – utilizing an increasingly important medium – 
military blogs.
408
  
b) Strategic Concept  
The strategy emphasized the significance of the international global system for trade and se-
curity. CS-21 was the innovative conceptual framework that Vice Admiral Morgan sought to 
implement in order to reverse the existing process of strategy-making. Before that, program-
matic decisions derived from the annual Navy budget submissions shaped the service’s strate-
gy. Morgan wanted to turn around that causality. Recognition of the interdependencies, the 
energy demands, and the unhindered exchange of goods and information in the global system 
was the central enabler for CS-21. By tying itself directly to American grand strategy and the 
systemic notion of international security and stability (that the U.S. had a fundamental interest 
in a safe global system and at the same time fielded the capabilities to orchestrate its protec-
tion), the Navy as an institution attempted to rise above the Southwest Asian ground wars and 
the annual budget submissions that dominated much of the discourse at the time.
409
 It also 
sought to broaden the nation’s view again, i.e., that there was more to American hegemony 
than messy and obscure counterinsurgency wars. The Navy wanted to provide military and 
political leaders with a compelling strategic concept that offered an alternative to unwinnable 
asymmetric ground wars.  
In highlighting the Navy’s role in guarding the liberal international system, sustained Ameri-
can sea power was linked to global prosperity and the advancement of democratic principles. 
In its deliberately benign characterization of American power, the strategy dovetailed the 
American understanding of its role in the world as a benevolent hegemon. It moved enthusias-
tically beyond the merely military role of naval forces and elevated constabulary and diplo-
matic uses of the sea. With that, it discarded the counter-societal and counter-military visions 
that had long dominated the understanding of strategic effects navies could have. That did not 
imply that the prospect of major hostilities was ruled out altogether; in fact, major-power war, 
regional conflicts, terrorism, and organized crime were all recognized as potentially threaten-
ing U.S. national security and (by implication) world prosperity. Strategically, CS-21 linked 
key naval tasks to strategic imperatives. These included regionally concentrated credible 
combat power in the Western Pacific, the Arabian Gulf, and the Indian Ocean to deter major-
                                                          
407
 “The Seapower Video,” http://www.navy.mil/maritime/display.asp?page=seapower_video.html 
408
 This broad distribution in turn led to a large number of subsequent analyses and articles in across all media. 
For a selection, see Swartz (2011i: 180-182, slides 360-364).  
409
 Not least, the Navy as the driver behind CS-21 pushed for a document to counter the Army/Marine Corps 
Field Manual 3-24 (the COIN doctrine).  
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power war, win those armed conflicts that the U.S. did have to fight, and contain regional 
wars. Additionally, the strategy recommended globally distributed and tailored forces with a 
focus on Africa and the Western Hemisphere. The hindrance of local disruptions, the contri-
bution of the sea services to homeland defense-in-depth, and the imperative for sustained co-
operation were also highlighted. For that, the strategy extrapolated six core capabilities for the 
sea services, namely forward presence, deterrence, sea control, power projection (these were 
Admiral Turner’s original naval missions) as well as maritime security and humanitarian as-
sistance and disaster relief (HA/DR) missions along a descending level of violence.
410
 In ele-
vating the latter two soft power missions to strategic importance, the strategy sought to gener-
ate more resources and visibility for these aspects.  
The Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard fashioned themselves as essential guardi-
ans of the system that underpinned globalization. Critics charged that a specific threat (a 
country or non-state actor) was deliberately missing and that the strategy’s key assumptions 
were simplistic (Pendley 2008). Many traditional naval warfare missions were only implied 
and some operating areas notably absent from the strategy (Work/van Tool 2008). The docu-
ment’s explanatory narrative sidelined all Navy strategic conceptual efforts since “The Mari-
time Strategy” (which raised some irritation), but did not provide a compelling force-level 
planning, programming, and budgeting link. Instead, cooperation and trust were emphasized, 
undertaking of a long view was encouraged, and war prevention was elevated to the same 
importance as winning wars.
411
 This gave the Navy both: a tie to the systemic dimension of 
international relations and a linkage to the population-centric roles and missions of the mili-
tary that were fashionable at the time. The strategy was also forward-looking in that it antici-
pated the presidential election of 2008, subsequent national security strategies, and the 2010 
QDR. The value of its innovative ideas was recognized after the change brought about by the 
election in 2008. Admiral Mullen was able to shepherd the document’s main points through 
his tenure as CJCS and aspects of CS-21 were echoed in the top-level strategic documents of 
the Obama administration (The White House 2010, Department of Defense 2010). The central 
themes of CS-21 resonated well in many circles in the U.S. and abroad – except for Congress, 
which was more concerned with warfighting and not interested in the peace-time engagement 
of the sea services.  
                                                          
410
 The link to Admiral Turner’s missions is remarkably close: Zumwalt and Turner discussed sea control and 
presence in reaction to Vietnam War power-projection focus; CS-21 discussed sea control and presence in reac-
tion to 1990s power projection focus (Swartz 2011i: 179, slide 358).  
411
 This is illustrated by the notion in the strategy that, contrary to military force and materiel, trust could not be 
surged.  
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10.4.9 Building on “CS-21”: Navy Strategic Plans and Guidance, Naval Operations Concept 
(2010), Naval Doctrine Pub 1 – Naval Warfare 
The development of capstone documents and the formulation of Navy contributions to U.S. 
strategy obviously did not stop with the publication of CS-21. There were in fact six Navy 
capstone documents to round out the decade, namely the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 
(Ch 1)” (Roughead’s revision of outgoing Mullen’s strategic plan of the same name 
[2007]),
412
 the “Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11” (2009), the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO 
POM 12” (2009), the pertinent “Naval Operations Concept” (2010), the equally important 
“Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval Warfare” (2010), and the “Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13” 
(2010). 
The “Navy Strategic Guidance” document (2009) remains classified. What little is publically 
available underlines the notion that this document reiterated the strategic imperatives that CS-
21 had formulated and linked them to Navy core capabilities, thus sharpening the Navy’s ar-
guments what maritime missions such as sea control, deterrence, power projection, forward 
presence, maritime security operations, and HA/DR could provide. The document also men-
tioned a number of additional naval objectives and capabilities, namely using the sea as a 
staging area (sea basing), superiority in the space and cyber domains, global domain aware-
ness, maritime BMD, and expeditionary logistics. As a programming support tool for the in-
coming administration, it laid out the larger objectives of Secretary of Defense Gates and 
CNO Roughead. The “Navy Strategic Plans” (2009/2010) were in principle, much like the 
“Navy Strategic Guidance”, directed internally (hence their classification). They continued 
the by then routine output of such specialized documents, which were increasingly aligned 
with other budgetary and programming cycles so that they could have more leverage. These 
documents used the constructs that CS-21 established and thus increasingly provided some 
much-needed intellectual cohesion and continuity.
413
  
More importantly in the longer run and more closely related to the overarching, larger scope 
of this study are the two final documents for the decade. To provide the “ways” for the “ends” 
that the “Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” described, an updated and expand-
ed “Naval Operations Concept” (NOC) to implement the new strategy was issued in May 
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 Still classified and thus not available to public analysis; for an overview, see Swartz (2011i: 194-203, slides 
387-405).  
413
 For an overview of the information that is publically available on “Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 11”, see 
Swartz (2011i: 203-219, slides 406-437).For an overview of the information that is publically available on “Na-
vy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12”, see Swartz (2011i: 219-234, slides 438-468); for “Navy Strategic Plan ISO 
POM 13”, see Swartz (2011i: 300-315, slides 600-630).  
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2010 (it was signed by the same three service chiefs as “CS-21”) (Department of the Navy 
2010a). Again, the process of drafting and implementing the concept was also a tri-service 
effort of the Navy, the Marine Corps, and the Coast Guard. Whereas the larger strategic aspi-
rations and objectives of these sea services were comparatively easy to align, the NOC needed 
to address all of the diverse current operations. Essentially, it covered the whole spectrum of 
challenges between global nuclear war on the high end, counter-drug operations on the low 
(irregular) end, and a plethora of conventional and hybrid challenges in between. This yielded 
an extended drafting process and a lengthy final, unclassified product (with 102 pages, it was 
larger than all previous NOC combined). At least three major sets of pressures affected the 
drafting process:  
 First, it proved to be challenging to define and articulate how sailors, marines, and 
coast guardsmen actually fought.  
 Second, the authors needed to provide fodder for the development of future joint/Navy 
concepts and doctrines.  
 Third, it needed to explain the linkage between “CS-21” and the Navy’s force-level 
goals (i.e., “the means”) to Congress and defense policy analysts (an effort to publish a 
force-structure plan that built on “CS-21” had been abandoned earlier) (Swartz 2011i: 
237, slide 437).  
In describing how naval forces contributed to U.S. national security in a range of operations, 
the document aimed to reiterate primarily to itself (although Congress, the Obama administra-
tion, and the American public were certainly secondary audiences) that the Navy was not just 
about blue-water operations, the Marine Corps did not simply constitute a second land army, 
and the Coast Guard was not simply a coastal gendarmerie but a true military partner. Inte-
grated and orchestrated, all of them could embrace all uses of the sea according to their rela-
tive leanings. 
Dozens of drafts circulated among a large number of stakeholders in the services. The incom-
ing administration and their capstone documents slowed down the process and dragged the 
completion. Operationally, the document accentuated the sea as a maneuver space for all three 
services. It employed the six core capabilities of CS-21 (forward presence, maritime security, 
HA/DR, sea control, power projection, and deterrence) and related them to the various classes 
of naval vessels to describe each ship’s place and role in the overall picture. Critics charged 
that the end product was too simplistic and obvious, a doctrinal instead of a conceptual pro-
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ject, bore little Navy ownership, and did not include risks and trade-offs (Swartz 2011i: 269, 
slides 537-538). As a document, it always was in the shadow of CS-21. The NOC’s influence 
was further curtailed in that it provide too voluminous and took too long to roll out.  
Just three months after the publication of the NOC, another Navy capstone document was 
issued. “NDP 1: Naval Warfare” (a doctrine aimed at the men and women in uniform, naval 
service civilians, and the policy community) superseded the first such pamphlet by the same 
name issued in 1994 (and in fact, NDP 1 through NDP 6) (Department of the Navy 2010b). 
The 2010 version included the contribution of the Coast Guard and subsequently bore the 
signature of its service chief, too. The pamphlet made heavy reference to joint documents as 
well as Navy and Marine Corps warfare publications. The NWDC held the responsibility for 
NDP1. It encountered a sluggish attitude toward the necessary revision in OPNAV and the 
Marine Corps (on the USMC side, the MCCDC was in charge; for the Coast Guard, the 
HQCG’s Office of Counterterrorism and Defense Operations oversaw the effort). Eventually, 
NDP1’s drafting dragged on for more than eighteen months. Its public release was deliberate-
ly held back so that the Naval Operations Concept (NOC) could be issued first. NDP1 includ-
ed sections on the very general nature of naval service, the employment of its forces, and the 
conduct of naval operations (in addition, it provided service core values, mentioned the levels 
of war, and included some naval history). Its construct – six strategic imperatives and six core 
capabilities – was derived from CS-21 and used as a template across the six-phase joint cam-
paign model (phase 0 – shape, phase I – deter, phase II – seize the initiative, phase III – domi-
nate, phase IV – stabilize, phase V – enable civil authority) (Swartz 2011i: 296-297, slides 
592-593). Given the Navy’s aversion to written doctrine, the document’s influence remained 
as limited as that of its 16-year old predecessor, not least because it failed to speak to the po-
litical role of naval forces and to future force structure.  
The naval missions that the documents from the 2001-2011 timeframe provided to achieve 
strategic goals are reprinted in the following illustration. The table shows that only three of 
these capstone documents identified naval missions. The other documents were notably silent 
on missions. They took a markedly less ambitious tone and concentrated on sub-strategic lev-
els (although it should be cautioned that absence of outspoken naval missions does not per se 
indicate a lack of strategic ambition or scope of such adocument).  
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Name Year Missions Identified  
Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS 2002 5 enduring missions (“classic 4” plus 
sealift)  
Naval Power 21 … A Naval Vision 2002  
Naval Operations Concept for 
Joint Operations  
2003  
Fleet Response Plan 2003  
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 08 2006/2007  
Naval Operations Concept 2006 13 naval missions, including “classic 4” 
(no mention of sealift)  
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 2007  
A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 
Century Seapower 
2007 6 expanded core capabilities (“classic 4” 
plus maritime security operations, hu-
manitarian assistance/disaster relief; no 
mention of sealift)  
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 10 
(Ch 1) 
2007  
Navy Strategic Guidance ISO PR 
11 
2009  
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 12 2009  
Naval Operations Concept 2010  
Naval Doctrine Pub 1: Naval War-
fare 
2010  
Navy Strategic Plan ISO POM 13 2010  
Illustration 33: 2000s Capstone Documents and Navy Sea-Strategic Concepts (Forster 2013: 21) 
10.5 Force Structure 
At the turn of the century, the quantitative decline in U.S. Navy forces continued slowly but 
steadily. This led to a scaled down version of the Cold War fleet, but with individually more 
capable ships that were still grouped around the nuclear-powered aircraft carriers 
(Lundesgaard 2011: 24). The carriers were once again validated in that they provided the first 
wave of attacks against Taliban strongholds in Afghanistan. However, trouble was quickly 
brewing for the Navy’s force structure. To fund the U.S. military’s unexpectedly higher ex-
penses in the ground campaigns in Afghanistan and later in Iraq, the Navy shipbuilding budg-
et accounts were drained. Carriers, submarines, and destroyer programs suffered. In addition, 
legacy platforms that had joined the fleet since the late 1970s and early 1980s were decom-
missioned in increasingly large numbers. Their maintenance was deemed too costly against 
the background of the pressing demands of the current wars. With the beginning of the with-
drawal of the Oliver-Hazard-Perry-class frigates from service and the decommissioning of 
the five oldest Ticonderoga-class guided-missile cruisers, the Navy lost one fifth of its cruiser 
and its frigate inventory between FY 1999 and FY 2009, respectively.  
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The Global CONOPS (2002) had included new force package labels in an attempt to better 
utilize the flexibility of naval forces, maximize combat capability, and provide intellectual 
backing for the 375-ship battle fleet goal. By rearranging and re-labeling carrier and expedi-
tionary groups, establishing surface action groups, and adding the four converted Ohio-class 
SSGN (capable of carrying 154 Tomahawk cruise missiles each), the Navy went from twenty-
four formal strike groups to thirty-seven. The assertion, that expeditionary strike groups 
(ESG), surface action groups (SAG), or guided-missile submarines (SSGN) could somehow 
replace a carrier strike group (CSG), was often scrutinized.  
In the early 2000s, the introduction of newer ships was imminent. On 1 November 2001, the 
Navy announced its Future Surface Combatant Program. This family of next-generation sur-
face warships included three classes of ships: a destroyer program dubbed DD(X) (later 
DDG-1000) for long-strike and naval gunfire support missions, a cruiser program called 
CG(X) for fleet air defense and ballistic missile roles, and a whole new platform called the 
littoral combat ship (LCS).
414
 In contrast to the other, multi-mission-capable ships of the Na-
vy, the LCS was designed to be fitted with specific modules that are interchangeable and thus 
allow a tailored employment in mine warfare, anti-submarine warfare, and surface warfare 
missions.
415
 Although the design stemmed from the time before the September 11 attacks and 
the assault on the destroyer Cole in Yemen (2000), the LCS promised to be the suitable and 
efficient response to the challenges of asymmetry that emerged with the long war against ter-
rorism as well. It would be easier, more effective, and more efficient to send a littoral combat 
ship than an expensive cruiser or a valued destroyer into the murky and dangerous littorals of 
the 21
st
 century. As such, the LCS enjoyed strong support by CNO Clark.  
However, the next-generation surface combatant suffered epochal blows. The CG(X) program 
was terminated in 2010 for cost reasons and never got beyond the initial design phase. The 
DDG-1000 program, which had its roots in the early 1990s designs for a 21
st
-century destroy-
er, was reduced to just three (from 32) units in 2009. The Navy instead opted to procure opti-
mized destroyers of the Arleigh-Burke-class to fill the widening capability gap. The LCS pro-
gram, built in two different sea frames (a conventional mono hull and a futuristic trimaran 
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 For more details on these shipbuilding programs, see the comprehensive CRS reports on CG(X) (O’Rourke 
2010), DDG-1000 (O’Rourke 2014b), and the LCS (O’Rourke 2014c).  
415
 The LCS evolved from the “Streetfighter” concept (1999). These inexpensive, small, but agile and capable 
warships were designed with their expendability in mind (a concept that fundamentally challenged the founda-
tions of naval strategic culture). In other words, these ships could go into harms’ way near an enemy coast with-
out risking the deployment of a larger, more expensive vessel. It rested on the conviction that in order to make a 
strategic difference, the Navy had to forcefully embrace littoral warfare and accept all the challenges (and oppor-
tunities) that came with it.  
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design), was capped at 32 units as recently as 2014 in favor of an agile, more versatile, and 
larger frigate-type ship that is yet to be constructed.
416
 Like many other military procurement 
projects, the LCS is also affected by cost-overruns. As of 2014, the prototypes are still in the 
process of operational testing and introduction into the fleet.  
The fate of the family of next-generation surface combatants weighed on the image of the 
Navy in the public and with Congress. In the larger context, the debate about the advantages 
and shortfalls of each class of ships reflected the debate between two well-known and estab-
lished schools of thought. Should the U.S. try to maintain a balanced fleet, and what exactly 
were the kinds of missions that the Navy should be tasked with? On the one hand, people like 
Admiral Nathman (Commander, FFC) argued against eroding the precious service life of the 
fleet by chasing terrorists or conducting humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts (a 
notion that echoed Samuel Huntington’s 1954 similar warning). These lesser-included mis-
sions were of little overall value and thus should not be elevated to strategic importance. On 
the other hand, there were those like CNO Admiral Mullen and Vice Admiral Morgan who 
lobbied for a broader, less militarized understanding of sea power, which needed to be reflect-
ed better in the force structure.
417
 The Navy’s force structure decisions for the time being also 
muted the smoldering argument between the proponents of flexible, multi-mission warships 
and the fans of specialized platforms for niche missions. Even more fundamentally, this de-
bate echoed the “high-low” force structure discussions of the 1970s. Mullen and Morgan’s 
argument that a trade-off was unnecessary resounded with much of the Navy and Congress. It 
reflected the desire for a balanced fleet of high- and low-end assets that was able to be for-
ward-deployed as well as surge-capable to address the whole range of imaginable threats on 
the spectrum. The energetic approach could not conceal that Navy force structure is a very 
conservative business and cannot be turned around within a few years.  
The next-generation surface warships were not the only ship-building programs affected by 
cost overruns, procurement delays, and design flaws. The 24,900-ton amphibious transport 
                                                          
416
 If the original plans for the LCS had gone through, that class of ships would have accounted for 1/6 of the 
total Navy battle fleet inventory, signaling a focus on the littorals but weakening blue-water capabilities of the 
U.S. Navy. The two LCS classes are the Freedom-class mono hull (odd-numbered LCS 1 etc.) built by Marinette 
Marine, Marinette (Wisconsin) and the Independence-class (even-numbered LCS 2 etc.) built by Austal USA, 
Mobile (Alabama), respectively. 
417
 The “3/1 strategy” draft from 2006 declared that the Navy could no longer allow the inefficiency that came 
with utilizing high-end platforms for lesser-included missions. Counter-piracy, -narcotics, and -terrorism opera-
tions wore the fleet out and peacekeeping, disaster response, and humanitarian assistance took their tool as well. 
However, the “3/1 strategy” asserted that these missions were now significant for prevailing in the global, gener-
ational, long-war. Consequently, they needed to be dealt with in a coherent and fitting way that was represented 
in strategic plans, shipbuilding, and the budget.  
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docks of the San-Antonio-class (LPD 17 etc.) were commissioned beginning in 2006 (to date, 
nine are in service and two more are under construction) but numerous mechanical failures 
and a doubling of the price for each ship yielded bad press and spun the program out of con-
trol.
418
 The Navy of the 21
st
 century, despite all lip-service paid to irregular warfare and 
asymmetric threats by the proponents of the long war against terrorism and the cheerleaders 
for small boats, remained grouped around aircraft carriers. The nuclear-powered Ronald 
Reagan (CVN 76) and George H.W. Bush (CVN 77) were procured.
419
 Large-deck flat-tops 
were also added with the Iwo Jima (LHD 7 and Makin Island (LHD 8).
420
 Many classes re-
tained constant in numbers, others suffered from continued cuts of Cold-War-era ships. Oth-
ers, like all 12 Osprey-class minesweepers, were decommissioned between 2006 and 2007 
(further degrading the Navy’s organic, sea-frame MCM capabilities). Mid-decade decreases 
in other classes, for example, in the destroyer category (the Spruance-class warships were 
decommissioned and disposed of) were offset with the purchase of newer Arleigh Burkes. The 
first LCS warships at sea and new joint high-speed catamarans for Army/Navy intra-theater 
lift (JHSV) in the building yards foreshadowed new ship designs and capabilities. On balance, 
the Navy remained a big-ship navy with further reduced overall numbers.  
The following table breaks down the total numbers of the actual inventory.  
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 The next-generation amphibious ship, designed to replace the aging Whidbey-Island-class/Harpers-Ferry-
class from the 2020s, is already in planning. For the program dubbed LX(R), see O’Rourke (2014d).  
419
 For an overview of other aircraft carrier missions and leveraging their potential, see Gordon IV et al. (2006).  
420
 On a related note, the inventory of naval aviation was also modernized. Whereas the last F-14 “Tomcat” 
fighters were decommissioned and the last S-3 “Viking” ASW aircraft paid off during the decade, 369 new F/A-
18E/F “Super Hornet” multipurpose carrier-based jets, 78 EA-18G “Growler” EW aircraft, and 300 MH-60R/S 
multipurpose “Sea Hawk” helicopters were added (Swartz 2011j: 65, slide 126). The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, 
the fifth-generation multirole fighter jet, began design and production in the mid-2000s. The program, which will 
deliver variants to USAF (conventional), USN (carrier), and USMC (V/STOL), remains under pressure from 
cost overruns and technological challenges.  
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Date 9/01 9/02 9/03 9/04 9/04 9/06 9/07 9/08 9/09 9/10 9/11 
Carriers 12 12 12 12 12 12 11 11 11 11 11 
Cruisers 27 27 27 25 23 22 22 22 22 22 22 
Destroyers 53 55 49 48 46 50 52 54 57 59 61 
Frigates 35 33 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 29 26 
LCS - - - - - - - 1 1 2 2 
Submarines 55 54 54 54 54 54 53 53 53 53 53 
SSBNs 18 18 16 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 14 
SSGNs 0 0 2 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 
Mine Warfare 18 17 17 17 17 16 14 14 14 14 14 
Amphibious 41 41 38 37 37 35 33 34 33 33 31 
Auxiliary 57 56 52 51 45 44 46 45 46 47 47 
Surface Total 127 127 118 115 111 114 115 118 121 123 122 
Total Active 316 313 297 292 282 281 278 282 285 288 285 
Illustration 34: U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 2001-2011 (Navy History and Heritage Command 2011). 
To clarify the ship numbers included in this table, the year 2000 entries include active commissioned ships, those 
in the Naval Reserve Force (NRF) and ships operated by the Military Sealift Command (MSC). Row entries are 
self-explanatory, with the auxiliary category including combat logistic ships (such as oilers, ammunition, and 
combat store ships), mobile logistics ships (such as submarine tenders) and support ships (such as command, 
salvage, tugs and research ships). Command ships have been subsumed into that category and the separate line 
entry removed. A new row has been added for guided missile submarines (SSGN) and for the Littoral Combat 
Ships (LCS). The battleship category has been removed.  
With the debate around the balancing of high-seas, blue-water options with littoral, green- and 
brown-water orientation carried over from the 1990s and reflected in the declaratory docu-
ments of the time, force composition became an increasingly popular subject of study. The 
proposed forces would continue to be structured around aircraft carriers. The following chart 
illustrates the suggestions of some of the major reports and studies. The table is reprinted here 
to illustrate the range and scope of force-level plans that the Navy was faced with in various 
reports. 
Report : 
 
 
 
Ship type: 
2000 Ship-
building 
Report 
2001 QDR 
(Navy View) 
2002 USN 
Global 
CONOPS 
2005 USN 
Interim 
Long-range 
Plan (range 
of numbers) 
2006 DON 
plan 
Total battle 
force ships 
305-360 310 375 260-325 313 
Attack sub-
marines 
50-66 55 55 37-41 48 
Aircraft 
carriers 
11-15 12 12 10-11 11 
Surface 
combatants 
116-133 116 160 130-174 143 
Amphibious 
ships 
36-42 36 37 17-24 31 
Illustration 35: 2000s USN Force Level Goals (Swartz 2011j: 58, slide 116) 
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Despite the occasional lobbying efforts to reverse the quantitative attrition of the fleet and a 
host of studies that analyzed current and future fleet design, the Navy’s force structure de-
graded over the 2000s.
421
 Most of the decade was a tailwind period for the service in terms of 
budget and national standing. With CS-21, the service wanted to gain momentum to change 
that and develop a narrative that supported force growth. However, CS-21 was not a ship-
building strategy. It was a deliberately declaratory document. It was designed as a growth 
strategy, recognizing that 313 ships were too low a number to account for all the missions that 
the Navy was tasked to do (and that the Navy asserted through its strategy). The final tally 
would have been more in the vicinity of 342 warships, including 38 amphibious ships. How-
ever, a force-structure plan that was to follow within six months of CS-21 never materialized. 
With such a document, Congress would likely have been more interested and engaged; as it 
were, “CS-21” was pretty readily dismissed and the focus remained on current shipbuilding 
plans and associated problems.
422
 The following figure shows that force levels shrank and did 
not pick up until the end of the decade.  
                                                          
421
 The debate about force-structure continued for the rest of the decade and is ongoing. In 2009 and 2010, alter-
native U.S. Navy force level goals emerged to complement, or rival, the CNO’s opinion of 313 ships as a floor. 
A “Report to Congress on Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels for FY 2011” (the 30-
year Navy Shipbuilding plan) floated the number 292 battle force ships by FY 2016, 304 battle force ships by 
FY 2028, and 301 battle force ships by FY 2040. The 2010 QDR projected a number of 255-289 ships for FY 
2011-FY 2015 plus an according number of SSBNs, prepositioning vessels, and 51 ships for strategic lift. Secre-
tary of Defense Gates in August 2010 derived from the QDR his 313-323 battle force goal noted in the table 
above (Swartz 2011j: 59, slide 118). Other alternatives were floated in various publications by the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) (2008) – 326 ships; the Center for New American Security 
(CNAS) (2008) – 300 ships; the Sustainable Defense Task Force (SDTF) (2010) – 230 ships; the QDR Inde-
pendent Panel (QDRIP) (2010) – 346 ships; and the CATO Institute (2010) – 241 ships (Swartz 2011j: 60, slide 
119-120). 
422
 The Navy’s 30-year-shipbuilding plan has in recent years been a central subject of deliberations on Capitol 
Hill, e.g., in the House of Representatives Armed Services Committee and its appropriate subcommittee, the 
Seapower and Projection Forces Subcommittee. In many discourses, numbers have replaced any strategic rea-
soning in that regard.  
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Illustration 36: USN 2000s ship levels (Swartz 2011j: 57-58, slides 113-115). In 2005, the force level goal was 
between 260 and 325; in 2010, the landing zone was between 313 and 323. The CRS and NHHC numbers on the 
battle force and the active ships levels, respectively, align.  
The graph illustrates that declaratory force level goals, with the exception of the first year, 
were never met. The Navy routinely fell short of that goal by 30 ships or more. In 2005, when 
a force level goal of somewhere between 260 and 325 ships was postulated, the inventory 
would have been made to fit. Given the conservative structure of a Navy and the long-term 
dynamics of warship design, construction, procurement, and service life, a significant change 
in the structure of the force (a decrease of force levels notwithstanding) is still not observable.  
10.6 Strategic and Operational Implementation: Planned vs. Actual  
The intimate relationship between U.S. naval strategy and naval operations remained as rele-
vant in the 2000s as it did during any other time covered in this study. Operational experienc-
es influenced the making of strategy as commanders rotated into OPNAV billets. The fleet, in 
turn, set out to operationalize the strategies that were handed down to them. At the same time, 
the Navy worked hard to answer when called to serve American foreign policy interests and 
ends. It followed that the Navy’s operational tempo was high. This brought larger operating 
and manpower costs but also provided the service with considerable expertise and experience. 
In the following, three major naval operations will be discussed briefly to illustrate the real-
world operations that shaped Navy thinking and conduct after 2001.  
310 
375 375 375 
325 
313 313 313 313 
323 323 
316 313 
297 291 282 281 279 282 
285 
288 285 
6 6 5 7 8 4 5 3 8 7 0 0 
50 
100 
150 
200 
250 
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Force Level Goal 
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10.6.1 Major U.S. Naval Operations423 
a) Horn of Africa (since 2002) 
In response to the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the U.S. orchestrated military strikes against tar-
gets in Afghanistan on 7 October 2001. Dubbed “Operation Enduring Freedom”, the opera-
tion’s strategic goal was toppling the Taliban government, capturing Osama bin Laden (the 
mastermind behind the attacks), destroying the terrorist network al-Qaida, and establishing 
the conditions to introduce a democratic regime in the landlocked Central Asian country. 
With neither the patience of senior U.S. leaders nor the infrastructure in the region in place to 
reprise Gulf-War-style invasion plans, a more unconventional CIA plan was adopted. Using 
proxy tribal armed forces of a loose anti-Taliban alliance that was managed and paid by the 
agency’s operatives, U.S. naval air power (together with the USAF and allied air forces) pro-
vided the bulk of the initial combat thrust against Afghanistan (Haynes 2013: 222). Innova-
tively, the carrier Kitty Hawk (CV 63) was used as an improvised afloat forward-staging base 
for SOF helicopters (part of the carrier’s organic air wing departed for the course of that mis-
sion).  
OEF has since merged into a larger concept that encompasses several subordinate operations 
that spanned from the Caribbean to the Horn of Africa, Afghanistan, and the Philippines. The 
war in Afghanistan accounted for the overwhelming majority of OEF operations and despite 
the landlocked character of the operating area, the Navy is involved in joint operations there. 
It provided (and in many cases still does) C
4
ISR, strike and special operations, Seabees engi-
neers and Navy specialists from a wide range of disciplines (e.g., intelligence, medical, supply 
and logistics, explosive ordnance removal and demolition, legal, personnel, IT/information 
dominance, and law enforcement) for the range of tasks that come with working in the irregu-
lar warfare environment. In addition, the Marine Corps was increasingly engaged in the 
ground war around the country.
424
 The most visible naval subordinate operation is the OEF 
component at the Horn of Africa (HOA). Just like the operations in Afghanistan, OEF-HOA 
falls in the area of responsibility for U.S. Central Command. Its main objectives, covering the 
whole western Indian Ocean, were the physical protection of maritime traffic from terrorist 
attacks, force protection, and providing stability against re-grouping terrorist networks. Al-
Qaida was very active in the Horn of Africa region in the 1990s and U.S. leaders considered 
                                                          
423
 Major naval operations understood as the sustained commitment of forces engaged in expeditionary opera-
tions against a shore or a fleet. On the problem of definitions, see Vego (2008: 7-39). In this chapter, these are 
selected naval operations designed to illustrate the real-world operations that the U.S. Navy conducted in the 
2000s.  
424
 For a description of the USMC’s operations against Afghanistan 2001-2002 from the sea, see Lowry (2013).  
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that area a likely destination for terrorists fleeing from combat operations in Afghanistan. Na-
vy operations typically involved maritime monitoring, boarding, search and seizure of suspect 
ships and dhows. This helped to gather intelligence, inhibit terrorism, curb armed robbery, 
and limit smuggling (Schneller 2007: 100-101). As much as in OEF support for the war in 
Afghanistan, the naval presence in the Arabian Sea was also multinational in nature (many 
countries contributed to some degree in both, obviously restricted by their respective capabili-
ties, rules of engagement, and U.S. requirements). Participants at the Horn of Africa included 
long-time NATO partners, other allies, and recently-arrived countries that joined the U.S. 
effort in the “Global War on Terror”.425 Beyond the operations discussed, OEF-HOA forces 
were also engaged in humanitarian assistance, counter-proliferation, and counter-piracy ef-
forts.
426
 Piracy began to affect maritime security in the region in earnest beginning in 2008 
(after having plagued African coasts and Southeast Asia, although qualitatively different in 
the Strait of Malacca, for many years prior to that escalation).
427
 Consequently, the European 
Union (“Operation Atalanta” since December 2008), NATO (“Operation Allied Provider” 
October-December 2008, “Operation Allied Protector” March-June 2009, “Operation Ocean 
Shield” since August 2009), and the U.S.-administered CTF-151 (since January 2009) have 
been stood up complementary to OEF-HOA and U.S. national (Fifth Fleet) efforts in order to 
protect shipping and fight piracy off the Horn of Africa. After high points in 2009 and 2010, 
the quantity and quality of piracy incidents has decreased remarkably due to a combination of 
naval force presence, shipping industry best-management practices, and anti-piracy operations 
ashore. To date, anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa, some with U.S. participation, 
others under individual national mandates, continue. In addition to the immediate curbing of 
piracy, the host of naval platforms in the area provides geostrategic results: naval presence 
matters in ways that armies and air forces cannot fulfill. The operational cooperation is an 
example of a global maritime partnership in action (Bruns 2009).  
 
                                                          
425
 A picture from 14 September 2001 made considerable headlines on the brotherhood in arms after 9/11: The 
U.S. guided-missile destroyer Winston Churchill (DDG 81) and the German Charles-F.-Adams-class guided-
missile destroyer Lütjens (D 185) met on the Atlantic. The crew of the (U.S.-manufactured) German warship 
manned the rails and presented a banner that read “We stand by you”. Germany participated in the naval side of 
OEF at the Horn of Africa with destroyers, frigates, fast-patrol boats, submarines, tenders, and MPA between 
2002 and 2010 (Bundeswehr 2014).  
426
 For a discussion of the particulars of piracy and maritime terrorism, in particular an analysis against con-
founding the two phenomena in designing suitable counter-strategies, see Murphy (2008) and Chalk (2008).  
427
 One of the most notable piracy events at the Horn of Africa with U.S. involvement was the hijacking of the 
container ship M/V Maersk Alabama in April 2009. The ship was subsequently released and the pirates made off 
with the master towards the Somali coast. Bainbridge (DDG 96), Halyburton (FFG 40), Boxer (LHD 4), a SEAL 
tam, and a P3-C Orion MPA were dispatched to end the hostage-taking. Eventually, three pirates were killed, 
two more were arrested, and the victim was released.  
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b) Arabian Gulf and Operation Iraqi Freedom (2003-2011) 
After the decision was made to attack Iraq in the context of the “Global War on Terrorism” 
(Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld and Vice President Cheney were instrumental in the inner-
administration persuasion), operational plans for the Arabian Gulf region needed to be re-
vamped (Ricks 2007, Cheney 2011). The premise of a “Desert Storm II” plan approved in 
1998 consisted of a six-month build-up of 400,000 troops and was not viewed favorably by 
Rumsfeld, who wanted something faster and much leaner (Ricks 2007, Rumsfeld 2012). Iraqi 
forces were degraded since their defeat in the first Gulf War more than a decade earlier, but to 
the “coalition of the willing” that assembled for this operation it was still a formidable oppo-
nent (on land). On the naval side, five carrier battle groups, two amphibious ready groups, 
two amphibious task forces, and a Royal Navy amphibious task group were assigned to 
CENTCOM (Schneller 2007: 92) at the outset of the campaign against Iraq. The surge of half 
of the Navy’s operational carrier strike groups and ten expeditionary strike groups (a remark-
able demonstration of U.S. sea power) was a function of the emerging “Fleet Response Plan” 
(2003) and an overwhelming and inhibiting display. Sealift moved cargo, fuel, and equipment 
to the troops and did so with even less opposition than during “Operation Desert 
Shield”/”Operation Desert Storm” (early in the war, Navy special forces seized Iraqi oil fields 
and terminals, and thwarted the covert sewing of mines). Joint operations against Iraq were, in 
another marked contrast to 1990/1991, relatively smooth because the Navy had practiced and 
learned to interoperate with the other military branches during the long decade of aerial war-
fare, while enforcing no-fly zones over Iraq. Naval aviation (especially the F/A-18 workhors-
es) flew 65% of the strike, reconnaissance, and power-projection sorties over Iraq and 35 al-
lied warships fired more than 750 Tomahawk missiles against targets ashore (Schneller 2007: 
96). The fast drive to oust Saddam Hussein from power confirmed many promises of the 
transformation agenda that “Sea Power 21” had attempted to codify for the Navy just a year 
earlier. But after President Bush declared major combat operations over on 1 May 2003, Iraq 
soon descended into a full-fledged civil war and a defining insurgency. Although the Army 
and the Marine Corps bore the brunt of this onslaught, Navy and Coast Guard (e.g., EOD 
teams, MCM personnel, Seabees construction battalions, riverine forces, etc.) were also 
drawn into the deteriorating security situation and the quagmire that was left behind. The 
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emerging counterinsurgency doctrine required much intellectual flexibility from the Marine 
Corps and, to a much lesser degree, the Navy.
 428
 
c) Tsunami Relief (2004/2005)  
In the middle of the two major U.S. ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, a natural disaster in 
Southeast Asia demonstrated the humanitarian assistance and disaster relief capabilities of 
naval forces. On 26 December 2004, a 9.1-magnitude earthquake northwest of the Indonesian 
island of Sumatra resulted in a massive tsunami that swept through the whole Indian Ocean 
littorals. More than 230,000 people (165,000 in Indonesia alone) were killed and upwards of 
one million inhabitants were left homeless. The international community responded swiftly 
and dispatched substantial goods, personnel, and emergency services into the worst-affected 
regions (Margesson 2005, Elleman 2007). Military forces, in particular navies, of many coun-
tries played an indispensable role in providing medical help, serving as floating hospitals, 
functioning as command centers, and providing highly demanded water-purification facilities. 
The military also provided vital security in the devastated areas ashore. In “Operation Unified 
Assistance”, the U.S. Navy’s response included the Abraham Lincoln (CVN 72) carrier strike 
group and the Bonhomme Richard (LHD 6) expeditionary strike group (later relived by Essex 
[LHD 2]). One of the most important parts of this reactive disaster response was the deploy-
ment of the hospital ship Mercy (T-AH 19), a converted oil tanker commissioned in 1986 (the 
U.S. Navy operates two of these ships). Combined, more than 100,000 patient services were 
provided. The U.S. Navy’s contribution to the relief operation amounted to more than 25 
ships in 2004/2005. The Navy adopted these successful operations and increasingly conducted 
proactive humanitarian assistance deployments. Hospital ships or LHD helicopter carriers 
were dispatched increasingly to provide Pacific and Latin American countries support. This 
practice (which also improved U.S. reputation in the affected regions) was later codified in 
the “Global Fleet Stations” concepts that formed an integral part of “CS-21” (Department of 
the Navy/U.S. Coast Guard 2007, Sohn 2009).
429
  
  
                                                          
428
 A good introduction to the Marine Corps’ embrace of operational aspects of counterinsurgency is Hoffman 
(2010). The Navy did counterinsurgency during in Vietnam, which by virtue of its geography provided a much 
more suitable terrain than Iraq or Afghanistan ever could. For an introduction on the naval support to counterin-
surgency, see Murphy (2010).  
429
 The response to the Haiti earthquake in January 2010 reiterated the Navy’s disaster response role: The Navy 
surged 112 ship task force grouped around aircraft carriers, helicopter carriers, and amphibious assault ships. 
That operation underlined the themes of cooperation and trust that “CS-21” articulated.  
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10.6.2 Relationships to Sister Services: Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Army, Air Force 
a) USMC 
The major naval operations of the 2000s displayed the improved Navy-Marine Corps rela-
tions. That is not to say that there were not contentious issues between the two services (e.g., 
the number of amphibious ships, the characteristics of new vessels, and the JSF variants). The 
Marine Corps’ growing end-strength reflected the increasing operational demands of the 
ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq. At sea and in the littorals, maritime security operations, 
humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief dominated the operational experience. At the same 
time, the Marines had to focus increasingly on counterinsurgency operations ashore and 
risked a degradation of their amphibious competency (Feickert 2014).  
By and large, the services collaborated on many conceptual and strategic documents during 
the first decade of the 21
st
 century with the highpoint of CS-21. Simultaneously, the services 
also pursued single-service vision, concept, strategy, and doctrinal publications.
430
 The naval 
capstone documents offered a close degree of coherence between the Navy and the Marine 
Corps, although both services usually engaged in different roles. The Marine Corps continued 
to rise to co-equality with the Navy and the other branches of the military (a trend that has 
been ongoing since the Vietnam War) through operational emancipation and such high-profile 
developments as the tenure of General Pace as CJCS (2005-2007). To the public and Con-
gress, the versatility of the Navy-Marine Corps team was demonstrated by such measures as 
the increased use of amphibious ships for non-amphibious roles (i.e. Global Fleet Stations) 
(Bruns 2010b).  
b) USCG 
The U.S. government’s responses to the terrorist attacks of 9/11 fundamentally enhanced the 
role of the Coast Guard. With the increasingly value of homeland security, the Navy and the 
Coast Guard moved closer together. A 2008 memorandum of understanding formalized the 
Coast Guard’s national defense capabilities in support of DOD (including maritime interdic-
tion, counter-terrorism, port security, military environmental responses, coastal sea-control, 
maritime operational threat responses, helicopter air-interception operations, and support for 
area security cooperation initiatives). The Coast Guard was engaged in comprehensive mili-
tary operations such as “Nobel Eagle”431 and “Iraqi Freedom.” It participated increasingly in 
“Global Fleet Stations” worldwide and continued its counter-drug operations in the Caribbe-
                                                          
430
 For an overview of USMC doctrinal thought in the 2000s, see Swartz (2011j: 131-136, slides 261-271). 
431
 “Operation Noble Eagle” was the code name for the post-9/11 homeland security operation.  
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an. The “National Strategy for Maritime Security” (2005) codified the significant role that the 
Coast Guard played in national security and defense. In conjunction with the Navy and the 
Marine Corps, the Coast Guard engaged in writing CS-21 (2007). That document provided a 
significant coherence for sea services that in fact often do very different things.
432
 With the 
tie-in to the overarching maritime strategy, the Coast Guard’s ageing fleet needs to be drasti-
cally modernized (Bruns 2013a: 179).  
c) Army & Air Force 
The relationship between the Army and the Navy after 2001 was rocky. The Navy spent much 
of the decade under the impression that it had been marginalized in the eyes of successive 
administrations and the American public due to the Pentagon’s focus (and the adjacent public-
ity) on two land-forces centric ground wars to which the Army was central (no matter how 
much support the Navy provided). After narrowly averting a defeat in Iraq in the face of a 
violent insurgency (2004-2006) that called into question the political-military planning on 
heavy combat forces, the Army became energized and transformed itself into a capable COIN 
force to turn around the momentum of the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
433
 However, by 2010 
the tide had turned and the American public and its senior leaders (much to the dismay of the 
Army) appeared desirous to leave the irregular conflicts behind.
434
 Pressed by operational 
military realities, the Navy mentioned some contributions to COIN in its capstone documents 
(e.g., maritime security operations, riverine operations, and humanitarian assistance/disaster 
relief tactics). The JHSV were initially designed (as the classification suggests) as a joint Ar-
my-Navy program where the Army was slated to take responsibility of half of the units pro-
cured. The program has since moved completely into the hands of the Navy. Operationally, 
intellectually, and strategically, the Army and the Navy traveled on diverging tracks in the 
2000s.
435
 
The Air Force (which came out of the 1990s on a high note after it had ostensibly demonstrat-
ed the decisive power of aerial warfare in the Kosovo War) was in a situation similar to the 
Navy. The evolving geostrategic situation underlined the need for overcoming other coun-
tries’ A2AD capabilities (in particular China and Iran). This sparked an interest in air defense, 
                                                          
432
 For more on Navy-Coast Guard relations in the 2000s, see Swartz (2011j: 136-147, slides 272-293).  
433
 For an introduction to the Army’s embrace of operational aspects of counterinsurgency, see Mansoor (2010). 
434
 Emblematic is Secretary of Defense Gates’ dictum during a speech at the U.S. Military Academy in West 
Point, NY: “In my opinion, any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American 
land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined,’ as General MacArthur so 
delicately put it.” (citied in Shanker, “Warning Against Wars Like Iraq an Afghanistan,” The New York Times, 
25 February 2011) 
435
 For more on Navy-Army relations, see Swartz (2011j: 167-180, slides 334-360).  
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sea control, and counter-sea operations and capabilities (Swartz 2011i: 148, slide 296). By 
virtue of their operational focus, both services were extraordinarily well positioned for this. 
Another commonality was that the Air Force also played little more than a supporting role in 
the ground-centric COIN operations in Southwest Asia.
436
 In finding common ground and 
shared understanding regarding the future primary warfighting domain, the Air Force and the 
Navy reached an unprecedented degree of cooperation and integration. This culminated in the 
development of a classified Air-Sea Battle (ASB) concept directed by the Secretary of De-
fense at the end of the decade. Although a deliberate echo of the Air-Land Battle doctrine of 
the 1970s and 1980s (which tied together Army and Air Force at the Central Front in Europe), 
the ASB concept focused on smarter acquisition, not smarter warfighting like the former.
437
 
With the Joint Strike Fighter variants, the Air Force, the Navy, and the Marines are likely to 
be tied together even closer in terms of equipment and doctrine in the coming decade.
438
 
10.6.3 Relationships to Allies  
9/11 and the “Global War on Terrorism” sparked an unprecedented degree of multilateral na-
val cooperation. These were no longer limited to traditional alliances; instead, the U.S. Navy 
increasingly also relied on coalitions of the willing and other non-binding partnerships (at sea, 
navies historically have frequently trained and interoperated with each other). This was less 
instrumental in support of the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq where coalitions by-and-
large worked. It was all the more significant in the global littorals and at sea. CNO Admiral 
Mullen’s “1,000-ship Navy” concept to engage maritime forces around the world (later ex-
panded and rebranded “Global Maritime Partnership” under CNO Admiral Roughead) had 
two focal points. “Global Fleet Stations” engaged local and regional navies, coast guards, 
harbor police, NGOs, and local government entities to facilitate capacity-building in the naval 
realm and enhance U.S. (and by implication, Western) standing in a given region.
439
 On the 
higher end, combined operations and exercises, information-sharing, and technology transfer 
between the U.S. Navy and its allies continued (e.g., integration of allied warships into U.S. 
Navy carrier strike groups, operational testing of leased foreign catamarans by the Navy, par-
                                                          
436
 The airpower and air support that was in demand in the ground wars was often provided by organic Ar-
my/Marine Corps forces. For an introduction to the role of airpower in counterinsurgency, see Dunlap (2010). 
437
 In the process, the Pentagon appears to have lost control of the message – if there ever was one beyond the 
implicit call on the Navy and the Air Force to eliminate redundancies – of ASB. Army and Marine Corps were 
unhappy that they were not included and China, the ASB concept’s apparent objective, understandably not 
amused.  
438
 For more on Navy-Air Force relations (including weapons systems, platforms, operational aspects, and space 
domain perspectives) see Swartz (2011j: 147-167, slides 294-333).  
439
 In 2008, Robert Work suggested seven of these global fleet stations (Work 2009: 64). For an analysis of the 
strategy, see Sohn (2009) and for short assessments of those GFS already in place (African Partnership Station, 
APS; Southern Partnership Station, SPS; and Pacific Partnership, PP), see Bruns (2010b, 2013b: 10-13).  
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ticipation of foreign navies in Aegis- and JSF-programs, etc.). The anti-terror “Operation Ac-
tive Endeavour” (OAE)440 in the Mediterranean (since 2001), Proliferation Security Initiative 
(since 2003) operations, and the multilateral anti-piracy operations off the Horn of Africa 
(since 2008) provided an unparalleled degree of naval cooperation and operational integra-
tion.  
In 2007, the fleet balance shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific. More ships were now oper-
ating in Asian waters than in European and African waters. In 2008, after ten years of being 
forward-stationed in Yokosuka (Japan), the aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk (CV 63) was relieved 
by the significantly larger nuclear-powered George Washington (CVN 73). Established USN-
led maneuvers and exercises continued to be conducted (e.g., Baltops in the Baltic Sea, Mala-
bar exercises in the Indian Ocean, CARAT in Southeast Asia, UNITAS in the Americas, and 
RIMPAC in the Pacific) just as new forums were developed and implemented (e.g., Valiant 
Shield in the Pacific since 2006). U.S. leadership was not limited to these recurring exercises 
but also included organizational (command) support. As NATO expanded and integrated in 
the 2000s, the U.S. Navy permanently contributed naval assets.
441
 The drafting of NATO’s 
new “Alliance Maritime Strategy” began in 2009. It was published in March of 2011. Mean-
while, China had its “coming out” as a blue-water navy in 2009. Throughout the decade, na-
vy-to-navy relations were problematic and incidents such as PLAN ships harassing U.S. Navy 
ships were emblematic of an uncertain bilateral future.  
10.6.4 Significant Organizational Changes  
On the home front, the Navy also implemented some changes. The creation of the Fleet Forc-
es Command (FFC) reinforced the Navy’s focus on operations and resource management that 
was popularized under CNO Clark. FFC served a vehicle for OPNAV to organize, train, and 
equip the force and while that excluded strategic thinking, senior commanders from this shore 
establishment were actively engaged in trying to shape the future direction of the Navy. More 
publicly visible was the creation of USAFRICOM on 1 October 2008, a separate geographic 
command for Africa (headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany) (Ploch 2011). The same year, the 
4
th
 Fleet under USSOUTHCOM was re-established to provide a more suitable framework for 
U.S. naval operations in Latin America, the Caribbean, and South America.
442
 In 2006, the 
Navy Expeditionary Combat Command (NECC) was stood up to bracket together EOD mis-
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 OAE was one of the first military responses to the invocation of Article 5 North Atlantic Treaty after the 9/11 
attacks. 
441
 Examples include USN participation in standing NATO maritime groups and hosting the newly-established 
Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk (Virginia) since 2003.  
442
 For a reflection of the strategic context and the roles and missions in the 4
th
 Fleet AOR, see Stavridis (2010).  
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sions, navy construction forces (Seabees), maritime civil affairs groups, and riverine forces 
(in 2007, the Navy conducted the first riverine combat operations in 34 years) (Navy Expedi-
tionary Combat Command 2011). In January 2010, the 10
th
 Fleet was re-established as a naval 
component and force provider to the U.S. Fleet Cyber Command (Chief of Naval Operations 
2010). 
10.7 Assessment: American Sea Power and U.S. Navy Strategy in a Time of Challenges 
and Innovation, 2001-2011 
The Navy ended the first decade of the 2000s on a mixed note. After the shock of 9/11 and the 
marginalization by the ground wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the service was energized by the 
impact of the trifecta family of strategic capstone documents.
443
 This deliberately connected 
group of documents replaced the single line of documents of the 1980s and the more erratic, 
often isolated documents that characterized Navy strategy-making in the 1990s. Throughout 
the 2000s, Navy budgets increased (in contrast to the 1990s) and the battle fleet inventory 
finally recovered after years of reductions in numbers. Previously, a disappointing record of 
shipbuilding and procurement tainted the Navy’s track record in this field.  
At the beginning of the decade, 9/11 fundamentally changed the security perception of Amer-
icans. The terrorist attacks heralded a decade that was dominated largely by ground wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq as well as a global campaign against illicit actors. Non-state actors and 
those who provided them with a safe haven increasingly moved into the focus of security pol-
icy. Like in the past, the Navy occasionally pushed back against the view of land-power fo-
cused “continentalists” who saw the generation-long war against international terrorism as 
emblematic for the future U.S. military. Along that narrative, the U.S. was never fully at war 
nor fully at peace. Sea power theorists and practitioners needed to grasp that trend and turn it 
around in their favor.  
They rediscovered that the Navy had always operated across the spectrum and, if made aware 
of its conceptual roots, was well suited to provide the senior civilian leaders with a range of 
options. The Navy needed to align better to the grand strategy and if possible translate such 
knowledge into suitable contributions to the policy of the Bush administration. Cornered by 
the public and political focus on the ground wars and burdened by the growing demands of 
the ongoing missions and naval operations, the Navy looked toward regaining the conceptual 
                                                          
443
 These were the “Naval Operations Concept”, the “Navy Strategic Plan”, and “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st 
Century Seapower”. The new spirit is recently also characterized by the Navy’s advertisement slogan, “A Global 
Force for Good” (http://www.navy.com/about/gffg.html).  
  
308 
initiative. First, naval planners remembered and restated the naval missions that had been cod-
ified by Admiral Turner forty years earlier. Second, these same officers returned to the reali-
zation that forward-deployed navies have always had a very distinct position to play in 
shapping events ashore and in the littorals, thereby uniquely influencing events and strategic 
outcomes. Animated by the top-cover provided by the Navy leadership, revitalized by input 
from formal and informal study groups, think tanks, and other discussion forums, and sensing 
momentum, CS-21 emerged as genuinely new maritime (not just a naval) strategy. It fash-
ioned the Navy as a post-modern force that defended the global system. Strikingly, its devel-
opment went against the prevailing currents of military and political planning. Mullen and his 
collaborators managed to design a strategy that was at once in line with the overarching 
grand-strategic demands that the Bush administration directed (even if Bush 43’s foreign pol-
icy was seen by some as increasingly belligerent and unilateral) and fashioned a concerted, 
forward-looking, and systemic approach at the same time. In fact, the selection of the strate-
gy’s title is a revelation. In proposing a seapower (one word) strategy for this century, CS-21 
forged a bridge between the universal and institutional meaning of the concept (given that the 
globalized world is so interconnected and integrated that it can indeed be understood as one 
system – or more precisely, a system of systems) and the physical political, diplomatic, con-
stabulary, and military exercise of sea power (two words).  
Meanwhile, in the Pentagon thinking was dominated by the focus on terrorism. The need to 
transform in stride by developing future capabilities to achieve the vision of full spectrum 
dominance was met by greater financial resources, better technology, more reliance on acti-
vating reserve forces, and a growth in Army and Marine Corps force structure (Meinhard 
2012:81). CS-21 also helped to overcome the previous, rather limited focus on operations and 
budget submissions. This was a politically safe way to rationalize the service to a Congress 
that was very concerned with war-fighting and weapons systems, but otherwise had eclipsed 
any visions that earlier strategic documents had partially offered. This had caused strategic 
thinking and the art of strategy to degenerate. As surface warfare officers, Vice Admiral Mor-
gan and Admiral Mullen were better suited to identify and embrace a more population-centric 
role of sea power. Due to the indisputable facts that Kabul and Bagdad were not exactly major 
port cities and Afghanistan’s and Iraq’s sea power marginal, the Navy needed to develop 
something completely different and novel. At the time, the demand for specialist prowess 
such as counter-IED capabilities, cultural and language abilities, and the more comprehensive 
view that sea power needed to affect the littoral sea- and land-wards had eclipsed the fashion-
able vocabularies related to transformation and capabilities-based planning. Conceptually, 
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CS-21 refocused the understanding of the value of sea power for foreign-policy ends and ele-
vated it. For much of the post-Cold War time, the Navy (e.g., for a lack of ambition, institu-
tional coherence, or intellectual vigor) had conveniently concentrated on operational, doctri-
nal, and tactical aspects of naval warfare.  
Toward the end of the decade, U.S. security policy began to look beyond the hostilities in the 
Middle East and Central Asia arenas. The rise of China (and to lesser degrees Brazil, Russia, 
and India) epitomized that emergence of peer competitors who looked for access to resources 
and influence. They have the potential to challenge U.S. sea power, which had been uncon-
tested for over a decade. By 2010, the world had changed. Shortly after the publication of the 
2007 “CS-21” document, the stock market took a dive. One of the main implicit assumptions 
of the strategy (continuous mutual prosperity) faded away. In Washington, the assumption of 
rising defense budgets turned out to be incorrect as the U.S. economy went into a downward 
spiral. The global financial crisis deeply shocked the global economy and international trade 
nearly collapsed. China began to challenge the United States in the Pacific and by extension 
in the South and East China Sea. Russia’s 2008 war against Georgia foreshadowed Moscow’s 
resurrecting geopolitical ambitions. The nuclear programs of North Korea and Iran continued 
unabatedly despite sanction regimes and political-military pressure. These are fundamental, 
considerably more violent shocks to the global system that CS-21 outlined. With the Arab 
Spring of 2011, a major part of the Middle East and North Africa descended into an (ongoing) 
mélange of civil war, insurgency, and terror. In Libya, the international community intervened 
using a combination of naval and air forces in the U.S.-led “Operation Odyssey Dawn” 
(March 2011) and later as the NATO-led “Operation Unified Protector” (March-October 
2011). The military operation demonstrated some fundamental shortcomings in naval power 
of the U.S. and its allies (McGrath 2013, Smith-Windsor 2013).  
With “CS-21”, the Navy was well underway to develop upward pressure and to fashion a na-
tional, systemic, and truly maritime strategy. The intermittent failure to develop the idea fur-
ther and implement the document – due to economic events, a changing administration that 
was more focused on domestic politics and generally shy of executable strategic and military 
ideas, political gridlock in Washington, more immediate concerns about the ground wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, and an ever-shifting geopolitical situation – is regrettable. Navy strate-
gies between 2001 and 2011 demonstrate the enduring value of the four core naval missions. 
These documents underlined that only a strategy that addresses political ends in naval warfare 
can be assured some impact. Concurrently,n aval strategy by default (e.g., force-planning by 
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the FY budget requests) was, and is, a dead end. These missions are a common theme over 
more than three decades and a link to what the future may hold for U.S .Navy strategy and the 
exercise of American sea power around the world.  
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11 Synopsis 
11.1 A Few General Conclusions  
This study analyses the evolution of U.S. Navy strategy and American sea power over the 
course of three decades framed by major Navy capstone documents. To arrive at a more nu-
anced understanding of the concepts involved, the survey first discussed the relationship be-
tween seapower and sea power, the political and military uses of the sea, relevant theory, the 
links between different levels of strategy, naval missions, and some particulars of the mari-
time domain that guide formulation of naval and maritime strategy. The analysis also showed 
the intimate relationship among strategy, planning, and force structure.  
The role of navies in foreign policy and as strategic tools of security policy is underappreciat-
ed and widely unexplored in practical policy as well as in the academy. The reasons for this 
remain speculative; perhaps it is due to the service’s specialized strategic culture or its opera-
tions out at sea and thus out of sight that often lets it appear inaccessible to outsiders. Howev-
er, the military and political effects of navies and naval power are ultimately felt ashore. Stra-
tegic planners must take this into account, and analysts are well-served to conceptualize this. 
This warrants the study of modern seapower and sea power. Ken Booth’s work of 1979 de-
serves to be dusted off. 
More than just a semantic egg dance, one has to be careful in teasing apart the different mean-
ings of the concepts at hand. An assessment of the role (and relative value) of a navy in the 
national security construct of a state requires a sustainable methodology and a careful differ-
entiation. Terminology is not always helpful: After all, what exactly constitutes U.S. Navy 
strategy in the first place? What can be subsumed under the umbrella of “sea power”? The 
terms involved are so comprehensive that they can easily mean something entirely else to 
anyone. To hedge against such confusion, this dissertation broke the concept down into 
seapower (one word) as an institutional and geographical quality of a nation and sea power 
(two words) as a universal, comprehensive, and conscious political choice in the application 
of military power.  
There are some general aspects. Sea power includes diplomatic, constabulary, and military 
roles. These require a balanced fleet of different but multi-mission capable ships. To rational-
ize a balanced fleet, a navy must produce declaratory statements for various internal and ex-
ternal audiences such as policy and military leaders, legislators, programmers, the public, of-
ficers and enlisted men and women, allies, and by implication even competitors. These de-
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claratory capstone documents are the hinges that connect seapower with sea power. For the 
researcher, the strategic concepts offer a unique prism through which intellectual, fiscal, geo-
strategic, technological, programming, personnel, and domestic political currents must be 
assessed. These aspects govern the effectiveness and efficiency of sea power. In turn, a look 
at how these declaratory documents played out in the real world – in force structure, naval 
operations, public support, relationship to allies, etc. – is also justified to arrive at a better 
placement of strategy into context.  
A causal relation between strategies (general or naval), their practical employment, and 
whether a strategy was a success, is difficult to trace much less to verify. Decision-making 
processes and institutional learning rarely conform to theoretical models. Instead, they are 
subject to diverse internal dynamics and external influences of a political nature. In short, they 
are contingent on changing world conditions, national polices, and personalities (Swartz 
2009b: 18). Moreover, the strategic orientation of a navy, its roles, missions, and force struc-
ture are never determined in a political vacuum. They hardly adhere to orderly hierarchical 
processes in which strategy follows from an articulation of national interests, an identification 
of threats, the establishment of political-military objectives, the matching of goals with avail-
able resources, and corresponding operations. Although strategy is the attempt to control 
events, in reality, making strategy is more often a complicated and even chaotic process 
(Hattendorf 2004: viii). Naval strategy and its underlying policies are both a product of and a 
factor in the competitions, interactions, and ambiguities of statecraft; they are an input and an 
output. Individuals, events, or adverse decisions can interpose even in the most rational and 
theoretical logic of these processes. Naval strategies can thus often only approximately align 
with overarching strategies. At best, they offer narratives that are compelling and substantiat-
ed enough to exert upward political pressure, enhance service cohesion, and provide a com-
prehensive and optimistic general marching order. A study of naval strategy must reflect these 
limitations and dynamics or else render itself meaningless.  
11.2 American Seapower  
America sports determinants of functional (geographic) as well as horizontal (institutional) 
seapower. “From Sea to Shining Sea,” as the famous hymn “America, the Beautiful” declares, 
America is an island nation with extended coastlines in the East and West, some of the largest 
and best-served ports in the world, and a potent maritime industrial base. Although the quality 
and quantity of American shipbuilding is waning compared to many other nations, the domes-
tic maritime industry supports nearly 500,000 jobs and almost $100 billion in annual econom-
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ic output (Hunter/Scalise 2014). The United States’ division of the world into areas of mili-
tary responsibility is unique, but it is a function of the island nation and the established prac-
tice of forward presence.  
Institutionally, there are a number of actors that make, as well as factors that shape, the con-
stitution of American seapower and, by implication, relevant statements of strategic quality 
and intent. The President, Congress, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (and its Chairman), the Secretary 
of Defense, and the regional and functional military commanders all matter. As principally 
laid out in the U.S. Constitution and Title 10, U.S. Code, they have codified responsibilities 
and obligations that they continually exercise to shifting degrees and in the face of inter-
personal dynamics and influences. The president is important for overarching leadership and 
direction, i.e., where he wants the nation to go. The U.S. Senate and the House of Representa-
tives are in charge of modifying presidential politics although historically they have been 
more interested in people and equipment which they are asked to fund, and less so in the larg-
er strategic designs of the Navy (Swartz 2009b: 70).  
In a world where the military is thinking and acting progressively more jointly (and single-
service strategies and programs are increasingly looked down on), the Chairmen of the Joint 
Chiefs have a central role in the formulation of military strategy and in advising the president 
on security and defense policy matters (although the chain of command now essentially by-
passes them). The unified combatant commanders also have an important role. Their require-
ments for forces are based on what they assess as the demands on the ground. Even if these 
requests are more geared toward fulfilling current needs, they can exert upward pressure 
through the chain of command.  
The Secretary of Defense is important in coordinating the programming efforts of the services 
and departments. OPNAV and the Department of the Navy are the cores where service strate-
gy, or more precisely Navy capstone documents, originate and emerge in the overwhelming 
majority of instances. Such projects are naturally subject to available budgets, specializations, 
individual and collective ambition, classification statuses, and many more influences. It fol-
lows – and a look at the history of the documents will prove – that in terms of strategy-
making and institutional seapower, Chiefs of Naval Operations usually matter a lot, whereas 
the Secretaries of the Navy only sometimes matter (Swartz 2011b: 84, slides 167-168).  
In the discussion of American seapower, a host of shapers must be considered as secondary 
influences, although they neither have the constitutional nor legal rights and obligations to 
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make and shape U.S. Navy strategy. For example, there is inherent competition between de-
partments like the Department of Defense and the Department of State. To leverage American 
sea power, it is advisable to analyze if and how far general directions, subordinate policies, 
and even capstone documents are aligned (if not directed by the president). Similar recom-
mendations can be made for other branches of the military in the perpetual quest for resources 
and national attention.  
It also behooves to consider the unique qualities and capabilities that the other military ser-
vices bring to bear. Where service strategies previously wrestled with influence and thrust, in 
an increasingly joint environment a service can now better attempt to affect coming legisla-
tion and even joint policy and strategy to their advantage by deliberately joining hands. This 
must be taken into account in an analysis. Interest groups and the media are further aspects 
that can – however briefly – interpose. Although they often merely focus on individual issues 
or events far below the truly strategic level, their actions influence policy-makers to eventual-
ly make strategically-relevant choices. This, in turn, can affect program planning and the 
crafting of strategy.  
The underlying ideas and ideals that frame grand, security, and military strategy are the ones 
that are most interesting to the political scientist. These range from overarching, great visions 
(e.g., why does America go to war, to what ends, and against which targets does it direct po-
litical-military force) to more practical, but long-established naval missions (e.g., what and 
how does the Navy do at sea to contribute effectively and efficiently to foreign-policy objec-
tives). Ideally, the former and the latter both factor equally. The current practice in strategy-
making as well as in its analyses, however, appears to be more about missions than about vi-
sions.  
This is where the overlap between seapower theory and sea power theory is at its largest. 
Seapower is a fundamental national security quality with sea power as its indispensable in-
strument. These general hypotheses have evolved since the writings of Alfred Thayer Mahan, 
Julian Corbett, or Stansfield Turner. Despite the advent of many technologies and the funda-
mental complexities of the modern age, there are a number of patterns that help understand 
and explain the enduring value of sea power for a seapower like the United States. It follows 
that naval strategy is not revolutionary, but evolutionary. Technologically advanced, well-
equipped, flexible and forward-present naval forces can serve the nation across a spectrum 
that ranges from alliance-building and humanitarian assistance to surveillance and from eco-
nomic coercion, show of/use of force to limited and larger wars in ways that other military 
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and diplomatic tools do not offer. Obviously, such a wide array of opportunities must be em-
bedded in political and military guidance. In fact, the effects of a navy were seldom a problem 
for such a high-tech force; the determination what to reach out and touch and whether that 
makes a difference is the supreme challenge.  
11.3 U.S. Navy Strategy and American Sea Power in Perspective  
The evolution of U.S. Navy strategy is deeply rooted in the normative and political history of 
the country, and its role and place in the world. After the Spanish-American War of 1898, the 
United States emerged as a truly global power. For the United States, World War I and World 
War II were inherently maritime and naval in nature; for Washington, the entanglement in 
both conflicts was signaled by events at or from the sea. After 1945, nuclear weapons began 
to dominate strategic thinking. In the absence of a capable sea control challenger, the Navy 
began to focus on deterrence. Strategic bombing and massive retaliation became central polit-
ical and military vocabulary even when real-world events showed that limited, non-nuclear 
armed conflicts were still a real possibility. The end of the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weap-
ons and long-range delivery systems and the introduction of missile technology and nuclear 
propulsion guided the development of a sea-based strategic deterrent. That SSBN force sup-
planted aircraft carriers in their nuclear strike role and turned out to be a milestone in the re-
vival of a conventional naval strategy (Center for Naval Analyses 1992: 47). This timely de-
velopment occurred against the background of the Vietnam War years where the Navy’s mis-
sion was reduced to power projection at the expense of sea control capabilities. Emerging 
Soviet high seas power required a renewed concentration on giving the Navy a broader mis-
sion set just as the nation licked its wounds from the defeat in Southeast Asia and the fallout 
of Watergate. The strategic renaissance of a comprehensive sea power strategy slowly began 
inside the Navy but for the time being faced countercurrents in a mainly anti-naval Carter 
administration. 
With the presidency of Ronald Reagan and the top cover of Secretary of the Navy John Leh-
man, “The Maritime Strategy” could eventually unfold. It was a timely reaction to increasing 
Soviet confidence and came amidst deteriorating superpower relations in the ‘Second Cold 
War’ 1979-1985. Buoyed by rising defense spending and fervent presidential rhetoric, the 
new strategy and the accompanying 600-ship force structure energized the navy. The coming 
war, in the words of Admiral Jim Stavridis (who was a young lieutenant in the office that 
helped draft the strategy) (Interview 2012: 00:09:45 – 00:12:20),  
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“was all about fighting the Soviet Union, it was about the Greenland-Iceland-United 
Kingdom gap […], it was about the ‘Hunt for Red October’, the great undersea battle 
that would transpire. It was a very, very large, almost galactic struggle across the At-
lantic and really around the world.”  
Reagan’s second presidential term was characterized by eased relations with the Soviet Un-
ion. Defense reorganization and acquisition reforms changed the way the military went about 
its business. In short, “The Maritime Strategy” was a meaningful maritime piece of U.S. over-
all strategy, even if that meant running the risk of unbalancing the Soviets through offensive 
carrier and attack submarine operations in the vicinity of Moscow’s strategic SSBN reserves. 
“The Maritime Strategy” tracked with the President, Congress, the Navy, and – after the doc-
uments were unclassified – with the public and American allies. The U.S. Navy was also very 
busy with limited conflicts throughout the 1980s, which underlined naval roles across the 
spectrum of conflict and the presence-crisis-war continuum that “The Maritime Strategy” de-
scribed.  
After the end of the Cold War, dramatically shrinking defense and naval budgets put signifi-
cant pressure on the service and the global existential threat of the Cold War was replaced by 
more nuanced, but vague regional scenarios (and, in the words of President George H.W. 
Bush, a new world order). This uncertain environment yielded an abundance of overarching 
strategies and policies from senior political and military leaders, in particular during the pres-
idency of Bill Clinton, who tried to manage and grasp the different era. The Navy sought to 
react accordingly. It produced a host of (usually already unclassified) strategic concepts and 
documents with different names to influence the debate. With “…From the Sea” (1992) and 
“Forward…From the Sea” (1994), the Navy accepted power projection and refocused from 
the high seas to the littorals, while retaining a blue-water navy. At the same time, the United 
States enjoyed uncontested maritime supremacy and was rushing to draw down its Cold-War 
force level (which for the Navy was consistently higher than strategic documents requested) 
rationally. Some of the substantial intellectual gains of “…From the Sea” and “For-
ward…From the Sea” unfortunately were eclipsed by the series of scandals that unsettled the 
Navy at the time. The Navy’s capstone documents of the second half of the decade must 
therefore also be understood as a low-key effort to right the service’s culture and to provide it 
with doctrinal and operational consolidation instead of grander strategic and political-military 
visions. The naval operations of the 1990s (with increasing integration of allies) reaffirmed 
the versatility of naval forces as adaptable instruments in the foreign policy toolkit. From 
mere peacetime presence to limited armed conflict, the Navy was engaged in many short wars 
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and incidents. These operations were buttressed by significant advancements in technology, 
computerization, and shipbuilding.  
After the terrorist attacks of 9/11, the Navy was once again asked to adapt and adjust, having 
just recently submitted its “Seapower 21” capstone document. Homeland security and coun-
ter-terrorism now became a yardstick by which many programs and strategies were justified. 
Throughout the decade, the Navy’s force level goals were higher than the current inventory. 
From the confined waters of the Persian Gulf or the open seaways of the Arabian Sea, the 
U.S. Navy supported the ground, air, and counterinsurgency operations in Afghanistan and 
Iraq with close air support, long-range strike, reconnaissance, surveillance, and intelligence 
collection. The Navy also forward-deployed thousands of troops on the ground who provided 
explosive ordnance disposal, communications, security, training, special operations, and addi-
tional missions in conjunction with the other military branches, allies, and partners. The U.S. 
military was in the middle of a bottom-up transformation process when the demands of the 
asymmetric and hybrid war against terrorism mandated yet another change in posture and 
thinking, another transformative shock. This affected the Army and the Marine Corps most, 
which bore the brunt of the campaigns in Southwest Asia. Despite rising defense budgets and 
the Navy’s quest to identify inefficiencies, the service benefited comparatively little from the 
militarization under President George W. Bush. Cost and schedule overruns plagued the mod-
ernization of the fleet. In the mid-2000s, the Navy came up with a concept that was built 
around the dynamics and implications of globalization (and repudiated the popular and pre-
vailing general assumption of a generational long war against irregular fighters). More implic-
itly, the strategic focus also shifted to near-peer competitors like China. This family of related 
documents included the participation of the Marines and the Coast Guard. Much of the Na-
vy’s strategic outlook survived the transition to President Barack Obama although the future, 
as always, remained uncertain. Since 2009, geopolitical shifts, an ongoing, comprehensive 
economic and financial crisis, an erosion of American/EU political leadership and amicable 
transatlantic ties, political gridlock in Washington, and an increasingly weak president have 
weighed down on American drive and will to lead the world.  
The various Navy strategic documents can be interwoven with the golden thread that is Amer-
ican foreign and security policy from 1981 on, but a definite appraisal is hard (not least be-
cause naval strategic documents have been drafted differently over the decades and no two 
documents or contexts are alike).  
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The victories of sea power are often silent (Cropsey 2013: 94). The exceptional flexibility of 
sea power has played an important role for the United States of America, but the appreciation 
for the Navy in the White House, on Capitol Hill, in the Pentagon leadership, and in the pub-
lic has waxed and waned. This is especially true for the tilting balance in favor of continental 
and land-based conflicts that America has encountered since the end of the Cold War. The 
service carries its share of responsibility for that. Problems along the way of creating, craft-
ing, and implementing strategy range stem from the pressures of jointness, a lack of apprecia-
tion for policy dynamics and terminology, the Navy’s inherent tactical and operational focus, 
internal problems, a fear of debate and discussion, budgetary concerns, Navy-Marine Corps 
issues, classification, or the lack of senior leader involvement (Swartz 2009b: 32). Other is-
sues include timing and alignment with joint planning circles and joint documents like the 
Quadrennial Defense Review or the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strate-
gy, and the National Military Strategy. The Navy’s documents can never satisfy all audiences. 
Hence, the service can do naval strategy (like “…From the Sea” and “Sea Power 21”), but a 
maritime strategy (like “The Maritime Strategy” or CS-21) is more difficult to develop.  
Most important of all, real-world actions usually interpose and undermine the attempt of strat-
egy-makers to control the course of events. This means that only process is a viable key to 
comprehending U.S. Navy strategy and understanding American sea power, even if that is 
academically unsatisfying. The quality and assertiveness of naval strategic thought fluctuates. 
It requires constant grooming, consciousness of best practices, and a harking back to tradi-
tional virtues. Enduring naval missions offer insights into what the future might hold for the 
U.S. Navy and the prospective exercise of American naval power around the world in the 
years to come. 
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12 Afterword  
When the topic and scope of this study were first drawn up in late 2007 and early 2008, the 
fundamentally innovative “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower” had just been 
published. When the doctoral candidateship in Kiel was secured and research began in earnest 
in 2010 (after a two-year career-building interregnum in the public/private sector), the “Naval 
Operations Concept” emerged as a guidance memorandum to execute the maritime strategy 
was rolled out. During extended stays in Washington, D.C. in 2010-2011 and again in 2012, 
the essence of public and private discussions with key naval and policy stakeholders was that 
a revised version of CS-21 was in the making and should be revealed soon. As of July 2014, 
these suggestions continue when one monitors the debate in policy and naval circles, but an 
updated or revised version of the capstone document has yet to be published (what the revised 
strategy should encompass has been subject of comprehensive debate; for samples, see 
McGrath 2010, Moore 2011, Hill 2012, 2013).
444
  
The particulars of a moving target aside, the world has obviously moved on and in many re-
spects looks different than on the eve of the military intervention in Libya in March 2011. 
Despite some careful recovery, the repercussions of the economic and financial crisis are still 
felt around the world. Parts of Japan continue to battle with the fallout of the earth-
quake/tsunami/nuclear catastrophe more than three years ago.
445
 Since early 2011, the protests 
and civil unrest of the “Arab Spring” have sent shockwaves through North Africa and the 
Middle East. To date, the civil war in Syria has cost the lives of at least 150,000 people, dis-
placed millions more, given rise to transnational jihadist fighters, and led to the employment 
of chemical weapons of mass destruction.
446
  
Meanwhile, Barack Obama secured a second presidential term in 2012. He and his national 
security team
447
 have concentrated on the nation’s wars in Iraq, which currently appears to 
descend into chaos again, and Afghanistan, where U.S. and allied troops were surged and are 
                                                          
444
 Author’s note (May 2015): The long awaited new capstone document, “A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Cen-
tury Seapower: Forward | Engaged | Ready” was issued by the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Marine Corps, and the U.S. 
Coast Guard on 13 March 2015.  
445
 The U.S. Navy played a significant role in first response efforts, utilizing the aircraft carrier Ronald Reagan 
(CVN 76) in the process despite safety and health concerns for the crew. 
446
 The U.S. Navy partnered with allied navies to help coerce the regime of Syrian ruler Bashar al-Assad to hand 
over the remaining stockpiles and neutralized the WMD at sea.  
447
 Secretary of Defense Gates was relived in July 2011 by Leon Panetta. Panetta’s successor (since February 
2013) is Chuck Hagel.  
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now set to depart later this year.
448
 The proposed rebalance (or “pivot”) to the Asia-Pacific 
region (issued as part of a Defense Strategic Guidance in January 2012) and the associated 
AirSea Battle concept have drawn a lot of commentary and criticism for shaking up European 
and Middle East allies, while unnecessarily rousing China. Meanwhile, the U.S. fiscal and 
budget crisis has continually worsened. It led to across-the-board spending cuts and a gov-
ernment shutdown in October 2013. Ongoing territorial disputes in the South and East China 
Seas, resurging Russian nationalism in the wake of the Crimean/Ukrainian crisis since Febru-
ary 2014, and the rise of other economies and political players have reinvigorated notions of 
peer-competitor conflict for the United States. The QDR 2014 (issued in March of this year) 
only partially reflects these trends in its call for a military that is tasked to defend the home-
land, build international security partnerships, project power, and win its conflicts decisively 
(Department of Defense 2014).  
The U.S. Navy retains a forward-deployed and combat-credible status, although the force is 
increasingly strained.
449
 Questions remain about alternatives to these unsustainable deploy-
ments (Whiteneck et al. 2010). Coupled with the cold winds of fiscal austerity, changing de-
mographics, and transforming energy dependencies, the American ability and will to use sea 
power as a comprehensive geopolitical instrument could be in fundamental question. Allies 
will be pressured to increasingly provide their own combat-credible naval presence in order to 
free U.S. assets elsewhere (Bruns 2014). At the same time, U.S. investments in new research, 
development, and testing of new platforms and capabilities continue.
450
 How these trends and 
demands can and will be reflected in future Navy strategies and capstone documents, remains 
to be seen.  
  
                                                          
448
 The continuing war against terrorists is best epitomized by the increasing use of unmanned aerial vehicles and 
targeted strikes against individuals and groups under President Obama.  
449
 As of 22 July 2014, the Navy’s battle fleet stood at 290 warships, 99 (or 34%) of which were deployed. For 
an up-to-date listing, see the regularly updated official Navy website listing, Status of the Navy, 
http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146.  
450
 E.g., unmanned systems, the cyber domain, green fuels, the littoral combat ship and its planned, larger frig-
ate-type successor, the next generation aircraft carrier etc. 
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printed in the annex for your inspiration on your own sailing trip. Until then!  
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15 Annex 
15.1 Acronyms and Abbreviations 
A2AD = Anti-Access/Area Denial  
AAW = Anti-Air Warfare 
ABM = Anti-Ballistic Missile  
ACUS = Atlantic Council of the United States  
ACT = Allied Command Transformation 
AEI = American Enterprise Institute  
AFB = Air Force Base 
AIPAC = American-Israeli Political Action Committee 
AIS = Automated Identification System 
ALB = AirLand Battle  
AOR = Area of Responsibility  
ARG = Amphibious Ready Group 
APS = African Partnership Station 
ASB = Air-Sea Battle  
ASuW = Anti-Surface Warfare 
ASW = Anti-Submarine Warfare 
ATO = Air Tasking Order 
AWACS = Airborne Warning and Control System 
BB = Battleship 
BBAG = Battleship Action Group 
BMD = Ballistic Missile Defense  
BRAC = Base Realignment and Closure  
BUR = Bottom-Up Review 
C
4
ISR = Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Intelligence, Surveillance and 
Reconnaissance 
CBO = Congressional Budget Office  
CFR = Council on Foreign Relations  
CG = Guided Missile Cruiser 
CG(X) = Guided Missile Cruiser, future  
CGN = Guide Missile Cruiser, Nuclear  
CIA = Central Intelligence Agency 
CIC = Command Information Center  
  
357 
CINC = Commander in Chief  
CIWS = Close-In Weapon System 
CJCS = Chairman Joint Chiefs of Staff 
CMC = Commandant Marine Corps  
CNA = Center for Naval Analyses 
CNN = Cable News Network  
CNO = Chief of Naval Operations 
COCOM = Combatant Commander  
COD = Carrier Onboard Delivery   
COIN = Counterinsurgency  
CONOPS = Concept of Naval Operations 
CPG = Contingency Planning Guidance 
CRS = Congressional Research Service  
CS-21 = A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower 
CSG = Carrier Strike Group  
CSI = Container Security Initiative  
CSIS = Center for Strategic and International Studies  
CTBT = Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty 
CV = Carrier, General Purpose 
CVBG = Carrier Battle Group  
CVL = Light Aircraft Carrier 
CVN = Carrier, Fixed Wing Aircraft, Nuclear  
CVV = Aircraft Carrier, Medium Size  
CVW = Carrier Air Wing 
DD = Destroyer  
DDG = Guided Missile Destroyer  
DD(X) = Destroyer, Future 
DHS = Department of Homeland Security  
DOD = Department of Defense  
DON = Department of the Navy  
DOT = Department of Transportation  
DOTMLPF = Doctrine, Organization, Training, Materiel, Leadership and Education, Person-
nel and Facilities 
DPG = Defense Planning Guidance 
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DR = Disaster Relief 
EBO = Effects-Based Operations  
EC = European Community   
EEZ = Exclusive Economic Zone 
EOD = Explosive Ordnance Disposal  
ESG = Expeditionary Strike Group 
EU = European Union 
EW = Electronic Warfare  
FBI = Federal Bureau of Investigation 
FF = Fast Frigate 
FFC = Fleet Forces Command  
FFG = Guided Missile Frigate 
FGN = Federal German Navy  
FOUO = For Official Use Only 
FRP = Fleet Response Plan 
FY = Fiscal Year 
FYDP = Future Years Defense Plan  
GAO = Government Accountability Office  
GDP = Gross Domestic Product 
GFS = Global Fleet Station 
GIUK = Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom Gap 
HA = Humanitarian Assistance 
HASC = House (of Representatives) Armed Services Committee  
HMS = Her Majesty’s Ship  
HQCG = Headquarter Coast Guard  
IDTC = Inter-Deployment Training Cycle 
ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missile  
ICC = International Criminal Court  
IFOR = Implementation Force 
ISAF = International Security Assistance Force  
ISO = In Support Of  
ISPK = Institute for Security Policy at the University of Kiel  
ISPS = International Ship and Port Facility Security Code  
ISR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance   
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JCC(X) = Joint Command Ship, future 
JCS = Joint Chiefs of Staff  
JHSV = Joint High-Speed Vessel 
JIATF = Joint Inter-Agency Task Force 
JMSDF = Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force 
JOC = Joint Operations Concept 
JSCP = Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan  
JSF = Joint Strike Fighter 
JSPS = Joint Strategic Planning System 
KAL = Korean Airlines 
LCS = Littoral Combat Ship 
LEDET = Law Enforcement Detachment  
LHA = Amphibious Assault Ship (General Purpose)  
LHD = Amphibious Assault Ship (Multipurpose)  
LPD = Amphibious Transport Dock  
LPH = Amphibious Assault Ship (Helicopter)  
LSD = Landing Ship, Dock  
MAB = Marine Amphibious Brigade 
MAF = Marine Amphibious Force 
MAGTF = Marine Air-Ground Task Force  
MARAD = Maritime Administration 
MBA = Master in Business Administration 
MCCDC = Marine Corps Combat Development Command 
MCM = Mine Countermeasures 
MCO = Medium Contingency Operation  
MDG = Millennium Development Goals  
MEU = Marine Expeditionary Unit  
MIO = Maritime Interdiction Operations/Maritime Interception Operations  
MNF = Multinational Force  
MOOTW = Military Operations Other Than War 
MPA = Maritime Patrol Aircraft 
MPF (F) = Maritime Prepositioning Force (Future)  
MPS = Maritime Prepositioning Ship  
MRC = Medium Regional Contingency 
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MSC = Military Sealift Command  
MSO = Maritime Security Operations  
MTW = Major Theater War 
MX = Missile Experimental  
N00K = CNO Executive Panel  
N513 = OPNAV’s Strategy and Concepts Branch  
NAFTA = North-American Free Trade Association   
NAS = Naval Air Station  
NATO = North Atlantic Treaty Organization  
NAVDOCCOM = Naval Doctrine Command  
NDRF = National Defense Reserve Fleet  
NFCPE = Naval Force Capabilities Planning Effort  
NHHC = Naval History and Heritage Command 
NDP = National Defense Policy 
NDP = Naval Doctrine Publication  
NDS = National Defense Strategy  
NECC = Navy Expeditionary Combat Command  
NGFS = Naval Gunfire Support  
NGO = Nongovernmental Organization  
NIE = National Intelligence Estimate  
NM = Nautical Mile  
NMD = National Missile Defense  
NMS = National Military Strategy  
NOC = Naval Operations Concept 
NOCJO = Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations  
NPT = Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSC = National Security Council  
NSD = National Security Directive  
NSDD = National Security Decision Directive  
NSPG = Navy Strategic Planning Guidance  
NSS = National Security Strategy 
NWDC = Naval Warfare Development Command 
OCO = Overseas Contingency Operations  
OEF = Operation Enduring Freedom 
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OIF = Operation Iraqi Freedom  
OLA = Office of Legislative Affairs  
OPA = Office of Program Appraisal  
OPNAV = Office of the Chief of Naval Operations  
OSD = Office of the Secretary of Defense 
PDD = Presidential Decision Directive  
PLAN = People’s Liberation Army Navy  
PLO = Palestine Liberation Organization  
POM = Program Objective Memoranda  
PP = Pacific Partnership  
PPBS = Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System  
PRM = Presidential Review Memorandum 
PSI = Proliferation Security Initiative 
PT = Patrol Torpedo Boat  
QDR = Quadrennial Defense Review 
RAS = Replenishment at Sea 
RD&T = Research, Development, and Testing 
RHIB = Rigid-Hull Inflatable Boat 
RIMPAC = Rim of the Pacific  
RMA = Revolution in Military Affairs  
ROE = Rules of Engagement  
RRF = Ready Reserve Force 
SACEUR = Supreme Allied Commander Europe 
SAG = Surface Action Group  
SAM = Surface to Air Missile 
SAR = Search and Rescue  
SASC = Senate Armed Services Committee  
SC-21 = Surface Combatant for the 21
st
 Century   
SCO = Shanghai Cooperation Initiative  
SDI = Strategic Defense Initiative  
SEAL = Sea-Air-Land  
SECDEF = Secretary of Defense  
SECNAV = Secretary of the Navy  
SLEP = Service Life Extension Program 
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SLOC = Sea Lines of Communication 
SNMG = Standing NATO Maritime Group 
SNMCMG = Standing NATO Mine-Countermeasures Group 
SOF = Special Operations Forces  
SOSUS = Sound Surveillance System  
SLBM = Submarine-launched Ballistic Missile  
SPS = Southern Partnership Station  
SSC = Small Surface Combatant  
SSN = Ship, Submersible, Nuclear  
SSBN = Ship, Submersible, Ballistic Missile, Nuclear 
SSG = Strategic Studies Group  
SSGN = Ship, Submersible, Guided Missile, Nuclear  
STANAVFORLANT = Standing Naval Force Atlantic  
STANAVFORMED = Standing Naval Force Mediterranean  
START = Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty  
T-AH = Hospital Ship (MSC)  
T-AKE = Replenishment Naval Vessel (MSC) 
T-AKR = Large, Medium Speed Roll-On/Roll-Off Ships (MSC) 
T-AO = Replenishment Oiler (MSC) 
T-AGOS = Oceanographic Research Ship, General Ocean Surveillance (MSC) 
TEU = Twenty-Foot Equivalent Unit  
TLAM = Tomahawk Land-Attack Missile 
TWA = Trans-World Airlines 
UN = United Nations  
UNCLOS = United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
UNITAF = United Task Force  
USA = United States Army  
USAF = United States Air Force 
USAFRICOM = United States Africa Command  
USCENTCOM = United States Central Command 
USCG = United States Coast Guard 
USEUCOM = United States European Command  
USMC = United States Marine Corps 
USN = United States Navy 
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USNA = United States Naval Academy  
USNI = United States Naval Institute  
USNORTHCOM = United States Northern Command 
USNR = United States Navy Reserve  
USNWC = United States Naval War College 
USPACOM = United States Pacific Command 
USS = United States Ship  
USSOUTHCOM = United States Southern Command  
USSOCOM = United States Special Operations Command 
USSR = Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
USSTRATCOM = United States Strategic Command  
USTRANSCOM = United States Transportation Command  
VBBS = Visit, Board, Search, and Seizure  
VLS = Vertical Launch System  
V/STOL = Vertical and/or Short Take-off and Landing  
WEU = Western European Union  
WEUCONMARFOR = Western European Union Contingency Maritime Force 
WMD = Weapons of Mass Destruction  
WTO = World Trade Organization  
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15.2  List of Illustrations 
1 The 'use of the sea' triangle 31 
2 Spectrum-of-Conflict Model 38 
3 The U.S. Military Construct for the Levels of War 40 
4 Hierarchy of Guidance and Implementing Operations 47 
5 Functions of modern-day navies 53 
6 Weapons Systems Appropriate for Sea Control 54 
7 Strategic Planning Ways, Drivers, Strengths, and Weaknesses 57 
8 The Setting of the U.S. Navy Strategy 62 
9 Legal Boundaries of the Oceans and Airspace 67 
10 Joint and Tactical Hierarchy 77 
11 The Institutional Learning Cycle: The Process of Doctrinal Change 78 
12 Six-Step Strategic Planning Process 82 
13 Principal Foreign-policy Provisions of the U.S. Constitution 87 
14 Avenues of Congressional Foreign Policy Influence 92 
15 Unified and Specialized Commands 95 
16 Competing visions of war and their naval-strategic implications 106 
17 1980s U.S. Defense Budget, FY 1981 – FY 1990 130 
18 Main 1980s USN capstone documents 134 
19 Crucial Naval Choke Points during the Cold War 127 
20 USN 1980s ship levels 145 
21 Inventory of U.S. Navy Aircraft, 1981-1988 151 
22 U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1981-1989 152 
23 U.S./USSR Maritime Balance 153 
24 U.S. Cold War Areas of Responsibility, 1983-1991 166 
25 Old and New Security Environment 184 
26 1990s U.S. Defense Budget, FY 1991-2000 192 
27 Main1990s USN capstone documents 199 
28 1990s Capstone Documents and Navy Sea-Strategic Concepts 218 
29 USN 1990s ship levels 221 
30 U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 1990-2000 221 
31 2000s U.S. Defense Budget, FY 2001 – FY 2011 259 
32 USN capstone documents 2001-2011 268 
33 2000s Capstone Documents and Navy Sea-Strategic Concepts 292 
34 U.S. Navy Active Ship Force Levels, 2001-2011 296 
35 2000s USN Force Level Goals 296 
36 USN 2000s Ship Levels 298 
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15.3 Rank Conversion Chart 
U.S. Military  NATO 
Code 
Bundeswehr Equivalent  
Admiral (ADM) 
 
OF-9 
 
Admiral (Marine) bzw. General (Luft-
waffe, Heer) 
Vice Admiral (VADM) 
Rear Admiral (upper half) (RADM) 
Major General (MGEN) 
OF-8 Vizeadmiral (Marine) bzw. Generalleut-
nant (Luftwaffe, Heer) 
Rear Admiral (lower half) (RDML) OF-7 Konteradmiral (Marine) bzw. 
Generalmajor (Luftwaffe, Heer) 
Brigadier General (BG) OF-6 Flottillenadmiral (Marine) bzw. 
Brigadegeneral (Luftwaffe, Heer)  
Captain (CAPT) 
Colonel (COL) 
OF-5 Kapitän zur See (Marine) bzw. Oberst 
(Luftwaffe, Heer)  
Commander (CDR) OF-4 Fregattenkapitän (Marine) bzw. Oberst-
leutnant (Luftwaffe, Heer)  
Lieutenant Commander (LCDR) 
Major (MAJ) 
OF-3 Korvettenkapitän (Marine) bzw. Major 
(Luftwaffe, Heer)  
 
15.4 Colin Powell’s “13 rules of leadership”  
First printed in the August 13, 1989 issue of Parade Magazine, these are Colin Powell's 13 
Rules of Leadership.  
1. It aint' as bad as you think. 
2. Get mad, then get over it. 
3. Avoid having your ego so close to your position that when your position falls, your 
ego goes with it. 
4. It can be done.  
5. Be careful what you choose. You may get it.  
6. Don't let adverse facts stand in the way of a good decision. 
7. You can't make someone else's choices. 
8. Check small things. 
9. Share credit.  
10. Remain calm. Be kind. 
11. Have a vision.  
12. Don't take counsel of your fears or naysayers. 
13. Perpetual optimism is a force multiplier.   
 
 
 
 
U.S. Navy Capstone Documents, 1970-2010 and classification status as of December 2011
1
 
Name Month/Year Classification 
Project SIXTY & Missions of the U.S. Navy Sept 1970, Mar-Apr 1970 DECLAS (Project SIXTY), UNCLAS (Missions of the U.S. Navy) 
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, NWP 1 (5) Dec 1975-May 1978 UNCLAS 
Sea Plan 2000 Mar 1978 UNCLAS Executive Summary; study still SECRET 
CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power Jan, May 1979 UNCLAS; Strategic Concepts still TOP SECRET 
The Maritime Strategy (8) Nov 1982-May 1990 Some UNCLAS; SECRET versions DECLAS 
The Way Ahead Apr 1991 UNCLAS 
The Navy Policy Book May 1992 UNCLAS 
… From the Sea Nov 1992 UNCLAS 
NDP 1: Naval Warfare Mar 1994 UNCLAS 
Forward… From the Sea Oct 1994 UNCLAS 
Navy Operational Concept (NOC) May 1997 UNCLAS 
Anytime, Anywhere Nov 1997 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) (2) Aug 1999, Apr 2000 NSPG I still SECRET; NSPG II UNCLAS 
Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS  Jun 2002 UNCLAS 
Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision Oct 2002 UNCLAS 
Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO) Apr 2003 UNCLAS 
Fleet Response Plan (FRP) May 2003 Largely UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08 Apr 2006 Two versions: UNCLAS; still SECRET 
Naval Operations Concept (NOC) Sep 2006 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 Sep 2007 Still SECRET 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower  Oct 2007 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10, Change 1 Nov 2007 Still SECRET 
Navy Strategic Guidance ISP PR 11 May 2009 Still SECRET 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12 Oct 2009 Still SECRET 
Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 May 2010 UNCLAS 
Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1: Naval Warfare Aug 2010 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 13 Oct 2010 Still SECRET 
                                                          
1
 Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction, Background and Analyses. Center for Naval Analyses. Alexandria, 2011, S. 31, 33. 
 Unified Command Plan (2011) (Source: http://www.defense.gov/home/features/2009/0109_unifiedcommand/) 
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1 
 
US-Marinestrategie und Seemacht von der „Maritimen Strategie“ (1982-1986) bis zur 
„Kooperativen Strategie für Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert“ (2007):  
Politik, Dokumente und Einsätze 1981-2011 
 
 
1. Einführung 
Die See ist ein entscheidender Bestimmungsfaktor menschlicher Entwicklung. Einerseits 
Nahrungsquelle durch Fischfang, Handelsweg für Geschäfte mit anderen Völkern, Ausbeu-
tungsraum ozeanischer Ressourcen, Medium des Informationsaustausches, Transportroute für 
militärische Vorhaben; anderseits respekteinflößende und potenziell lebensbedrohliche Natur-
gewalt, die sich nur unter erheblichen Anstrengungen (und auch dann nie ganz ‚sicher‘) be-
wältigen lässt: Seefahrt und die mit ihr verbundene Fähigkeit zur politischen Nutzung der See 
hat die Weltgeschichte ganz maßgeblich beeinflusst. Beispiele für solche zivilisatorischen 
Entwicklungen lassen sich vom antiken Rom über das mediterrane Venedig und die nordeu-
ropäische Hanse im Mittelalter bis hin zu den neuzeitlichen europäischen Seefahrernationen 
Großbritannien, Spanien und Portugal überall finden. Stehen die Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika, wie es US-Admiral Chester Nimitz geradezu poetisch ausdrückte, als „logische[r] 
Erbe des Dreizacks der großen Seemächte der Vergangenheit“,1 als Weltseemacht folglich in 
dieser Reihe?
2
 
Der deutsche Admiral Edward Wegener formulierte einst: „Weltpolitik und Weltmachtstreben 
sind ohne ozeanische Seeherrschaft zum Scheitern verurteilt. In einer globalen Machtausei-
nandersetzung [fällt] der Beherrschung der Ozeane eine Schlüsselrolle zu […].“3 Diese See-
macht ist vornehmlich militärisch zu verstehen, obschon sie auch wirtschaftliche, geographi-
                                                          
1
 Chester W. Nimitz, Geleitwort, in: E.B. Potter/C.W. Nimitz, Seemacht. Eine Seekriegsgeschichte von der An-
tike bis zur Gegenwart. Deutsche Fassung herausgegeben im Auftrag des Arbeitskreises für Wehrforschung von 
Jürgen Rohwer, Herrsching 1982, S. XIII.  
2
 Die US-Marine hat derzeit über 323.000 Angehörige, dazu mehr als 170.000 Reservisten und noch einmal 
201.000 Zivilangestellte des Marineministeriums. Derzeit befinden sich 290 Kriegsschiffe im Bestand der Mari-
ne, von denen stets in etwa ein Drittel im Einsatz (vorwärts disloziert) ist. Der aktuelle Stand ist abzurufen unter 
Status of the Navy, http://www.navy.mil/navydata/nav_legacy.asp?id=146. 
3
 Edward Wegener, Die Elemente von Seemacht und maritimer Macht, in: Dieter Mahncke/Hans-Peter Schwartz 
(Hrsg.), Seemacht und Außenpolitik (=Rüstungsbeschränkungen und Sicherheit, Band 11), Schriftenreihe der 
Deutschen Gesellschaft für Auswärtige Politik, Frankfurt am Main 1974, S. 25-58, S. 37. 
Deutschsprachige Zusammenfassung der Dissertation 
 
“U.S. Navy Strategy & American Sea Power from ‘The Maritime Strategy’ (1982-86) to 
‘A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower’ (2007): Politics, Capstone Documents and Major Naval 
Operations 1981-2011” 
 
gemäß §12, Absatz (2) der Promotionsordnung (Satzung)der Philosophischen Fakultät der 
Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel vom 19. Februar 2014 
 
2 
 
sche und kulturelle Aspekte in sich vereint.
4
 Vor dem Hintergrund der drei etablierten Ziele 
vom Einsatz militärischer Macht (zur Abschreckung, zur Erzwingung politischer Ziele sowie 
zur Verteidigung) kommen militärischen Seemachtmitteln daher ganz unterschiedliche Rollen 
und Funktionen zu.
5
 Gleichwohl beeinflussen eine Reihe von Faktoren die Ausprägung von 
militärischer Macht auf und über See entscheidend: Nationale Interessen, Geographie, exeku-
tive und legislative Dynamiken, Interessen und Konkurrenz der Teilstreitkräfte und innerhalb 
der Marine, öffentliche Meinung, Verteidigungshaushalte, Erfahrungen aus abgeschlossenen 
Einsätzen, Qualität und Quantität strategischen Denkens, technologische und militärische 
Entwicklungen, internationale Kräfte, Allianzen usw. haben einen kumulativen Einfluss auf 
Seemachtausübung.  
Obschon die US-Marine als qualitativ größte Seestreitkraft der Welt eine tragende Rolle in 
der globalen Machtausübung der USA spielt, haben sich weder in den Vereinigten Staaten 
noch in Europa einschlägige Studien mit der Rolle von amerikanischer Seemacht aus politik- 
und strategiewissenschaftlicher Perspektive (und dies über einen längeren Zeitraum) ausei-
nandergesetzt.
6
 Weder die inneramerikanischen Prozesse noch die Ausübung von Seemacht 
weltweit sind hinlänglich untersucht worden; beiden Generalthemen wendet sich die vorlie-
gende Studie zu. Als Mittel zum analytischen Zweck bieten sich dabei die amerikanischen 
Sicherheits- und Marinestrategien an, also jene Dokumente, in denen deklaratorisch formu-
liert wird, welchen Beitrag die Marine zur nationalen Sicherheit der Vereinigten Staaten von 
Amerika zu leisten hat. Aus diesen Papieren lassen dann sich Einsatzszenarien, Beschaf-
fungsprogramme, Ausbildungsvorhaben und vieles weiteres ableiten.
7
  
                                                          
4
 Seemacht beinhalt die Kontrolle und Beeinflussung internationalen Handelns, Seekriegsoperationen sowie die 
Nutzung von Seestreitkräften als Instrumente von Diplomatie, Abschreckung und politischer Einflussnahme 
unterhalb des Krieges (vgl. Sam Tangredi, Sea Power Theory and Practicse, in: Strategy in the Contemporary 
World. An Introduction to Strategic Studies, Oxford 2002, S. 113-136, S. 114).  
5
 Vgl. Robert Art, A Grand Strategy for America, Ithica/London 2003, S. 4f.  
6
 Über die Gründe kann nur spekuliert werden. Die Subdisziplin der Marinegeschichte, im deutschsprachigen 
Wissenschaftsraum leider so gut wie nicht existent, hat sich zwar aus amerikanischer Perspektive umfassend 
Einzelthemen angenommen, konzentriert sich allerdings hauptsächlich auf länger als drei Jahrzehnte zurücklie-
gende Themen. Hingegen gibt es neben den nicht weiter zu vertiefenden Standardwerken über Genese und Ent-
wicklung der US-Außenpolitik (auch seit den achtziger Jahren des 20. Jahrhunderts) eine Vielzahl von Publika-
tionen zu Spezialgebieten wie Marineschiffbau, Waffentechnologie, Schiffsklassen, Einsatzgebieten und einzel-
nen maritimen Einsätzen.    
7
 Das breite wissenschaftlichen Desiderat im Bereich (US-)Marinestrategie und Seemacht ist insofern verwun-
derlich, da der überwiegende Teil der Strategien mittlerweile frei zugänglich ist (siehe Aufstellung im Anhang). 
Erst im Vorfeld der derzeit maßgeblichen „Kooperativen Strategie für Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert“ (2007) 
beauftragte die Marine ab 2005 das in nahe Washington, D.C. ansässige Center for Naval Analyses mit einer 
Zusammenstellung früherer Strategien und der Analyse des Kontexts (Center for Naval Analyses, U.S. Navy 
Capstone Strategies, Alexandria 2012). Koordinator dieses Projekts war Kapitän zur See a.D. Peter Swartz, der 
zunächst der US-Marine in Vietnam diente und später Offizier für die „Maritime Strategie“ während der Reagan-
Administration war. Das Ergebnis des mehrjährigen Vorhabens ist ein siebzehnbändiges Kompendium (aller-
 
3 
 
Seemacht ist ein rationales Instrument staatlicher Macht und ein langfristiges Phänomen, denn 
Schiffe, Designs, die industrielle Basis und die Erfahrungen können nicht kurzfristig improvi-
siert werden.
8
 Marinestrategische Dokumente stellen das Scharnier zwischen der institutionel-
len Seemacht (also Faktoren und Akteure, die Seemachtformulierung und Ausübung beein-
flussen) und der funktionalen Seemacht (also der weltweiten Ausübung maritimer Macht zum 
Zweck der Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik) dar. Das Interesse dieser Studie konzentriert sich 
auf (1.) die Analyse von Seemacht im amerikanischen Kontext samt der Bewertung als In-
strument der nationalen Sicherheit; (2.) die Untersuchung weiterer einflussreicher Faktoren 
und Akteure; (3.) die politischen, strategischen, programmatischen, budgetären und personel-
len Rahmenbedingungen in den vergangenen drei Jahrzehnten; (4.) die Prüfung, wie, wo und 
warum die US-Marine in diesem Zeitraum einsetzt wurde (und inwiefern sich ein Bezug zu 
den strategischen Dokumenten herstellen lässt); (5.) die wiederkehrenden Themen und Lekti-
onen in der Anwendung amerikanischer Seemacht.  
Der Zeitraum zwischen 1981 und 2011 ist dabei so gewählt, dass er erstens eine repräsentati-
ve Abbildung der strategischen Entwicklung von US-Seemacht bietet, zweitens die maßgebli-
chen Strategiedokumente The Maritime Strategy (mithin die erste Marinestrategie der USA 
seit 1945) und A Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower (derzeit gültiges Dokument, 
verabschiedet 2007) umfasst und drittens Anreize für Wissenschaft und Praxis bietet, sich mit 
der bislang unterbelichteten Rolle der US-Marine heute und in Zukunft zu befassen.  
2. Politische und militärische Macht über See 
 
Sicherheitspolitisch fallen der See drei Funktionen zu, die Seestreitkräfte entsprechend abbil-
den können: Die diplomatische Rolle (Flaggenzeigen und Kanonenbootpolitik), die polizeili-
che Rolle (Aufrechterhaltung der guten Ordnung und Souveränität auf See, Sicherung von 
Ressourcen und Handelswegen und internationale Friedenssicherung) und die militärische 
Rolle (Machtprojektion an Land, Kontrolle der See und Verwehrung gegnerischer Seemacht) 
vermengen sich dabei durchaus.
9
 Es bedarf folglich eines dezidierten politischen, rechtlichen 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
dings lediglich in Form von Powerpoint-Folien), das den Bedarf an der Erforschung und Erarbeitung amerikani-
scher Marinestrategie und US-Seemacht nochmals verdeutlicht hat. Die Arbeiten von Swartz haben die ersten 
wissenschaftlichen Studien zur modernen US-Marinestrategie (Larissa Forster, Influence without Boots on the 
Ground, Newport 2013; Peter Haynes, American Naval Thinking in the Post-Cold War Era, Monterey 2013) 
beeinflusst. Auch diese Analyse ist Teil des Kanons sich ergänzender Studien zum Thema (Amund Lundesgaard 
wird seine Arbeit zum Thema US-Flottenstruktur seit 1989 im kommenden Jahr vorlegen). 
8
 Vgl. Colin Gray, The Navy in the Post-Cold War World, University Park (Pennsylvania) 1994, S. 86.  
9
 Vgl. Kenneth Booth, Navies and Foreign Policy, New York 1977, S. 16 & Eric Grove, The Future of Sea Pow-
er, London 1990, S. 234. 
 
4 
 
und technologischen Ansatzes, um Seemacht entsprechend zu orchestrieren. Da es sich im 
Lauf der Zeit erwiesen hat, dass Seemacht sowohl eine institutionelle als auch eine operative 
Dimension hat, ist eine analytische Trennung geboten.
10
 Die allgemeine Seemachttheorie hat 
ihre Wurzeln bereits im alten Griechenland, wo der Philosoph und Historiker Thukydides 
nachzuweisen versuchte, dass prosperierender maritimer Handel und das Erreichen politischer 
Ziele im Krieg untrennbar miteinander verbunden seien. Ausformuliert wurden solche Über-
legungen in der modernen Zeit von Alfred Thayer Mahan, der 1890 sein einschlägiges Werk 
über den Einfluss von Seemacht auf die Geschichte vorlegte. Die darin enthaltenden Theorien 
zum Seekrieg stellen bis heute den Ausgangspunkt für die Studie von Konstituierung und 
Wirksamkeit von Seemacht dar. Gleichwohl entzog sich Seemacht der einfachen mathemati-
schen Berechnung. Der deutsche Konteradmiral Edward Wegener versuchte noch Mitte der 
1970er Jahre, Seemacht als das Produkt von Flotte, Stützpunkten und maritimen Denken dar-
zustellen. Eine letztgültige Berechnung von Seemacht ist jedoch unmöglich und so ist die 
Bewertung ihres Erfolgs oder Misserfolges – und der Rolle der Marine im Gesamtgefüge der 
Außenpolitik – nur relativ zu bemessen. Das ist umso zentraler, da mit dem Aufkommen der 
so genannten Jeune École zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts eine komplementäre Seemacht-
denkschule auftrat, die Mahans Überzeugungen (u.a. Entscheidungsschlachten auf hoher See) 
in Frage stelle und vielmehr auf defensivere Konzepte (ermöglicht durch neue technologische 
Entwicklungen wie U-Boote, Torpedos, Seeflieger und Minen) verwies. Die vollständige 
Kontrolle von Seegebieten war spätestens von dort an kein absolutes, sondern nur noch eine 
relatives militärisch-politisches Ziel, es konnte lediglich zeitweise Kontrolle ausgeübt werden. 
Nach dem Briten Julian Corbett war die Marine allein ohnehin nicht in der Lage, solche Ziele 
zu erreichen. Es bedurfte vielmehr eines maritimen Gesamtansatzes, der die Dynamiken der 
Landkriegsführung einkalkulierte.  
Der Aufstieg von Flugzeugträgern als Seekriegsmittel, der Aufschwung der Luftwaffe und die 
Einführung von Nuklearwaffen ab 1945 (später auch von nuklearem Antrieb bei Kriegsschif-
fen) veränderten die Seemachttheorie und deren Ausübung nachhaltig. Neue strategische 
Funktionen waren zu erarbeiten und zu erlernen. Mit dem Aufkommen der Raumfahrt, der 
Erschließung des elektromagnetischen Spektrums und der Cyber-Domäne gibt nunmehr sechs 
Dimensionen (die übrigen drei sind Luft, Über- und Unterwasser), in denen Seemacht ausge-
übt werden soll. Gleichzeitig sind Seemachtmittel weiterhin prädestiniert, auf dem Konflikt-
                                                          
10
 Der britische Seemachtexperte Geoffrey Till formulierte präzise, Seemacht sei etwas, das bestimmte Staaten 
(Seemächte) haben (vgl. Till, Seapower, A Guide to the 21st Century. 2. Auflage, London 2009, S. 21).  
 
5 
 
spektrum zwischen Präsenz im Frieden, Überwachung, Machtdemonstration, begrenztem 
Krieg, globalem konventionellem Krieg und – so es notwendig würde – nuklearen Auseinan-
dersetzungen zu wirken. Daraus leiten sich die Missionen und Operationen ab, für die eine 
Marine ausgerüstet und trainiert werden muss. Aus amerikanischer Perspektive wird aller-
dings häufig ein Fokus auf taktische und operative Fragen von militärischer Macht gelegt, 
seltener auf strategische und politische Dimensionen.
11
 Folglich bedarf es einer gewissenhaf-
ten Einbettung dieser Aspekte in den Zusammenhang der Gesamtstrategie, aus der sich Mari-
nestrategie ableiten lässt.  
 
3. Von der Gesamt- zur Marinestrategie  
 
Strategie kann stets nur eine ungefähre Übung sein, muss sie doch einerseits präskriptiv genug 
sein, um handlungsleitend zu wirken, andererseits aber flexibel genug formuliert sein, um auf 
politische Ereignisse und Entwicklungen angemessen reagieren zu können. Staaten verfügen 
in der Regel nicht nur über eine Strategie, sondern über ein thematisch abgestuftes System 
von Strategien, die aufeinander aufbauen und unterschiedliche Schwerpunkte setzen.
12
  Stra-
tegie beschreibt die Darstellung einer Ziel-Mittel-Weg-Relation. Daher ermöglicht nur die 
analytische Aufteilung in eine Gesamtstrategie und eine daraus abgeleitete Sicherheits- und 
Militärstrategie, aus der wiederum Maritime bzw. Marinestrategie entstehen (letztere eben nur 
ein Teil von maritimer Strategie), ein besseres Verständnis. Die amerikanische Gesamtstrate-
gie (Grand Strategy) setzt sich aus den nationalen Interessen zusammen, die die Verhinderung 
eines kriegerischen Angriffs auf den Staat, die Verhinderung von Sicherheitskonkurrenz und 
offenen Kriegen auf dem eurasischen Kontinent, den Zugang zum Erdöl, die Aufrechterhal-
tung der internationalen wirtschaftlichen und politischen Ordnung, die Verbreitung von de-
mokratischen und menschenrechtlichen Prinzipien weltweit (insbesondere die Verhinderung 
von Genozid und Bürgerkriegen) und den Schutz der globalen Umwelt umfassen.
13
 Sicher-
heits- und Militärstrategien, die diesen Zielen zuarbeiten, können im Rahmen von hegemoni-
al-unilateralen Herrschaftsansprüchen ebenso auftreten wie in Form von globalen oder regio-
nalen System kollektiver Sicherheit bzw. Verteidigung. Auch Eindämmung, Isolationismus, 
die diplomatisch hinterlegte Aufrechterhaltung eines Kräftegleichgewichts in einer bestimm-
ten Region (offshore balancing) sowie selektives Engagement können als Ausprägung auftau-
                                                          
11
 Vgl. David Barno, “Challenges in Fighting a Global Insurgency,” in: Parameters, Summer 2006, S. 15-29. 
12
 Vgl. Martin Wagener, „Über das Wesen der Strategie,“ in: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 4/2010, S. 
3-13, S. 6.  
13
 Vgl. Art, Grand Strategy, S. 7.  
 
6 
 
chen. Strategie meint hier den Versuch, Abläufe und Ergebnisse zu kontrollieren. Dabei hat 
Strategie auch in Friedenszeiten eine wichtige Rolle als Planungsreferenz, politisches Druck-
mittel und einigendes Moment.  
 
Idealerweise gibt es einen logischen Weg von der übergeordneten nationalen Sicherheitsstra-
tegie über Regionalstrategien bis hin zu den operativen und taktischen Plänen und deren Aus-
führung, denn Strategie ist die Brücke zwischen dem politischen Zweck (das Ziel) und der 
Anwendung militärischer Gewalt (das Mittel). Das gilt auch für die Seestreitkräfte (hier ist zu 
unterscheiden zwischen einer allgemeinen maritimen Strategie unter Hinzuziehung anderer 
Teilstreitkräfte/Ressourcen sowie einer auf die US-Marine begrenzten Marinestrategie). Die 
Beziehung zwischen den verschiedenen Ebenen ist dabei keineswegs nur als Einbahnstraße zu 
verstehen, in der die nachgeordnete Ebene die Vorgaben der höheren Position umstandslos 
umsetzt. Vielmehr wirken Kräfte auch in die andere Richtung: Operative und gar taktische 
Aspekte können Erfolg oder Misserfolg von Strategie beeinflussen.  
 
Historisch gesehen haben Staaten ihre Seestreitkräfte sowohl offensiv (Entscheidungsschlacht 
auf See, Blockade des Gegners, Machtprojektion/Expeditionsoperationen) als auch defensiv 
(Handelskrieg, Küstenverteidigung, fleet-in-being
14
) eingesetzt. Die modernen Missionen der 
Marinen gehen auf Ausführungen von US-Admiral Stansfield Turner zurück, der 1974 Kon-
trolle der Seewege, Machtprojektion gen Land, maritime Präsenz und strategische Abschre-
ckung als vier zentrale Aufgaben für Seestreitkräfte vorsah. Diese klassischen vier Rollen sind 
bis heute Ausgangspunkt für amerikanische Überlegungen zum Einsatz ihrer Marine und fin-
den folglich in vielen der Strategiedokumente zwischen 1981 und 2011 ihren Niederschlag. 
Aus diesen vier Missionen leiten sich weitere spezifischere Aufgaben (z.B. amphibische Fä-
higkeiten, vorbereitendes Feuer von See, taktische Seefliegerei, Aufklärung, Nuklearwaffen-
einsatz etc.) ab. Die Missionen haben ferner umfassende Konsequenzen für den Marineschiff-
bau, die Ausrüstung mit Waffen und Sensoren, die entsprechende Ausbildung – sowie die 
Flottenstruktur.
15 
  
  
                                                          
14
 Als Fleet-in-Being bezeichnet man ein strategisches Konzept, bei dem eine Flotte durch bloße Präsenz (vor-
nehmlich im eigenen Stützpunkt in ausreichender Entfernung) einen Gegner zwingt, ausreichend Kräfte vorzu-
halten, um im Falle des Einsatz diese Flotte bekämpfen zu können.  
15
 Andere Missionen wie humanitäre Hilfe, Evakuierungs- und Katastrophenhilfe oder der Kampf gegen moder-
ne Piraterie und den internationalen Terrorismus (zur See) sind hingegen herrschender Meinung nach vorherr-
schender Meinung lediglich substrategische Rollen von Seestreitkräften und sollten in der Seemachtstrategie nur 
einen nachgelagerten Platz einnehmen. 
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4. Die Verknüpfung von Strategie, Planung und Streitkräftestruktur  
 
Im Bereich der Kräfteplanung finden sich sechs zentrale, korrelative Variablen: Die nationa-
len Interessen und Ziele, die daraus abgeleitete Sicherheitsstrategie, die zur Verfügung ste-
henden Mittel und Instrumente, das Risiko des Scheiterns, das sicherheitspolitische Umfeld 
und die vorhandenen Ressourcen.
16
 Vor diesem Hintergrund ergeben sich acht Szenarien, wie 
Streitkräfteplanung vor sich gehen kann (von oben befohlen, sich von unten durch die Institu-
tion entwickelnd, basierend auf Szenarien, militärischen Missionen, Gefahren oder Technolo-
gien, fiskalisch [nach Umfang des Verteidigungsetats] oder mit dem Ziel der umfassenden 
Risikominimierung). Jede dieser Planungsmöglichkeiten hat Stärken und Schwächen. Häufig 
kommt es zu einer Durchmischung dieser Möglichkeiten, die sich der Kontrolle eines Einzel-
nen ohnehin entziehen.  
 
5. Methodik für die Analyse  
 
Basierend auf den in Kapitel 1-4 entwickelten analytischen Rahmen zeigt der Blick auf US-
Seemachtanalyse also sowohl eine horizontale, geographische Dimension als auch eine verti-
kale, institutionelle Dimension. Dazu sind folgende Aspekte jeweils genauer zu betrachten: 
erstens die gesamtstrategischen Entwicklungen, zweitens die innenpolitischen Einflüsse, drit-
tens die Entwicklung der US-Marinestrategiedokumente selbst, viertens das entsprechende 
seestrategische Konzept (d.h. die Missionen), fünftens die Streitkräftestruktur und deren künf-
tige Planung, sechstens der avisierte und der tatsächliche Einsatz der US-Marine und siebtens 
die Bewertung vor den zeithistorischen und seestrategischen Kontexten. Die Kontextualisie-
rung verhindert, dass Strategiedokumente für sich alleine genommen analysiert werden – der 
Beweis, wie erfolgreich ein Dokument war, ist ohnehin nur schwer vorzunehmen. Vorweg 
sind jedoch einige Besonderheiten des maritimen Umfelds zu klären, die Einfluss auf Strate-
gie und Einsätze der US-Marine haben können.  
 
6. Die Besonderheiten der marinestrategischen Kultur und ihre Bedeutung für Strate-
gie und Einsatz 
 
Die Mehrdimensionalität des Einsatzraumes – die Luftwaffe oder das Heer haben vergleich-
bare Probleme nicht – bedarf zwangsläufig einer entsprechenden intellektuellen Herange-
                                                          
16
 Vgl. Henry Bartlett, Paul Holman, Timothy Somes (1995), “The Art of Strategy and Force Planning”, in: Na-
val War College Review, Vol. 48, No. 1 (1995), S. 114-126. 
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hensweise. Für die Marine bedeutet der operative oder gar strategische Erfolg in einer Dimen-
sion (Überwasser, Unterwasser, Luftraum, Weltall, Cyberspace, elektromagnetisches Spekt-
rum) nicht zwangsläufig den erfolgreichen Abschluss einer gesamten militärischen Operation 
(ggf. mit der Ausnahme der Wild Card namens Nuklearwaffeneinsatz). Ferner haben sich 
innerhalb der US-Marine drei operative Bünde herauskristallisiert (Unterseebootfahrer, 
Überwasserfahrer und Marineflieger), die miteinander um Einfluss, Budgetmittel, militärische 
Spitzenpositionen und allgemeines nationales Ansehen ringen. Diese Interessenvertretung ist 
Folge der Spezialisierung, die angehende Marineoffiziere und Mannschaften frühzeitig in 
ihrer Karriere einschlagen müssen (die US-Marineinfanterie und die Spezialkräfte haben ihre 
eigenen Ethos und Organisation, sind aber nicht im engeren Sinne Gegenstand der Studie). 
Die strategische Kultur, d.h. der Umgang miteinander, mit dem anvertrauten Gerät, mit den 
Befehlen und der übergeordneten Politik, ist dabei ein zentrales einigendes Moment. Die Na-
vy zehrt von der institutionellen und individuellen Vermittlung gemeinsamer und übergeord-
neter Werte sowie von ihrer Marinegeschichte.  
 
Die physische Beschaffenheit und rechtliche Ordnung der Welt beeinflusst maßgeblich, was 
Seeoffiziere tun – und wie sie es tun.  Zu nennen sind die Abhängigkeit von funktionierender 
Technologie, die gegen die Gefahren der See, des Wetters und der Feindeinwirkung schützt; 
die Aufteilung des Operationsgebiets entlang unverrückbarer Knotenpunkte (diese Flaschen-
hälse können natürliche oder künstliche Engstellen wie Kanäle oder Meerengen sein, an de-
nen sich der maritime Verkehr bündelt und deren Kontrolle von überragender strategischer 
Bedeutung ist); das Völkerrecht (UN-Seerechtsabkommen), der die Hohe See jenseits der 12-
Seemeilen-Grenze eines Nationalstaats als Allgemeingut der Menschheit anerkannt hat und 
die u.a. maritime Präsenz, Abschreckung, Machtprojektion und Kontrolle der Seewege in 
nächster Nähe von Alliierten oder Antagonisten erlaubt. Folglich unterscheidet sich Kriegs-
führung auf und von See in einigen zentralen Aspekten deutlich von der Land- und Luft-
kriegsführung.
17
 
 
Ferner bietet die Flotte durch ihre Mobilität, ihre Flexibilität und ihre Skalierbarkeit politi-
schen Planern entsprechend variable Möglichkeiten. Die meisten Kriegsschiffe sind daher 
nicht auf eine Mission oder Rolle beschränkt; ihr strategischer Wert ergibt sich vielmehr aus 
dem Zusammenwirken mit anderen Einheiten (auch aus befreundeten Nationen) und im Übri-
                                                          
17
 Zum Vergleich: Anders als beim Heer geht es der Marine nicht um die dauerhafte Eroberung von Territorium 
für strategische Effekte. Anders als die Luftwaffe, die Überflugrechte benötigt, kann die Marine die operativen 
und rechtlichen Möglichkeiten weitgehend ohne Behinderung nationaler Souveränitätsansprüche durchsetzen.    
 
9 
 
gen auch anderen Teilstreitkräften. Die US-Marine ist seit dem 2. Weltkrieg eine global vor-
wärts disloziert operierende Teilstreitkraft, die anders als Luftwaffe oder Heer nicht haupt-
sächlich in den Stützpunkten verweilt. Dazu sind In-See-Versorgung und Nuklearantriebe 
wichtige Säulen. Ferner gibt es bei der US-Marine (mit Ausnahme des scharfen Schusses) 
zwischen den Friedenseinsätzen und den Kriegseinsätzen keine größeren operativen und takti-
schen Unterschiede. Das hat Folgen für die strategische Kultur, die eindeutig von den operati-
ven Erfahrungen der Marineangehörigen geprägt ist; eine Marinestrategie muss diese Um-
stände reflektieren. Das zentrale Element eines solchen strategischen Konzepts ist die klare 
Beziehung zur nationalen Sicherheit eines Staates. Nur so kann eine Teilstreitkraft der Öffent-
lichkeit und der politischen Elite darlegen, welche Rolle sie spielt. Öffentliche Unterstützung 
für eine Marine und eine entsprechende organisatorische Struktur sind weitere notwendige 
Aspekte.
18
 
 
7. Genese amerikanischer Seemacht  
 
Zunächst in aller Kürze zur horizontalen Dimension von Seemacht (Elemente der funktiona-
len Seemacht USA): Es handelt sich hierbei vor allem um die Distanzen zwischen den Einhei-
ten der Flotte, die Qualität und Quantität von entsprechenden Häfen und Marinestützpunkten, 
die Entfernung zu den wichtigsten maritimen Flaschenhälsen, die Distanz zu den eigenen ma-
ritimen Aufgaben (die Distanz zu den eigenen strategischen Rollen und Operationsgebieten), 
die Beschaffenheit der See, welche das Land und seine maritimen Verpflichtungen trennt; 
ferner Bevölkerungsschemata und Siedlungsstrukturen, Städte, Befestigungsanlagen, kritische 
Infrastruktur im Küstenbereich (Häfen, Schleusen, Kanäle, Verkehrswege, Werften, Pipelines 
etc.), Position und Beschaffenheit der Landmasse, usw.
19
 
 
Von größerer Bedeutung ist die vertikale Dimension von Seemacht (Elemente der institutio-
nellen Seemacht USA): Zu nennen sind hier allgemeine verfassungsrechtliche oder andere 
gesetzliche Zuständigkeiten sowie die Planungs- und Lernabläufe hierarchisch strukturierter 
Organisationen. Es sind vor allen Dingen diese Prozesse, die ebenso undurchschaubar wie 
unabdingbar für das Verständnis sind, wie US-Marinestrategie entsteht und umgesetzt wird.
20
  
                                                          
18
 Vgl. Samuel Huntington, “National Policy and the Transoceanic Navy,” in: U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, 
Vol. 80, No.5, May 1954, n.p. 
19
 Eine solche geographische Studie zur funktionalen Seemacht USA wäre durchaus wünschenswert. Entspre-
chende Daten zu den Vereinigten Staaten sind bis auf Weiteres den einschlägigen Werken und Datenbanken zu 
entnehmen. Die funktionale Seemachtausübung der USA ist nicht Gegenstand dieser Analyse.  
20
 Da solche Prozesse methodisch nicht nachvollziehbar sind, haben Jon Sumida und David Rosenberg die Ana-
lysekategorien unter den fünf „M“ zusammengefasst: Demnach sind für die Auswertung machines, men, manu-
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Der strategische Planungsprozess besteht aus sechs abgestimmten Schritten. Aus den artiku-
lierten nationalen Interessen (erstens) ergeben sich (zweitens) die Gefahren für ebenjene. Um 
diesen Gefahren zu begegnen, werden (drittens) die politisch-militärischen Zielvorstellungen 
formuliert. Bevor sich daraus (viertens) die bevorzugte Militärstrategie ableitet, machen in-
nen- und außenpolitische Faktoren ihren Einfluss gelten. Schließlich werden (fünftens) die 
dafür notwendigen Ressourcen mit den vorhandenen Mitteln abgeprüft und eine Risikoanaly-
se vorgenommen. Schließlich werden (sechstens) die Strategie, die Ressourcenbereitstellung 
oder beides angepasst.
21
  
 
Zum Zweck der Analyse der Seemacht USA lassen sich verschiedene Akteure, Faktoren und 
Ideen identifizieren, die auf die Strategiegestaltung Einfluss ausüben. Zu den zentralen Akteu-
ren zählen der amerikanische Präsident (als Oberbefehlshaber, Staats- und Regierungschef in 
Personalunion und Balance gegen die Legislative) und der Kongress (als Verteiler der Haus-
haltsmittel und Balance gegen die Exekutive), die Vereinigten Stabschefs der Teilstreitkräfte 
(ihnen obliegt die generelle konzeptionelle Kriegsplanung), der Verteidigungsminister (der 
die Bemühungen der einzelnen Teilstreitkräfte, ihre Beschaffungs- und Einsatzprogramme 
koordiniert) und die Regionalen Oberbefehlshaber (die Vereinigten Staaten sind das einzige 
Land weltweit, das den Globus in regionale und funktionale Zuständigkeitsgebiete aufgeteilt 
hat).
22
 Zu den Faktoren, die keine verfassungsmäßigen Kompetenzen mit Blick auf Strategie 
und Seemacht besitzen, aber dennoch in die Prozesse hineinwirken, zählen andere Ministerien 
(etwa das Außenministerium als zentrales diplomatisches Instrument oder das Heimatschutz-
ministerium, in dessen Zuständigkeit die US-Küstenwache fällt) ebenso wie die anderen Teil-
streitkräfte (Heer, Luftwaffe und Marineinfanterie – obgleich letztere Teil des Marineministe-
riums ist – kämpfen um Einfluss und Budgetmittel). Interessengruppen (z.B. Veteranenver-
bände, Lobbyisten oder Industrievereinigungen), die Medien (als oft gescholtene vierte Ge-
walt im Staat) und mit Abstrichen die Gerichte bzw. der Oberste Gerichtshof (durch entspre-
                                                                                                                                                                                     
facturing, management, and money zu betrachten (Sumida, Jon, Rosenberg, David, Machines, Men, Manufactu-
ring, Management and Money. The Study of Navies as Complex Organizations and the Transformation of Twen-
tieth Century Naval History, in: Doing Naval History. Essays towards Improvement, hrsg. von J. Hattendorf. 
Newport, Rhode Island 1995, S. 25-40). Der deutsche Politikwissenschaftler (und Kapitän zur See a.D.) Wilfried 
Stallmann ergänzte in seiner einschlägigen, allerdings veralteten Studie aus dem Jahr 2000 diesen Kanon noch 
um ein sechstes „M“: mentality (Stallmann, Wilfried, Die maritime Strategie der USA nach 1945: Entwicklung, 
Einflußgrößen und Auswirkungen auf das atlantische Bündnis. Dissertation zur Erlangung des Doktorgrades der 
Philosophischen Fakultät der Christian-Albrechts-Universität zu Kiel, Kiel 2000).  
21
 Vgl. Collins, John, Military Strategy. Principles, Practices, and Historical Perspectives. Washington, D.C. 
2002, S. 6.  
22
 Für eine Aufstellung siehe Karte im Anhang.  
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chende Urteile) sind ebenso zu berücksichtigen. Im Besonderen liegen der Genese von See-
macht natürlich auch Allianzüberlegungen zugrunde, etwa durch die in Artikel 5 des Nordat-
lantikvertrags oder durch andere, weniger automatisierte, aber gleichfalls in die Analyse ein-
zubeziehende Beistandspakte mit anderen Staaten. Schließlich ist die ideengeschichtliche Di-
mension von erheblicher Bedeutung: Diese Grundlagen der US-Außenpolitik mögen imperial-
liberal, hegemonial-liberal, realistisch-international, liberal-internationalistisch, realistisch-
isolationistisch oder liberal-isolationistisch ausgeprägt sein.
23
 Sie berühren in jedem Fall die 
Frage, zu welchem Zwecke Amerika in den Krieg zieht und ob das Land mit dem Einsatz 
militärischer Gewalt fremde Gesellschaften oder nur das fremde Militär treffen will. 
 
8. 1981-1989: „Marine-Renaissance“ durch die „Maritime Strategie“?  
 
Folgt man der Charakterisierung der achtziger Jahre als Wiedergeburt der US-Marine,
24
 so 
ergibt sich daraus zwangsläufig die Schlussfolgerung, dass der Zeitraum unmittelbar zuvor 
von einem maritimen Abschwung oder gar einer Marine-Depression gekennzeichnet war. 
Dabei war die US-Marine nach Ende des Zweiten Weltkriegs zunächst an einem Höhepunkt 
angelangt. Sie hatte einen zentralen Beitrag zum Sieg gegen Italien, Deutschland und Japan 
geleistet (u.a. mit Landungen in der Normandie und in Nordafrika, Geleitschutzaufgaben im 
Atlantik und Pazifik, Einführung der Flugzeugträger als völlig neues Großkampfschiff). Doch 
die Entwicklung der Atombombe und den daraus resultierenden Überlegungen im aufziehen-
den Kalten Krieg, dass ein Waffengang gegen die Sowjetunion kurz, vollumfassend nuklear 
und damit apokalyptisch sein werde, traf die Marine – die keinen Gegner auf See mehr fürch-
ten musste – schwer. Es war nun die neugegründete US-Luftwaffe, die für sich in Anspruch 
nehmen konnte, im kommenden Krieg die im wahrsten Sinne des Wortes tragende Rolle zu 
spielen. Im Koreakrieg (1950-1953), während der US-Intervention im Libanon (1958) und in 
der Kubakrise (1962) zeigte die Marine jedoch ihre Vielseitigkeit unterhalb der Schwelle des 
Atomkrieges auf. Nuklearantrieb, Raketentechnik und Computerisierung bestimmten die 
technologische Entwicklung (und damit auch die Erweiterung operativer Möglichkeiten). In 
den Jahren des Vietnamkriegs spielte die Marine dann nur noch eine untergeordnete Rolle. 
                                                          
23
 Vgl. Rhodes, Edward (1999): “‘…From the Sea’ and Back Again. Naval Power in the Second American Cen-
tury,” in: Naval War College Review, Vol. LII, No. 2, S. 13-54; siehe auch: Krause, Joachim, Strategische Wis-
senschaft, in: Handbuch der Internationalen Politik, hrsg. v. C. Masala et al. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag für Sozial-
wissenschaften 2010, S. 182–198.  
24
 Vgl. Hartmann, Frederic, Naval Renaissance. The U.S. Navy in the 1980’s, Annapolis (Maryland) 1992 und 
Rudolf, Peter, Amerikanische Seemachtpolitik und maritime Rüstungskontrolle unter Carter und Reagan. Frank-
furt/Main 1990, S. 241-362. 
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Sie konzentrierte sich vor allen Dingen auf Flugzeugträgeroperationen, Küsten- und Fluss-
kriegsführung Minenkrieg, Patrouillen und Landzielbeschuss. Die Hauptlast in Vietnam tru-
gen jedoch Luftwaffe, Heer und Marineinfanterie. Das strategische Denken verkümmerte zu-
sehends. Machtprojektion war zum einzigen Daseinszweck der Navy geworden – just als die 
UdSSR ihrerseits eine große und kampffähige Hochseeflotte in Dienst stellte.  
 
In den siebziger Jahren kam es wieder zu einer ersten vorsichtigen Entwicklung hin zu einem 
breiteren, strategischen Ansatz (u.a. unter den Admiralen Zumwalt, Turner und Holloway). 
Doch die Umstände sprachen gegen die Marine: Die Folgen des Vietnamtraumas, die Umge-
staltung der U.S.-Streitkräfte zu einer reinen Freiwilligenarmee (samt der damit verbundenen 
sozialen Probleme), die immer kleiner und älter werdende Flotte und die Politik der Präsiden-
ten Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford und v.a. Jimmy Carter boten der US-Marine wenig Gelegen-
heit zur strategischen Entfaltung. Selbst als der Kalte Krieg wieder an Schärfe zunahm, war 
das Szenario eines Waffengangs zwischen den Blöcken von der Vorstellung der Panzer-
schlacht an der innerdeutschen Grenze geprägt. Die Navy hätte in diesen Überlegungen wenig 
mehr als die Rolle einer maritimen Spedition gespielt.  
 
Mit der Wahl von Ronald Reagan zum US-Präsidenten ändert sich das maßgeblich. Reagans 
verschärfte Rhetorik gegenüber Moskau wurde durch neue sicherheitspolitische Konzepte und 
einem deutlich gestiegenen Verteidigungshaushalt begleitet. Die Marine, die seit Mitte der 
siebziger Jahre ihre Ideen für eine globale, offensive und breit aufgestellte Seestreitkräfte ge-
hegt und gepflegt hatte, konnte nun – unter zentraler Mithilfe des damaligen Marineministers 
John Lehman – ein fertiges Konzept präsentieren. Zur Unterstützung der operativen Vorhaben 
sollten bis zu 600 Kampfschiffe angeschafft bzw. reaktiviert werden (1981 lag der Bestand 
insgesamt bei 521 Schiffen).
25
 Inmitten des ‚Zweiten Kalten Krieges‘ (sowjetische Invasion in 
Afghanistan, Sturz des Schahs und Geiselnahme an der US-Botschaft in Teheran, Abschuss 
eines koreanischen Passagierjets durch sowjetische Abfangjäger, Grenada-Invasion, NATO-
Doppelbeschluss, schnelle Folge altersbedingter Führungswechsel an der Spitze des Politbü-
ros der UdSSR, usw.) präsentierte die Marine eine Strategie, die verhieß, dass die US-Schiffe 
sich nah an das sowjetische Festland heranwagen würden (u.a. mit Operationen von Angriffs-
U-Booten und Flugzeugträgern in der Norwegensee und in der Barentssee), um die strategi-
sche Reserve Moskaus (die nuklearwaffenbestückten Unterseeboote in Murmansk) zu bedro-
hen. Gleichzeitig sollten auch im Pazifik (im Ochotskische Meer) offensive Operationen 
                                                          
25
 Für eine Aufstellung über die Entwicklung der Flottengröße siehe Tabelle im Anhang.  
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durchgeführt werden – eine Abkehr der Swing Strategy aus der Carter-Zeit, die Seestreitkräfte 
auf den Atlantik konzentrieren und im asiatisch-pazifischen Raum lediglich rudimentäre Kräf-
te stationieren wollte, die zu allem Überfluss im Bedarfsfall auch noch gen Atlantik verscho-
ben werden würden.  
 
Die Vorstellung der „Maritimen Strategie“ war, dass ein Konflikt konventionell gehalten 
werden könnte; eine Annahme, die man angesichts des volatilen Verhältnisses zwischen Ost 
und West zumindest hinterfragen kann.
26
 Die Bedrohung der sowjetischen Flanken würde 
deren Kräfte spalten und eine Attacke in Zentraleuropa (wo der Warschauer Pakt konventio-
nell überlegen war) weniger wahrscheinlich machen. Da die USA und ihre Alliierten sämtli-
che zentralen maritimen Flaschenhälse rund um die russische Landmasse kontrollierten, sollte 
die Sowjetunion so von eigener offensiver Seemachtausübung abgeschnitten und schließlich 
niedergerungen werden können. Der Verlauf der Geschichte hat gezeigt, dass die „Maritime 
Strategie“ nicht vollumfänglich zum Einsatz kam. Gleichwohl veränderte sich im Rahmen der 
Zielvorstellung der 600-Schiff-Marine die Flottenstruktur nachhaltig. Alte Schiffe und Split-
tergattungen wurden ausgemustert, die Beschaffungsprogramme neuerer und fähigerer Ein-
heiten (u.a. Ticondaroga-Kreuzer mit dem neuen Aegis-Warn- und Feuerleitsystem, amphibi-
sche Träger vom Typ Wasp, strategische Unterseeboote der Ohio-Klasse) intensiviert und vier 
alte Schlachtschiffe aus den vierziger Jahren reaktiviert und modernisiert. 1983 und 1988 
brachte die US-Navy jeweils zwei atombetriebene Flugzeugträger in die Haushaltspläne ein. 
Der Kongress bewilligte diese massiven Investitionen anstandslos.   
 
Die mit der „Maritimen Strategie“ global ausgerichtete Navy (neben den an den US-Küsten 
stationierten Flotten unterhielt die Marine zu jener Zeit Knotenpunkte im Mittelmeer, im Per-
sischen Golf und im West-Pazifik) hatte aber neben der Planung für die Konfrontation mit der 
Sowjetunion auch andere Krisen zu bewältigen, die in dem Papier nicht explizit benannt wur-
den, aber aus dringlichen Gründen auf die Agenda gehoben wurden. Dazu zählten u.a. die 
Verwicklung in den libanesischen Bürgerkrieg, die in dem Bombenanschlag auf einen Stütz-
punkt der Marineinfanterie in Beirut (23. Oktober 1983) gipfelte, Seekriegsoperationen gegen 
Libyens Diktator Muammar al-Gaddafi (zwischen 1981 und 1989), der den transnationalen 
Terrorismus – auch gegen US-Ziele – unterstützte und darüber hinaus eigenmächtig die liby-
schen Hoheitsgewässer erweitern wollte und der so genannten Tanker-Krieg im Persischen 
                                                          
26
 Vgl. Posen, Barry, “Inadvertent Nuclear War? Escalation and NATO’s Northern Flank,” in: International 
Security, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1982), S. 28-54 und Ball, Desmond, “Nuclear War at Sea,” in: International Security, 
Vol. 10, no. 3 (1985), S. 3-31. 
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Golf (1987/1988), in dem die US-Marine den Warenverkehr im minenverseuchten Golf 
schützen musste und in schwere Gefechte im Zuge des andauernden Iran-Irak-Krieges verwi-
ckelt wurde.  
 
Die Beziehungen zu den anderen Teilstreitkräften und den Alliierten gestalteten sich zwischen 
1981 und 1989 hinlänglich freundschaftlich. Die NATO blieb zunächst auf Zentraleuropa 
fokussiert, erarbeitete sich aber schnell aber zunehmend eine erweiterten maritim-strategische 
Perspektive – nicht zuletzt, da einige der Mitgliedstaaten (u.a. die Bundesrepublik Deutsch-
land) ihrerseits ihre Flotten dahingehend modernisierten, mehr Hochseeaufgaben zu über-
nehmen. Lediglich an den Flanken (Süd- und Nordeuropa, Japan) gab es vorsichtige Warnun-
gen, dass eine Provokation der Sowjetunion möglicherweise unkalkulierbare Folgen haben 
könnte. Mit Blick auf den erheblich gewachsenen Verteidigungsetat musste die Navy den 
übermäßigen Neid von Marineinfanterie, Heer und Luftwaffe nicht fürchten. Die „Maritime 
Strategie“ bot ihrerseits die Mitwirkung der anderen Teilstreitkräfte an, doch das Heer blieb 
reserviert. Organisatorisch waren die achtziger Jahre von der gesetzlich mandatierten teil-
streitkraftübergreifende Führung (jointness) geprägt, der die Navy ihrerseits ablehnend, da um 
ihre Autonomie fürchtend, gegenüberstand.   
 
Die „Maritime Strategie“ war ein Dokument, das sich seit den siebziger Jahren entwickelte 
und nun zur vollen Entfaltung kam. Für das Weiße Haus, den Kongress und die amerikani-
sche Öffentlichkeit war dies eine nachvollziehbare Schilderung maritimer strategischer Rolle 
im Frieden, in Krisenzeiten und im Krieg. Allerdings verlor die Verfeinerung und Veranke-
rung der Strategie gegen Ende der achtziger Jahre zusehends an Schwung, da die Reagan-
Regierung mit innenpolitischen Problemen befasst war und sich eine umfassende Entspan-
nung im sowjetisch-amerikanischen Verhältnis andeutete.  
  
9. 1989-2001: Management strategischen Wandels und Entstehung einer „Neuen Welt-
ordnung“  
 
Mit dem Fall der Berliner Mauer am 9. November 1989 kündigte sich das Ende der vorherr-
schenden bipolaren Weltordnung an. Kurz bevor die Deutsche Einheit zustande kam, prokla-
mierte US-Präsident George H.W. Bush eine neue Weltordnung. Nunmehr von Moskau un-
abhängige Staaten strebten gen Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft und die Sowjetunion selbst 
zerfiel. Kurzum: die „Geschäftsgrundlage“, auf der die Navy bis dato operierte, war hinfällig 
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geworden. Inmitten des unipolaren Moments, den die Vereinigten Staaten nach dem erfolg-
reich zu Ende gegangenen Kalten Krieg für sich beanspruchen konnten, überfiel der Irak das 
benachbarte Kuwait und löste so 1990/1991 den Golfkrieg aus. Auf dem Balkan zeichnete 
sich gleichzeitig ein blutiger Sezessionskonflikt ab. Für die Strategie- und Streitkräfteplaner 
ergab sich die duale Herausforderung, einerseits diesen unmittelbaren Bedrohungen zu be-
gegnen und andererseits ihr Kalkül den neuen geopolitischen Umständen sensibel anzupassen.   
 
Während die US-Marine noch kurzzeitig an der „Maritimen Strategie“ festhielt, begab sie sich 
ab 1991 unter dem Eindruck des Golfkriegs auf den Weg einer umfassenden strategischen 
Neuorientierung. Mit dem Ende der Sowjetunion war auch die russische Hochseeflotte Ge-
schichte. Die US-Planer gingen davon aus, dass ein gleichwertiger Rivale nicht vor 2010 auf-
treten würde. So konnte sich die Marine von der hohen See und den globalen Strategien ab-
wenden (hier wurden die in den siebziger Jahren erarbeiteten Missionen – Kontrolle der See-
wege, Machtprojektion gen Land, maritime Präsenz und strategische Abschreckung – heran-
gezogen) und sich vielmehr auf regionale und küstennahe Szenarien konzentrieren. Diese 
Aspekte reflektierten die  Vorgaben, die die übergeordneten Nationalen Sicherheitsstrategien, 
der vierjährige Verteidigungsbericht und weitere Strukturplanungen der neunziger Jahre für 
die Marine formulierten. Die fundamentale Erneuerung der strategischen Perspektive fand 
Niederschlag im Titel der Marinestrategie. …From the Sea (1992) machte den Anspruch der 
Navy deutlich, nunmehr von See zunehmend auf und an Land zu wirken (das Nachfolgepa-
pier Forward…From the Sea [1994] revidierte die amphibischen Aspekte zwar wieder etwas, 
ließ an der allgemeinen Zielrichtung aber keinen Zweifel). Im Gegensatz zu den achtziger 
Jahren, in denen es lediglich ein Dokument unter einem Titel (obgleich in verschiedenen Ver-
sionen) gab, wurden in den neunziger Jahren nicht weniger als neun strategische Marinedo-
kumente unterschiedlicher Art, Ambition und Bezeichnung publiziert.  
 
Allerdings konnte die Marine ihre neuen Ideen nicht so durchsetzen, wie es noch unter Präsi-
dent Reagan der Fall gewesen war. Die reduzierten Verteidigungsbudgets mussten sinnvoll 
eingesetzt werden, um die nunmehr schrumpfende Kalte-Kriegs-Flotte in Bewegung zu hal-
ten. Zahlreiche Stützpunkte in den USA und weltweit wurden geschlossen. Präsident Bush Sr. 
wurde nach nur einer Amtszeit durch Bill Clinton abgelöst, der in der Folge die Eindäm-
mungsstrategie aus Zeiten des Blockgegensatzes durch eine Erweiterungsstrategie ersetzte. 
Viele Verbündete reduzierten ihre Verteidigungshaushalte, während Staaten aus Ost-
Mitteleuropa nunmehr in die NATO und die EU strebten. Amerikanische Sicherheitspolitik 
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geriet derweil angesichts des an Härte zunehmenden Bürgerkriegs auf dem Balkan und in 
Folge einer gescheiterten Expedition in Somalia unter erheblichen Druck. Keine dieser Kriege 
und Krisen berührte die nationalen Interessen der Vereinigten Staaten so fundamental, dass 
ein massiver militärisch-diplomatischer Aufwand wie noch im Kalten Krieg gefragt gewesen 
wäre. Die US-Marine selbst hatte mit den Folgen massiver Skandale (u.a. eine Geschützturm-
explosion an Bord eines Schlachtschiffs mit 47 Toten, sexuelle Belästigungen in umfangrei-
chen Stil während einer Marinefliegertagung in Las Vegas 1991, Korruption und Veruntreu-
ung, Selbstmord des Marinebefehlshabers Admiral Mike Boorda 1996, ineffiziente Führung 
des Marineministeriums etc.) zu kämpfen. Die Vielzahl der im Laufe der Dekade erarbeiteten 
Dokumente reflektiert so auch den Versuch, der Marine Struktur und innere Festigkeit zu ge-
ben. Die Konzentration auf Doktrin und operative Aspekte waren die Abkehr vom Versuch, 
Seemacht in den größeren Gesamtkontext amerikanischer Außenpolitik einzubetten. Diese 
Erosion strategischer Ambition wirkte sich auch auf die Streitkräftestruktur aus.  
 
Insgesamt stand die Marine vor dem Dilemma, einerseits die Flotte den neuen Gegebenheiten 
anzupassen, andererseits aber auch die notwendigen Zeiträume für die Modifikation der 
Schiffe zu berücksichtigen. Zwar wurden so zahlreiche Schiffe aus Lehmans 600-Schiff-
Marine-Programm gestrichen, doch die Neujustierung auf die Küstengewässer geschah letzt-
lich mit der Hochseeflotte aus Kalten-Kriegs-Zeiten. Nur langsam schmolz der Bestand und 
näherte sich den niedrigen Vorgaben der Präsidenten, der Verteidigungsminister und der Vor-
sitzenden der vereinigten Generalstabschefs. Zahlreiche neue Schiffdesigns wurden zwar be-
gonnen (u.a. Kreuzer, Zerstörer und ein mit Tomahawk-Marschflugkörpern bestücktes Arse-
nalschiff), scheiterten aber aus unterschiedlichen Gründen. Andere Programme wie die Aegis-
Zerstörer der Arleigh-Burke-Klasse führten gleichzeitig zu einer Modernisierung der Flotte, 
die sich zunehmend auf die umfassende Computerisierung von Systemen und Sensoren stütz-
te.  
 
Aus operativer Sicht wurden die neunziger Jahre für die Marine von den Einsätzen im Persi-
schen Golf bestimmt. In Vorbereitung des Golfkriegs 1991 leistete die Marine umfangreiche 
logistische Beiträge, in die Kampfhandlungen selbst griff man u.a. Marschflugkörpern und 
Trägerflugzeugen ein. Auch nach der Vertreibung Saddam Husseins aus Kuwait war es an der 
Marine, das Sanktionsregime gegen den Irak (u.a. mit Flugverbotszonen) zu kontrollieren und 
ggf. militärisch durchzusetzen (bis 2003). Doch auch in anderen Weltregionen war amerikani-
sche Seemacht stets nachgefragt. In der Adria gab es ab 1993 den ersten NATO-geführten 
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Marinekampfeinsatz, zunächst als Embargo-Operation gegen Rest-Jugoslawien, später auch 
mit Kampfflugzeugen und Marschflugkörpern im Zuge der Bosnien- und Kosovokriege. 1994 
wurde Haiti zum Schauplatz einer Operation, die den von einem Militärputsch und humanitä-
rer Not heimgesuchten Inselstaat wieder in demokratisch verfasste Bahnen lenkte. Im Pazifik 
bestimmte 1995/1996 die Taiwan-Straße die Schlagzeilen. Die Volksrepublik China hielt Ma-
növer in unmittelbarer Nähe Taiwans ab, um dortige Unabhängigkeitsbestrebungen zu unter-
minieren. In der Folge verstärkten die Vereinigten Staaten ihre Militärhilfe für Taiwan und 
zeigten maritime Präsenz mit Flugzeugträgergruppen.  
 
Die strategische Umorientierung in den neunziger Jahren und die reduzierten Mittel führten 
zu einigen Verwerfungen innerhalb der Streitkräfte (so war bspw. die Luftwaffe überzeugt, 
dass ausschließlich sie die zentralen Plattformen für künftige bewaffnete Konflikte stellen 
würde). Die anfänglich gute Kooperation zwischen Marine und Marineinfanterie wurde zu-
nehmend davon belastet, welche Balance zwischen Hochsee- und amphibischen Operationen 
gewählt werden sollte (das Marine Corps erarbeitete zunehmend eigene Konzeptionen, die 
küstennahe Einsätze im land- und seeseitigen Küstenstreifen in den Mittelpunkt stellten).  
 
Ohne eine Schablone für eine Gesamtstrategie, wie es der Kalte Krieg noch wenige Jahre zu-
vor ermöglicht hatte, war die Marine zunehmend damit befasst, sich selbst zu managen. Stra-
tegisches Denken wurde häufig isoliert vorgenommen, der Gegenwind erratischer präsiden-
tieller Politik und schwindender Budgets tat sein übriges. Erst mit der beginnenden Globali-
sierung zeichnete sich eine systemische Rolle ab, in der der Beitrag von Seestreitkräften wie-
der mehr Gewicht bekommen würde. Die sicherheitspolitischen Herausforderungen zwischen 
1989 und 2001 – u.a. auch der zunehmende transnationale Terrorismus (Anschläge auf die 
US-Botschaften in Tansania und Kenia, Selbstmordattentat auf den Zerstörer Cole) – waren 
nicht von der umfassenden Bedeutung wie der bipolare Konflikt. Kleinere Krisen und Kriege 
schalteten sich zwischen die vorsichtig konstruierten Dokumente und unterstrichen die Kom-
plexität und notwendige Flexibilität von Strategie.  
 
10. 2001-2011: Begründung und Umsetzung von Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert 
 
Mit der Präsidentschaft von George W. Bush, dem Sohn von George H.W. Bush, begann auch 
mit Blick auf sicherheitspolitische Herausforderungen eine neue Zeitrechnung. Die Terroran-
schläge vom 11. September 2001 in New York und Washington stellten die Bedrohungswahr-
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nehmung auf den Kopf. Bush und sein Kabinett reagierten mit der Proklamation eines globa-
len Kriegs gegen den Terrorismus. Dabei ging es nicht nur gegen die terroristischen Netzwer-
ke (vornehmlich al-Qaida), sondern auch gegen die Staaten, die nach gängiger Auffassung 
diesen Terroristen Heimstatt und Ausbildungshilfe boten. Diese asymmetrischen und hybri-
den Szenarien überlagerten die etablierten strategischen Ziele. Das Militär befand sich noch 
immer in einem Transformationsprozess, der von den Verheißungen von Präzisionsmunition, 
Baukastenprinzipien, Informationstechnologie, netzwerkzentrierter Kriegsführung, Hightech-
Waffensystem und Tarnkappentechnologie getragen wurde.  
 
Die erste Dekade des 21. Jahrhunderts wurde neben dem transnationalen Terrorismus insbe-
sondere von der weiter fortschreitenden Globalisierung, dem Aufstieg von Schwellenstaaten 
(den so genannten BRICS-Ländern), der Proliferation von Massenvernichtungswaffen (auch 
unter nicht-staatlichen Akteuren), den regional-hegemonialen Ambitionen des Iran, Nordko-
reas und Chinas sowie von der Finanzkrise und der finanz- und sicherheitspolitischen Über-
dehnung der USA bestimmt. Die Kriege in Afghanistan (seit 2001) und gegen den Irak (2003-
2011) waren mit militärtechnologischer Überlegenheit allein nicht zu gewinnen. Es bedurfte 
der Entwicklung neuer Doktrinen und Konzepte. Die Marine sah sich von der Konzentration 
auf die südwestasiatische Landmasse (hier waren Heer, Luftwaffe und Marineinfanterie be-
sonderes im Kampfgeschehen gefordert) strategisch, operativ und budgetär zunehmend an den 
Rand gedrängt. Nach geltender Sichtweise des Verteidigungsministers Donald Rumsfeld hat-
ten die Teilstreitkräfte ohnehin keine eigenen strategischen Absichten zu formulieren, sondern 
lediglich die angefragten Mittel aus dem Verteidigungshaushalt zu rechtfertigen. Die Marine 
war davon nicht ausgenommen.  
 
Erst Mitte des Jahrzehnts kam es zu einer vorsichtigen Revitalisierung marinestrategischen 
Denkens. Nicht die andernorts vielfach vorgebrachte Erwartung, sich nunmehr in einem über 
eine Generation erstreckenden asymmetrischen Krieg gegen den Terrorismus zu befinden, 
sondern die Entwicklung eines auf die vier Missionen von Admiral Turner (Kontrolle der 
Seewege, Machtprojektion gen Land, maritime Präsenz und strategische Abschreckung) auf-
bauenden, weitreichenden und wirklich strategischen Konzepts stand im Mittelpunkt der Be-
mühungen. Das Ergebnis war die 2007 veröffentlichte „Kooperativen Strategie für Seemacht 
im 21. Jahrhundert“, in der sich zudem maritime Sicherheit und humanitäre Katastrophenhilfe 
als zusätzliche Marinemissionen von strategischem Rang wiederfanden. Als systemische Stra-
tegie war das Papier für die US-Marine ein Schritt hin zu einer postmodernen Navy. Diese 
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Postmodernität beschreibt den Einsatz von Seestreitkräften auch zum Schutz des globalen 
Systems und der dahinterstehenden liberalen, marktwirtschaftlichen, humanitären Werte (mo-
derne Marinen hingegen sind solche, die ausschließlich zur Verteidigung und zum Erhalt von 
Allianzen geführt werden). Folglich bekam die Verhinderung von Krieg den gleichen Stel-
lenwert – im Sinne der Einsatz- und Flottenplanung – wie die Kriegsführung selbst. Dazu ist 
ein hohes Maß von vertrauensbildenden Maßnahmen notwendig, was wiederum auf der Er-
kenntnis fußt, dass die Seestreitkräfte aller Staaten nur im Verbund den jeweiligen maritimen 
Problemen Herr werden können.  
 
Die einsetzende Wirtschafts- und Finanzkrise ab Ende 2007 und der relative globale Macht-
verlust der Vereinigten Staaten (gepaart mit Kriegsmüdigkeit, Staatsschuldenwachstum und 
innenpolitischer Blockade) haben die ambitionierten Perspektiven für die Kooperative Strate-
gie nachhaltig geschmälert. Mittlerweile dominieren Szenarien wie die Seemachtambitionen 
Chinas oder das Bestreben von Staaten wie der Volksrepublik (und des Iran) nach Waffen, die 
die US-Marine auf Abstand halten sollen (so genannte anti-access/area denial bzw. A²AD). 
Das hierfür entwickelte Marine-Luftwaffen-Konzept AirSea Battle hat mit der  AirLand Batt-
le-Doktrin aus den Zeiten des Kalten Kriegs in Mitteleuropa kaum mehr als den Namen ge-
meinsam. Ursprünglich als effizienteres Beschaffungskonzept gedacht, ist ASB in einigen 
Zirkeln dennoch ungerechtfertigt zur Blaupause für einen möglichen Kampf mit China ge-
worden. 
 
Unter der Ägide von Bushs Nachfolger Barack Obama ist es zu einem Abzug amerikanischer 
Truppen aus dem Irak gekommen, während die Konzentration auf Afghanistan und Pakistan 
nochmals intensiviert wurde (u.a. mit der Verlegung zusätzlicher Truppen an den Hindukusch 
und der Tötung von al-Qaida-Führer Osama bin Laden). Der Arabische Frühling seit 2010 hat 
die kooperative Politik Obamas, die auf Restauration des amerikanischen Ansehens zielte, 
unterminiert und eine Weltregion von zentralem strategischem Interesse für die USA in 
schwere Turbulenzen gestürzt.  
 
Die Streitkräftestruktur im ersten Jahrzehnt des neuen Jahrtausends war weiterhin von großen 
Einheiten (v.a. den nuklearbetriebenen Flugzeugträgern sowie den konventionell angetriebe-
nen amphibischen Schiffen) geprägt. Erst mühsam erlernte die Marine, ihre Flotte effizienter 
zu nutzen und für kooperative Maßnahmen (z.B. die Verwendung von Hospitalschiffen bei 
Naturkatastrophen oder von Docklandungsschiffen für Ausbildungsmissionen afrikanischer 
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Küstenwachen) einzusetzen. Die Ende der neunziger Jahre eingeleiteten Beschaffungsvorha-
ben (u.a. Küstenkampfschiffe der Independence- und Freedom-Klassen, Docklandungsschiffe 
vom Typ San Antonio oder Joint-Strike-Fighter-Kampfflugzeuge F-35) verteuerten und ver-
zögerten sich ebenso wie die neue Generation atombetriebener Flugzeugträger (Typschiff 
Gerald Ford). 
 
Auch in diesem Jahrzehnt war die US-Navy eine Marine im Einsatz. Flugzeugträger unter-
stützten die Kampfoperationen in Afghanistan und im Irak, US-Kriegsschiffe patrouillierten 
am Horn von Afrika zur Bekämpfung des transnationalen Terrorismus und der aufflammen-
den Piraterie – und nach einem verheerenden Tsunami in Südostasien wurde 2004/2005 groß-
flächige humanitäre Unterstützung von See aus geleistet. In all diesen Einsätzen brachte US-
Seemacht ihre spezifischen Möglichkeiten zum Zweck übergeordneter politisch-militärischer 
Gesamtziele zum Tragen. Die Einbindung von Alliierten und die engere Kooperation mit der 
Marineinfanterie und der US-Küstenwache bei der Erarbeitung und Durchsetzung der gülti-
gen Strategie zeugten von einem ernstzunehmenden kooperativen Ansatz.  
 
Auch wenn die „Kooperativen Strategie für Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert“ nicht die umfas-
sende Neugestaltung der US-Gesamtstrategie zu realisieren vermochte, bleibt das Papier ein 
nachhaltiges Zeugnis für eine intelligente Neuerfindung von Seemacht im 21. Jahrhundert. 
Freilich wird sich zeigen müssen, inwieweit es der US-Marine angesichts schwindender Bud-
gets gelingt, die Balance zwischen den weicheren Missionen einerseits und der Fähigkeit zur 
Kriegsführung und strategischen Abschreckung andererseits zu halten. Im Lichte des Libyen-
Kriegs 2011, dem Konflikt um syrische Giftgaseinsätze seit 2013 und der Krim-/Ukraine-
Krise seit Anfang 2014 scheint der Bedarf an dieser modernen Ausprägung zeitgemäßer See-
macht wieder zu steigen.   
 
11. Zusammenfassung und Fazit  
 
Die Bewertung der Rolle von Seemacht im amerikanischen Kontext ist eine methodische und 
analytische Herausforderung. Die US-Navy ist schließlich nur ein Instrument unter vielen, das 
zum Zwecke der nationalen Sicherheit eingesetzt werden kann und letztlich auch nur ein – 
wenn auch dominanter – Aspekt von Seemacht. Diese stützt sich gleich auf mehrere Dimensi-
onen: zum einen sind die geographischen und institutionellen Bedingungen im Land selbst 
von Bedeutung, zum anderen gilt das Forschungsinteresse der Ausprägung und Projektion 
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maritime Macht durch die USA weltweit. Die deklaratorischen Marinestrategien bieten sich 
hier als Scharnier an, um darzustellen, welchen intellektuellen, fiskalischen, geostrategischen, 
technologischen, programmatischen, personellen und innenpolitischen Wellenbewegungen 
Einsatz und Effizienz von Seemacht unterworfen ist. Eine Kausalrelation zwischen den Stra-
tegien und der Umsetzung in der Praxis ist jedoch schwierig nachzuweisen: Entscheidungs-
prozesse und institutionelles Lernen funktionieren nur selten nach den theoretisch vorge-
schriebenen Mustern, sondern unterliegen vielfältigen inneren Dynamiken und zahlreichen 
äußeren Einflüssen (wie z.B. macht- und weltpolitischer Natur).  
 
In den achtziger Jahren konnte die Marine nach einigen Jahren strategischer Depression Sinn-
stiftendes zur ihrer Rolle im globalen Konflikt mit der Sowjetunion im Frieden, Krise und 
Krieg darbieten. In den neunziger Jahren wandte sich der Blick in Folge des gewandelten stra-
tegischen Umfelds, einiger Skandale und einer unsicheren politischen und militärischen Füh-
rung zunehmend nach innen. In der ersten Dekade des 21. Jahrhunderts schließlich musste die 
Marine ihr Narrativ neu entwickeln, um der politisch-militärischen Führung, den anderen 
Teilstreitkräften und der Öffentlichkeit glaubhaft darzustellen, dass es eine Rolle für See-
macht jenseits asymmetrischer Kriege gegen al-Qaida gebe.  
Die verschiedenen marinestrategischen Dokumente zwischen 1981 und 2011 lassen sich zwar 
mit dem roten Faden der US-Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik verweben, eine letztgültige Ein-
schätzung zum Erfolg oder Misserfolg einer Marinestrategie ist hingegen nur schwer möglich. 
Auch wenn der Einsatz von Seestreitkräften stetem Wandel unterliegt, lassen sich mit mariti-
men Missionen einige wiederkehrende Themen und Lektionen feststellen, die auch mögliche 
Zukunftsszenarien für Einsatz und Ausprägung amerikanischer Seemacht erlauben.  
 
12. Postskriptum: US-Seemacht und Marinestrategie seit 2011  
 
Derzeit entwickelt man in den USA eine ergänzte Version der kooperativen Strategie von 
2007. Sie soll – 2015 – die Aufgaben moderner Marinen (Landesverteidigung und Allianzen) 
stärker betonen und potenzielle Gegner expliziter beim Namen nennen. Mit den bereits er-
wähnten maritimen Aufgaben seit 2011 wird deutlich, dass die Ausübung von amerikanischer 
Seemacht eine zentrale Komponente amerikanischer Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik bleiben 
wird.  
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15. Anhang 
 
 Regionalkommandos  
 Übersicht amerikanischer Marinestrategiedokumente  
 Entwicklung des Flottenbestands 1981-2011 
 
Anmerkung: Eine ergänzte Fassung dieser Kurzstudie wurde im März 2015 in der Reihe 
Kieler Analysen zur Sicherheitspolitik des Instituts fürs Sicherheitspolitik an der Universität 
Kiel publiziert.   
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US-Marinestrategiedokumente 1970-2011 und deren Klassifizierung (Stand Dezember 2011)28 
Name Monat/Jahr Einstufung 
Project SIXTY & Missions of the U.S. Navy Sept 1970, Mar-Apr 1970 DECLAS (Project SIXTY), UNCLAS (Missions of the U.S. Navy) 
Strategic Concepts of the U.S. Navy, NWP 1 (5) Dec 1975-May 1978 UNCLAS 
Sea Plan 2000 Mar 1978 UNCLAS Executive Summary; study still SECRET 
CNO Strategic Concepts & Future of U.S. Sea Power Jan, May 1979 UNCLAS; Strategic Concepts still TOP SECRET 
The Maritime Strategy (8) Nov 1982-May 1990 Some UNCLAS; SECRET versions DECLAS 
The Way Ahead Apr 1991 UNCLAS 
The Navy Policy Book May 1992 UNCLAS 
… From the Sea Nov 1992 UNCLAS 
NDP 1: Naval Warfare Mar 1994 UNCLAS 
Forward… From the Sea Oct 1994 UNCLAS 
Navy Operational Concept (NOC) May 1997 UNCLAS 
Anytime, Anywhere Nov 1997 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Planning Guidance (NSPG) (2) Aug 1999, Apr 2000 NSPG I still SECRET; NSPG II UNCLAS 
Sea Power 21 & Global CONOPS  Jun 2002 UNCLAS 
Naval Power 21… A Naval Vision Oct 2002 UNCLAS 
Naval Operating Concept for Joint Operations (NOCJO) Apr 2003 UNCLAS 
Fleet Response Plan (FRP) May 2003 Largely UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 08 Apr 2006 Two versions: UNCLAS; still SECRET 
Naval Operations Concept (NOC) Sep 2006 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10 Sep 2007 Still SECRET 
A Cooperative Strategy for 21
st
 Century Seapower  Oct 2007 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 10, Change 1 Nov 2007 Still SECRET 
Navy Strategic Guidance ISP PR 11 May 2009 Still SECRET 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 12 Oct 2009 Still SECRET 
Naval Operations Concept (NOC) 2010 May 2010 UNCLAS 
Naval Doctrine Publication (NDP) 1: Naval Warfare Aug 2010 UNCLAS 
Navy Strategic Plan (NSP) ISO POM 13 Oct 2010 Still SECRET 
                                                          
28
 Peter M. Swartz, U.S. Navy Capstone Strategies and Concepts: Introduction, Background and Analyses. Center for Naval Analyses. Alexandria, 2011, S. 31, 33. Legende: 
UNCLAS = Nicht eingestuft frei verfügbar, SECRET = Verschlusssache, DECLAS = ehem. Verschlusssache, nunmehr freigegeben). 
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Illustration 1: US-Flottengröße im Wandel der Zeit 
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